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Missile Capabilities

Capabilities Overview

Syria today possesses one of the most sizeable arsenals of ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets in the Middle East. Syria's missile and long-range rocket systems are capable of delivering conventional and weapon of mass destruction warheads to many of its regional neighbors, including Israel with whom Syria has long maintained acrimonious relations.

Syria began acquiring its long-range artillery rocket and missile arsenal in the early 1970s through import from the former Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, however, Syria was no longer able to procure the advanced missiles it sought from the Soviet Union, so it began to look elsewhere. In 1988, Syria began negotiations with China to acquire a newly developed ballistic missile, but US intervention seemed to derail the deal. Immediately thereafter, the Syrians contracted with North Korea for the purchase of their sophisticated Scud missiles and for North Korean assistance in establishing missile production facilities in Syria.

North Korea's provision of technology, training and raw materiel—together with assistance provided by China and/or Chinese firms, Iran and possibly Russia—has indeed enabled Syria to build a modest indigenous missile development and production infrastructure. In turn, Syria now manufactures liquid-propellant Scud missiles and is developing longer-range missile programs. Estimates indicate that Syria currently possesses at least several hundred ballistic missiles, and it continues solid- and liquid-fuel missile development and production programs with the aid of foreign governments.

The impetuses driving Syria's past missile procurement efforts and more recent missile development programs derive mainly from regional threat perceptions, especially Syria's longstanding state of de facto war against Israel. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons and sophisticated chemical and biological weapon programs. Israel also maintains a conventional weapon capability that clearly eclipses that of Syria—a fact demonstrated repeatedly during the numerous armed conflicts which have erupted between the two nations since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In addition, Saddam Hussein's years as leader of neighboring Iraq also provided an important loci of regional instability for Syria, as the Hussein regime's ardent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems were long coupled with aggressive tendencies toward neighboring countries. Moreover, US pronouncements against the current Syrian government increased after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This—in combination with the formidable US presence that is currently stationed next door in Iraq—enhances Syria's intra-regional threat calculation and consequently motivates its missile proliferation activities.

Available information suggests that Syria currently possesses an unknown number of FROG-7 long-range artillery rockets, and a ballistic missile inventory which includes at least several hundred Scud missiles and Soviet-made SS-21s. An Israeli estimate charged that the total number of Syrian missiles is close to 1,000.[1] Syria maintains at least four brigades of mobile surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs)—one with Scud-Bs, two with Scud-Cs, and one with SS-21s—as well as one brigade of Soviet-made FROG-7 long-range artillery rockets.[2] Syria acquired and may currently maintain up to 200 short-range SS-21 missiles as well as approximately 18 to 24 SS-21 mobile launchers. Syria may also possess up to 200 Soviet-made Scud-B missiles,[3] and up to or exceeding 150 Scud-Cs which were either received from North Korea or some of which may have been produced in Syria. It is estimated that Syria has at least 48 total mobile launchers for its Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, as well as underground storage facilities for up to 1,000 Scud-C missiles. Additionally, unsubstantiated reports suggest that Syria received up to 50 Scud-D missiles from North Korea in May 2000, as well as seven mobile Scud-D launchers.[4] Syria likely conducted a Scud-D flight test on 23 September 2000.[5]

Syria is now able to produce ballistic missiles indigenously, mainly using domestically manufactured parts. It is likely that Syria's fairly small production capability currently includes Scud-C and possibly Scud-D missiles.[6]


From a proliferation standpoint, Syria currently presents a number of challenges. Primary among these are:

  • Syria's large arsenal of ballistic missiles exists together with ongoing hostility towards its well-equipped neighbor Israel. The potential for heated conflict, including potentially devastating missile exchanges, remains a noteworthy concern. Syria's mobile missile arsenal is also capable of reaching targets in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and currently US-occupied Iraq.
  • Syria's indigenous capability to produce liquid-fueled missiles, using both locally manufactured and imported parts, continues to progress.
  • The willingness of nations (e.g. North Korea, China, Iran, Russia) to provide Syria with materials and expertise to advance its missile production capabilities, including its solid-propellant rocket motor development programs.
  • The likelihood that regional concerns may drive Syria to pursue a longer-range missile capability in the not-distant future.
  • The probability that Syria possesses the capability to deploy chemical weapon warheads with its current missile and long-range rocket delivery systems. Syria is also suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program.

[1] Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Development," The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.
[2] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003, pp. 51-54.
[3] Ibid.
[4] "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea Profile: Missile Exports," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/>.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," pp. 51-54.
[7] Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Development," March-April 1997.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), pp. 58-73.
[10] Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," pp. 51-54.
[11] Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Development," March-April 1997.
[12] Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," pp. 51-54.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] "North Korea: Missile: Missile Capabilities," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <www.nti.org/>.
[16] Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," pp. 51-54.
[17] "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea Profile: Missile Exports," Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
[18] "North Korea: Missile: Missile Capabilities," Nuclear Threat Initiative.
[19] "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea Profile: Missile Exports," Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
[20] Missile Systems of the World (AMI International: Lexington, Massachusetts, 1999).
[21] Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Milestones," The Risk Report, Vol. 6, no. 5, September-October 2000, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>.
[22] "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea Profile: Missile Exports," Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
[23] Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, pp. 58-73.


Syrian Missile Capabilities--Summary Table
Name  Propulsion
/Type 
Payload (kg)  Range (km)  CEP  Status
/Service 
Inventory Estimate (missiles
/launchers) 
FROG-7  solid fuel
/long-range artillery rockets 
450 [7]  70 [8]  500-700m  deployed  unknown
/up to 24 [9] 
M-9 (DF-15)  solid fuel /single stage  500  600  300m  possibly in production  0/up to 24 [10] 
Scud-B (SS-IC, R-17 Elbrus)  liquid fuel /single stage  550 [11] - 985 [12]  300 [13]  600m  production, deployed  up to 200 [14]/ up to 28 total for Scud-B and -C 
Scud-C (Hwasong-6)  liquid fuel/ single stage  770 [15]  500 - 600 [16] (Syria's upgraded Scud-C reportedly can travel 600km)  unknown  production, deployed  up to 150 or more /up to 48 total for Scud-B and -C 
Scud-D (No-dong I)  liquid fuel/ single stage  500 [17]  700 [18]  unknown  possibly deployed and in production  possibly 50 or more/ up to 7 [19] 
SS-21  solid fuel /single stage  480 [20]  70 [21]  160m  deployed  36-200 [22]/18-24  

 

Updated October 2004



Capabilities Overview
Long-range Artillery Rockets (FROG-7s)
Scud-B (SS-1C, R-17 Elbrus)
Scud-C (Hwasŏng-6)
Scud-D (No-dong 1)
SS-21 (Scarab)


Maps
WMD in the Middle East
China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Syria
Treaties and Organizations
GlobalSecurity: Nuclear Weapons Programs
Syria's Secret Nuclear Program and Long Term Threat
Syria and WMD: incentives and capabilities. (2004)
The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors (2005)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
Syria’s Chemical Weapons (1997)
Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations (1997)



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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