Since the mid-1970s, the majority of Syria's nuclear facilities have been constructed under the auspices of IAEA technical cooperation projects, relying heavily on additional foreign assistance. Syria's few facilities, the most notable being the Chinese-built miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR), or SRR-1, and the Ion Beam cyclotron facility, are research-related and located primarily at the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS) headquarters in Damascus and the Der Al-Hadjar Research Center, southeast of Damascus. Ironically, if the destroyed facility near Al-Kibar was indeed a nuclear reactor, it would have been Syria's most advanced nuclear facility. However, the IAEA investigation regarding the site's intended purpose is ongoing, rendering any definitive conclusions premature.

Relevant Individuals and Institutions

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, (and prior to 2000, his father, President Hafez al-Assad), is the highest governing authority and is therefore ultimately responsible for all key decisions regarding Syria's nuclear program. Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri's office helps to guide and regulate Syria's top nuclear agency, the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS). [1] The AECS, currently led by Director General Ibrahim Othman, is composed of Syria's top nuclear experts and manages Syrian nuclear research. It is "responsible for the peaceful utilization of atomic and nuclear technologies." [2] An administrative council manages the AECS's departments, including those involved in nuclear energy, safety, and regulation. The AECS also serves as the Syrian government's representative for IAEA technical, regional, and interregional cooperative projects. [3]

Two additional ministries play a significant role in shaping Syria's nuclear policies and work extensively with the AECS. The first is the Ministry of Electricity, which has consistently been involved in IAEA-Syria technical cooperation projects, including the 1979 feasibility study for Syrian nuclear power options. [4] Ahmad Qusay Kayali is the current minister of electricity. Additionally, the Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for all Syrian universities, higher institutes and professional and technical training institutions, including Damascus University. [5] The current minister is Dr. Ghitath Barakat.

The most controversial entity often linked to Syria's nuclear program is the Syrian Scientific Research Center (SSRC). The SSRC's stated goals are to conduct research and development for the economic and social advancement of Syria. [6] Outside analysts suspect it serves as a front for Syrian military research, however, most likely including chemical weapons and missile research, and possibly including biological and/or nuclear weapons research. [7] However, there is insufficient evidence available in the open source literature to confirm this speculation about the SSRC.

Funding for the Nuclear Program

Information on the total cost of Syria's nuclear program is unavailable in the open source literature. However, Syria received approximately $14.5 million in IAEA Technical Cooperation Assistance from 1997-2007. [8]

Past, Present and Planned Nuclear Facilities

In 1976, President Hafez al-Assad established the AECS, which undertook limited technical projects with the IAEA in the 1970s, most notably including nuclear energy feasibility studies. [9] Only in the early 1980's did the AECS's work begin to progress. In 1982, Syria constructed a nuclear analytical laboratory with the assistance of the IAEA. This was soon followed by discussions with the IAEA regarding Syria's ambition to construct six 600MWe power reactors by the 1990s, but the project never progressed into reactor construction. [10]

During the mid-1980s, Syria began researching processes to recover uranium from phosphate rock in the hopes of ensuring itself an indigenous uranium supply. Syria possesses abundant sources of phosphate rock and conducts mining at several locations, including Charkia and Knifes. [11] The IAEA also provided the AECS with a uranium recovery micro-pilot plant at Homs, located northeast of Damascus, which was completed in 1992 and remains operational today. According to the IAEA, a "pilot plant, an industrial scale plant and then possibly operations such as refining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication," would potentially follow the micro-pilot plant, which was the logical first step in Syria's civil nuclear program. [12] Syria also signed a contract with the IAEA and an unnamed supplier in 1996 to improve its technical process for recovering uranium from triple super phosphate and completed the project in late 2001 [13] However, Syria is not currently capable of conversion, enrichment or fuel fabrication, and it would not be financially feasible for Damascus to industrialize its limited uranium extraction efforts. [14] In 1991, under IAEA technical project SYR/4/004, China began constructing the Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Center near Damascus, the centerpiece of which is the SRR-1 miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR). [15] The SRR-1 is Syria's sole (declared) research reactor, went critical in 1996, and is under IAEA safeguards. [16]

In 1997, the Belgian company, Ion Beam Applications, built Syria's cyclotron facility. The facility is intended to produce short-lived radiopharmaceuticals and to help modernize Syria's national health care system. It is located at the AECS Dubaya Center in Damascus, also home to Syria's Nuclear Medicine Center. [17]

The IAEA also approved a technical project in 1999 to assist Syria in establishing radioactive waste management technology and infrastructure at Der Al-Hadjar. [18] Syria's Department of Radiation and Nuclear Safety and the Radiation Protection Division also contributed to this project, which concluded in 2007. Syria's AECS has since taken the lead role in waste management and "all relevant technological and control operations that are required in the framework of Syria's nuclear programme." [19]

On 6 September 2007, Israel destroyed a facility near Dawr az Zwar. Commonly known as the "Al-Kibar" facility, it is alleged by U.S. and Israeli intelligence to have been a partially completed 25MWth gas-cooled graphite-moderated nuclear reactor, which would have been capable of producing enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year. [20] The IAEA visited the site on 23 June 2008, but has not been permitted to return since. [21] As of its 5 June 2009 report, findings regarding the site's purpose remained inconclusive. [22]

Despite the Al-Kibar controversy, the IAEA has continued to engage Syria on technical cooperation, regional, and interregional projects. [23] More than a dozen technical projects remain ongoing, including a feasibility study and site selection for what would be Syria's first nuclear power plant. [24] Approved in early 2009, the project's stated objective is "to perform technical specification and economic evaluation to obtain the most technically beneficial and economically advantageous nuclear power plant." [25] However, even if proven feasible, the project would be unlikely to move forward into construction for many years.

Sources:
[1] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 56.
[2] For more information see, the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria's website, www.aec.org.sy/ index_a.php.
[3] See Ibrahim Othman's presentation at the IAEA Workshop on "Steps for Conducting Nuclear Power Plant Technology Assessments," in Vienna, Austria, 17-20 November 2008, www.iaea.org.
[4] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[5] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 51.
[6] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 28.
[7] Ellen Laipson, "Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained Without Nukes?", in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: 2004), pp. 83-110; Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2002, www.meforum.org; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Three Entities Targeted by Treasury for Supporting Syria's WMD Proliferation," 4 January 2007, www.treas.gov.
[8] "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program," United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 2 March 2009, www.gao.gov.
[9] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82; and "SYR/0/003: Nuclear Energy Planning," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1979, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[10] "SYR/1/002: Nuclear Analytical Laboratory," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1982, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, (Carlisle, PA: 2005), pp. 51-88.
[11] "SYR/3/003: Uranium Recovery from Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1986, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[12] "SYR/3/003: Uranium Recovery from Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1986, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[13] "SYR/3/005: Purification of Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1996, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, (Carlisle, PA: 2005), pp. 51-88.
[14] "SYR/3/003: Uranium Recovery from Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1986, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, (Carlisle, PA: 2005), pp. 51-88.
[15] "SYR/4/004: Miniature Neutron Source Reactor," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1991, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[16] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Syrian Arab Republic: Research Reactor Details-SRR-1," www.iaea.org; Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[17] "SYR/4/007: Cyclotron Facility for Medical Radioisotopes," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1997, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp; Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 55.
[18] "SYR/4/008: Radioactive Waste Management Facility," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1999, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[19] "SYR/4/008: Radioactive Waste Management Facility," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1999, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[20] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "ISIS Report: The Al Kibar Reactor: Extraordinary Camouflage, Troubling Implications," Institute for Science and International Security, 12 May 2008, www.isis-online.org; "North Korea and Syria: Oh what a tangled web they weave," The Economist, 1 May 2008.
[21] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 November 2008, www.iaea.org; It is important to note that subsequent to the airstrike Syria leveled and then built over the Al-Kibar site, greatly impeding inspectors' ability to determine the site's previously intended function.
[22] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "IAEA Report of Syria: Undeclared Uranium Particles Found in Hot Cell Facility in Damascus; Syria Not Answering IAEA's Questions," Institute for Science and International Security, 5 June 2009, www.isis-online.org; IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 5 June 2009, www.iaea.org.
[23] For more information on active IAEA-Syria Technical Cooperation Projects, see IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, "Query Project by Country: Syria," www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ tcprogramme/ projectsbycountry/ query/ default.asp; Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 64.
[24] "SYR/020: Conducting a Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 2009, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.
[25] "SYR/020: Conducting a Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 2009, www-tc.iaea.org/ tcweb/ default.asp.

	Updated July 2009