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Updated July 2009
Nuclear Overview
A member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1969, and a proponent of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, Syria is nonetheless suspected of harboring nuclear weapons ambitions. While Damascus is currently known to possess only one small operational research reactor, the Chinese built SRR-1, it has consistently pursued more advanced nuclear technologies. The military has been a stakeholder in Syria's nuclear program since the 1970s, and Damascus has both openly and covertly sought the assistance of numerous parties, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to develop its nuclear program.
Syria's nuclear program has come under significant international scrutiny since Israel's September 2007 airstrike on Al-Kibar, a site alleged by Israeli and American officials to have been an undeclared plutonium production reactor. An IAEA investigation into the matter is ongoing, with progress hindered by limited Syrian cooperation.
Syria's adversarial relationship with Israel is the most important factor influencing its national security policies, and could motivate Damascus to pursue nuclear weapons.[1] In the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, the two countries are still technically at war with each other, and Israel's military capabilities—widely understood to include a nuclear weapons arsenal—are greatly superior to Syria's. Israel's successful attack on Al-Kibar can only have reinforced this fact for Damascus's leadership. Furthermore, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and continued military presence in the region have amplified Syrian security sensitivities.
Capabilities
The Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS) directs Syria's limited nuclear program. However, Syria is incapable of operating a large-scale program without significant external assistance. It has a weak industrial infrastructure, poor scientific capabilities, and lacks the trained engineers and other personnel needed to run a major civilian or weapons-oriented program. Syria's sole reactor, the Chinese-built 30KWt SRR-1 research reactor, is under IAEA safeguards. The SRR-1 yields only minute quantities of plutonium in its spent fuel, making it unsuitable for fissile materials production, and its HEU fuel is insufficient in quantity for a nuclear weapon. Syria has not developed full nuclear fuel-cycle expertise and is not known to possess reprocessing technologies.[2]
The majority of Syria's nuclear-related work takes place at the Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Center and the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Damascus. Syria currently has fifteen active technical cooperation projects with the IAEA, primarily involving the production of radioactive isotopes for medical, agricultural and geological purposes, including nuclear medicine and neutron-activation analysis. Overall, Syria has worked with the IAEA on more than sixty technical projects since the 1970s.[3]
As of April 2009, the IAEA investigation into the purpose of the Al-Kibar site remains inconclusive, rendering comprehensive analysis of Syrian nuclear capabilities impossible.[4] According to the Institute for Science and International Security, the Al-Kibar site matched North Korea's Yongbyon reactor in its layout and technical design, which included heavily sealed reinforced-concrete rooms for heat exchanges and a spent fuel holding pool. Albright and Brannan estimate the building to have been a 20-25 MWt reactor, large enough to produce sufficient plutonium for one bomb per year.[5] If proven true, these allegations would shed a new light on Syria's potential nuclear capabilities, at the very least demonstrating Damascus to be highly capable of illicit technology procurement.
History
The 1970s and 1980s: Decades of Disappointment
Syria was an early entrant to the NPT, signing the treaty in 1968 and ratifying it the following year. Compared to other Middle Eastern states, many of whom commenced nuclear programs soon after U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace speech, Syria began its nuclear program quite late. Only in 1976 would Damascus establish the AECS and declare its intention to pursue nuclear power.[6] Syria also founded the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in the early 1970s. Analysts widely believe that the SSRC is affiliated with the Syrian military and serves as the center for research, development, and procurement of unconventional weapons and missiles.[7] For example, the SSRC is thought to have played a major role in Syria's chemical and biological weapons programs.[8] However, Syria's nuclear efforts progressed quite slowly in the 1970s. The AECS began work on only six projects with the IAEA. Most significantly, Syria consulted with the IAEA regarding its nuclear options, resulting in an ambitious national plan to construct six 600 MWe reactors by the 1990s.[9]
Why did Damascus suddenly embark on a nuclear program in the 1970s? On the one hand, Syria's rapidly increasing domestic energy demand during that decade provided it with incentives to consider nuclear energy. But Damascus may also have been pursuing a hedging strategy, as it could no longer afford total military dependence on the Soviet Union.[10] The USSR provided Syria with little support during its 1967 war with Israel, and had worked openly with the United States to end the 1973 war. Meanwhile, Damascus's principal adversary enjoyed reliable support from the United States throughout the decade. Given Syria's weak conventional forces, a nuclear weapons program may have seemed a viable option for achieving strategic parity with Israel.[11]
However, by the early 1980s Syria realized it was not capable of indigenously producing a single nuclear reactor, let alone six, and sought assistance from states such as the USSR, Belgium, Switzerland and France to acquire a reactor. More than thirty firms bid on the proposed reactor, including at least one U.S. firm, but Syria ultimately chose the French firm Sofratome. In 1983, both the IAEA and the USSR advised Syria on selection of the reactor site.[12] But Sofratome backed out of the agreement following feasibility studies, as the Syrians lacked the resources to finance the reactor. Frustrated, Syria again approached the USSR in 1985, hoping its friendly relations with the superpower would translate into acquisition of a nuclear reactor. The negotiations yielded plans for construction of a 2 to10MWt research reactor and an associated research center. Progress was slow due to financial disagreements and the project was retired in the design phase in 1991.[13]
The 1990s: Limited Progress
In 1990, Syria concluded a $100 million nuclear deal with Argentina.[14] The state-controlled National Institute of Applied Research (INVAP) agreed to provide Syria with a 10MWt research reactor, and Argentina's Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) was to provide the requisite uranium hexafluoride reactor fuel, enriched to a maximum of 20 percent U-235. The deal also included a radiological protection center and a hot cell lab for producing radioisotopes.[15] However, the Argentinean government vetoed the deal in 1995, stating that a special nuclear cooperation treaty with Syria was a prerequisite to the implementation of the deal.[16] Argentina allegedly received strong pressure from both the United States and Israel to block the deal. Guido Di Tella, who was then Argentina's Foreign Minister, publicly stated that he was aware of objections to the sale and that "not only do we have to judge that it is not interfering with the process or security, but both Israel and Syria must believe the same."[17] Similarly, India's offer to provide Syria with a 5MWt reactor was shelved in 1991 under significant U.S. pressure.[18]
Syrian nuclear ambitions finally met with limited success when China began constructing the SRR-1 research reactor in 1991 as a part of an IAEA technical assistance project. China also provided Syria with 980.4g of uranium enriched to 90.2% U-235 to fuel the reactor, intended to ensure operation for 2,000 hours per year for ten years.[19] Fuel depletion now limits current operation to only two hours per day.[20] The SRR-1 reactor is modeled after the Canadian Slowpoke 2 reactor and is used for neutron activation analysis (NAA), training, and small-scale radioisotope production. Syria concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1992 and the reactor went critical in 1996.[21]
Controversy surrounded Syrian nuclear intentions during the 1990s. As far back as 1991, Western officials, particularly from the United States and Israel, claimed China was working with Syria on weaponization projects.[22] Whether any of these allegations were true remains unclear, but they were often directly contradicted by open source reports from the U.S. intelligence community. For example, in 1996, John Deutch, who was then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified to the U.S. Senate that "Syria's nuclear research program is at a rudimentary level and appears to be aimed at peaceful uses at this time. It is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. At present, we have no evidence that Syria has attempted to acquire fissile material."[23]
However, various members of the international community continued to worry about sensitive technology transfer to Syria. In 1998 for example, the intergovernmental Russia-Syria Commission on Trade and Scientific and Technical Cooperation signed a deal for the peaceful use of nuclear power, which included a desalination facility powered by a 25MW light-water reactor. The project did not progress and is likely to have collapsed under U.S. pressure, similarly to the Argentinean and Indian negotiations in the early 1990s.[24] In 2003, Syria signed a $2 billion nuclear deal with Russia that included a nuclear power plant and a nuclear seawater desalination facility.[25] The announcement of the deal was originally placed on the Russian Foreign Ministry website and received a considerable amount of negative attention. The Foreign Ministry spokesman quickly refuted claims that any such discussion had taken place. Currently, there is no known Russian-Syrian cooperation in the field of nuclear power.[26]
There was little open source basis for concern about a Syrian nuclear weapons program prior to the 2007 revelation of an alleged nuclear facility at Al-Kibar. However, Syria's other WMD endeavors, namely in the chemical weapons arena, led countries such as the United States to closely monitor its activities and oppose sensitive technology transfers. Furthermore, a 2004 CIA report found that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan may have provided Syria with nuclear information and equipment.[27] According to a 2007 statement by President Bashar al-Assad, while Khan approached Syria in 2001 with an offer to provide it with nuclear equipment, he rejected the offer.[28]
Recent Developments and Current Status
On 6 September 2007, Israel destroyed a facility near the Euphrates River in the Northeastern region of Dar az Zwar. Commonly referred to as "Al-Kibar," the facility is alleged by U.S. and Israeli intelligence to have been a partially completed 25MWth gas-cooled graphite-moderated nuclear reactor, which would have been capable of producing enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year.[29]
The strike precipitated a flurry of media interest and speculation; Israeli authorities maintained silence on the issue, while Syria adopted the tone of aggrieved victim and claimed the site had been an unused military building. Problematically for IAEA inspections, and in a move guaranteed to make some question if it had something to hide, Syria leveled what remained of the Al-Kibar site and built over it only three days after the airstrike. In April 2008, the U.S. released photos reportedly taken at the Al-Kibar site prior to the airstrike, whose striking similarity to images of Yongbyon suggested that the facility had been a nuclear reactor developed with North Korean assistance.[30].
The IAEA was finally provided unrestricted access to the Al-Kibar site on 23 June 2008, which enabled inspectors to decipher its layout, dimensions, containment structures, and water-pumping infrastructure. In its subsequent report, the agency found that the containment structure and overall size of the building could be sufficient for a nuclear reactor, and the water pumping capacity was "adequate for a reactor size referred to in the allegations."[31] Inspectors also found natural uranium particles, which Syria claimed derived from Israeli munitions, an allegation swiftly denied by Israel.[32]
However, the June 2008 visit ultimately raised as many questions as it answered. In November 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors sent letters to both Israel and Syria requesting more information on Al-Kibar.[33] The agency also asked Syria for access to additional sites, which Syria had refused during the June 2008 inspection. Syria's February 2009 response reiterated that Al-Kibar had been a military site, and did not permit additional inspections access. That same month the IAEA released a second report on Al-Kibar that did not produce new information about the site's infrastructure, but revealed that environmental samples had yielded additional traces of anthropogenic (or manmade) uranium and rejected Syrian claims that the uranium derived from dropped Israeli munitions.[34] The February 2009 report states, "there is low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles," and it further indicates that the uranium particles were not of a type found in Syria's declared inventory.[35] Again on 5 June 2009, the IAEA reported that its inspections had revealed the presence of undeclared anthropogenic uranium particles, this time from a hot cell facility at the SRR-1 research reactor in Damascus.[36]
Syria continues to deny that it was ever involved in illicit nuclear activities and to insist that the Al-Kibar site was and remains a non-nuclear military installation. However, Damascus also persists in refusing further inspections access. As of July 2009, the investigation therefore remained inconclusive.
Syria's uncooperativeness in resolving agency questions about its nuclear program has contributed to the firestorm of criticism surrounding the efficacy of the nonproliferation regime.[37] While Damascus's refusal to join the IAEA Additional Protocol means inspectors lack powerful authorities to visit undeclared nuclear facilities, the IAEA does have the right to invoke special inspections and end the Al-Kibar stalemate. However, the checkered history of special inspections, last invoked unsuccessfully against a defiant North Korea in 1993, has left this potentially powerful tool hostage to diplomatic politics.[38]
In 2007, high-level Syrian officials, including Syrian Electricity Minister Khalid al-Ali announced Syria might pursue nuclear power to satisfy domestic energy demand.[39] However, Syria has not asked the IAEA for assistance or made an official decision on future nuclear power plans.[40] Given Damascus's limited financial and technological resources, its refusal to join the Additional Protocol, and unresolved allegations that it was building a clandestine plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar, it is unlikely that Syria will find investment in a nuclear power program feasible anytime in the near future.
Sources:
[1] Ellen Laipson, "Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained Without Nukes?" in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: 2004), pp. 83-110.
[2] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Syria: Country Profile," www.sipri.org; Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[3] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82; For more information on active IAEA-Syria Technical Cooperation Projects, see IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, "Query Project by Country: Syria," www-tc.iaea.org; Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 64.
[4] "IAEA Board of Governors: Statements of the Director-General," International Atomic Energy Agency, 2 March 2009, www.iaea.org.
[5] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "ISIS Report: The Al Kibar Reactor: Extraordinary Camouflage, Troubling Implications," Institute for Science and International Security, 12 May 2008, www.isis-online.org; Anthony Cordesman, "An Overview: Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 June 2008, www.csis.org.
[6] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[7] "Three Entities Targeted by Treasury for Supporting Syria's WMD Proliferation," U.S. Department of Treasury, 4 January 2007, www.ustreas.gov; Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2002, www.meforum.org.
[8] Ellen Laipson, "Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained Without Nukes?," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: 2004), pp. 83-110; Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2002, www.meforum.org.
[9] For a list of IAEA-Syria technical cooperation projects see, Federation of American Scientists, "IAEA-TC Projects by Country," www.fas.org.
[10] Ellen Laipson, "Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained Without Nukes?," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, D.C: 2004), pp. 83-110.
[11] Ellen Laipson, "Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained Without Nukes?," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: 2004), pp. 83-110.
[12] Anthony Cordesman, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: The Impact on the Regional Military Balance," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 25 March 2005, p. 58, www.csis.org.
[13] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[14] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Syria: Country Profile," www.sipri.org.
[15] Richard Kessler, "Argentina to Ink Research Reactor Deal Soon with Syria, Says CNEA," Nucleonics Week, 31 May 1990.
[16] David Makovsky, "Argentina: We won't sell reactor to Syria," Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1995, www.jpost.com.
[17] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[18] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Syria: Country Profile," www.sipri.org.
[19] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Syrian Arab Republic: Research Reactor Details-SRR-1," www.iaea.org; Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[20] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Syrian Arab Republic: Research Reactor Details-SRR-1," www.iaea.org
[21] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Syrian Arab Republic: Research Reactor Details-SRR-1," www.iaea.org; Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[22] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 73
[23] Testimony of John Deutch, Director Central Intelligence Agency, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Weapons Proliferation, 20 March 1996.
[24] Global Security, "What are Syria's Nuclear Capabilities?," www.globalsecurity.org.
[25] Jeremy M. Sharp, RL33487, "Syria: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, 1 May 2008, www.fas.org; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Syria: Country Profile," www.sipri.org.
[26] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Syria: Country Profile," www.sipri.org.
[27] Bruno Tertrais, "Kahn's Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?," in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004) pp. 15-51.
[28] "Assad says in 2001 He Rejected Offer from Pakistani Smugglers to Buy Nukes," Jerusalem Post, 20 December 2007; Bruno Tertrais, "Kahn's Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?," in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004) pp. 15-51.
[29] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 November 2008, www.iaea.org.
[30] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "ISIS Report: The Al Kibar Reactor: Extraordinary Camouflage, Troubling Implications," Institute for Science and International Security, 12 May 2008, www.isis-online.org; Anthony Cordesman, "An Overview: Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 June 2008, www.csis.org.
[31] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 February 2009, www.iaea.org.
[32] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 February 2009, www.iaea.org.
[33] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 November 2008, www.iaea.org.
[34] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 February 2009, www.iaea.org.
[35] Julian Borger, "UN nuclear watchdog rejects Syrian excuses for uranium found," Guardian, 19 February 2009, www.guardian.co.uk; IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 November 2008, www.iaea.org.
[36] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "IAEA Report of Syria: Undeclared Uranium Particles Found in Hot Cell Facility in Damascus; Syria Not Answering IAEA's Questions," Institute for Science and International Security, 5 June 2009, www.isis-online.org; IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 5 June 2009, www.iaea.org.
[37] Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, "Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime," Arms Control Today, Volume 38, no 6, July/August 2008.
[38] James Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick and Pierre Goldschmidt, "The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection in Syria," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 February 2009, www.carnegieendowment.org; Mark Heinrich, "IAEA urged to impose 'special' inspections on Syria," Reuters, 26 February 2009, www.reuters.com; IAEA, "IAEA Safeguards Overview: Agreements and Additional Protocols," www.iaea.org
[39] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82; "Report on Proliferation Implications for the Global Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power," The International Security Advisory Board of the U.S. Department of State, 7 April 2008, www.doe.gov.
[40] Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief: Syria," March 2008, www.eia.doe.gov; Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 73.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
