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Updated November 2008
Missile Facilities
Location: 350km north of Damascus; province of Halab.
Subordinate to: The Syrian Missile Command is based here.
Primary Function: Missile Command HQ; missile storage and production site
Description: 1992 press reports indicated that two missile factories were being constructed in Syria. Aleppo was one, the other was at Hama. Chinese specialists were reported to have repeatedly visited Syria in 1993, specifically to work on guidance systems, and were observed shuttling between Hama and the larger Aleppo facility.
The Syrian Missile Command based in Aleppo controls three mobile surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades comprising one battalion each (per brigade) of FROG-7 SSM, SS-21 Scarab SRBM and Scud-B missiles, with ranges between 70 and 300km. The missile command oversees operations of underground missile facilities, at least 15 of which are being readied for approximately 1000 Scud-C missiles, with a 500km range and Scud-D missiles, with a 700km range, are housed in tunnel complexes.
Many of the Scud-C missiles are known to be located currently at Hama; the Scud-D missiles are presumably in Aleppo and are being manufactured with assistance from the DPRK, China and Iran. The Chinese M-9 missile is also thought to be produced in Aleppo. Syria took delivery in May 2000 of a new, more accurate, missile from North Korea based on the Scud-D; the first indication of its existence however, did not occur until September of that year when it was picked up by radar during a test firing.
All of Syria's Scuds are allegedly designed to carry a full panoply of warheads, to include conventional, and potentially chemical or biological. Aleppo is viewed as one of several possible dual-use sites in Syria, as it includes a pharmaceuticals plant which enjoyed heavy investment from the Syrian government, to the tune of $40 million. However, although construction began in 1989, there has been no further indication of its completion.
Sources: [1] Dany Shoham., "Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent," The Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2002, www.meforum.org [2] John Pike, "Aleppo," Globalsecurity.org www.gloabalsecurity.org. Accessed on 24 March 2003 [3] "Syrian Ballistic Missile Arsenal," IraqWar.ru, www1.iraqwar.ru [4] William Safire, "China's 'Hama Rules'," The New York Times, March 5, 1992, p.27 [5] "Syria: Missile Development," The Risk Report, March-April 1997, www.wisconsinproject.org
Al Safir
Other names: As Safirah, Al-Safir, Safir, Safira, Sfira, Sfire
Location: 301km north of Damascus and approximately 30km southeast of Aleppo; province of Halab
Subordinate to: The Syrian Missile Command
Primary Function: Scud base and munitions storage facility; also possibly a chemical weapons production and storage site
Description: It is reported that Al Safir was first established as a chemical weapons site as early as 1980, according to Russian imagery. Subsequent work on an underground tunnel system and Scud support base became known around 1995 and was apparently completed as of July 2002.
The underground and storage areas are protected by a Russian-built SAM-2 battery. Precision-guided munitions guard the tunnel entrances.
Source: John Pike, "Al Safir," GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org, accessed 5 April, 2004.
Location: 110km north of Damascus; province of Hama.
Subordinate to: The Syrian Missile Command
Primary Function: There are reportedly two missile factories located at this complex, one is designed to produce solid fuel missiles; the other is designed to produce liquid fuel missiles.
Description: 1992 press reports indicated that two missile factories were being constructed in Syria, Hama being one, the other being Aleppo. It was later suggested that North Korea, Iran and China all assisted in Hama's construction. The Hama facility is reportedly located approximately 25km east of the town of Hama, on the road to as-Salamiyah.
In addition to solid and liquid-fuel missiles, it is also reported to produce missile guidance systems, possibly an effort to improve the accuracy of the Scud-C.
Chinese specialists were reported to have repeatedly visited Syria in 1993, specifically to work on guidance systems, and were observed shuttling between Hama and the larger Aleppo facility.
Two 18-launcher Scud-C brigades, for a total of 36 are thought to be deployed at the Hama site. This number is generally deemed high for a single site; most Scud sites around the world average just 10 per launcher. The strategic thinking behind the heavy missile to launcher ratio is thought be that firing the missiles in several salvos would inflict maximum damage on the target. One source suggests that the Hama facility houses a full half of Syria's missiles.
Sources:
[1] "Hama," www.globalsecurity.org, accessed 24 March 2004
[2] William Safire, "China's 'Hama Rules'," The New York Times, 5 March 1992, p. 27
[3] Vadim Kozyulin, "Syria's Missile Deterrent: Final Breakthrough," PIR Arms Control Letters, October 26, 2000, www.pircenter.org
[4] "Syria: Missile Development," The Risk Report, March-April 1997, www.wisconsinproject.org
Homs
Other names: Hims
Location: 160km north of Damascus; province of Hims.
Subordinate to: The Syrian Missile Command
Primary Function: It is reported that this facility produces Scud C and D missiles, in addition to nonconventional weapons; missile testing.
Description: Analysts have described this site as a "huge complex that covers many miles." A huge blast on March 24 of 2002 left one building destroyed and several others damaged. Intelligence assessments suggest that the missile and WMD production line were spared however, and destruction was confined to a conventional weapons factory.
A missile test site is located 15km south of Homs.
Sources:
[1] "Missile Factory Blows Up in Syria," World Tribune.com, April 3, 2002 accessed on 24 March 2004
[2] "Syria's WMD Production Line Spared by Blast," Middle East Newsline, May 6, 2002, www.menewsline.com accessed on 19 April, 2004
[3] "Homs," Global Security.org, May 23, 2003 www.globalsecrrity.org accessed on 26 April 2004.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
