One of the most notable features of the Syrian chemical warfare (CW) program has been the manner in which it has escaped the sort of public criticism and detailed examination applied to CW programs in states such as Libya, North Korea, and Iran. The result has been a relative paucity of open source information. Despite this lack of information, it is possible to draw a general picture of the Syrian CW program.

Since the early 1980s, Syria has made determined efforts to acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemical weapons. The objective of this pursuit was to provide Syria with a long-range strike capability that could deter Israel from taking advantage of its superior conventional warfare capabilities. Although Syrian perceptions of an Israeli threat are the most likely driver behind the CW acquisition decision the possibility that acquisition was related to Iraq's development and use of chemical weapons in the early to mid 1980s should not be completely discounted. As such, the Syrian CW program should probably be seen as strategically defensive. The CW program has been consistently pursued despite the damage this has done to Syria's international reputation and the negative impact on the Syrian economy as a consequence of increasingly stringent export controls aimed at preventing proliferation. Despite substantial investments of materiel and resources, Syria appears to have remained heavily dependent upon imports of materials and expertise for CW production. Since the early 1990s, Syria has shifted its focus from the basic development of chemical weapons warfare agents to improving improvements in delivery systems, such as Scud missiles. Syria's ability to produce and deploy these long-range delivery systems also appears to be dependant upon continued overseas support. Since the late 1990s, the limited information made available about the Syrian CW program has suggested that it is in a form of stasis. This may be because the program has achieved its core production and capability goals earlier in the decade. Alternatively it may be that Syria has reached a technological plateau beyond which it is either unwilling to, or incapable of, progressing at this time.

History

There is a general consensus that Syria first obtained chemical weapons from Egypt in 1972 or 1973 as part of the two countries preparations for their joint attack on Israel in October 1973.[1] Reports that Israeli troops captured stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that these weapons were made available to combat units during the Yom Kippur war.[2] It is notable that although Syrian forces were severely defeated, at no point did they make use of their CW capability. In the absence of access to Syrian personnel or records all explanations of why chemical weapons were not used by the Syrians in 1973 must remain largely speculative.

The next major development in Syrian efforts to acquire chemical weapons took place following the defeat of Syrian air and land forces deployed to Lebanon during Israel's invasion of that country in 1982. However, a direct causal relationship has not been established and a decision to pursue chemical weapons as a counter-balance to Israel's strategic nuclear superiority may have been nascent prior to 1982. Nevertheless, it is likely that the brutal exposure of Syrian vulnerability to Israeli conventional forces was a significant factor in making the decision to build a CW arsenal. Large-scale acquisition of materials and construction of facilities was not reported prior to 1982.

The Syrian CW program was established under the aegis of the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS), an ostensibly civilian research institute that appears to be responsible for all research, development, and production activities and facilities. Once the decision to proceed with a CW program had been made, it appears that the initial focus was the establishment of a facility for research and development, and possibly pilot production, in the Damascus area. This facility has continued to be used for CW-related research. Simultaneously, work commenced on the construction of larger dedicated CW production facilities. These plants in Al-Safira, Hama, and Homs all came online in the mid- to late 1980s. The first priority of the Syrian CW program was the production of sarin; initial, small-scale production appears to have started in 1984. Originally, this agent was to be carried by Syrian Air Force bombers, but this was an unreliable means of delivery given Israeli air superiority. Intense efforts were undertaken to provide a more dependable delivery system. By 1987, Syria was able to fit sarin-filled warheads, probably unitary rather than cluster, on some of its Scud missiles creating a limited long-range CW strike capability. Since that time, the focus of Syrian efforts has been on increasing the range and effectiveness of their strike capability by obtaining longer-range missiles from foreign suppliers such as North Korea and by improving the sophistication of the warheads. The fitting of bomblet-filled cluster warheads to Scud-C missiles after 1997 was a significant development that greatly increased the potential effectiveness of Syrian chemical weapons. Additionally, Syria has sought to increase the lethality of its force by developing V-agents. Syria has been researching this type of agent since the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents but also suggested a lack of success.

Following the successful weaponization of sarin in the 1980s, Syria turned to developing additional agents, most notably vesicants. Syria appears to have built up a stockpile of mustard and sarin for tactical uses in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the Syrian CW program seems to have reached a plateau in terms of capability and production. There is no current information conclusively suggesting that Syria is engaged in ongoing large-scale production and stockpiling of CW agents.

The driving motivation behind Syria's CW program has been the need to find a way to balance the growing conventional warfare capabilities of Israel. During the 1980s and 1990s, the differences in the relative capabilities of the two countries rapidly widened, leaving Syria in a position of heightened vulnerability. The distancing of Syria from its Soviet patron in the mid-1980s—combined with the all too apparent inadequacies of Soviet-supplied equipment—required Syria to seek an equalizer. In this sense, the objective of the Syrian CW program has been to provide Syria with room to attempt escalation dominance by threatening the expansion of a conventional conflict to include direct attacks against the civilian population or, alternately, by inflicting unbearable losses on Israeli forces. The key dilemma facing Syria in all its efforts has been the need to develop and maintain a credible threat while not being so threatening as to trigger an Israeli attack which would expose Syria's inadequate conventional forces to the risk of severe defeat. In this regard, neither Syria has found it advantageous to adopt an opaque policy, not unlike that of Israel, in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of these weapons even as it continues to deploy and improve them.

From its earliest beginnings Syria's CW program has been heavily dependent on outside support. As a consequence of its low levels of industrial and technological development Syria has been a voracious importer of materials, technologies, and expertise. Although indigenous development efforts have been made, they have been constrained by Syria's relative isolation from the world community, its relative poverty, and the diversion of substantial proportions of its national resources to military activities. Consequently, it is not clear that Syria has achieved significant breadth or depth in terms of its ability to pursue indigenous development of chemical weapons or their delivery systems. Open sources continue to refer to extensive efforts to secure materials and expertise from overseas suppliers, pointing to substantial limitations on internal capabilities. However, these open sources generally do not provide details on these imports; and, as a consequence, it is difficult to identify any changes in the character of import activity except in the broadest sense. In the early 1980s, Syria was engaged in importing the key process equipment and technology required to establish its CW infrastructure. Since that time, it appears that the scale of imports, though not the need for them, has declined precipitously as the requirement becomes one of supporting an existing program.

The Syrian development program appears to have involved surprisingly few tests, whether of agents or delivery systems. It is possible that additional tests occurred which were not detected by foreign intelligence agencies or that have not been reported in the open sources. It is also possible, though less likely that the levels of outside support Syria has received have enabled it to have a high degree of confidence in its systems despite an absence of testing.

Syria has not publicly announced doctrines related to the use of chemical weapons; indeed, it has continually denied possessing such weapons. All conclusions regarding doctrines or policies are accordingly extrapolations from the limited information about force structures and production history available in the open sources. At all times, it has been presumed that the primary focus of Syrian chemical weapons was an attack on the Israeli civilian population rather than tactical battlefield use. However, given source limitations confirmation of this strategy is impossible, and commentary on any possible changes is highly speculative.

Very little reliable information exists regarding Syrian CW defensive efforts in part because open source information has been focused on Syrian offensive rather than defensive capabilities. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of military vehicles from the Soviet Union that were usually fitted with chemical protection systems as standard equipment. It is believed that a full range of decontamination equipment was supplied by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.[3] It is assumed, though not demonstrated, that personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers during the same period. There is one known instance in which Syria purchased more than 11,000 Chinese MF-11 protective masks; however, it is not clear whether this was a single purchase or part of a broader effort to replace all existing masks.[4]

For several decades, Damascus has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD. At the same time, Syria has supported the right of any state to adopt those measures that it feels are most appropriate to securing itself against outside threats. On numerous occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has repeatedly indicated that it would not renounce the right to possess chemical weapons, nor destroy any arsenal if it possessed one, until Israel first abandoned its nuclear weapons program. It is unclear whether this position represents a willingness to bargain away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclear weapons program or is simply a useful argument to justify the possession of chemical weapons. In practice, Syria remains adamantly opposed to membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention, aligns politically with Egypt in opposition to membership, and has attempted with diminishing effectiveness to discourage other Arab nations from joining.

Status

Syria is currently believed to deploy between 100 and 200 Scud missiles fitted with sarin warheads. Some of these missiles may be fitted with V-agent warheads although this information is less reliable. In addition, Syria is believed to have stockpiled several hundred tons of sarin and mustard agents for tactical uses in the form of artillery shells and air-dropped munitions. Syria retains its production infrastructure of at least three and possibly four facilities; however, it is not known whether these are currently being used to produce new agent. Syria conducted one missile test in July 2001, which probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead.[5] Since that time, the CW program has maintained a very low profile.

In general, previously noted trends established in the early 1990s continue. Despite regular Israeli announcements of Syrian success Syria is apparently still working to perfect its V-agent capability and to enhance the range and effectiveness of its delivery systems.

In 2003 the US renewed its focus on Syrian WMD capabilities, leveling numerous accusations that Syria had received and hidden Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. Although the assertion that Syria received Iraq's WMD prior to the spring 2003 US-led invasion ultimately proved unsustainable it was nevertheless important, signaling US determination to pursue WMD issues and a refusal to maintain relations with Syria on a "business as usual" basis. This new approach resulted in a number of policy shifts, the most significant of which was US support for ultimately successful efforts to expel Syria from Lebanon. Additional pressure came on Syria as a consequence of the public repudiation of all WMD efforts by Libya in late 2003 and the subsequent dismantling and conversion of all WMD related equipment and facilities in 2004 and 2005. In 2004 Syrian officials met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Syrian representatives also began to attend regional seminars organized by the OPCW. In November 2005, a Syrian delegation attended the Annual Conference of the States Party in The Hague. In the absence of information on the motivations behind these actions the significance of these developments remains unclear at this time. However, they may be the first signs of an impending change in Syrian policy on chemical weapons, or more likely, an attempt to relieve international pressure on Syria by suggesting that a change is being considered.

In late 2008 Syria finds itself confronting a difficult international situation that is further complicated by its suspected WMD capabilities. A military capability that was established to enhance national security through its deterrent effect, now endangers it, by threatening to attract the wrath of Syria's enemies. Although abandoning these programs might actually improve national security, too much has been invested in the combined missile and CW arsenals to easily surrender them, the more so given the critical role they play in Syria's national strategy. Given the circumstances, Syria will need to examine its priorities in the near future and decide whether retaining its chemical weapons is worth the risk of war with greatly superior foes.

Sources:
[1] W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988.
[2] Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, 17 May 1984, p. H4088.
[3] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[4] Ibid.
[5] David C. Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead", Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 September 2001, <http://www.janes.com>.

	Updated March 2008