Introduction
During the Cold War, the USSR built up an enormous military-industrial complex. Huge resources were devoted to the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of their delivery. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the breakup of the single, unified Soviet military-industrial complex, with industrial facilities and military research centers claimed as national property by the governments the former Soviet republics where those facilities happened to be located. The same process occurred with weapons arsenals:  each newly independent state inherited, by default, the weapons systems stationed on its territory.

Ukraine, like Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan, found in its possession not only conventional arms, but also WMD: chemical and nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers. Ukraine also inherited a massive military-industrial complex consisting of both research institutions and industrial facilities that specialized in weapons production. One component of the Cold War legacy that Ukraine did not inherit from the USSR, however, was a system of export controls for military hardware and technologies.

The transition from Soviet republic to fully functioning state has proven to be difficult. An initial period of political instability and eroded state authority and control created conditions favorable for unscrupulous weapons trade. The economic plight of the state and the presence of many production facilities provided additional incentives to expand the country’s exports to generate much needed revenue. Weapons and weapons-related materials and know-how are among the few commodities in the former Soviet Union for which there is an international demand backed by hard currency.[1] The emergence of organized crime and widespread corruption aggravated the situation as large quantities of military equipment could be illegally acquired and moved out of the country undetected and unaccounted for. Such developments created considerable apprehension abroad that Ukraine could turn into a major source of weapons and other military equipment and technologies for any country or non-state entity willing to pay. The presence of nuclear and missile facilities on Ukrainian territory was especially troubling in this context. In light of this situation, it was imperative that Ukraine start working on establishing its own system of export controls if it wanted to become a respected member of the international community.

This research paper traces the evolution of the Ukrainian system of export controls and evaluates the effectiveness of the current system. Since Ukraine has both technological expertise and industrial capabilities in areas related to the manufacture of WMD, the global nonproliferation regime will be strengthened considerably if Ukraine establishes an effective system of export controls capable of preventing transfers of sensitive technologies, equipment, and materials to countries that may aspire to develop their own WMD programs.

In recent years, there have been no reports of illicit Ukrainian WMD-related exports or smuggling of WMD materials out of the country; but the author believes that in the context of assessing the effectiveness of the Ukrainian export controls system in preventing illegal transfers of sensitive WMD technologies and hardware to foreign buyers, it is useful to look at how trade in conventional arms and dual-use items is conducted. It is true that one should not consider trade in armored vehicles on a par with exports of nuclear materials. However, if aircraft engines are exported to countries under a UN embargo,[2] missile components also arguably can find their way to international black markets.

Ukrainian WMD Production Capabilities and Military Exports Overview
In the nuclear sphere, Ukraine has a number of facilities involved in nuclear research, power production, and fissile material production; there are about sixty facilities engaged in nuclear technology research and manufacture of nuclear-related goods. Ukraine has five nuclear power plants (Chornobyl, Khmelnytskyy, Rivne, Mykolayiv, and Zaporizhzhya) with a total of 17 nuclear power reactors and two nuclear research facilities each with two reactors (the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research and Sevastopil Naval Academy). The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology is believed to store up to 75kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) with enrichment levels of up to 90% and small quantities of Pu-239. The Eastern Mining and Conversion Combine in Zhovti Vody and the Dnieper Basin Chemical Works in Dniprodzerzhynsk are engaged in uranium processing and U3O8 (yellowcake) production.[3]

In Soviet times, more than 100 Ukrainian facilities participated in the design and manufacture of missiles and missile components. Some of the most important of these facilities included the Khartron Scientific and Production Association in Kharkiv, which worked on designing guidance systems for Soviet ICBMs; the Monolit Scientific Center in Kharkiv, which developed enabling codes for nuclear warheads and created missile control systems; the Pivdenne Design Bureau in Dnipropetrovsk, which designed missile and missile components; the Pivdenmash Production Association (also known by its Russian acronym “Yuzhmash”), which produced ICBMs and is the largest facility of its kind in the former Soviet Union; and the Pavlohrad Machine Building Plant, which manufactured solid-fuel missile engines and all three stages for the SS-24 “Scalpel” ICBM.[4]

There is also a large number of enterprises in Ukraine involved in the production of numerous dual-use materials and goods: the Kommunar Production Association in Kharkiv manufactures missile and space guidance equipment; the Novokramatorsk Machine Building Plant, materials for use in space programs; the Arsenal Plant in Kiev, precise measuring devices for missile guidance systems; the Artem Production Association, also in Kiev, air-to-air missiles and missile components; the Kiev Instrumental Production Association, tools for space vehicles; the Kiev Radio Plant, missile control systems; the Kinescope Production Association in Lviv, components for aircraft and missile control systems; and the Prydniprovkskyy Chemical Plant in Dniprodzerzhynsk, zirconium, hafnium, heavy water, ion exchange resin, and uranium oxide. Other production facilities make explosives, which, upon alteration, may be used in a nuclear explosive device, lasers and related equipment, spectrometers, vacuum pumps, and neutron generator systems.[5]

Even though the military-industrial complex of Ukraine experienced a considerable decline in the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR, it is still one of the biggest in the world. Vasyl Gureyev, Minister for Industrial Policy, stated that “40% of the ex-USSR's military-industrial complex facilities were located on Ukrainian territory.”[6] Ukraine arguably belongs among the world’s top developers and manufacturers of missiles and rockets.[7] In general terms, about 1,870 industrial enterprises in Ukraine, comprising 70% of the country’s industrial sector, produce defense-related products.[8] A significant number of these enterprises get their revenues from foreign sales and some of them export from 70% to 90% of their products.[9]

Ukraine is actively pursuing the policy of becoming one of the world’s leaders in arms exports. Ukraine ranks somewhere “between the top ten and twenty arms exporters worldwide.”[10] According to Leonid Rozhen, chairman of the Committee for Policy on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control under the President of Ukraine, each year Ukraine increases its military exports by several percent compared to the preceding year.[11] Valeriy Malev, director-general of Ukraine’s arms trading company Ukrspetseksport, gave the following statistics: In 1998, Ukrainian military exports grew by 25% compared to 1997 sales; in 1999, by 45% compared to 1998; in 2000, by 3% compared to 1999.[12] Ukrainian officials say that in 2001, arms sales increased by another 5-7% and that ten more countries became importers of Ukrainian arms, thus increasing the number of countries with which Ukraine trades to 63.[13] It is hard to verify these statements, as the Ukrainian government does not disclose to the public details of its arms deals. Experts agree that Ukraine annually sells military products worth $450-600 million[14] and some estimate that its arms export “may total about $4 billion a year,”[15] though the latter figure seems to be inflated. Modest estimates show that during its ten years of independence, Ukraine sold military equipment worth $3 billion. Other estimates present a figure as high as $32 billion for the 1992-1998 period. (This figure is the result of an investigation carried out by a temporary commission of the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian Parliament] in 1998.)[16]

These facts demonstrate, first, that Ukraine is capable of manufacturing weapons and military equipment that are in demand on the world arms market, and second, that Ukraine is trying to secure its position as an arms exporter by constantly increasing the volume of its weapon sales. In this context, it is important to consider the geographic regions of the markets for Ukrainian arms. Valeriy Malev said in 2001 that “about 40% of [Ukrainian] arms, military equipment, special services and technologies are transferred to countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.”[17] Incidentally, these regions are also home to several so-called “countries of concern” (such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria), some of which are known for their aspirations to acquire both WMD and means of their delivery. These countries would be happy to import relevant Ukrainian technologies, materials, and equipment to facilitate progress of their WMD programs. Of special interest to these countries would be Ukrainian missile-related products, the manufacture of which, according to Volodymyr Horbulin, head of the the State Commission on Military-Industrial Complex, is a priority for Ukraine, along with the manufacture of aircraft, radio location equipment, and air defense systems.[18]

Ukraine is a participant in almost all existing international nonproliferation regimes—Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement—whose guidelines Ukraine is legally bound to follow as a formal member.[19] The only international regime in which Ukraine does not participate is the Australia Group, but even in this case, the Ukrainian government unilaterally agreed to adhere to the regime’s rules in its export policies regarding chemical and biological products.[20] In order to fulfill these regimes’ obligations, in terms of controlling transfers of sensitive technologies and materials to outside customers, the Ukrainian state must establish export controls capable of preventing illicit sales and ensuring that legally exported items will not be used in a WMD program.

An ideal export control system should not interfere with the country’s overall export strategy nor create any unnecessary obstacles for enterprises involved in foreign trade. At the same time, it should be effective in implementing nonproliferation policies. Establishing the correct balance between economic interests and nonproliferation obligations is very difficult when a country is experiencing economic difficulties and many of its domestically manufactured products can be sold only in foreign markets, as domestic customers lack the necessary financial resources. The cause of nonproliferation may not be very high on the government’s agenda, since Ukraine's government does not see development of WMD programs in other countries as a direct military threat to its national security. Ukraine’s primary problems lie within the country—poor economic performance, a volatile political situation, cumbersome and ineffective state governance, widespread corruption, and underdeveloped democratic institutions.

During the decade following the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine managed to establish an export control system, which can be characterized as technically competent.[21] At the same time, inadequate financing, poor training of personnel, government corruption, lack of transparency, absence of parliamentary oversight, and other factors undermined the system’s effectiveness. Frequent accusations of Ukraine’s violations of international regulations governing arms sales point to a less-than-sterling record of Ukrainian export controls. Even though no allegations have ever been publicly proven to be correct, they still serve as indicators that there is much room for improvement of the national export control system.

Legal Framework of Ukrainian Export Controls
The system of export controls in Ukraine is regulated primarily by decrees and resolutions issued by the executive branch—the president and the Cabinet of Ministers. The role of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) remains quite limited even though it has adopted several laws that address the issue of exports of military-related products. The following legislation plays the most significant role in regulating the military-technical cooperation of Ukraine with foreign countries (a legal term in Ukraine for international transfers of military-related products): Law on economic independence, No. 142-KhP, 8/3/1990, article 12; Law on entrepreneurship, No. 698-KhP, 2/7/1991, article 4; Law on foreign trade activities, No. 959-KhP, 4/16/1991, articles 16 and 20; Resolution on creation of a list of raw materials and materials not permitted for export, No.2728-XII, 10/26/1992; Law on use of nuclear energy and radiation safety, 2/8/1995. The most important of these is the Law on foreign trade activities, which sets up licensing procedures for export/import of certain goods and explicitly states that certain exports/imports (nuclear materials and technologies, military hardware) can be conducted only with authorization from the state.[22] Article 228-6 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that violations of export procedures regarding transfers of military- and nuclear-related materials, services, and hardware can be punished by confiscation of property and imprisonment for three to eight years.[23] As of yet, there have been no convictions or even prosecutions under this article.
The most telling sign that the Ukrainian parliament basically is removed from the decision making process in the export control area is the absence of a comprehensive export control law. The Cabinet of Ministers has been working on a comprehensive export control law for several years. The draft Law on state control of international transfers of goods designated for military purposes and dual-use goods has not even been introduced to the parliament for formal consideration, and only a few parliamentarians have had a chance to read it.[24] However, it would be inaccurate to put the blame for the marginal position of the parliament in military export questions solely on the uncooperative executive branch, which has fought to preserve its monopoly over military problems in general and military exports in particular. The discussion “Elections 2002: Positions of political parties and coalitions on military policy of Ukraine,” in which representatives of eight leading political parties participated on 13 February 2002, demonstrated that military-related problems do not rank high on the priority lists of major political parties in Ukraine.[25]

As stated before, export controls in Ukraine are based primarily on presidential decrees and resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers. During Ukraine's first ten years of independence, the executive branch issued more than twenty documents that regulate exports of Ukrainian military-related products. At the institutional and administrative levels, the national system of export controls underwent many major changes. The first government body to deal with sensitive military exports was the State Expert-Technical Commission, created on 23 March 1992 by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 153. The Commission was tasked with drafting and implementing export control laws, developing control lists, and licensing weapons exports. The Commission was subordinated to the Ministry of Machine Building, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion, which was more interested in promoting arms exports than controlling them. Thus the Commission “was very slow in developing a legal foundation, but was active in arms trade deals.”[26]

On 3 January 1993, Presidential Decree No. 3 “On Improving State Export Controls” abolished the Expert-Technical Commission and established in its place two bodies—the Government Commission on Export Controls and the Expert-Technical Committee. Under the new system, all ministries and state agencies involved in export control issues received equal representation in the commission, thereby instituting a more balanced approach to export control. The commission formulated and directed state export control policy, while the committee acted as the commission's executive arm. On 28 December 1996, the two entities were transformed by Presidential Decree No. 1279 “On Further Improving State Export Controls” into the Government Commission for Export Control Policy and the State Service for Export Control, respectively. With this change, the State Service for Export Control became an independent agency, its status equal to that of a ministry.[27]

In 1999, new changes were introduced with the hope of increasing efficiency. The Government Commission for Export Control Policy, previously subordinate to both the president and the Cabinet of Ministers, came under exclusive presidential control and was renamed the Commission for Policy on Export Control and Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries. The main task of the commission became “decision making on ‘critical’ exports to any country and any military-related exports to ‘critical’ countries.”[28] A new entity was created within the Cabinet of Ministers called the State Commission on the Defense-Industrial Complex.  It is responsible for defense industry development.[29]

The State Service for Export Control was liquidated as an independent body and reconstituted under the same name within the Ministry of Economy in March 2000.[30] This transfer resulted in the loss of a certain degree of independence and status. On 8 July 2000, the Commission for Policy on Export Control and Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries was replaced by Presidential Decree No. 868 with the Committee for Policy on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control.[31] On 27 December 2001, President Leonid Kuchma signed a decree that liquidated the State Service for Export Control within the Ministry of Economy and European Integration and provided for the creation of the State Service for Export Control of Ukraine as an independent body with a special status.[32]

These constant changes constitute indirect proof that the Ukrainian system of export controls is still far from perfect. One can predict that further changes will be introduced, with the goal of improving national export controls. The nature of these possible changes will be discussed below. The influence of the executive branch over export control affairs introduces a certain level of flexibility into the system, making swift adjustments possible if loopholes are discovered. On the other hand, the virtually exclusive authority of the president and Cabinet of Ministers over export controls means that the export control system is susceptible to changes in the political climate of the country, resulting in the frequent change of export control regulations to satisfy the shifting political interests of those in power.[33] The situation in which rules are enforced by the same people who write the rules also creates the possibility that high-ranking government officials might manipulate rules in pursuit of political, financial, or other gains.

Nearly all weapons export transactions from Ukraine are conducted by the state company Ukrspetseksport, created in 1996 through a merger of three major arms export firms, Progres, Ukrinmash, and Ukroboronservice.[34] As of 2002, Ukrspetseksport consisted of five subsidiaries—the aforementioned three and Promoboroneksport and Spetstekhnoeksport.[35] In order to centralize military-related exports and prevent competition among Ukrainian arms manufacturing companies on international markets, the state granted the rights of special exporters to only six military-oriented enterprises and limited the number of air carriers of sensitive cargo to two—Antonov Airlines, owned by the Antonov Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex, and Ukrainian Air Transport Company, operated by the Ministry of Defense.[36]

Problem Areas
After ten years of independence, Ukraine has built a multi-layered system of export controls. But a whole range of problems, from meager financing and poor training to lax enforcement, still remain. Illicit arms transfers likely constitute the biggest problem. Some experts maintain that most of the exported military equipment (in some years up to 80%) leaves the country illegally.[37] There is no concrete evidence that the Ukrainian government itself sanctions these transfers, but the fact remains that Ukrainian weapons have appeared in places where they should not have, such as in the former Yugoslavia or African countries like Angola and Sierra Leone. In many cases, the Ukrainian partner was presented with fake end-user certificates; it is unclear whether all measures were taken to verify the certificates' validity.[38] One explanation may be that under current economic conditions, Ukraine cannot commit the resources to maintain or send official representatives overseas to verify end-user certificates. But even if this is the case, the Ukrainian government should have been more cautious in accepting end-user certificates from countries located in known problem regions. For example, Ukraine sold 113 tons of conventional arms munitions in 2000 to the Ivory Coast on the basis of an end-user certificate from this country. UN investigators discovered that when the munitions arrived in the Ivory Coast, they were loaded on another plane and sent to Liberia, a country under a UN arms embargo.[39] One may argue that Ukrainian government officials who approved the deal should have suspected that the UN embargo was being broken, but, for whatever reason, decided to approve the transfer.

The handling of this particular case by the Ukrainian authorities shows that the national system of export control failed to prevent an illegal arms transfer. The reason for this may be poor training of export control personnel, lack of sound judgment by Ukrainian officials, insufficient financial and technical resources to investigate cases in detail, corruption, or a combination of these elements. One cannot rule out the possibility that behind illegal arms exports in Ukraine stand high-ranking government officials. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Borys Tarasyuk said in an interview on Radio Liberty that on several occasions, some high-ranking government officials tried to convince the committee [probably the Committee for Policy on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control] to adopt proposals that would violate UN Security Council sanctions.[40] Even if the committee always decided against such proposals, there is no guarantee that there have not been attempts to ignore committee recommendations.

Ukrainian officials like to point out that no proof has ever been presented to validate accusations against the Ukrainian government of illegal arms sales. What they do not like to mention is that even the United Nations has severely criticized Ukraine for showing “neither restraint nor due care and diligence in its arms dealing, making Ukraine a point of origin for illegally trafficked weapons.”[41]  This points to another problem—lack of information regarding Ukraine’s military export activities. On 14 July 2001, the newspaper Dzerkalo tyzhnya wrote that even the general information that the government of Ukraine provides to international organizations within the framework of international control regimes is not easily accessible for domestic experts and journalists.[42] This lack of information not only reduces public knowledge about arms trading but also negative effects the defense industry itself, which is often “uninformed and confused” about export control laws and regulations. For example, enterprises often apply for a license from the State Service for Export Control when there is no need for a license; or some enterprises, on their own initiative, offer their foreign partners services or goods, the transfer of which would be a clear violation of international nonproliferation regimes.[43] This indicates the clear need to educate managers of industrial enterprises on nonproliferation norms and state laws and regulations. Some progress has been made in this respect through the establishment of regional export control offices and the Scientific and Technical Center, which assist Ukrainian military goods exporters by providing export control information.[44]

What Can Be Done?
Many of the export control problems in Ukraine are due to the virtual monopolization of military-related exports by the executive branch and the extreme secrecy surrounding international arms transfers. One should not be surprised to hear rumors of scandals in connection with Ukrainian military goods being sold on international black markets, considering the following: the public is unaware of the government’s dealings in the arms trade; the parliament does not have information about what military-related goods are being sold by the executive branch; non-governmental experts and journalists get their information about the government’s policies regarding arms trading from foreign publications; high-ranking government officials entertain the possibility of violating UN embargos; enforcement of export control laws and regulations lies with agencies that are underpaid, understaffed, and poorly trained. When so much is covered under a cloak of secrecy, how can one verify statements by the Ukrainian government that all accusations of illegal arms trade are false?
The Ukrainian system of export controls is operational. It may not have all the computers it needs to maintain its databases, and its employees may receive very small salaries, but these are technical problems that can be solved relatively easily. When the state has sufficient resources, it can purchase and install the necessary equipment and raise salaries. This, however, does not mean that there will not be future arms trading scandals. They will continue unless the Ukrainian government introduces more transparency into its arms trading. This can be done in a variety of ways: the parliament should have access to information regarding military-related exports; the government should release figures on the country’s military sales and acquisitions (these do not have to be so detailed as to undermine national security interests); and the state should start using non-governmental institutions and think-tanks to provide independent assessments of the effectiveness of national arms export policies. Once information on military-related exports becomes more visible to the general public, the window of opportunity for conducting illegal operations will suddenly become much smaller. Consequently, it will be much easier for the government to refute accusations of wrongdoing with publicly available hard data.

The United States, NATO, and the European Union can all contribute to increasing the transparency of Ukraine's arms deals. First, Ukraine is a recipient of significant international technical assistance designed to improve its export controls. In October 2001, Ukraine signed an agreement with the United States under which the United States will provide Ukraine with $4 million per year under an export control and border protection program.[45] Such assistance can be made contingent upon Ukraine’s willingness to open up its military trade according to international standards. NATO and the European Union can facilitate the process of making Ukrainian arms trading more transparent by including the issue in future talks related to developing closer relations with these organizations.

Increased transparency will benefit all sides: Ukraine will be spared the accusations of illegal arms sales and the outside world will have more assurances that Ukraine will not turn into a source of proliferation of both conventional arms and WMD. But until Ukraine becomes more frank and open about its arms trading, one can expect more scandals in which Ukrainian military goods will figure prominently.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
English Language Sources:

Valentyn Badrak, “State Control of ‘Sensitive Exports’ Through the Prism of Accusations,” National Security and Defense, No. 6 (18), July 2001, p. 13.

Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, eds. Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 1998).

Garry K. Bertsch and William C. Potter, eds., Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (New York: Routledge, 1999).

Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Decree No. 473, About the Establishment of the State Service for Export Control, 10 March 2000, SIPRI Website, <http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Ukraine/
ukrcab473.htm>.

Sarah Jacobson, “A Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian Export Control Regimes,” Nonproliferation Analysis Journal online edition, <http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/
fsuexportcontrols.html>, No. 1, April 1995.

Scott A. Jones, “An Evaluation of Export Controls in Ukraine,” Center for International Trade and Security Website, <http://www.uga.edu/cits/ttxc/nat_eval_ukraine.htm>.

Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: Look into Arms Exports,” The Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 2002, p. 9.

“Military Industrial Complex and Technology Transfer in Ukraine,” Occasional Paper 39, Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine Website, <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua/e/op/1999-03ope12mic-tec.phtml>, July-September 1999.

Lisa Misol, “Ukraine’s Arms Deals,” The Washington Post, 22 June 2001.

Tariq Rauf, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Jenni Rissanen, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2000.

Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations Security Council), December 2000
“Ukraine Arms Export Chief Denies Drop in Sales,” BBS, 20 August 2001; in Arms Trade Newswire, Council for a Livable World, <http://www.clw.org/atop/newswire/nw082101.html#Ukrainian>, 21 August 2001.

“Ukraine Gunning for Arms Sales – Not So Picky About Customers, Though,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 August 2001; in Arms Trade Newswire, Council for a Livable World, <http://www.clw.org/atop/newswire/nw082001.html#Ukraine>, 20 August 2001.

“Ukraine: Legislative Acts and Executive Decrees Related to Nonproliferation Export Controls,” NIS Nuclear Profiles, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/excon/report/
legislat.htm>.

“Ukraine: Nuclear Weapon Facilities,” NIS Nuclear Profiles, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/weafacil/ff_ukfcl.htm>.

“Ukraine: Research and Power Reactors,” NIS Nuclear Profiles, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/reactors/ff_ukrea.htm>.

“Ukraine: Uranium Mining and Milling,” NIS Nuclear Profiles, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/fissmat/ff_ukfis.htm>.

“Ukraine, USA Sign Export Control Agreement,” BBC Monitoring Kiev Unit, 22 October 2001; in Arms Trade Newswire, Council for a Livable World, <http://www.clw.org/atop/newswire/nw102301.html>, 23 October 2001.

“Ukraine’s Arms Exports,” Occasional Paper 5, Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine Website, <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua/e/op/
1997-01ope05ua-arms-export.phtml>, January-March 1997.

“The Australia Group,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Website, <http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/australia_group.htm>.

Victor Zaborsky, “Ukraine Restructures Its Arms Export Controls,” Center for International Trade and Security Website, <http://www.uga.edu/cits/database/My%20Webs/Russia/
JIR%20artcl.htm>.

Ukrainian and Russian Language Sources:

Valentin Badrak, “Chuvstvitelnaya torgovlya: sbyvayushchiyesya nadezhdy.” Rossiysko-Ukrainskiy Byulleten, Natsionalnyy instytut ukraynsko-rosiyskykh vidnosyn Website, <http://www.niurr.gov.ua/ru/ukr_rus/bulletin_5/badrak.htm>, No. 5, 2000.

Valentyn Badrak, “Eksportna kontseptsiya: ‘oboronku’ pidtyagnut do svitovykh standartiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/339391>, No. 7 (382), p. 22, February-1 March 2002.

Valentyn Badrak, “Leonid Rozhen: Ukrainu prosto vytisnyat z rynku ozbroyen,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/32332>, No. 37 (361), pp. 22-28 September 2001.

Valentyn Badrak, “Skhidnyy vector Ukrainy staye dovshym,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/33225>, No. 49 (373), 22-28 September 2001.

Aleksandr Ilchenko, “I vse-taki ‘Kolchugi’ prodali,” 2000 online edition, <http://www.news2000.com.ua/tema.php?id=114>, 18 April 2002.

Roman Kupchinskiy, “Postavki oruzhyya dlya Liberii v obkhod embargo OON,” Ukraina kriminalnaya Website, <http://www.cripo.com.ua/stati/rub-8/r8-s14.htm>.

Roman Kupchynskyy, “Yak Ukraina torguye zbroyeyu. Deyaki fakty,” Ukrainska pravda Website, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/?20416-2-print>, 16 April 2002.

“Novyny TSN,” Kanal 1+1 Website, <http://www.1plus1.net/news/?9828>, 12 March 2002.

“Oruzheynyy skandal: molchalivaya Ukraina i podozritelnyy Zapad,” Ukraina kriminalnaya Website, <http://www.cripo.com.ua/stati/rub-3/r3-s23.htm>.

Leonid Polyakov, “Chy zminytsya voyenna polityka Ukrainy pislya parlamentskykh vyboriv?” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/382/33930/>, No. 7 (382), 23 February-1 March 2002.

Leonid Polyakov, “Kontrol nad eksportom zbroi: chastkove vidkryttya zakrytoi temy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/350/31593>, No. 26 (350), 14-20 July 2001.

Presidential Decree No. 1265/2001, Pro Derzhavnu sluzhbu eksportnogo kontrolyu Ukrainy, 27 December 2002, President of Ukraine Official Website, <http://www.kuchma.gov.ua/main/?whatto-458>.

Ruslan Pukhov, “VTS gosudarstv SNG so stranami dalnego zarubezhya,” Eksport vooruzheniy online edition, <http://www.cast.ru/russian/publish/1999/may-june/3sng.html>, May-June 1999.

“Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya Ukrainy,” Scientific and Technical Center on the Export and Import of Special Technologies, Hardware and Materials Website, <http://www.ntc.kiev.ua/sec/index.html>.

“Stattya 228-6. Nezakonnyy vyviz za mezhi Ukrainy syrovyny, materialiv, obladnannya dlya stvorennya zbroi, a takozh viyskovoi i spetsialnoi tekhniky,” Criminal Code of Ukraine, Ukrainskoye pravo Website, <http://www.ukrpravo.com/Codex/Crime/page_10.shtml>.

“Strilyayuchyy eksport: chomu eksport ozbroyen zrostaye, koly ‘oboronka’ v zanepadi,” National Institute of Strategic Studies Website, <http://www.niss.gov.ua/Tasko/006.htm>.

Ukrspetseksport Website, <http://use-weapon.astral.kiev.ua/ukraine/index.html>.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FOOTNOTES
[1] Garry K. Bertsch and William C. Potter, eds., Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 3-4.
[2] The head of a commercial Ukrainian airline was recently arrested for the sale of aircraft engines to Angola made by the “Motor-Sich” enterprise in Zaporizhya. Two engines were declared for delivery to Moldova, but turned up instead on the African continent. The Securiy Service of Ukraine arrested the smuggler when he was trying to export two more engines out of the country. Source: “Novyny TSN,” Kanal 1+1 Website, <http://www.1plus1.net/news/?9828>, 12 March 2002.
[3] “Ukraine: Research and Power Reactors,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, NIS Nuclear Profiles: Ukraine, NTI Website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/reactors/ff_ukrea.htm>; “Ukraine: Uranium Mining and Milling,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, NIS Nuclear Profiles: Ukraine, NTI Website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/fissmat/ff_ukfis.htm>; Gary K. Bertsch and William C. Potter, eds., p. 45.
[4] “Ukraine: Nuclear Weapon Facilities,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, NIS Nuclear Profiles: Ukraine, NTI Website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/weafacil/ff_ukfcl.htm>; Gary Bertsch and William Potter, eds., p. 45.
[5] Gary K. Bertsch and William C. Potter, eds., p. 46.
[6] “Military Industrial Complex and Technology Transfer in Ukraine,” Occasional Paper 39, Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine Website, <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua/
e/op/1999-03ope12mic-tec.phtml>, July-September 1999.
[7] Valentin Badrak, “Chuvstvitelnaya torgovlya: sbyvayushchiyesya nadezhdy,” Rossiysko-Ukrainskiy Byulleten, Natsionalnyy instytut ukraynsko-rosiyskykh vidnosyn Website, <http://www.niurr.gov.ua/ru/ukr_rus/bulletin_5/badrak.htm>, No. 5, 2000.
[8] Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, eds., Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 60.
[9] Valentyn Badrak, “Eksportna kontseptsiya: ‘oboronku’ pidtyagnut do svitovykh standartiv,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/339391>, No. 7 (382), 22 February-1 March 2002.
[10] “Ukraine Gunning for Arms Sales – Not So Picky About Customers, Though,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 August 2001; in Arms Trade Newswire, Council for a Livable World, <http://www.clw.org/atop/newswire/nw082001.html#Ukraine>, 20 August 2001.
[11] Valentyn Badrak, “Leonid Rozhen: Ukrainu prosto vytisnyat z rynku ozbroyen,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/32332>, No. 37 (361), 22-28 September 2001.
[12] “Ukraine Arms Export Chief Denies Drop in Sales,” BBS, 20 August 2001; in Arms Trade Newswire, Council for a Livable World, <http://www.clw.org/atop/newswire/nw082101.html#Ukrainian>, 21 August 2001.
[13] Valentyn Badrak, “Skhidnyy vector Ukrainy staye dovshym,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/33225>, No. 49 (373), 22-28 September 2001.
[14] Leonid Polyakov, “Kontrol nad eksportom zbroi: chastkove vidkryttya zakrytoi temy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/350/31593>, No. 26 (350), 14-20 July 2001.
[15] “Ukraine’s Arms Exports,” Occasional Paper 5, Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine Website, <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.ua/e/op/
1997-01ope05ua-arms-export.phtml> January-March 1997.
[16] Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: Look into Arms Exports,” The Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 2002, p. 9.
[17] Valentyn Badrak, “Skhidnyy vector Ukrainy staye dovshym,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/print/33225>, No. 49 (373), 22-28 September 2001.
[18] Valentyn Badrak, “Eksportna kontseptsiya: ‘oboronku’ pidtyagnut do svitovykh standartiv.”
[19] Tariq Rauf, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Jenni Rissanen, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2000), pp. 31- 41.
[20] “The Australia Group,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, <http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/australia_group.htm>.
[21] Scott A. Jones, “An Evaluation of Export Controls in Ukraine,” Center for International Trade and Security Website, <http://www.uga.edu/cits/ttxc/nat_eval_ukraine.htm>.
[22] “Ukraine: Legislative Acts and Executive Decrees Related to Nonproliferation Export Controls,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, NIS Nuclear Profiles: Ukraine, NTI Website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/excon/report/legislat.htm>.
[23] “Stattya 228-6. Nezakonnyy vyviz za mezhi Ukrainy syrovyny, materialiv, obladnannya dlya stvorennya zbroi, a takozh viyskovoi i spetsialnoi tekhniky,” Criminal Code of Ukraine, Ukrainskoye pravo website, <http://www.ukrpravo.com/Codex/Crime/page_10.shtml>.
[24] Leonid Polyakov, “Kontrol nad eksportom zbroi: chastkove vidkryttya zakrytoi temy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/350/31593>, No. 26 (350), 14-20 July 2001.
[25] Leonid Polyakov, “Chy zminytsya voyenna polityka Ukrainy pislya parlamentskykh vyboriv?” Dzerkalo tyzhnya online edition, <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/382/33930/>, No. 7 (382), 23 February-1 March 2002.
[26] Victor Zaborsky, “Ukraine Restructures Its Arms Export Controls,” Center for International Trade and Security Website, <http://www.uga.edu/cits/database/
My%20Webs/Russia/JIR%20artcl.htm>.
[27] “Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya Ukrainy,” Scientific and Technical Center on the Export and Import of Special Technologies, Hardware and Materials Website, <http://www.ntc.kiev.ua/sec/index.html>.
[28] Victor Zaborsky, “Ukraine Restructures Its Arms Export Controls.”
[29] “Strilyayuchyy eksport: chomu eksport ozbroyen zrostaye, koly ‘oboronka’ v zanepadi,” National Institute of Strategic Studies Website, <http://www.niss.gov.ua/Tasko/006.htm>.
[30] Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Decree No. 473, About the Establishment of the State Service for Export Control, 10 March 2000, SIPRI Website, <http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Ukraine/ukrcab473.htm>.
[31] “Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya Ukrainy.”
[32] Presidential Decree No. 1265/2001, Pro Derzhavnu sluzhbu eksportnogo kontrolyu Ukrainy, 27 December 2001, President of Ukraine Official Website, <http://www.kuchma.gov.ua/main/?whatto-458>.
[33] Sarah Jacobson, “A Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian Export Control Regimes,” Nonproliferation Analysis Journal online edition, <http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/najournal/
fsuexportcontrols.html>, No. 1, April 1995.
[34] Aleksandr Ilchenko, “I vse-taki ‘Kolchugi’ prodali,” 2000 online edition, <http://www.news2000.com.ua/tema.php?id=114>, 18 April 2002.
[35] Ukrspetseksport Website, <http://use-weapon.astral.kiev.ua/ukraine/index.html>.
[36] Valentyn Badrak, “State Control of ‘Sensitive Exports’ Through the Prism of Accusations,” National Security and Defense, No. 6 (18), July 2001, p. 13.
[37] Ruslan Pukhov, “VTS gosudarstv SNG so stranami dalnego zarubezhya,” Eksport vooruzheniy online edition, <http://www.cast.ru/russian/publish/1999/may-june/3sng.html>, May-June 1999.
[38] Roman Kupchynskyy, “Yak Ukraina torguye zbroyeyu. Deyaki fakty,” Ukrainska pravda Website, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/?20416-2-print>, 16 April 2002.
[39] Roman Kupchinskiy, “Postavki oruzhyya dlya Liberii v obkhod embargo OON,” Ukraina kriminalnaya Website, <http://www.cripo.com.ua/stati/rub-8/r8-s14.htm>.
[40] “Oruzheynyy skandal: molchalivaya Ukraina i podozritelnyy Zapad,” Ukraina kriminalnaya Website, <http://www.cripo.com.ua/stati/rub-3/r3-s23.htm>.
[41] Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations Security Council), December 2000.
[42] Leonid Polyakov, “Chy zminytsya voyenna polityka Ukrainy pislya parlamentskykh vyboriv?”
[43] “Strilyayuchyy eksport: chomu eksport ozbroyen zrostaye, koly ‘oboronka’ v zanepadi.”; Garry K. Bertsch and William C. Potter, eds., p. 55.
[44] Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, eds., p. 62.
[45] “Ukraine, USA Sign Export Control Agreement,” BBC Monitoring Kiev Unit, 22 October 2001; in Arms Trade Newswire, Council for a Livable World, <http://www.clw.org/atop/newswire/nw102301.html>, 23 October 2001.

	Updated April 2005