Reports that the Soviet Union was shipping its SS-21 missiles to Syria first surfaced from American intelligence sources on 7 October 1983. The Soviets agreed to deliver the SS-21 missile after Syria's unimpressive military performance during combat against Israel in Lebanon in June 1982. The SS-21 is a single-stage, solid-fuel guided missile capable of transporting a nuclear, chemical or conventional warhead. The SS-21 was designed to replace the older, inaccurate FROG-7 unguided artillery rocket. It offers a range of up to 70km and a CEP of 160m. The missile itself is carried on a six-wheeled mobile transporter that doubles as a launcher.
Syria became the first country outside the Warsaw Pact to receive and deploy the SS-21. On 13 October 1983, reports from Damascus pointed toward what was likely the first test of Syria's newly acquired SS-21 missiles. Although the reports did not specifically identify the missile tested, a Syrian press agency dispatch described the event as a "total success."[1] By the end of October, five missile tests widely construed as SS-21 tests are believed to have taken place.
In a speech delivered on 8 August 1986, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres asserted that Syria is "spending large sums to acquire surface-to-surface missiles and to develop chemical warheads."[2] Estimates differ, however, about the size of Syria's SS-21 arsenal Recent calculations cite 18 SS-21 launchers and at least 36 SS-21 missiles deployed in Syria, while other reports suggest a far larger sum of nearly 200 SS-21 missiles.[3] Some reports have also emerged which indicate that Syria may have transferred some of its SS-21 missiles to Iran.
At any rate, Syria's relationship as a missile importer from the Soviet Union turned less fruitful by 1987 and 1988, as repeated requests by Syria for access to more advanced systems, namely the SS-23 solid-fueled missile, were denied. The SS-23 "Spider" missile was designed as a replacement for the Soviet Scud-B stockpile, but the Soviets were prohibited from transferring their SS-23 model to other countries or maintaining it in their own arsenal as a result of proscriptions in the INF Treaty, which was signed in December 1988. In all, the Soviet refusal to provide more sophisticated missile systems led to unproductive Syrian efforts to increase the range of its existing Scud-B arsenal, as well as controversial negotiations with China for the purchase of the newly developed M-9 missile.
Later, in 1996, it was also alleged that North Korea and Syria were involved in a program to reverse-engineer the SS-21 missile.[4] Syrian missile technicians who had traveled to North Korea to receive missile training reportedly provided information on the SS-21 to the North Koreans.[5]
[1] G.G. Labelle, "International News," Associated Press, 13 October 1983; "Syrian Military Exercise with SSMs," Damascus Home Service as translated by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 15 October 1983.
[2] L. Swayn, "Warning of Syrian Poison Gas Missiles," Telegraph, 8 August 1986.
[3] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003, pp. 51-54; "Eye on Proliferation: WMD Country Profiles: North Korea Profile: Missile Exports," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <http://www.cns.miis.edu>; Marie Colvan and John Witherow, "Syrian nerve gas warheads alarm Israel," London Times, 10 January 1988.
[4] "SS-21," Missile Systems of the World (AMI International: Lexington, Massachusetts, 1999), p. 530.
[5] Joseph Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper no. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 19, 26, 32.
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Updated August 2004 |
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