Syria's attempts to expand and improve its ballistic missile capabilities were stalled by the late 1980s. The Soviets were unwilling to fulfill Syrian requests for its more sophisticated SS-23 missile due to the limitations imposed by the recently inked IMF Treaty. Another planned deal in which Syria was to purchase M-9 missiles from China seemed to fall through late in 1989 due to intense US pressure on the Chinese. As a result, Syria turned to North Korea.
The first hint of a deal in the works between Syria and North Korea occurred when North Korean President Yi Chong-Ok traveled to Damascus on 20 March 1990. His visit resulted in the signing of what was billed as a technical and scientific cooperative agreement between the two nations. By the end of 1990, however, Syria had entered the final stages of secret negotiations with North Korea for the purchase of Scud-C missiles, using the $2 billion it received from Saudi Arabia for its participation in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War coalition as financing for much of the order. It was also reported that Libya helped to finance the transaction.
The Scud-C is a modified version of the Soviet-made Scud-B. It is a medium-range, liquid-fueled missile capable of carrying conventional and chemical warheads. The Scud-C is able to travel up to 500km, or possibly 600km depending on its modifications.
The initial Syrian-North Korean agreement was for the purchase of 150 Scud-Cs at a price of approximately $500 million, with long-term deliveries set to continue through at least 1995.[1] Syria's deal with North Korea also included the latter's agreement to build two missile assembly and electronics facilities in Syria, one near Aleppo and one outside of Hama.[2] The Aleppo plant was originally designated to assemble and produce missiles, while the other was geared to produce guidance equipment and rocket fuel.
Once the deal was finalized, shipments began to arrive in Syria. There is conflicting information, however, about the number of North Korean Scud-C shipments as well as the composition of the missiles (i.e. ready-to-be assembled or in a fully assembled state) that ultimately arrived in Syria. It seems the first shipment left North Korea in January 1991 aboard the ship Al-Yarmouk, and included at least 24 Scud-Cs—probably in kit form[3]—and 20 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).[4] The ship charted a circuitous path to Syria in order to avoid detection by the large US military presence stationed in the Persian Gulf region due to the war against Iraq. This Scud-C shipment ultimately arrived in the Syrian port of Latakia on 13 March 1991.
Syria reportedly received another 60 Scud-Cs and 12 TELs from North Korea via an Iranian transshipping location in April 1991.[5] A subsequent delivery of 36 Scuds likely arrived in Syria in May after having been transshipped through Yugoslavia.[6] In late July of 1991, Syria conducted a flight test of two Scud-C missiles.[7] Meanwhile, US intelligence agencies continued to monitor other suspicious transports in 1991, including a shipment aboard a naval vessel named Mupo and a possible freight load traveling by rail.[8] In the fall of 1991, Iran reportedly received an unknown quantity of Scud-C missiles and mobile launchers that had been destined for Syria but were diverted to Iran after concerns arose that the Israeli navy planned to interfere with the direct delivery near Syria. These items may have been airlifted from Iran to Syria later in 1992.[9]
Other reports indicate ongoing shipments of dozens of Scud-Cs from North Korea to Syria during 1992, some of which were again transshipped through Iran.[10] In particular, 24 Scud-Cs were sent aboard the North Korean freighter Tae Hung Ho, although the shipment may have been split up with part of the cargo arriving in Syria by airlift from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas in March and the remaining items turning up directly to the Syrian naval port of Tartus. Besides Scud-Cs, missile production and assembly equipment destined for missile factories in Hama and Aleppo was reportedly included with these shipments.[11] Another load of 100 Scud-Cs departed for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas aboard a North Korean vessel in October, and half of that shipment was reportedly transported overland from Iran to Syria.[12]
Syria also conducted two tests of the missiles during July and August 1992. North Korean military personnel were reportedly present. Israel claimed that these were the last tests before the missile becomes operational.[13] Meanwhile, according to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, North Korea offered to stop delivering Scuds to Syria if Israel agreed to pay $500 million.[14]
The following year in August 1993, two Russian Condor aircraft flew an unknown number of North Korean Scud-Cs to Syria as well as seven MAZ-543 chassis—which are often used as mobile missile launchers—from Sunan International Airport in North Korea to Damascus. Further, missile manufacturing in those facilities being built by the North Koreans may have begun as early as April 1993 or 1994, with a capacity to produce 30 to 50 missiles per year. Many reports, however, suggest that production—especially Scud-C production—did not begin until years later.[15] In 1994, Syria received an unknown number of Scud-Cs and TELs from North Korea as well as an unknown number of Scud-C cluster warheads. Syria also conducted a flight test of the Scud-C in the middle of 1994, another in November,[16] as well as others during the summer of 1996.[17]
Reports indicate a number of Syrian missile technicians traveled to North Korea in 1996 for two weeks worth of training.[18] A 1996 US intelligence report also alleged that Syria and Iran were cooperating on solid-fuel technology for missiles along with a program to convert Syrian Scud-Bs into longer range Scud-Cs. Besides Iran and North Korea's involvement in aiding the development of Syria's indigenous missile production capability, technical assistance from China and perhaps Russia has also been provided.
Syria has received shipments of equipment and supplies for its production work from Asian suppliers, including from firms in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan.[19] China also reportedly shipped 30 tons of ammonium perchlorate—a fuel component—to Syria in 1992. Ten tons of powdered aluminum made its way from China to the Centre des Etudes de Recherche Scientifique, the institute in charge of Syria's missile program, in 1999.[20]
In 2002, Israeli and US officials declared that Syria was able to mass-produce its longer-range version of the Scud-C missile.[21] Current assessments suggest that Syria maintains two brigades, comprised of 18 Scud-C launchers apiece, in a valley possibly near Hama. Syria is also believed to possess underground bunkers that offer a capacity to store up to 1,000 Scud-C missiles. Syria may maintain an on-site ratio of approximately two Scud-C missiles per launcher,[22] and a stockpile of up to 150 Scud-Cs or more depending on the country's current production capabilities.
In April 2004, allegations emerged that Syria was flying shipments of Scud-C and Scud-D missiles, along with weapons of mass destruction components, to Khartoum in Sudan aboard civilian airliners. These alleged transfers were ostensibly "authorized and directed by the [Syrian] Defense Ministry," although intelligence sources believed "that the Sudanese regime of President Omar Bashir was not informed of the Syrian missile and WMD shipments."[23] President Bashir reportedly ordered the removal of the missiles and other items from Sudanese territory in April 2004 due to concern that his country would be perceived as in collusion with Syria.
[1] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export," <http://www.cnsinfo.miis.edu/>; Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 72; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 18; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chžnjaeng (Seoul: Sžmundang, May 1999), p. 277; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, vol. 33, no. 10, 1 October 2000; Adel Darwish, "N. Korea 'Selling Scuds'," Independent, 6 April 1991.
[2] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export"; Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 72.
[3]Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 72.
[4] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export"; Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast via Cyprus," Washington Times, 2 July 1991; Bill Gertz, "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles, Washington Times, 4 June 1991; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991; Adel Darwish, "N. Korea 'Selling Scuds'"; "Syria 'Signed for N. Korean Scuds'," Flight International, 13 March 1991.
[5] "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," p. 18; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chžnjaeng, p. 277; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review; Adel Darwish, "N. Korea 'Selling Scuds'."
[6] "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative.
[7] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," p. 18.
[8] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export"; Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast Via Cyprus," 2 July 1991.
[9] Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 72; Alon Pinkas, "Defense Minister: Israel not monitoring N. Korean ship," The Jerusalem Post, 15 October 1991; Adel Darwish, "Missiles head for Iran," The Independent (London), 9 November 1991, p. 15.
[10] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export"; "North Korea Missile Exports Table," Nuclear Threat Initiative; Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Development," The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html/>; Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 73; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. tracks a Korean ship taking missiles to Syria," New York Times, 21 February 1992, p. A9; George Lardner Jr., "Probe Ordered in Failure to Track N. Korean Ship," Washington Post, 14 March 1992, p. A17; Douglas Waller, et al., "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22 June 1992, pp. 42-46; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3; Neal Sandler, "Israeli Concern over Syrian 'Scud' Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 1; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to BAe Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31.
[11] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export.".
[12] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export."
[13] Bill Gertz, "Israelis Say Syrians Test-Fired New Scud," Washington Times, 14 August 1992, p. A25; Neal Sandler, "Israeli Concern over Syrian 'Scud' Tests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 August 1992, p. 11; "Increase in Egypt's 'Scuds' Leads to Bar Pull-Out," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 September 1992, p. 31; Allison Kaplan and David Makovsky, "Rabin Blasts Proposed US Arms Sales to Saudis: PM Rejected US Deal," Jerusalem Post, 13 August 1992; "Syria, Ch'oech'žmdan Missile Saengsandan'gye/Israel Chžn'yžk Sajžng'gwžn'e," Chosun Ilbo, 14 August 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhanje Scud Missile/Syria, Shilhžmbalsa Sžnggong," Donga Ilbo, 14 August 1992, p. 5, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr/; Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Development," March-April 1997.
[14] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export."
[15] Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999, in "Mideast Missile Race Detailed," FBIS Document ID FTS19990903000290; Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along With Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A10; "Pukhan, Syria Dŭng Chungdonggukka'e Missile Such'ul WSJ Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 20 July 1993, http://www.joins.com/; Kim Yong Il, "Puk Nodong 1 Ho Missile Yangsan Chaknyžnputo 30-50 Ki Saengsan," Joongang Ilbo, 17 May 1995, <http://www.joins.com>.
[16] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export"; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," p. 19.
[17] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," p. 19.
[18] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export."
[19] Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, p. 73.
[20] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea: Missile: Import/Export."
[21] Steve Rodan, "Syria preparing to build extended-ranged Scud," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 June 2002, p. 40.
[22] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003, p. 51.
[23] Jim Hauser, "Syria Shipping WMD Components to Sudan," Talon News, 13 April 2004.
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