Ukraine currently operates four nuclear power plants (NPPs), at Khmelnytskyy, Rivne, Konstyantynivka, and Zaporizhzhya. The last operating reactors at the Chornobyl NPP were shut down in December 2000. Overall, these NPPs constitute a significant source of energy for Ukraine: given an uninterrupted fuel supply, they are capable of satisfying nearly half of Ukraine's energy needs. The government of Ukraine is interested in further expanding its nuclear power generating capacity, and has been seeking funding for the construction of new reactors.
Khmelnytskyy
Rivne
Konstyantynivka
Zaporizhzhya
Chornobyl
Archived Power Reactor Developments
Reactor Incidents Table
Location: Neteshyn, Slavuta Rayon, Khmelnytskyy Oblast
[Enerhoatom Web Ssite, http://www.gca.atom.gov.ua. ] {Entered 3/3/2000}
Subordination: Enerhoatom
Type: VVER-1000, model 320
Units: One (operational)
Unit 1: initial criticality November 1987 (operational 8 August 1988).
Sources:
[1] "Power Reactors: Country-by-Country Summaries," World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1995, p. 33.
[2] Uranium Institute,"Power Reactors in Ukraine," http://www.uilondon.org/, 15 July 1996, p. 1. {Updated on 8/21/96 GN}
Power: 953 MWe
Fuel: Enriched to 3.3-4.4 percent.
[Ukrainian Media Digest (in Ukrainian), 2 February 1993, 78-79.]
Status: Since 1992 the plant has been unable to ship its spent fuel to Krasnoyarsk in Russia for reprocessing because Russia will not accept its spent nuclear fuel. The plant has reconfigured its storage pool to accommodate more spent fuel.[1] In 1990, the Ukrainian Rada issued a moratorium which stopped construction on Units 2, 3, and 4. However, in October 1993, citing Ukraine's energy shortage, the Rada voted to restart the project. In 1994 former president Kravchuk issued a decree calling for the completion of Units 2, 3, and 4.[1] As of March 2000, Unit 2 is 80-85 percent complete.[2] As of 1999, Unit 3 was 50 percent complete, and Unit 4 was 10 percent complete.[1] Please see the Khmelnytsyy NPP Developments file for more information.
Sources:
[1] Pacific Northwest Laboratory website, http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/?profiles/khmelnytskyy/kh_history .
[2] "Raboty po dostroyke atomnykh stantsiy na Ukraine v 1999 godu byli vypolneny na 60% ," Interfax, 1 March 2000. {Entered 3/3/2000 GD}
Safety: A majority of the MPC&A programs at Khmelnytskyy were completed in 1998 by the US Department of Energy (DOE). DOE's main focus was on establishing the Khmelnytskyy Training Center, a facility at which NPP operators in Ukraine learn new training procedures. An employee training methodology was established at the center and was incorporated at other Ukrainian NPPs. Support items for the training center include computers, printers, scanners, faxes, and related peripherals. According to the DOE, more than 2,000 personnel have taken part in training at the Center. Other projects at Khmelnytskyy have focused on improving operating procedures and practices. A safety parameter display system was installed in July 1998 and two ultrasonic flaw detectors have been delivered. In-depth safety assessments and provision of nondestructive examination equipment have also been priorities of the DOE. A full-scope simulator was installed in December 1997.
[Pacific Northwest Laboratory website, http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/?profiles/khmelnytskyy/doe_scope .] {Entered 3/3/2000 GD}
Location: Kuznetsovsk
Subordination: Enerhoatom
Type:
Units 1 and 2: VVER-440, model 213
Unit 3: VVER-1000, model 320
Units: Three
Unit 1: initial criticality12/80 (operational 9/81)
Unit 2: initial criticality 12/81 (operational 7/82)
Unit 3: initial criticality 11/86 (operational 5/87)
Sources:
[1] "World List Of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, September 1994, p. 71.
[2] "Power Reactors: Country-by-country Summaries," World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1995, p. 33.
[3] Uranium Institute,"Power Reactors in Ukraine", http://www.uilondon.org/, 15 July 1996, p. 1. {Updated on 8/21/96 GN}
Power:
Unit 1 - 420 MWe
Unit 2 - 420 MWe
Unit 3 - 954 MWe
Fuel:
Units 1 and 2 - enriched to 3.3 percent.
Unit 3 - enriched to 3.3-4.4 percent.
[NEI World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1992, p. 94.]
Safety: The US Department of Energy (DOE) is active in improving safety at Rivne NPP. DOE programs began in 1993 and have focused on improving the safety of day-to-day plant operations. In its initial assessment of Rivne, DOE emphasized the development of emergency operating instructions, improvements in operator training, and the performance of in-depth safety assessments. DOE projects have included a comprehensive safety assessment of Unit 3, the delivery of six ultrasonic flaw detectors, components for a full-scope simulator at Unit 3, operator exchanges, initiation of the Systematic Approach to Training Methodology from the Khmelnytskyy Training Center , and the drafting of new safety procedures for VVER-440/213 units.
[Pacific Northwest Laboratories website, http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/?profiles/rivne/doe_scope .] {Entered 3/21/2000, GD}
Comments: In May 1996 it was reported that out of five nuclear units officially under construction in Ukraine, Rivne's Unit 4 is one of the two units given priority, and was due for completion in 1998.[1] Other reports have given varying estimates of the pace of construction and estimated completion dates. According to Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, as of March 2000 over $1 billion was needed to complete Rivne Unit 4 and Khmelnytskyy Unit 2.[2] However, just two weeks later another Deputy Prime Minister, Yuliya Tymoshenko, stated that Rivne-4 was 90 percent complete and that only 3 billion hryvnyas (about $550 million as of March 2000) were necessary for completion of the project, which could be finished in a year to eighteen months.[3] Funding for the completion of Unit 4 may come from one of two sources. The first source is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which has proposed a $1.47 billion dollar credit. The second source is Russia, which has proposed a joint Russian-Ukrainian project with an estimated cost of $800 million.[4]
Sources:
[1] Nucnet, 20 May 1996, No. 25.
[2] "Ukraine steps up talks with EBRD on funding construction of nuclear reactors," Interfax, 3 March 2000.
[3] UNIAN, 14 March 2000; in "Govt views terms for Nuclear Plant Construction," FBIS Document CEP20000314000321.
[4] "Raboty po dostroyke atomnykh stantsiy na Ukraine v 1999 godu byli vypolneny na 60%," Interfax, 1 March 2000. {Entered 3/23/2000 GD}
Location: Konstyantynivka (Konstantinovka)
Subordination: Enerhoatom
Types:
Unit 1: VVER-1000, model 302
Unit 2: VVER-1000, model 338
Unit 3: VVER-1000, model 320
[Steinberg, 8/94.]
Units: Three
Unit 1: initial criticality in 12/82 (operational 10/83)
Unit 2: initial criticality12/84 (operational 4/85)
Unit 3 initial criticality 9/89 (operational 12/89)
Sources:
[1] "World List Of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, September 1994, p. 71.
[2] "Power Reactors in Ukraine," Uranium Institute - Power Reactors in Ukraine, http://www.uilondon.org/ukrpower.htm. {Updated on 8/21/96 GN}
Power: 953 MWe per operating unit
Fuel: Enriched to 3.3-4.4 percent
Sources:
[1] NEI World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1992, p. 97.
[2] Steinberg, August 1994.
Status: Unit 4 is still under construction and is not expected to come on-line until after 2000. According to Serhiy Lopatin, it is still uncertain whether Unit 4 will ever be completed due to a lack of financial resources; currently there are no plans for its completion. Construction was halted between 1990-1993 due to the moratorium on nuclear power station construction. For more information please see the South Ukraine Developments and Spent Fuel files, and the Ukraine General Power Reactor Developments file.
Sources:
[1] "Only Eight Nuclear Reactors Functioning," UNIAN, 3 October 1995.
[2] Interfax-Ukraine, 3 October 1995.
[3] "Nuclear Power Programs in Developing Countries of the World: Eastern Europe and Central Asia," Nuexco review, No. 322, June 1995, p. 25.
[4] Nucleonics Week, 30 July 1992, p. 13.
[5] CISNP interview with Ukrainian nuclear official, June 19, 1995.
Safety: The US Department of Energy (DOE) is active in improving safety at the plant. DOE programs began in 1995 and have focused on developing full-scope simulators for operator training, performing detailed safety assessments, and providing safety parameter display systems. Specific management and safety improvements include a full-scope simulator for Unit 1, operator exchange programs, delivery of components for the Unit 3 full-scope simulator, training methodology improvements, a computer with network capabilities, and staff training. Six ultrasonic flaw detectors were delivered. An in-depth safety assessment of Unit 1 was undertaken in 1999.[1] Enhanced security measures have been completed at the NPP, but no internal security improvements have been made to eliminate the threat of an "insider" stealing nuclear material.[2]
Sources:
[1] Pacific Northwest Laboratories website, http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/?profiles/south_ukraine/su.
[2] NISNP discussions with Ukrainian government official, June 1999, UKR990600. {Entered 3/2/2000 GD}
Location: Energodar
Subordination: Enerhoatom
Type: VVER-1000, model 320
Units: Six
Unit 1: initial criticality 9/84 (operational 4/85)
Unit 2: initial criticality 6/85 (operational 10/85)
Unit 3: initial criticality 4/86 (operational 1/87)
Unit 4: initial criticality 12/87 (operational 1/88)
Unit 5: initial criticality 6/89 (operational 10/89)
Unit 6: in 10/95 (operational immediately)
Sources:
[1] "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, September 1994, p. 71.
[2] "Power Reactors: Country-by-country Summaries," World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1995, p. 33.
[3] Ukraine Opens New Nuclear Reactor," United Press International, 6 October 1995.
[4] "Ukraine," UI News Briefing, NB95.41-1, 3-10 October 1995.
[5] "Power Reactors in Ukraine," Uranium Institute website, http://www.uilondon.org, 15 July 1996, p. 1. {Updated 8/21/96 GN}
Power: 953 MWe per operating unit
Sources:
[1] "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, September 1994, p. 71.
[2] "Power Reactors in Ukraine," Uranium Institute website, http://www.uilondon.org,, 15 July 1996, p. 1. {Updated on 8/21/96 GN}
Fuel: Enriched to 3.3-4.4 percent
[NEI World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1992, p. 104-105.]
Status: Six reactors are operating, making this plant Europe's largest with 5700 MWe.
["Interview With Mikhail Umanets: Derzhkomatom Speaks," Nukem, August 1995, p. 20.]
Safety: The US Department of Energy (DOE) has been active in improving safety at the plant. DOE programs began in 1993 and have focused on improving the safety of day-to-day plant operations, upgrading safety systems, and ensuring adequate storage facilities for spent fuel. DOE projects have included operator training (since 1994), new operating procedures and practices (1993-1997), and in-depth safety assessments (since 1996). In addition, DOE provided fire-fighting and fire-prevention materials and equipment (since 1993) as well as a dry storage system for spent fuel (since 1994).
DOE Management and Operational Safety upgrades include drafts of a new set of emergency operating instructions for both operators and management; an operator exchange program, upgrades to the full-scope simulator for Unit 5, simulator instructor training sessions, computer equipment and peripherals, utilization of the Systematic Approach to Training methodology from the Khmelnytskyy NPP , and staff training that focuses on internal quality assurance audits.
DOE Engineering and Technology upgrades include the delivery of fire-resistant sealant materials, fire detectors, sprinkler heads, fire fighting equipment, technology transfer to a Ukrainian company (Askenn Concern) that manufactures fire-resistant doors, delivery of equipment to inspect steam-generator tubing, and the delivery of 12 ultrasonic flaw detectors.
DOE Fuel Cycle Safety upgrades include a project to provide three spent fuel dry-storage casks, a cask transporter, training for the use of this equipment, a construction license from the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety , and procedures for the dry-cask storage system.
Lastly, in the Nuclear Safety in an Institutional and Regulatory Framework area, DOE improvements include training Ukrainian regulators to use new analytical tools for evaluating dry-storage safety compliance and creating a national standard for quality assurance at nuclear facilities.
[Pacific Northwest Laboratories Web Site, http://insp.pnl.gov:2080/.../za_history .] {Entered 3/28/2000 GD}
Location: Prypyat
Type: RBMK-1000
Units: Four (All units have been shut down)
Unit 1: initial criticality 8/77 (operational 5/78)
Unit 2: initial criticality 11/78 (operational 5/79)
Unit 3: initial criticality 6/81 (operational 6/82)
Unit 4: initial criticality 11/83 (operational 12/83)
["World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1995," Nuclear Engineering International, p. 33.] {Entered 1/17/97 MEW}
Power:
Unit 1: 700 MWe
Unit 2: 700 MWe
Unit 3: 925 MWe
Fuel: Enriched to three levels: 1.8, 2.0 and 2.4 percent
According to Andriy Glukhov, 1.8 percent enriched fuel has not been used for more than one year and is currently only being stored in spent fuel ponds in reactor halls and in an AFR SFSF (Away From Reactors Spent Fuel Storage Facility), which is located on-site. More on spent fuel and radioactive waste.
[Correspondence with Andriy Glukhov, Head of the Safeguards and Safe Transportation Department in the UkrSCNRS, January 1995.]
Status: Unit 1: shut down on 11/30/96.[1]
Unit 2: A fire at Unit 2 resulted in its shutdown in 10/91.[2] More on safety at Chornobyl.
Unit 3: Shut down on 15 December 2000.[3]
Unit 4: destroyed in the 4/86 disaster.[4]
Sources:
[1] Ann MacLachlan, "Ukraine Shuts Chernobyl-1, Fulfilling Promise To West," Nucleonics Week, 5 December 1996, p. 14.
[2] Peter Coryn, "Ukraine: Restoration Continues at Chornobyl-2," Nucleonics Week, 4 May 1995, p. 20.
[3] "15 dekabrya v 13.15 ostanovlen reaktor tretego energobloka ChAES," UNIAN, No. 50, 11-17 December 2000.
[4] Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukraine To Shut Down Aging Chornobyl Reactor," OMRI Daily Digest, 25 June 1996. {Updated 3/23/01 RG}
Comments: Construction was reportedly halted on a fifth and sixth unit after the 1986 accident. Units 1 and 3 were shut down in 1991 after an accident at the similar Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (at Sosnovyy Bor) in Russia, but were restarted in December and October of 1992, respectively. The restart decision was taken against the advice of the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (UkrSCNRS--Derzhkomatom). UkrSCNRS managed to secure the down-rating of Unit 1 to 80 percent of its nominal (gross) capacity of 1000 MWe. In accordance with Ukraine's vow to the G-7 to shut down the entire Chornobyl NPP and to fulfill the requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1995, Unit 1 was shut down on 30 November 1996, leaving Unit 3 as the only unit operational until it was finally shut down on 15 December 2000.[6]
Sources:
[1] "Chornobyl Reactors Will Never Operate Again, Sherbak Says," Nucleonics Week, 5/28/92, p. 1, 7-8.
[2] William C. Potter, "The Future of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Safety in the Former Soviet Union," Nuclear News, 3/93, pp. 61-67.
[3] CISNP interview with Ukrainian nuclear official, 8/94.
[4] Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukrainian Experts Devise Plan for Chornobyl Shutdown," OMRI Daily Digest, Vol. 1, No. 94, 5/16/95.
[5] Alex Brall, "Ukraine Proposes Schedule For Shutting Chornobyl Units," Nucleonics Week, 6/1/95, pp. 7-8. {Entered 1/17/97, MEW}
[6] Kirill Razumovskiy, "Dlya etogo atomnuyu stantsiyu nado snova otkryt," Kommersant, 14 December 2000.
{Updated 3/23/01 RG}
See also:
Chornobyl Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Developments
Chornobyl Shutdown and Western Aid Developments
Chornobyl Shutdown Background Report
Chornobyl NPP Safety and Contamination Developments
Chornobyl Fuel and Energy Background Report
4/5/2004: Thieves of Nuclear Plant Equipment Arrested in Ukraine
At a 5 April 2004 press-conference, Mykola Tomilovych, department head at the Rivne Oblast Prosecutor’s Office, announced that the police directorate for fighting organized crime in Kuznetsovsk arrested five men on suspicion of stealing equipment from the Rivne nuclear power plant. According to Tomilovych, four employees of the Rivne NPP bribed a security officer working at the plant’s checkpoint to pass through security and stole a piece of the plant’s equipment—the reactor’s evaporator heating chamber. [It is likely that the piece of stolen equipment, which the Ukrainian press and media identifies as "the reactor’s evaporator heating chamber" is actually the spare evaporator from the condensate treatment system of the VVER-440 reactor. The evaporator, which in the condensate treatment system is linked with the reactor coolant and can be described as a heating chamber, is relatively small and portable. Because the evaporator was a spare, it was not contaminated with radioactivity and therefore could have been stolen without exposing the thieves to harmful radiation.[4]] The perpetrators paid the security officer 400 hryvnyas ($77 as of April 2004) for the service.[1,2,3] Initial reports suggested that the bribed checkpoint worker was a warrant officer serving at a military unit guarding the Rivne NPP, but the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense later stated that the warrant officer had no relation to the military because NPPs in Ukraine are guarded by units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[3]
The thieves sold the stolen piece of equipment to a local scrap metal collection station for a mere 1,600 hryvnyas ($309 as of April 2004), while experts estimated its cost at 800,000 hryvnyas ($154,000 as of April 2004). The device was not in service at the time of the theft, so operations at the Rivne NPP were not affected. The four plant workers were charged under Article 185, part 5 (Large-Scale Theft) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and Article 369 (Bribery). The security officer was charged under Article 368 (Bribe taking).[1,2]
4/2/2003: GERMAN SPECIALISTS UPGRADE FIRE SAFETY OF SOUTH UKRAINE NPP
Podrobnosti reported on 2 April 2003 that, according to Enerhoatom, specialists from the German firm Brandschutz were working at the South Ukraine NPP to improve its fire safety. German specialists will also train NPP personnel to use the new equipment. South Ukraine NPP has been using Brandschutz equipment since 1999.
2/21/2003 SOUTH UKRAINE NPP RECEIVES TACIS-FUNDED SAFETY EQUIPMENT
UNIAN reported on 21 February 2003 that the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) received instruments for automatic monitoring of water quality. The equipment is scheduled to be installed by the end of the first quarter of 2003 on Unit 3, and will be used to measure water quality in the turbine section and the steam generators. The instruments were produced by the French firm ELTA, and were provided via European Union’s TACIS program.
2/14/2003: US SPECIALISTS ASSIST ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP
From 10 to 14 February 2003, safety experts from the US firm Westinghouse studied a project to develop and implement comprehensive emergency procedures at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, whose Unit 5 has been chosen as a pilot VVER-type reactor to introduce such procedures. The procedures are to be fully implemented by the end of 2004, and will then be applied at other units of the NPP. Westinghouse experts also plan to visit other Ukrainian NPPs. Prior to their visit to Zaporizhzhya NPP, Westinghouse specialists, together with representatives of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the Argonne National Laboratory, held talks with specialists from Enerhoatom and Ukraine’s NPPs on the emergency procedures project.
2/10/2003: JAPANESE SPECIALISTS TRAIN UKRAINIAN REACTOR PERSONNEL
UNIAN reported on 10 February 2003 that a delegation of specialists from the Japan Electric Power Information Center (JEPIC) visited the South Ukraine nuclear power plant (NPP). The visit was part of a program of international cooperation on NPP safety. The Japanese experts remarked that South Ukraine NPP personnel left a positive impression, and that they intend to continue cooperation in this area. Three South Ukraine NPP specialists visited Japan in 2002 where they received instruction in NPP safety procedures.
12/5/2002: GERMAN DELEGATION CITES INADEQUATE REACTOR SAFETY EFFORTS
Interfax reported on 5 December 2002 that a German delegation of the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, headed by the Director General of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Wolfgang Renneberg, spent three days familiarizing itself with the work on the closing of the Chornobyl NPP. According to the German experts, Ukraine is not spending enough on nuclear safety. Wolfgang Renneberg also said that if Ukraine were to perform a risk-benefit analysis of its nuclear energy program, the risks would most likely outweigh the benefits.
[“Nemetskiye eksperty polagayut, chto Ukraine sleduyet tratit bolshe sredstv na podderzhaniye yadernoy bezopasnosti,” Interfax, 5 December 2002.] {Entered 5/13/2003 MJ}
10/4/2002: QUALITY OF NPP OPERATORS QUESTIONED
Rivne vechirne reported on 4 October 2002 that over 10 employees of the Rivne NPP had false higher education diplomas that they had purchased for $500-600. The holders of false Odessa National Polyte3chnic University diplomas were employed in administrative and engineering positions at the NPP. The revelation has prompted an investigation by the oblast prosecutor's office and anti-organized crime directorate.[1] An Enerhoatom commission was dispatched to investigate. Individuals accused of purchasing university diplomas remained at their jobs, however. NPP management stated this was justified because none of the individuals in question worked in positions affecting reactor safety. According to the head of the department for public relations at Rivne NPP, Oleksiy Kiskiy, the licensing process for reactor operators is so strict that it excludes the possibility of unqualified personnel occupying such positions.[2] However, the Ukrainian nuclear power industry is experiencing a problem retaining qualified cadres. Only 40% of reactor operators are willing to remain at their jobs; 280 left Ukraine in the last three years. Enerhoatom is attempting to stem the outflow of expensively trained specialists by introducing new social programs. However, funding of these programs would require the tripling of electricity tariffs.[3]
8/15/2002: TULUB ON CONDITION OF UKRAINIAN REACTORS
Izvestiya reported on 15 August 2002 that during a visit to the city of Slavutych, Enerhoatom president Serhiy Tulub assessed the depreciation of Ukrainian power reactors' thermomechanical equipment at 56%, and electrical and control systems at 60%. Only major financial investments can improve the situation, according to the article.
8/6/2002: RIVNE, KHMELNYTSKYY NPP CONSTRUCTION ACCELERATED
Interfax Ukraine reported on 6 August 2002 that the funding rate for the construction of new reactors at Rivne and Khmelnytskiy NPPs has been doubled, from 700,000 hryvnyas (about $126,000) per day to 1.4 million hryvnyas (about $252,000) per day. The reactors are to become operational in 2004. While Enerhoatom is funding the project using its own resources, it is also planning to continue negotiations with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) concerning financial assistance for the project.[1] Enerhoatom is also ignoring the suit against the construction of the two reactors brought by Serhiy Konyukhov of the Public Committee for State Security of Ukraine, a Ukrainian non-governmental environmental organization (for more information, see the 5/25/2002 entry, below). Although a district court in Kiev agreed to consider the suit, as of 19 August 2002 Enerhoatom had not received an official notice to stop construction.[2]
5/25/2002: PROTESTS AGAINST NEW REACTOR CONSTRUCTION
The Public Committee for State Security of Ukraine has called upon Russia to refuse financial support for the construction of additional reactors at Rivne and Khmelnytskyy NPPs. The committee's message to the Russian State Duma claims such involvement is not advantageous to either country, may incur financial risks, and damage relations. Moreover, according to the committee, there are safety-related concerns over the construction of the two reactors, and the design documentation is obsolete, placing even the legality of their construction in doubt. Russia has offered assistance of up to $500 million, including $140 million in the form of credits for manufactured products, but the Ukrainian government has made it clear that it does not need Russian products worth that amount, since all necessary Russian equipment has already been purchased.[1] On 20 June 2002, protest rallies were held in Kharkiv against the signing by Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov of an agreement on joint completion of the two reactors. The protesters demanded that reactor construction be halted and called on the two prime ministers to focus on modernizing already existing reactors.[2]
4/10/2002: RUSSIA TO FINANCE REACTOR CONSTRUCTION
On 10 April 2002, following talks with Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced that Russia will loan Ukraine $45 million to finance the construction of new reactors at the Rivne and Khmelnytskyy NPPs. The loans will finance the final stages of construction and final equipment supplies.
4/9/2002: UKRAINE AND EBRD MAKE PROGRESS ON REACTOR CREDITS
Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh announced on 9 April 2002 that Ukraine and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) had made progress on the details of financing the construction of additional reactors at the Rivne and Khmelnytskiy NPPs. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine is to determine how to address the issue of electricity tariffs to ensure the project is profitable by the end of June 2002. This announcement follows the January 2002 agreement between Ukraine and the EBRD to reduce the cost of the two reactors, and to change some of the EBRD's conditions.
3/20/2002: UKRAINE PREPARED TO HIRE IGNALINA NPP WORKERS
Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh announced on 20 March 2002 that Ukraine is ready to offer specialists working at Lithuania's Ignalina NPP employment at the new reactors at Rivne and Khmelnytskiy NPPs. Kinakh made the statement following high-level talks between the governments of Ukraine and Lithuania. Ignalina NPP is to be shut down by 2009 as part of Lithuania's efforts to join the European Union. Kinakh also offered Lithuania assistance in shutting down its nuclear reactors.
11/29/2001: UKRAINE REJECTS EBRD REQUIREMENTS, LOOKS TO RUSSIA
On 29 November 2001, the government of Ukraine rejected the requirements put forth by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to grant $1.5 billion in credit for the construction of two reactors at Rivne and Khmelnytskiy NPPs. Ukraine decided to seek funding from Russia instead, and on 4 December 2001 Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov reached a preliminary agreement on a loan for Ukraine of over $200 million, beginning with $60 million in 2002. Although the total value of Russian funding is considerably less than the EBRD credit, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has called the original EBRD cost estimate "overblown," and said Ukrainian experts assured him the entire project could be completed for just $600 million. Kuchma also complained that whereas initially EBRD only required Ukraine to close the Chornobyl NPP as a condition for the credits, the list of demands later grew to the point that it became unacceptable to Ukraine.
7/23/2001: UKRAINE TO BUILD TWO NEW POWER REACTORS
UNIAN reported that during a meeting with US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Richard Meserve, Ukranian Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh announced that Ukraine intends to construct two new power reactors. Kinakh also stressed the need for Western financial assistance for the realization of this project. Kinakh believes that this aid will ensure safety of Ukrainian atomic energy.
12/15/2000: UKRAINE SHUTS DOWN FINAL REACTOR AT CHORNOBYL, SEEKS COMPENSATION
On 15 December 2000, Unit 3, the last operating reactor at the Chornobyl nuclear power station, was officially shut down by its chief engineer in front of news cameras.[1] In a Memorandum signed in 1995, Ukraine had committed itself to shut down the Chornobyl nuclear power station no later than 2000. In exchange for the shutdown, the Memorandum promises international aid to Ukraine to finance decommissioning operations at Chornobyl and compensate for the loss in energy production.[2] Ukraine plans to replace the lost power by completing two reactors in Khmelnytskiy and Rivne, pending loans from the EBRD and Euroatom.[3] President Kuchma stressed the need for this aid and also stated that questions remain concerning the economic and social effects of the power plant closure on the residents near the Chornobyl power station.[4] For more information on loans and compensation provided by the Memorandum, see the 4/22/97, 3/18/97, 11/14/96, and 6/6/96 entries in the Chornobyl Shutdown and Western Aid Developments section.
6/26/2000: REFORMS PLANNED FOR ENERHOATOM
The government of Ukraine is planning to create a state joint stock company uniting all of its nuclear power plants. This process is part of the restructuring of Enerhoatom, which was begun in June 2000 on instructions from the Fuel and Energy Ministry to convert all energy sector enterprises into corporations. According to Enerhoatom's acting president Volodymyr Bronnykov, the government will issue a resolution on corporatizing Enerhoatom by the end of 2000. Nuclear power plants will form detached subdivisions of the new joint stock company.
6/22/2000: ENERHOATOM CHARGED WITH TAX EVASION
On 22 June 2000, Nucleonics Week reported that the government of Ukraine has brought criminal charges of tax evasion against Enerhoatom. The charges resulted from an audit by a special investigative group established within Ukraine's State Tax Administration.[1] In remarks made after President Clinton's visit to Kiev, President Leonid Kuchma blamed the crisis in Ukraine's nuclear sector on "unscrupulous officials and businessmen," including former managers of Enerhoatom, and accused them of attempting to destroy the company. Kuchma also indicated that some nuclear power plants needed to be investigated as well.[2] Experts, however, noted that Enerhoatom's tax liability is caused by flaws in Ukrainian tax legislation. While Enerhoatom is receiving payments for only a portion of delivered electricity, NPP taxes are calculated on the basis of generated power, rather than revenues from electricity sales. Adding to the controversy surrounding Enerhoatom, Deputy Prime Minister for Fuel Yulia Tymoshenko accused Peoples' Deputy Hryhoriy Surkis of saddling Enerhoatom with a $1.2 billion debt. Surkis, who has major investments in Ukrainian energy companies and reportedly has good relations with Leonid Kuchma, denies the charges.[3]
6/13/2000: CRIMEA NPP CANCELLED
The government of Ukraine decided to stop construction of the incomplete Crimea NPP, according to a statement by the Ukrainian governmental press service. Construction of Crimea NPP began in 1976 but no progress has been made since 1989. Part of the equipment used on the construction site has been moved to other NPPs.
5/16/2000: UKRAINE MAY HOLD NEW TENDER FOR RIVNE AND KHMELNYTSKYY NPP CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
Yulia Tymoshenko, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, told Interfax on 16 May 2000 that the government may hold a new tender for the Rivne and Khmelnytskyy NPP construction projects if the present contractor [not named in report] does not lower its price. The original tender was for the amount of $1.4 billion, however the contractor then presented a figure of $2 billion to complete the work. Tymoshenko said that if the contractor does not lower its price to the original figure, Ukraine can legally hold a new tender for the contract.
4/26/2000: ENERHOATOM VICE-PRESIDENT PAINTS BLEAK PICTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY
In a 26 April 2000 interview in Holos Ukrayiny, Mykola Steynberg, vice-president of Enerhoatom, stated that the Ukrainian nuclear energy industry was on the verge of collapse. According to Steynberg, the biggest problem facing the industry is the lack of payment by energy customers. Enerhoatom is attempting to collect revenue by signing six-month futures contracts with Ukrainian businesses and industries. In addition, Steynberg noted that cut-backs in repairs at NPPs, a disregard for safety regulations, and the movement of skilled personnel to profitable sectors of the economy had become serious problems.
4/14/2000: ALBRIGHT REAFFIRMS US COMMITMENT TO KHARKIV INITIATIVE
During her April 2000 visit to Ukraine, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reaffirmed US commitment to the Kharkiv Initiative. On 14 April 2000, she highlighted several previous and ongoing programs the United States has supported in Kharkiv Oblast since the initiative began in June 1998. Programs include the provision of $18 million in aid to regional hospitals, training for local businessmen, and support for small and medium businesses. Albright emphasized that other areas of the Ukrainian economy have been positively affected by the programs. She cited the US-funded nuclear fuel diversification program, $7 million in US aid to support Ukrainian science, and support for Ukraine's membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). US Ambassador to Ukraine Stephen Pifer will coordinate further US efforts, Albright stated.
2/14/2000: ENERHOATOM HEAD FIRED AMID REPORTS OF ALLEGED CORRUPTION
Mykola Dudchencko, the head of Ukraine's state owned energy company Enerhoatom, and Enerhoatom first vice-president Tetyana Amosova were fired February 14 amid corruption allegations. Management problems at Enerhoatom are long-standing. An August 1998 report, which was recently released to the press, details several instances of mismanagement, corruption, and improper business practices. In particular, the report stated that the company's management expenses in 1998-1999 were 190 times higher than permitted. Dudchenko, who headed Enerhoatom since 1999, has been replaced by Volodymyr Bronnykov, the former director of the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
2/2000: US TO AID NUCLEAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Ukraine's Nuclear Regulatory Administration (NRA) signed an agreement whereby the US will fund research on nuclear safety in Ukraine. According to NRA head Oleksandr Smyshlyayev, the NRC has embarked on a four- to five-year program to improve the effectiveness of the NRA, through the provision of consultants and financing. The NRC has already been providing the NRA with technical equipment for the past seven years. Future NRC assistance will focus on the same areas as US DOE aid: analyzing the safety of nuclear reactors (required for licensing), licensing work on alternative nuclear fuel for Ukrainian NPPs, adopting new criteria for spent fuel storage, completing a new automated reactor control system, and decreasing radiation received by NPP personnel. Smyshlyayev noted that the NRC program was flexible, so its focus might change in future. He noted that this was particularly important as the NRA did not receive sufficient funding from the Ukrainian budget: in 1999 it received only half the funds it was promised.
12/27/99: ENERHOATOM HEIGHTENS SECURITY AT ALL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AFTER INCIDENT AT SOUTH UKRAINE NPP
For more information, please see the 12/27/99 entry in the South Ukraine NPP Developments section.
11/26/99: KUCHMA CREATES NUCLEAR ENERGY DIRECTORATE
President Kuchma signed a decree on 26 November 1999 entitled On the State Directorate for Nuclear Energy. The Directorate is a central executive body subordinate to the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy. Its responsibilities include managing nuclear energy use, handling radioactive waste, developing and implementing state policies for the nuclear sector, and creating a domestic nuclear fuel cycle.
10/31/99: UKRAINE WILL NOT CHANGE DECISION CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL FROM BUSHEHR DEAL
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told reporters on 30 October 1999 that Ukraine has no plans to withdraw from its decision not to build turbines for the Bushehr NPP. "We have made a definitive decision and are not going to change it," Kuchma stated. For more information on this issue, see the 10/4/99 entry below.
10/99: UKRAINE HOPES TO TRADE RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET DEBTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
10/4/99: NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION: WESTINGHOUSE
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
10/4/99: FURTHER PRESSURE ON UKRAINE TO RECONSIDER BUSHEHR TURBINE DEAL
UNIAN reported on 4 October 1999 that a source close to the presidential administration said Russia will include Ukrainian companies in Indian and Chinese NPP construction projects only if Ukraine reconsiders its decision not to build turbines for the Bushehr NPP in Iran. UNIAN's source stated that Ukrinterenerho, a state enterprise for foreign trade, will lobby the Ukrainian government and presidential administration for Ukrainian inclusion in foreign construction projects. For more information about Ukraine's withdrawal from the Bushehr deal, see the 1/31/99 entry below.
8/13/99: DRAFT AGREEMENT ON UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN-KAZAKHSTANI JOINT VENTURE NUCLEAR FUEL PRODUCTION APPROVED
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
7/17/99: DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR FUEL FROM RUSSIA TO UKRAINE DELAYED
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
6/4/99: EBRD TO FUND CONVERSION OF UNFINISHED CRIMEAN NPP
According to Serhiy Yermilov, chariman of the KrymEnergo joint stock company , the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has agreed to fund reconstruction of the unfinished Crimean NPP (located in Shcholkino). The NPP will be turned into a natural gas-burning power plant.
4/22/99: AUDIT REVEALS UNAUTHORIZED SPENDING
On 22 April 1999, the UNIAN news agency reported that a Ukrainian Accounts Chamber audit of the Ministry of Energy and its predecessors (the Ministry of Power Engineering and Electrification and the State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy) has uncovered misappropriations totalling 972.6 million hryvnyas (approximately $249 million). The Ministry of Energy had created six extrabudgetary funds with money earmarked for covering operating costs at domestic nuclear power plants. The Accounts Chamber also discovered violations involving the fund for creating a national nuclear fuel cycle. From 1996-1997, the fund received 647.7 million hryvnyas (approximately $165.6 million) less than records indicated it had received.
4/2/99: FORMER ICBM MANUFACTURER KHARTRON BUILDS NPP EQUIPMENT
Khartron, a former manufacturer of RS-20 [SS-18 'Satan'] and RS-18 [SS-19 'Stiletto'] ICBMs, has converted 95 percent of its production facilities to non-military purposes.[1] In 1994, together with the US company Westinghouse, Khartron created the Westron joint venture specializing in the production of control systems for Ukrainian NPPs. Westron is the first joint venture set up with the use of Nunn-Lugar funds.[2] Khartron is also supplying pressurized units for an international space station.[1]
4/99: UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS REDUCE OUTPUT AS A RESULT OF FUEL SHORTAGES
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
3/18/99: UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WORKERS POSTPONE STRIKE
Ukrainian nuclear power plant workers decided to postpone a scheduled strike over unpaid wages until the Constitutional Court reviews the current labor legislation prohibiting strikes in the nuclear power sector. The strike was planned for 22 March 1999 and was supposed to involve all employees, except those necessary to ensure stable operation of the nuclear reactors. The protest actions over unpaid wages meanwhile continue.[1] The Ukrainian government allocated 120 million hryvnyas ($30 million) to pay wage arrears; the amount will, however, be distributed between employees of both the nuclear and non-nuclear power sectors.[2]
2/18/99: PROTESTS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ESCALATE, TENT CAMPS SET UP
In February 1999, thousands of Ukrainian nuclear power plant workers launched protests demanding the payment of their wages and wage arrears. On 18 February 1999 about 700 employees from nuclear power plants picketed at the Ukrainian government headquarters in Kiev.[2] Protests developed at all five Ukrainian nuclear power plants during the following week, after a promise made by senior government officials to provide 390 million hryvnyas ($108 million) to pay delayed salaries went unfulfilled.[3] Seeing no progress, the workers held rallies and started to set up tent camps.[4] The protesters are depriving themselves of food and sleep and are prepared to launch an industry-wide hunger strike if their demands are not met.[1,3] The situation could impact safety at the power plants.[5] A conference of Enerhoatom employees recognized the validity of the workers' demands and approved the protest action. The conference also appealed to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to fulfill the government's agreements concerning salaries for nuclear power plant workers.[6] According to some sources, the salary debt totals 150 million hryvnyas ($42 million),[4,5,7,8] while other sources indicated 52 million hryvnyas ($15 million).[1,2]
2/8/99: EXPERTS SEE NUCLEAR ENERGY CRISIS AS NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT
Twenty-eight managers and senior experts involved in the Ukrainian nuclear field addressed an appeal to President Leonid Kuchma, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Tkachenko, and Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko, in which they stated that "the deep and many-sided crisis in nuclear energy poses a direct threat to Ukraine's national security." The appeal points out the deteriorating state of the Ukrainian nuclear industry, demonstrated by problems with the Ukrainian power grid, which poses a potential threat to safe nuclear power plant operations, and by a lack of resources for maintaining a proper level of output.
2/8/99: KUCHMA BANS BARTER ON WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET AT UNREGULATED RATES
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma issued a resolution effective 1 January 1999, banning barter transactions on the wholesale energy market at unregulated rates.
1/31/99: "KHARKIV INITIATIVE" NOT LIVING UP TO UKRAINIAN EXPECTATIONS
Ukraine's withdrawal from the $240 million Bushehr project in March 1998 was finalized after the United States agreed to compensate Kharkiv regional businesses and government. The "Kharkiv Initiative" began in June 1998. As part of the initiative, the United States agreed to back Ukraine's membership in the MTCR. Membership in MTCR allows Ukraine to export space launch vehicle technology.[1] However, Ukraine's satellite-launch business was set back after the crash of a Zenit rocket. Kharkiv's Governor, Oleg Demin, has said he is still waiting to see concrete results from the initiative. Turboatom, which held the Bushehr contract, has suggested other possible areas of cooperation. These include joint projects to upgrade Ukrainian NPP safety with equipment produced in both the United States and Ukraine, and a joint US-Ukrainian venture to produce turbine blades, which Ukraine currently imports from Russia. US ambassador to Ukraine Stephen Pifer offered his support, but stated that the United States cannot force US businesses to invest in any of these projects.[2] In an interview in the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo nedeli, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that the US Department of Commerce would publish a guide for US companies considering projects in the Kharkiv region. In addition, the United States Agency for International Development and Kharkiv Oblast are preparing a contract for the business analysis of and strategic planning for Kharkiv Oblast.[3] For more information on the progress of the "Kharkiv Initiative," see the 12/6/98entry below.
12/6/98: "KHARKIV INITIATIVE" MOVES AHEAD AFTER VISIT BY US OFFICIAL
The United States Coordinator for NIS assistance,William Taylor, visited Kharkiv on 6 December to explore further options for US investment in the region. The "Kharkiv Initiative" began as a US aid program for industries affected by Ukraine's withdrawal from the Bushehr turbine deal. For more details, see the overview Ukraine, Bushehr and the MTCR.
11/20/98: KUCHMA ORDERS INVESTIGATION OF PROFIT CONCEALMENT AND TAX EVASION
On 20 November 1998, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma ordered an investigation of allegations that Ukrainian NPPs concealed profits from using $1.1 billion worth of nuclear fuel supplied by Russia in exchange for Ukrainian warheads. They have also been charged with failure to pay taxes on revenues generated by use of the fuel.
9/29/98: AGREEMENT ON WAGE ARREARS REACHED AFTER PROTESTS
Protests by Ukraine's nuclear power sector workers ended on 29 September, after the Ukrainian government and union leaders signed an agreement on paying wages and debts.[1] The protesters from Ukraine's five nuclear power plants were expressing anger over a several month delay in wage payments. There were approximately 3,000 workers demonstrating at the Zaporizhzhya and South Ukraine NPPs. 300 protesters gathered in Kiev at government headquarters.[2] The government agreed to use a portion of the money normally allotted for nuclear fuel purchases to pay monthly wages. In the government's new plan, overdue wages will be paid by the end of the year with the help of 29.3 million hryvnyas ($ 7.6 million) allocated specifically for this purpose and revenue from a value-added tax on the sale of nuclear electricity.[1] The workers are, however, also concerned with the loss of value of their delayed wages due to the currency devaluation.[2] The protests were carried out in spite of Ukrainian legislation prohibiting such actions.[3] Operations at the five nuclear power plants were not affected by the protests.[2]
7/21/98: US VICE-PRESIDENT AL GORE VISITS UKRAINE
In July 1998, US Vice-President Al Gore visited Ukraine on the occasion of the second Kuchma-Gore committee meeting (US-Ukraine Binational Commission). During the meeting, both sides agreed on cooperation in enhancing the safety of Ukraine's nuclear power plants and establishing a radiation and ecology research laboratory in the International Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma complimented US-Ukrainian cooperation on international security issues, specifically in the areas of nuclear arms nonproliferation, missile technology controls, and developing a military-political partnership. Gore, on the other hand, favorably assessed Ukraine's nuclear disarmament initiatives. [1,2] He also said that, as part of the "Kharkiv Initiative," the United States will organize a business development trip to the United States for officials in Kharkiv's power sector.[3]
6/16/98: UNITED STATES AND UKRAINE BEGIN "KHARKIV INITIATIVE"
Representatives from several US government departments and agencies, along with US Ambassador to Ukraine Stephen Pifer, arrived in Kharkiv to discuss investment options in the region. The group planned to address the the negative economic consequences of Ukraine's decision not to participate in supplying turbines to the Bushehr NPP in Iran. Ukraine has lost $260 million and Turboatom, the company which held the contract, is reported to have lost $5 million.[1] The Kharkiv Oblast association of businessmen and entrepreneurs, Hranit, believes that thousands of jobs were lost, and has asked President Leonid Kuchma to reconsider the decision.[2] For more information, see the 3/6/98 entry below.
3/6/98: UKRAINE WITHDRAWS FROM PLAN TO SUPPLY TURBINES TO BUSHEHR NPP
After a meeting with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko announced that Ukraine had cancelled Turboatom's plans to supply two turbines to the Bushehr NPP in Iran. For more information see the overview Ukraine, Bushehr, and the MTCR.
4/97: UKRAINE WARNS AGAINST JOINT FUEL PRODUCTION VENTURE WITH RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
11/1/96: NUCLEAR POWER ENERGY TO BE SOLD ONLY THROUGH REGIONAL ENERGY SYSTEMS
Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko met with the directors and chief engineers of nuclear power plants to discuss the sale of nuclear power. Lazarenko said that electricity generated by Ukrainian nuclear power plants would only be sold through regional, not private, companies.
10/26/96: MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY CREATED
The Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council approved the creation of a Ministry of Atomic Energy which would oversee all nuclear issues, with an emphasis on safety standards. The new Ministry will possess greater authority than that of the State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Energy.
10/18/96: DIFFICULTIES IN ENERGY SYSTEM
According to the Ministry of Power and Electrification, Ukraine's energy system could collapse at any time. Emergency shutdown of generating unit No.1 at Khmelnytskyy nuclear power station and reductions in capacity at Chornobyl, Rivne and South Ukrainian nuclear power stations have caused Ukraine to operate its electricity engineering system at frequencies between 49.01 and 49.2 Hz.
10/8/96: BELARUS PLAN FOR ARMY FIRING EXERCISE IN CHORNOBYL ZONE IS BEING STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY UKRAINIAN SCIENTISTS
During his trip to the Chornobyl contaminated Gomel region, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenko proposed a large-scale army excercise with field firing to be conducted in the depopulated zone. According to 'Segodnya', Defence Ministries staff had already worked out the plan of excercise, triggering a great deal of criticism from Ukrainian scientific circles. According to Vasil Nesterenko, director of the Institute of Radiation Safety, "such an ill-considered experiment may cause a disaster by spreading radioactivity to areas that have not been affected yet".
9/19/96: NUCLEAR ENERGY CHAIRMAN COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR
Viktor Chebrov, Chairman of the Ukrainian State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Energy, said that as of 9/96, the nuclear power sector produced nearly 45% of Ukraine's total electric power output, but in early 1996 had been paid for just over half of the nuclear power produced--3 percent in cash and 50 percent in services. Chebrov said that while approximately 8,500 nuclear specialists emigrated to Russia in 1993-1994 due to economic difficulties, the situation has stabilized. As for future plans, Chebrov said that the Russian company TVEL had won a tender to create a complete nuclear fuel cycle in Ukraine.
7/28/96: NEW CORPORATION FORMED TO SELL NUCLEAR-GENERATED ELECTRICITY
A new corporation, UkrEnerhoAtom, has been established in Ukraine to sell electricity produced by Ukrainian nuclear power plants. According to an anonymous source at the Chornobyl press center, power sales will be conducted on a territorial level, directly with consumers. However, it is still unclear in what way the energy market shares for each of the five Ukrainian nuclear power plants will be stipulated. According to Chornobyl plant manager Serhiy Parashyn, who is one of the founders of UkrEnerhoAtom, the decision to create the enterprise was made by a council of directors from each of the five nuclear power plants. However, the new corporation will not be involved in the plants' operations and thus will have no responsibility for the reactors' operational safety. It is expected that Ukrainian nuclear power plants will be able to sell electric power directly to customers with payments remitted to the corporate account of the new corporation, thus avoiding the intermediate services of the Energy Ministry, which currently sells all types of power. None of the corporation's business activities will be carried out independently; all of these activities will be capitalized solely by the plants. The president of UkrEnerhoAtom will be elected by the corporation's Board of Directors. It was decided that the corporate headquarters will be located in Enerhodar (Zaporizhzhya NPP) and that the new company's charter will be completed at the second meeting of the Board in 9/96.
7/1/96: 30 WORKERS GO ON HUNGER STRIKE AT CHORNOBYL
According to Ukrainian State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy (Derzhkomatom) spokesman Leonid Kostiuk, 30 workers of the Chornobyl construction department went on a hunger strike demanding payment of several months of back wages. Other employees of the Chornobyl construction department have been on strike since 6/15/95. The main cause of the difficult financial situation at Chornobyl is that consumers are not paying for electricity. In addition, the plant's employees have been paid almost nothing from the state budget allocations for Chornobyl because the plant's management had to cover repair and maintenance expenses first. The total number of participants of both hunger and regular strikes is 129.
7/1/96: LOWER RATES BUT IMMEDIATE PAYMENT
The Ukrainian government decided to allow Ukrainian power plants to sell electricity at slightly lower rates to those customers who pay for it in full immediately rather than purchasing it on credit. Ukrainian customers and enterprises owe more than $700 million in electricity bills to Ukrainian nuclear power plants.
7/96: EUROPEAN COMPANIES OFFER TO HELP FINISH 3 VVER REACTORS
Three European companies, Electricite de France (EDF), Tractabel of Belgium, and IVO of Finland have indicated their willingness to participate in the completion of three unfinished VVER-type reactors--Khmelnytskyy-2, Rivne-2, and Zaporizhzhya-6.
5/25/96: GREENPEACE ON TAZHLYTSKA NPP PROJECT
The Mykolaiv "Greenpeace" association sent an appeal to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma regarding his plans to go ahead with the Tazhlytska NPP project. (Further information on this project is not available at this time.) The appeal points out that, according to expert analysis, the project is harmful both from the point of view of the environment, and the economy.
5/24/96: ONLY $20 MILLION OF $86 MILLION RECEIVED
According to Minister of the Environment Yuriy Kostenko, of $86 million planned for safety maintenance through the winter period of 1996, nuclear power plants have received only $20 million. This, plus the non-payment of $180 million in wages to nuclear plant employees, has created a situation where many nuclear power plants cannot carry out repair work.
5/15/96: UKRAINE ADOPTS NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN THROUGH 2010. WILL IT WORK?
The Verkhovna Rada approved "Ukraine's National Energy Program Through 2010." The program emphasizes independence for Ukraine in the area of electricity, to be achieved through the restructuring of the electricity sector, construction of thermal power plants, and development of the nuclear energy sector. The program envisages that in 2010 50% of Ukraine's electricity will be produced by thermal power plants, 40% by nuclear power plants, and 10% by alternative sources, Oleksandr Kozhuchko, Chairman of the Rada Commission on the Fuel-Energy Complex, told INTERFAX. In the first three months of 1996, nuclear power plants produced 46% of electricity in Ukraine, an increase in comparison with the corresponding figure of 38% in 1995. Thermal power plants produced less than 50% of electricity in the first three months of 1996. The national Energy Program also envisages the development of coal and gas industries. The Rada instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to work out measures aimed at the realization of the Program, and to make additions and corrections to the National Energy Program as necessary, depending on the changes in the socio-economic situation in Ukraine.
4/15/96: COULD UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT STOP BRAIN-DRAIN?
According to Nur Nihmatullin, head of Derzhkomatom, the nuclear industry in Ukraine is one of the three best paid sectors, along with banking and oil. Top industry officials in Ukraine now earn monthly salaries of about $500--about seven times the average wage. In the initial days after the collapse of the Soviet Union, hundreds of nuclear specialists fled from Ukraine to Russia, attracted by salaries four times higher. After the 1990 moratorium on the construction of nuclear power stations in Ukraine was scrapped in 1993, Derzhkomatom persuaded the government to raise salaries. Nuclear industry officials now see themselves as a vehicle for saving the national economy and view with deep suspicion Western criticism of their Soviet-era technology.
4-6/96: ENERHOATOM TO BE SET UP
According to a draft submitted by President Leonid Kuchma, a national generating company called Enerhoatom will be set up based on Ukraine's nuclear power plants. The basic proposal originated in Derzhkomatom, which says that the reform will be completed by 12/96. Enerhoatom is expected to supervise nuclear power stations and sales of nuclear electricity, handle fuel purchases, improve the safety culture at NPPs, and organize training and NPP staff. The board of the new company will be composed of Ukrainian NPP managers. Mykhailo Umanets, former Chairman of Derzhkomatom and a major proponent of providing more freedom in the nuclear sector, is acting as a consultant on the planned changes.
4/27/96:UKRAINIAN-CHINESE COOPERATION ON THE PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY
In Beijing, a representative of the Ukrainian State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy (Derzhkomatom) and a representative of the People's Republic of China signed an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. The Agreement foresees cooperation in the mining and milling of uranium ore, scientific research and design work for VVER reactors, work on the construction of nuclear power plants and safety at these plants.
4/1/96: UKRAINE HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY NUCLEAR FUEL RODS FROM RUSSIA
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
3/16/96: NPPS PROVIDE 45% OF UKRAINE'S ELECTRICITY
According to the Commission of Nuclear Policy and Environmental Safety, in 3/96 Ukraine's nuclear power plants in were producing 45% of the electricity in Ukraine.
3/12/96: UKRAINE REDUCED SUPPLIES OF POWER FOR 7000 FACTORIES
Ukraine was forced to cut off or substantially reduce supplies of power for 7000 of the 40,000 factories which have not paid their energy bills. Outstanding bills reportedly total approximately $980 million.
3/96: UKRAINIAN REACTORS' LOAD FACTORS THROUGH 3/96
According to a Western study, none of the 15 power reactors in Ukraine has achieved an annual load factor of over 80%, but five of them achieved an annual load factor of over 70%. Ukraine's average annual load factor for power units was 59% by the end of 3/96. The country's RBMK reactors had an average load factor of 66.9% over the past 12 months and the average lifetime load factor at these reactors was 63.1%. In the case of Ukrainian VVER-1000 reactors, the annual load factor was 62.6% and the lifetime load factor totaled 63.0%.
2/21/96: KUCHMA PROPOSES JOINT COMMISSION WITH GORE
During a meeting at the US White House, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma proposed that the United States and Ukraine create a joint commission on energy to be chaired by Kuchma and US Vice President Al Gore. Kuchma also invited Gore to visit Kiev on the tenth anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster and requested that the Chornobyl issue be raised at the 4/19-20/96 summit of G-7 leaders in Moscow.
2/12/96: RUSSIA REMOVES UKRAINE FROM JOINT POWER GRID FOR THE SECOND TIME
Russia removed Ukraine from their joint power grid for the second time in two months after it noted a surge in demand that the grid could not handle. The frequency of the current in Ukraine's power grid dropped from 49.5 to 49.23 Hz. Russian Energy Ministry spokeswoman Oksana Liven said that it was unlikely that Ukraine would be reconnected in the near future. The cut-off has forced a number of factories to close and Kiev is considering temporarily closing major industrial sites to prevent the collapse of the entire system. According to the Ukrainian National Dispatchers Center, the drop in Ukrainian power output that prompted the cut-off was caused by a coal-miners strike and an emergency shutdown of Unit 2 at the South Ukraine NPP.
1/96: NUCLEAR POWER CONTINUES TO THRIVE IN UKRAINE
Ukraine's nuclear power plants produced 50% of Ukraine's electricity in 1/96.
1/31/96: UKRAINIAN NPPs WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS
The State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy confirmed that Ukrainian NPPs will be equipped with automated control systems (ASTUP) developed at Khartron in Kharkiv. The first ASTUP will be set up at the beginning of 1997. In 1998, the system will be installed at South Ukraine 1 and Khmelnytskyy 1. In 1999, it will be installed in South Ukraine 2 and 3. By 2002, ASTUP should be installed on almost every Ukrainian reactor. The "Eastern Economist" reports that this system was created by a Westinghouse (United States)-Khartron joint venture. Westinghouse reportedly invested $200 million in the project, a figure matched by the US Department of Energy. This source also reports that the first ASTUP will be installed at Zaporizhzhya 1.
1/25/96: ZAGRANATOMENERGOSTROY WILL BUILD TURBINES FOR BUSHEHR PLANT
Kharkiv's Turboatom plant is expected to sign a production contract in the first quarter of 1996 with Moscow's ZagranAtomEnergoStroy to build two turbines for the Iranian nuclear power plant in Bushehr. Original construction was started in the early 1980s by the Moscow firm and Siemens, but was halted due to an international embargo against the sale and development of nuclear technology in Iran.
1/24/96: SHORTCOMINGS IN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
A plenary meeting of the central committee of the trade unions of nuclear power workers recommended that the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, the central committee of trade unions, and the sector's trade union committees should eliminate shortcomings in the industry and improve conditions and work safety at nuclear enterprises.
1/18/96: 23% OF ELECTRIC ENERGY WILL BE SOLD DIRECTLY TO CONSUMERS
According to According to the Deputy Minister of Energy Valentiyn Bondarenko, due to the Ministry of Energy's inability to pay the power industry on time, the Cabinet of Ministers has allowed NPPs to sell 23% of electric energy directly to consumers.
1/16/96: UKRAINE'S NPPs COULD MEET 20% OF NECESSARY STANDARDS
Nur Nihmatullin, the first deputy chairman of Derzhkomatom, reported that the allocations in the state budget for nuclear safety are such that Ukraine's NPPs are only able to meet 20% of necessary standards. In 1996, the sector will have to contend with the fact that 70% of the equipment at nuclear power plants is obsolete and four units will need to be halted for renovations which the sector cannot presently fund. Derzhkomatom plans to increase addressed sales of electric power as part of an effort to form a market for electricity in Ukraine.
1995: UKRAINE PROVIDES MORE ELECTRICITY BUT NUMBER OF EMERGENCIES IS LARGE
Reportedly, Ukrainian NPPs provided 2.4% more electricity in 1995 than in 1994 which accounted for 36.7% of the total energy output for the entire year. (NUCNET NEWS reported that NPPs provided 34.2% of Ukraine's electricity in 1994.) NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL reported that in the winter of 1995 NPPs provided 40% of Ukraine's electricity. The planned supply of electricity from NPPs for 1995 was 34.3% and nuclear power's installed capacity share is only 26.2% in Ukraine. The average load factor, according to NUCNET NEWS, was 61.8%. In addition, electricity production by Ukraine's nuclear power plants in 1995 was only 92% of that in 1990. There were 85 emergencies in 1995; one of these emergencies was at Chornobyl and rated a level three (it was only reported in 3/96), ten were rated as level 1 and the rest were level 0 on the INES scale.
1995: ELECTRICITY GENERATION INCREASED BY 2.5%
According to Derzhkomatom officials, there was a 2.5% increase in electricity generation in 1995. However, consumer debt totaling $54 million is preventing Ukraine from purchasing enough nuclear fuel from Russia to keep its stations operational. The industry also does not have enough money to replace outmoded equipment at Ukrainian NPPs.
12/20/95: UKRAINIAN-CANADIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT
Ukraine and Canada signed a nuclear co-operation agreement which allows for bilateral trade of nuclear material and equipment to help Ukraine with its energy needs.
12/20/95: WILL UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY BE PRIVATIZED?
It was reported that a proposal to privatize Ukraine's nuclear power industry has been discussed in Derzhkomatom. Mikhailo Umanets warned that a stabilization fund must be set up before the NPPs can be transferred to the private sector. The ex-director of the Zaporizhzhya NPP, Volodymyr Bronnikov, was against the idea of privatizing the nuclear power industry.
12/18/95: UKRAINE'S POWER GRID RECONNECTED TO RUSSIAN
It was reported that Ukraine's power grid was reconnected to the Russian power grid, raising the frequency of current in Ukraine's grid to 49.6-49.7 Hz.
12/14/95: UKRAINE COULD REDUCE OVERALL POWER CONSUMPTION BY 5-10%
The Global Energy Saving Strategy for Ukraine, under the auspices of TACIS, estimated potential energy saving in Ukraine at 26% of present demand. It predicted that with almost zero costs, Ukraine could reduce overall power consumption by 5-10% within two years. Greenpeace presented a report in late 10/95 which showed that energy consumption between 1990-94 dropped by 30.8%. This report claims that only 55.2% of the country's electricity generating capacity is actually being utilized.
12/5/95: RUSSIA DISCONNECTS UKRAINE FROM JOINT POWER GRID
Russia disconnected Ukraine from a joint power grid for using too much power. Oleksandr Voyevoda, an engineer at the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy, said the surge in Ukrainian consumption was due to the shutdown of a Zaporizhzhya reactor (see 12/5/95 in Zaporizhzhya Comments) and hoped that Russia would bring Ukraine back on line when Zaporizhzhya reactors 4 and 5 are repaired. After being disconnected, the frequency of the current in Ukraine's power grid dropped from 49.6 to 49.2-49.3 Hz. When the current is this low the situation is referred to as critical because the stability of the current is in jeopardy.
11/95: NPPs SUPPLY 37% OF TOTAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION
In the first 11 months of 1995, NPPs reportedly supplied 37% of Ukraine’s electricity.
10-11/95: UKRAINE PLANS TO EXPAND NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
Mikhailo Umanets reported at an international nuclear power symposium that by the year 2000 Ukraine plans to expand the nuclear infrastructure in Ukraine from 34.2% to 40% of domestic electrical power by commissioning Zaporizhzhya-6, Rivne-4, and Khmelnytskyy -2 and 4.
10/25/95: $225 MILLION WERE ALLOCATED TO UKRAINE
The US Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (H.R. 1868) allocated $225 million to Ukraine. $50 million is for improving safety of nuclear reactors and improving energy self-sufficiency. $2 million is for an energy distribution study.
9/12/95: ELECTRICITY FROM UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS IS SAID TO BE 20% CHEAPER THAN OTHER PLANTS
Chairman of Derzhkomatom Mikhail Umanets reported that electricity generated by Ukrainian nuclear power stations is 20% cheaper than that produced by conventional thermal plants. He also stated that Ukraine intends to complete construction of all those nuclear units on which construction has started.
9/1/95: NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING COMPLEX LEADERS APPEAL TO KUCHMA
An appeal was made to President Kuchma from the trade union leaders of the enterprises in the nuclear power engineering complex. Foremost amongst their concerns were the payment crisis and the need to ensure accident-free operation of the enterprises.
9/1/95: UKRAINE'S ENERGY SITUATION IS WORSE THAN LAST YEAR
A government official reported that Ukraine's energy situation is much worse than last year. The government had planned to stockpile 10 tons of coal, but instead has been burning it to meet power needs. The Cabinet of Ministers will soon discuss the possibility of scheduled cut-offs in response to limited power resources.
9/95: $426 MILLION IS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
According to Derzhkomatom, $426 million is needed to maintain operations of existing nuclear power plants during 1995. Derzhkomatom Chairman Mykhailo Umanets hopes that if the NPPs are kept operational nuclear output will increase by 50 percent by 2020. According to Nur Nihmatullin, much of this will depend on Ukraine's ability to raise foreign loans.
9/95: UKRAINE IS PLANNING TO RESTRUCTURE ITS ENERGY SECTOR
Nur Nihmatullin announced that Ukraine is planning to restructure its energy sector by establishing six thermal generating companies and one nuclear generating company. These will all be state controlled and not joint stock companies.
8/9/95: UKRAINE AND RUSSIA RE-SYNCHRONIZED ELECTRICITY GRIDS
Ukraine and Russia have now re-synchronized their electricity grids after an 18 month separation accompanied by operating problems. The two states hope that this move will facilitate greater operational stability.
8/10/95: APPEAL TO INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY
An appeal to President Kuchma was made by Vasyl Synko, Chairman of the Kiev region State Administration; Valeriy Shmarov, Defense Minister; Boris Olinyk, member of the Supreme Rada and the Rada Commission on Foreign Affairs and CIS Relations; Boris Paton, President of the National Academy of Sciences; Mikhailo Umanets, Chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy; Oleksandr Osakhovskyy, president of the Servispromatom Joint-Stock Company; and Kostiantyn Prodyn, public activist. This appeal proposed setting up at Chornobyl an international center for Nuclear Safety, to be founded by the presidents of the states which extract and process uranium, operate nuclear power plants, and manufacture nuclear weapons. Initially, this would only include the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the United States. This appeal made economic arguments in favor of the center.
8/10/95: NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS DROPPED IN 1995
It was reported by the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy (SCUAE) that the number of regime violations in the first half of 1995 dropped by 31% in comparison to the first six months of 1994. In the first half of 1995, 47% of electricity supplies, worth around $250 million, went unpaid. The nuclear power plants (NPPs) contributed 38.6 billion kWh or 39.1% of Ukraine's overall electricity output in the first half of 1995. Only eight reactors are functioning as of August 3, according to the public relations office of SCUAE. Their total output is 5,312 mw. The SCUAE reports that the 5 NPPs contributed only 32.2% of the overall electricity output in 1994. Of the 53 incidents in the first seven months of 1995, 29 occurred at Zaporizhzhya and only one at Chornobyl. Chornobyl accounted for 6.9% of the total electricity output in Ukraine, the highest production level for any Ukrainian NPP.
7/13/95: LICENSES WILL REDUCE CHORNOBYL-TYPE ACCIDENTS
Organizations that operate nuclear power stations will be required to obtain licenses, according to Yuriy Kostenko, Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety. This procedure is practiced in many other countries and should reduce the risk of another Chornobyl-type accident occurring again.
7/13/95: NO UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS HAVE REQUISITE ONE-YEAR SUPPLY OF FUEL
According to Yuriy Kostenko, none of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants has the requisite one year supply of fresh nuclear fuel.
7/95: WATER "DEFICIT" WILL INCREASE
It is estimated that by 2000 Ukraine's rivers will not be able to supply the 16 billion cubic meters of water needed for the safe operation of all of its power plants. This will increase the water "deficit" four-fold since 1984.
6/29/95: SYMPOSIUM ON REACTOR SAFETY: MORE PROBLEMS THAN RESULTS
A three-day symposium on reactor safety and energy policy was held in Germany, at which Ukrainian and Russian nuclear experts admitted that there were serious problems in their national nuclear power stations. They blamed their desperate economic situations and stated that Western aid is not being provided quickly enough. Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety blamed shoddy Soviet equipment and poorly trained personnel for the relatively high number of incidents at Ukrainian plants. Another problem is that much of the equipment is operating beyond its lifetime but Ukraine has no money to replace the old equipment. Other questions to be resolved include guaranteeing the supply of nuclear fuel, waste management for spent fuel rods, and the embrittlement of reactor shells of older power stations. There are more than 4,000 spent fuel rods sitting in cooling installations that are "filled to the brim." Dry storage pools are going to be set up on-site at the plants.
6/15/95: CONSORTIUM WILL ASSIST IN COMPLETING TWO POWER UNITS
Electricite de France (EDF), Tractebel Energy Engineering (TEE), and IVO International have formed a consortium and won a EC contract to assist Derzhkomatom complete two VVER-1000 power units (Rivne-4 and Khmelnytskyy -2). The contract, worth more $3.97 million, has not been signed yet. This contract may include financing for Unit 6 at Zaporizhzhya, which has been completed by Ukraine with no international assistance.
6/12/95: SPENT FUEL IS REPROCESSED IN KRASNOYARSK
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
6/95: UKRAINIAN ANNUAL LOAD FACTOR
Ukraine's average annual load factor was 62.2%. The lifetime average load factor is 65.1%. PWRs had the highest annual load factor, 63.3% annual and 65.6% lifetime. RBMKs were 56.0% annual and 61.7% lifetime. The highest annual load factors were at Rivne 1 and 2, followed by Zaporizhzhya 4.
6/95: NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS REPRESENTED 25% OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION
In the first half of 1995, nuclear power supplied 39.1% of total power generation in Ukraine while nuclear power plants represented 25% of total potential electricity generation.
6/95: TACIS AID TO BE PROVIDED TO UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS AND FACILITIES
The State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy and the EC Commission agreed to a general sum of 53.5 million ECU for the TACIS '92, '93, and '94 programs. 25.5 million ECU will be used to purchase equipment and 28 million ECU will be used for engineering work. Currently, funds from TACIS '92 and '93 are being used for: 8 projects totaling 9.5 million ECU with 4.5 million ECU for equipment at the South Ukraine NPP; 11 projects totaling 9.5 million ECU with 4.5 million for equipment at the Rivne NPP; 3 projects totaling 5.5 million with 3.0 million for equipment at the Zaporizhzhya NPP; 1 project totaling 1.5 million ECU at the Chornobyl NPP; 1 project totaling 1 million ECU at the Kiev and Kharkiv Institutes; and 9 projects totaling 8 million ECU, with 2 million ECU going toward a simulator of a VVER 440/213, at the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy. As of 12/94 contracts had been signed with French, Danish, and German companies.
5/18/95: DERZHKOMATOM PROPOSES REORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
Derzhkomatom has proposed reorganizing Ukraine's nuclear industry as a government-owned holding company that operates through branch companies and joint-stock enterprises. These firms would produce electricity and manage the nuclear fuel cycle. Such reform is necessary in order for Ukraine to develop a market economy; additionally, this will allow the crucial tasks that the nuclear industry performs to continue, in spite of the dire economic straits that Ukraine is in.
3/20/95: DERZHKOMATOM WILL BE UNITED WITH MINENERGO
A draft Presidential decree circulating in Kiev that would unite Derzhkomatom and Minenergo has received the support of top Derzhkomatom officials; this is an effort to create a unified national nuclear infrastructure. First Deputy Chairman of Derzhkomatom Nur Nihmatullin stated that it was a good proposal that would facilitate the establishment of a system for dealing with radioactive waste as well as a support system for the nuclear industry. Chairman of Derzhkomatom Mikhailo Umanets supports the idea as long as the new organization assumes complete responsibility for all problems related to the nuclear fuel cycle.
3/14/95: BROOKHAVEN LABORATORY WILL PROVIDE ANALYTICAL SIMULATORS
In late 1994 Brookhaven National Laboratory provided Ukraine with a full-scale simulator for training plant operators. The Lab is planning now to provide Ukraine with analytical simulators that are designed to train government regulatory officials, rather than plant operators. These simulators are being provided under the auspices of the Lisbon Initiative.
3/14/95: GOVERNMENT FUNDS WILL BE APPROPRIATED FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR
President Kuchma has issued a new decree that calls for the appropriation of government funds for the nuclear energy sector. The State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy will allocate some of the money for the completion of Unit 6 at Zaporizhzhya.
3/9/95: WESTINGHOUSE-KHARTRON AGREEMENT
Westinghouse and Khartron have signed an agreement worth $200,000 in which the feasibility of using Westinghouse's Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technology on 10 VVER-1000 reactors will be investigated. Westinghouse will provide $200,000 and Khartron will provide the other half.
3/2/95: NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY PERSONNEL WILL NOT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUALITY OF WORK
Derzhkomatom informed the government that the financial situation is so dire for the nuclear power industry that its personnel will no longer accept responsibility for the quality of work performed at the plants. Spring and summer repairs have been postponed. The nuclear plants require $224 million for fresh fuel in 1995 but Derzhkomatom has only $93 million. The lack of finances has required power cutbacks at Chornobyl and the same could happen at other plants as well. Ukraine had plans to purchase spare parts worth $52 million, but that has been put on hold indefinitely. Fresh fuel was delivered to Rivne just as Unit 1 required refueling. The fuel for Rivne was paid out of a general fuel fund for all nuclear plants in Ukraine, but that resulted in a lack of finances to purchase fuel for Unit 1 at the South Ukraine plant.
2/27/95: THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REQUESTS ADDITIONAL MONEY
The Department of Energy (DOE) has requested an additional $83.8 million for reactor safety upgrades in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine and Russia are to receive the bulk of the money--$78.8 million. The shut-down of Chornobyl is one of the projects this money will be used for. DOE FY 95 funding included $11 million for a simulator at Khmelnytskyy as well as $75 million for activities in both Russia and Ukraine.
2/16/95: UKRAINIAN NPPS DENY THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
The managers of most of Ukraine's nuclear power plants are protesting the lack of funding they are receiving, and denying their responsibility to perform maintenance and safety procedures. During the course of the past three years, the nuclear power industry provided Ukraine with more than 80 trillion karbovantsi, yet received in appropriations only 16 percent of the total value of the power they produced.
2/13/95: KIEV MAINTAINS THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FUEL RODS ARE LOW-QUALITY
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
1/12/95: ALL UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE OPERATIONAL
All 14 of Ukraine's nuclear power plants are currently operational. The 14 units are Chornobyl 1 and 3, Rivne 1-3, Khmelnytskyy 1, South Ukraine 1-3, and Zaporizhzhya 1-5.
1/12/95: TECNATOM WILL DELIVER NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIPMENT TO ZAPORIZHZHYA
Tecnatom, a Spanish company that specializes in non-destructive examination equipment, plans to $2 million worth of nuclear safety equipment to Zaporizhzhya beginning in 9/95; this is the first contract under which a western company will directly supply equipment to a Ukrainian plant. Zaporizhzhya will pay Tecnatom directly; the money is being raised through barter deals with uranium. This contract is separate from the EU's TACIS program, which is being held up due to third-party liability problems. Tecnatom is not concerned about third-party liability because its contract specifies that all responsibility ends once the equipment is tested successfully.
1/11/95: TASK FORCE DISCUSSES POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY PRIVATIZING
Derzhkomatom has created a task force to discuss the possibility of privatizing the nuclear power industry. The task force includes individuals from nuclear power stations as well as from uranium mining facilities, and engineering plants. The process of privatization would be very complex in Ukraine because the nuclear enterprises encompass many other facilities.
1/1/95: UKRAINE'S ELECTRICITY PRODUCED BY NUCLEAR POWER
The proportion of Ukraine's electricity produced by nuclear power reached a high of 52 percent at certain times during 1994, despite the fact that the total output of nuclear-generated electricity dropped as a result of unscheduled reactor shut-downs. This was because Ukraine experienced a decline of 16 percent in thermal stations' electricity generation. The proportion of nuclear-produced electricity averaged 38 percent.
1/95: NUCLEAR LEGISLATION DISORGANIZED
Nikolai Steinberg stated that Ukraine's nuclear power complex is functioning basically without a nuclear safety infrastructure as a result of funding crises, political crises, and indecision as to whether or not certain reactors will be shut down and started up. One problem is that there is no nuclear energy law; instead, there are 15 different laws that deal with the nuclear industry indirectly. The nuclear law that has been drafted has yet to be ratified by the Rada due to political wrangling.
1/95: THREE NEW VVER-1000S WILL BE CONSTRUCTED
A German-Belgium consortium led by Lahmeyer International has finalized plans to complete the construction of three new VVER-1000s at Khmelnytskyy -2, Rivne-4, and Zaporizhzhya-6. The project is being funded by the EU's TACIS program. It is estimated that the start-up of all three units will cost $950 million.
1994: 125 REGIME VIOLATIONS IN TEN MONTHS - 4 EVENTS OFF SCALE, 112 LEVEL-0 EVENTS, 26 LEVEL-1 EVENTS, 2 LEVEL-2 EVENTS
At the five Ukrainian NPPs, there were 125 regime violations in ten months of 1994. The highest number of violations was at the Zaporizhzhya plant (57). The lowest number was at Chornobyl ("only 13"). NUCLEAR EUROPE WORLDSCAN reported that in 1994 there were 144 events reported to the IAEA. According to the INES scale, 4 events were out of scale, 112 events were level 0, 26 were level 1, and 2 events were level 2. In addition, the reported total production in 1994 was 68.8 billion kWh, the nuclear share of electricity output was 34.2%, the average load factor was 61.4%, and the total capacity of the 14 units in operation was 12,818 Mwe.
1994: NO PROGRESS IN COOPERATION WITH WEST
Nuclear power plants provided 34.2% of Ukraine's electricity in 1994. In 1994, Ukraine under-produced 17.5 billion kWh, while corresponding figure for 1993 was 9 billion kWh. There were 133 malfunctions on the Ukrainian NPPs, down 20% from 1993 (167 malfunctions.) Malfunctions included 30 shutdowns, 28 malfunctions that lead to the reduction of reactor capacity, and 75 malfunctions that did not. On average, there were 9.7 malfunctions per reactor. Cooperation of Derzhkomatom with the Western partners did not progress in 1994 due to the lack of Ukrainian legislature governing responsibility for nuclear damage resulting from accidents on the nuclear facilities. Therefore, cooperation did not progress with TACIS ($66 million), with Germany on the improvement of the safeguard at the Rivne NPP ($20 million), cooperation under the Lisbon initiative ($30 million), and cooperation with foreign governments and firms to create in Ukraine enterprises producing nuclear fuel ($120 million). Also no progress was made on $20 million project to manufacture advanced instrumentation and control systems for the Ukrainian VVERs at Weston (a joint venture between Westinghouse and Khartron Product Association.)
1994: ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION FALLS
In 1994, 59.8% of electricity generation was from fossil fuel, down from 62.4% in 1993; 34.1% was from nuclear power, up from 32.7%; and 6.1% was from hydro power and other sources, up from 4.9%. Total electricity production fell from 229.9 TWh to 193.5 Twh.
1994: WORLD'S NINTH TOP PRODUCER OF NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY
In 1994, Ukraine was the world's 9th top producer of nuclear electricity, producing 68.85 billion kilowatt hours.
1994: UKRAINE'S ELECTRICITY DURING THE WINTER
Nuclear power plants provided 43.7% of Ukraine's electricity during the winter months of 1994.
12/22/94: ENERGY DEPARTMENT EXPANDS; LEVEL OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION FALLS
According to Volodymyr Usatenko, consultant to the Rada Commission on the Problems of the Chornobyl Disaster, the power industry was being split in December into two parts. If the split occurred, nuclear power would come under the jurisdiction of Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov and fossil fuel would come under the jurisdiction of Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Dyuba. Ukraine's energy consumption level has fallen in recent years and this consultant predicted that Ukraine's 1990 energy consumption level would only be attained again in 2110. Usatenko went on to say, "The unbridled expansion of the nuclear energy department is...leading the country into an economic and ecological catastrophe."
12/94: UKRAINE'S ENERGY SITUATION IS DIRE
According to Deputy Premier Anatoly Dyuba, Ukraine's energy situation for the winter is very dire. From 1-8/94, 147 TWh were produced, which just barely met demand. A decrease of 9 TWh was reportedly the result of an increase in the pricing policy, a loss in skilled workers, repeated delays in safety improvements, and inadequate fuel supplies. In south-eastern Ukraine, daily electricity shut-downs have become routine as a result of fuel shortages.
11/24/94: UKRAINE RECEIVES RUSSIAN FUEL BUT OFTEN TOO LATE
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
11/24/94: ONE-THIRD OF UKRAINE'S THERMAL GENERATING PLANTS ARE NOT OPERATING
According to Heorhiy Kopchinsky, head of Ukraine's Nukom, the importance of nuclear power generation increased during the last year. Nuclear plants in Ukraine account for 24 percent of the installed generating capacity, yet in 1994 they produced 33 percent of Ukraine's electricity. However, since the plants are not receiving the revenue due them, they are having difficulty procuring spare parts and fuel and all safety improvement plans have been temporarily halted. According to Kopchinsky, one-third of Ukraine's thermal generating plants are not operating due to a lack of fossil fuel. Ukraine produces only 44 percent of its fuel supply and currently owes more than $2.5 billion for oil and natural gas imports. Kopchinsky commented that even at the highest levels of government there is a lack of a safety culture.
11/21/94: CANADA PROMISES $200 MILLION FOR UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR UPGRADES
Canada has promised to provide an additional $200 million for safety upgrades to Ukrainian nuclear reactors. It will also provide Ukraine with $100 million so it can repay its energy debts.
11/17/94: RUSSIA PROVIDED MORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES THAN PLANNED
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
11/11-17/94: NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION IS GROWING
Electricity consumption fell from 268.3 GWh in 1991 to 226.2 GWH in 1993, which, according to Nikolai Steinberg of the SCNRS, reflects a decrease in electricity demand. The nuclear component of Ukraine's power production is constantly growing. Ukraine is ranked number eight in the world in terms of operational reactors and NPP output of electric power. It is ranked number seven in terms of total NPP capacity and is number twelve or thirteen in terms of percentage of electric power generated at its NPPs.
10/6/94: DERZHKOMATOM CANNOT FUND SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS
Nuclear power plants generated 39 billion kilowatt hours in the first six months of 1994, accounting for more than 38 percent of the electricity generation in Ukraine. But, Derzhkomatom can not supply the 1.6 trillion karbovantsi needed to maintain all the plants; all safety work has been halted. According to Nur Nihmatullin, more than $100 million has been lost as a result of unreliable VVER-1000 fuel rods that have gotten stuck halfway into the reactor core, making it necessary to reduce the output of the reactor by 50 percent. Fuel rod fabrication may have to be altered for the VVER-1000s and the core may be redesigned.
10/6/94: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL CENTER AT CHORNOBYL
The Kurchatov Institute and the Ukrainian National Academy of Science have proposed the creation of an International Scientific-Technical Center at Chornobyl. The goal of this joint project is to involve scientific expertise from Russia, Ukraine, and other nations to resolve many of the safety problems present at the Chornobyl site, including improving the sarcophagus, closing down the three power units currently operating, managing the radioactive wastes, and cleaning up of the land near Chornobyl. Derzhkomatom, MinChornobyl (the agency responsible for the rehabilitation of the Chornobyl area), Russia's Minatom, as well as scientific institutes in Belarus have given their support to the concept. This idea was initially proposed in 1986 but was rejected by the Soviet government; the issue was raised a second time in 1989-90, but the discussion was interrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
8/17/94: GERMANY WILL PROVIDE REMOTE MONITORING SYSTEM
According to the director of the Institute of Safety Research near Dresden, Germany, a remote monitoring system will be put into operation at Ukraine's nuclear power plants by 1995. The German institute developed the system which can help simulate defects in nuclear plants. The systems are currently being used in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Russia has expressed an interest in the system as well.
8/9/94: NUCLEAR PLANTS ARE NOT READY FOR WINTER
A familiarization tour of nuclear power plants by a government delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov was conducted in early August to check on the readiness of the plants for the winter, as well as the current state of uncompleted reactors at Zaporizhzhya, Khmelnytskyy , and Rivne. It was determined that the plants are not sufficiently ready for winter, and that due to errors of the workers at the stations undergoing renovations, there will be further delays in opening them. The main cause for the problems among nuclear plant workers has been cited as lack of pay.
7/20/94: SPENT FUEL IS NOT TRANSPORTED FROM POWER PLANTS
Directors of Ukraine's nuclear power plants gave a statement to the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, and Parliament regarding the need for assistance for their ailing industry. The industry currently faces payment delays, problems obtaining spare parts and deliveries of materials, and a mass exodus of experienced personnel to other fields. Also cited was the fact that due to a lack of funds, spent fuel cannot be transported from the power plants.
7/94: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HELPS UKRAINE AND RECOMMENDS CLOSING CHORNOBYL
At the 7/8-10 Summit in Naples, the G-7 states offered to provide $200 million in assistance to Ukraine in an effort to reform its nuclear industry. The EC has already provided 100 million ECU and Euratom has pledged to lend 400 million ECU for this purpose. Recommendations to close Chornobyl by 1996 were made, and estimates were given that newer and safer plants (Zaporizhzhya, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyy ) could make up for the loss in energy production.
7/94: UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY IS CONCERN ABOUT SAFETY IN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY
The Ukrainian Nuclear Society (UNS) issued a letter to the President, the Speaker of the Parliament, and the Prime Minister expressing concern about safety in the nuclear power industry. The UNS, however, attested to the need to keep the plants open, citing that more than forty percent of all energy produced in Ukraine during the first half of 1994 was produced by nuclear power plants, and that nuclear energy was the least expensive type of electric energy. UNS members also said that the Chornobyl plant should not be closed in the near future, but stressed the need for urgent measures to be taken to improve the safety situation.
7/94: 33 PERCENT OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY COMES FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
According to an IAEA estimate, nearly 33 percent of Ukraine's energy in 1993 came from nuclear power plants, as compared with 25 percent in 1992. Total nuclear power generation for 1993 was 75.2 terawatt hours (TWH). The 1993 figures placed Ukraine 13th on the list of nuclear power contributions cited for 30 nations.
6/10/94: WILL RBMK REACTORS BE SHUT DOWN?
The International RBMK Project presented the findings of its one-year investigation into the safety of RBMK reactors. The Project enumerated more than 300 recommendations for improving RBMK reactors and stated that they are "not as bad as they might be, but they could be better." First-generation reactors and the Chornobyl NPP were not included in the study; when the study began, Chornobyl was set to be decommissioned. Russian and Ukrainian officials have hailed the investigation as proof that RBMK reactors need not be shut down. The international investigation found that RBMK reactors cannot be grouped into one category but must be considered individually because each reactor is different.[1] One of the main arguments of Ukrainian authorities has been that due to the lack of major differences between Chornobyl and Russian RBMKs there is no reason to demand that Chornobyl be shut down while Russia keeps its RBMKs running.[2]
6/94: KURCHATOV INSTITUTE REPORT
According to a Kurchatov Institute report, in 1992 Ukraine operated 14 nuclear power units that generated 12,818 MW(E); this was 29.4 percent of Ukraine's total electricity output. Nuclear-generated electricity is important to Ukraine due to its economic crisis and as a result, Ukraine seeks to complete a number of units under construction, including the 6th unit at Zaporizhzhya (95 percent completed), the 2nd unit at Khmelnytskyy (85 percent completed), and the 4th unit at Rivne (80 percent). Ukraine is striving to domestically produce 100 percent of its nuclear reactor fuel by 2003.
4/94: EU COMMISSION SUGGESTS CREATING PERSONNEL TRAINING CENTER
After a fact-finding mission to Chornobyl, Zaporizhzhya, and Rivne, and talks with representatives from the South Ukraine and Khmelnytskyy power plants, members of an EU Commission concluded that a national training center complete with special literature and equipment should be set up to train personnel in the nuclear power field. They recommend that the G-7 countries provide technical assistance for this project.
3/8/94: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT BEGINS WITH SEMINAR IN KIEV
A three year international project, aimed at providing technical assistance in the nuclear safety field in Ukraine, has been fully launched. The project is within the Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program of the Commission of the European Communities, and is beginning with a seminar in Kiev on licensing nuclear installations. Participants in the seminar include French and German safety experts and their Ukrainian counterparts.
2/2/94: SHORTAGES OF NUCLEAR FUEL COULD CLOSE DOWN SEVERAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
For more information on this issue, see the entry under Fuel Cycle Developments.
2/2/94: DOE AUTHORIZATION WILL PROVIDE MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT
S3 Technologies received US DOE authorization to provide materials and equipment for Unit 1 at Zaporizhzhya, Units 1-3 at Rivne, and Unit 3 at the South Ukraine plant. Approved items include materials for full-scope control room operator training simulators at the three power plants.
2/94: SWEDEN HELPS UKRAINIAN SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM
It was reported that the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) is helping Ukrainian authorities to set up a safeguards program.
["Sweden Says Launching Safeguards in Ex-USSR Is Slow Process," NUCLEAR FUEL, 2/14/94, p. 16.]
An agreement for bilateral cooperation was signed in 9/93 and includes technical and administrative assistance for establishing a safeguards system based on Swedish and international experience.
1/25/94: CONCEPT OF SECURITY STATE REGULATION
The Supreme Rada adopted a "Concept of the state regulation of security and management of nuclear industry in Ukraine."
1/18/94: SAFETY VIOLATIONS AT UKRAINIAN POWER STATIONS INCREASE
Nikolai Steinberg, head of the UkrSCNRS, announced that safety violations at Ukraine's five nuclear power stations increased by 23 percent in 1993. He gave no figures, but official statistics for 1992 listed over 100 safety violations. The problems is caused in part by Ukraine's serious financial situation and "old habits of waiting for someone else to resolve all our problems," Steinberg said.
WINTER 1994: NUCLEAR POWER WARMS IN WINTER
During the winter of 1993-94, nuclear power provided more than 40% of Ukraine's electricity.
1993: UKRAINE IS THE 13TH ON NUCLEAR POWER LIST
Total electricity generation also fell during the period from 1990-93 from 298.5 billion kWh to 230 billion kWh. Nuclear power generation for 1993 made up nearly 33% of Ukraine's total energy in 1993 (75.2 terawatt hours), compared with 25% in 1992. The 1993 figures placed Ukraine 13th on the list of nuclear power contributions cited for 30 nations. Ukraine's electricity exports also reportedly fell from 1991-93 due to a decrease in demand. As a result nuclear electricity in Ukraine has gained in relative importance.
6/1/93: HIGH RUSSIAN FUEL PRICES WILL LEAD TO EXPANSION OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
The Ukrainian nuclear power industry is finding it difficult to afford fuel. In a speech to the Supreme Rada, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma lamented the "near world-market prices" Russia is now charging for its nuclear fuel. This action provides impetus for both energy independence and the drive to expand the nuclear industry, since natural uranium is abundant in Ukraine and could be exploited if the industry expanded with CANDU reactors.
6/93: UKRAINIAN-GERMAN NUCLEAR SAFETY ACCORD
Ukraine and Germany signed a nuclear safety accord that includes exchanges of legislation on installation safety, personnel and environment safety, and licensing. It also covers exchanges of information regarding the building, running, and closing of plants. Germany also offered assistance in assessing the damage caused by Chornobyl. The Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Germany's Federal Ministry for the Environment and Radiation Safety are also obliged to notify the other in the case of a nuclear accident. The final aspect of this accord reinforces an IAEA convention ratified by Ukraine.
4/93: SUPREME RADA CONSIDERING LIFTING MORATORIUM ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW NUCLEAR PLANTS UNITS
The Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissions on Primary Industries, on the Chornobyl Cleanup as well as the Ukrainian Government will propose that the Supreme Rada lift the moratorium on the construction of three new units at the Zaporizhzhya, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyy nuclear power plants.
1/14/93: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE AGREE TO COOPERATION
Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on scientific, technical, and economic cooperation in the nuclear power industry.
7/92: RIVNE AND KHMELNYTSKYY MAY BE SHUT DOWN
It was reported that the Ukrainian Rivne-3 and Khmelnytskyy -1 VVER-1000 reactors may be forced to shut down if Russia continues to refuse to accept their spent fuel at Krasnoyarsk, in Russia.
7/92: UKRAINE MAY TURN TO CANDU-TYPE REACTORS
It was reported that Ukraine may turn to CANDU-type, heavy water reactors to decrease reliance on Russia for enriched uranium and fuel fabrication.
8/2/90: SUPREME RADA MORATORIUM
The Supreme Rada passed a resolution to impose a moratorium on construction of all new nuclear power plants in Ukraine.
4/2/2003: GERMAN SPECIALISTS UPGRADE FIRE SAFETY OF SOUTH UKRAINE NPP
Podrobnosti reported on 2 April 2003 that, according to Enerhoatom, specialists from the German firm Brandschutz were working at the South Ukraine NPP to improve its fire safety. German specialists will also train NPP personnel to use the new equipment. South Ukraine NPP has been using Brandschutz equipment since 1999.
2/21/2003 SOUTH UKRAINE NPP RECEIVES TACIS-FUNDED SAFETY EQUIPMENT
UNIAN reported on 21 February 2003 that the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) received instruments for automatic monitoring of water quality. The equipment is scheduled to be installed by the end of the first quarter of 2003 on Unit 3, and will be used to measure water quality in the turbine section and the steam generators. The instruments were produced by the French firm ELTA, and were provided via European Union’s TACIS program.
2/14/2003: US SPECIALISTS ASSIST ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP
From 10 to 14 February 2003, safety experts from the US firm Westinghouse studied a project to develop and implement comprehensive emergency procedures at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, whose Unit 5 has been chosen as a pilot VVER-type reactor to introduce such procedures. The procedures are to be fully implemented by the end of 2004, and will then be applied at other units of the NPP. Westinghouse experts also plan to visit other Ukrainian NPPs. Prior to their visit to Zaporizhzhya NPP, Westinghouse specialists, together with representatives of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the Argonne National Laboratory, held talks with specialists from Enerhoatom and Ukraine’s NPPs on the emergency procedures project.
2/10/2003: JAPANESE SPECIALISTS TRAIN UKRAINIAN REACTOR PERSONNEL
UNIAN reported on 10 February 2003 that a delegation of specialists from the Japan Electric Power Information Center (JEPIC) visited the South Ukraine nuclear power plant (NPP). The visit was part of a program of international cooperation on NPP safety. The Japanese experts remarked that South Ukraine NPP personnel left a positive impression, and that they intend to continue cooperation in this area. Three South Ukraine NPP specialists visited Japan in 2002 where they received instruction in NPP safety procedures.
12/5/2002: GERMAN DELEGATION CITES INADEQUATE REACTOR SAFETY EFFORTS
Interfax reported on 5 December 2002 that a German delegation of the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, headed by Director General of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Wolfgang Renneberg, spent three days familiarizing itself with the work on the closing of the Chornobyl NPP. According to the German experts, Ukraine is not spending enough on nuclear safety. Wolfgang Renneberg also said that if Ukraine were to perform a risk-benefit analysis of its nuclear energy program, the risks would most likely outweigh the benefits.
[“Nemetskiye eksperty polagayut, chto Ukraine sleduyet tratit bolshe sredstv na podderzhaniye yadernoy bezopasnosti,” Interfax, 5 December 2002.] {Entered 5/13/2003 MJ}
10/4/2002: QUALITY OF NPP OPERATORS QUESTIONED
Rivne vechirne reported on 4 October 2002 that over 10 employees of the Rivne NPP had false higher education diplomas that they had purchased for $500-600. The holders of false Odessa National Polyte3chnic University diplomas were employed in administrative and engineering positions at the NPP. The revelation has prompted an investigation by the oblast prosecutor's office and anti-organized crime directorate.[1] An Enerhoatom commission was dispatched to investigate. Individuals accused of purchasing university diplomas remained at their jobs, however. NPP management stated this was justified because none of the individuals in question worked in positions affecting reactor safety. According to the head of the department for public relations at Rivne NPP, Oleksiy Kiskiy, the licensing process for reactor operators is so strict that it excludes the possibility of unqualified personnel occupying such positions.[2] However, the Ukrainian nuclear power industry is experiencing a problem retaining qualified cadres. Only 40% of reactor operators are willing to remain at their jobs; 280 left Ukraine in the last three years. Enerhoatom is attempting to stem the outflow of expensively trained specialists by introducing new social programs. However, funding of these programs would require the tripling of electricity tariffs.[3]
8/15/2002: TULUB ON CONDITION OF UKRAINIAN REACTORS
Izvestiya reported on 15 August 2002 that during a visit to the city of Slavutych, Enerhoatom president Serhiy Tulub assessed the depreciation of Ukrainian power reactors' thermomechanical equipment at 56%, and electrical and control systems at 60%. Only major financial investments can improve the situation, according to the article.
6/21/2002: EUROPEAN UNION ASSISTS WITH EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM
Kyiv Post reported on 21 June 2002 that the European Union will provide assistance in establishing an emergency response system to help provide assistance in establishing an emergency response system to help prevent and manage future nuclear accidents. According to Norbert Jousten, the head of the European Commission in Ukraine, and Ukrainian Minister of the Environment Serhiy Kurykin, the system, called RODOS, has already been tested and will become operational in the near future. Seven other countries already use the system, and tests have been condu8cted in Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
5/10/2002: REACTOR MALFUNCTIONS ON THE INCREASE
Interfax reported on 10 May 2002 that a State Nuclear Regulatory Committee report on the state of nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine shows a trend toward the decreasing safety of Ukrainian nuclear reactors. According to the report, none of Ukraine's 13 active power reactors operated flawlessly in 2001. There were 57 incidents that were rated as "0" on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), and 17 that were rated as "1." In comparison, in 1996 there were 12 INES 1 events, in 1997 five, in 1998 seven, in 1999 eight, and in 2000 10 INES 1 events. The largest number of incidents was noted at Knmelnytskyy Unit 1 (15 events), followed by Rivne Unit 2 (seven events).
5/7/2002: US COMPANY HELPS IMPROVE REACTOR SAFETY
The Kyiv Post reported on 7 May 2002 that the Verkhovna rada praised the US firm GSE Systems for its efforts in assisting Khmelnytskyy NPP operators in detecting minor reactor malfunctions. The firm is working with Russian and Ukrainian subcontractors on a project organized by the US Department of Energy to improve the safety of all Ukrainian NPPs.
12/6/99: UKRAINIAN PREPARATIONS FOR Y2K QUESTIONED
US Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson told ITAR-TASS news service on 6 December that US specialists are somewhat worried by the level of preparedness at the Ukrainian nuclear power plants for dealing with the Y2K problem. He also said that two US experts would travel to Ukraine in December to ensure no serious problems would develop at Ukrainian NPPs.[1] Mohammad El-Baradei, IAEA director general, identified the Chernobyl NPP as one of three facilites lagging behind in preparing for Y2K. The other two are the Metsamor NPP in Armenia and the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania.[2]
11/30/99: UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE NPPs READY FOR YEAR 2000
On 23 November, Enerhoatom executive director for production Viktor Stovbun told reporters that all of Ukraine's NPPs are prepared for the year 2000. He said that control, protection, and safety systems will not be affected by Y2K. Enerhoatom's President, Mykola Dudchenko, said that Y2K-associated problems are possible in management and bookkeeping.[1] In a 9 December interview with UT-2 television network, Vasyl Durdynets, acting minister for emergency situations, stated he is not worried about Y2K and its implications for Ukrainian NPPs. Durdynets was concerned, however, that government officials do not often attend Y2K staff meetings.[2] Oleg Osheka, Zaporizhzhya NPP spokesman, told ITAR-TASS on 10 December that the Zaporizhzhya facility is prepared for Y2K.[3]
5/19/99: SIGNATORIES MAINTAIN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE AT CONFERENCE
For more information, see the 5/19/99 entry in the Nuclear Safety Convention entry of the Nuclear Safety Treaties file.
5/14/99: IAEA FINDS MOST UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFE
Based on the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy's annual report on safety conditions at Ukrainian nuclear power plants, the IAEA found Ukrainian nuclear power reactors to be safe, expressing only minor concern over the safety of the Chornobyl nuclear facility, Interfax reported on 14 May 1999.[1] Oleksandr Smyshlyayev, head of the Ukrainian Nuclear Regulatory Administration, however, pointed out in July 1999 that Ukraine should improve safety measures at Units 1 and 2 (VVER-440 reactors) at the Rivne nuclear power plant. He indicated that Ukraine allocates only $6-7 million annually for safety measures at each reactor, which is insufficient. Smyshlyayev said underfunding is hampering safety analysis at Ukrainian power plants, which is needed to improve the security and reliability of the reactors, avoid unplanned shutdowns, and replace outdated equipment.[2]
4/8/99: MINISTRY ORDERS PRE-Y2K COMPUTER CHECK
To prevent potential nuclear accidents arising from the so-called Y2K bug, the Nuclear Regulatory Administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety has ordered that computer software at every Ukrainian nuclear power plant be checked. Unit 6 at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant will be the first to undergo a check-up, scheduled for 22 April 1999.[1] In January, Chornobyl Director Vitaliy Tovstonohov stated that a simulation conducted on a Chornobyl-type rector had showed that the reactor is safe. Former Chornobyl Director Serhiy Parashin, however, noted that several unknowns remain.[2] Westron, a joint venture between Khartron and Westinghouse, announced in March that it has designed a "simple and inexpensive" computer program that may solve the Y2K problem in Ukrainian nuclear power plant control systems.[3] Eight Western countries have extended help to Ukraine for dealing with the technical and financial aspects of the Y2K computer problem.[4] According to Parashin, Ukraine's costs for ameliorating the Y2K problem are unofficially estimated at $50 million.[5]
9/21-25/98: UKRAINE AND SLOVAKIA SIGN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY, EARLY WARNING COOPERATION
At the 42nd General Conference of the IAEA on 21-25 September 1998, Ukraine and Slovakia signed an agreement on the timely announcement of nuclear accidents, information exchange, and cooperation in nuclear safety and radiation protection.
10/23/96: WORLD BANK APPROVES CREDIT TO UPGRADE UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS
Taking into account the future closure of Chornobyl, the World Bank's Board of Directors approved a $317 million credit for upgrading 14 nuclear reactors in Ukraine.[1] Approximately one-third of this credit will be in cash, enabling Ukraine to purchase nuclear fuel from Russia for the coming winter. The credit is part of a $900 million financial aid program, provided by the World Bank to Ukraine for 1996-1998.[2] However, Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety Yuriy Kostenko has said that the loan will not help Ukraine modernize its reactors, adding "We are just burning money in inefficient plans." Kostenko emphasized that Kiev's priority is completing the two reactors at Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4.[3]
11/16-12/7/95: THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGENCY OF JAPAN WILL HOLD THREE UKRAINIAN-JAPANESE SEMINARS ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
The Science and Technology Agency of Japan sponsored the first Ukraine-Japan seminar on nuclear safety. Three additional seminars, one on the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, another on Asian countries, and the third on radioactive waste and spent fuel management, will be commissioned yearly by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute.
9/95: UKRAINE AND BELARUS WORK ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
The Executive Committee on Hydrometerology in coordination with the Belarusian Security Council has begun work on an early warning system for accidents at nuclear power stations located near the Belarusian border. This system was referred to earlier as the "Gamma-1" system (see 5-6/95). The system located across from Ignalina is expected to be on-line by 4/96. Monitoring systems at the Belarusian borders by Smolensk (Russia), Rivne (Ukraine), and Chornobyl are anticipated to be in place by 2005. Ukraine is expected to cooperate in the development of an interstate system which will be capable of monitoring all accidents on Belarusian and Ukrainian territory.
5-6/95: MONITORING SYSTEMS WILL BE DEVELOPED IN BELARUS AND UKRAINE
A 3.5 million ECU contract within the framework of the TACIS program was signed by the German firm Hormann Systemtechnik to develop the "Gamma-1" system in Ukraine and Belarus. This system will monitor the Rivne and Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Ukraine and the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania. The system will have 47 units to monitor gamma radiation, one unit to monitor concentrations of alpha and beta aerosols, and two units to monitor gamma activity in the water. In addition, there will be 5 mobile stations, 3 local stations, and 2 national monitoring centers.
4/18/95: UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR LAW ENTERS INTO FORCE Ukraine's nuclear law "On the Use of Atomic Energy" passed by the Verkhovna Rada on 2/8/95 has entered into force by decree of President Kuchma. The Rada has approved a resolution that relieves foreign firms from civil responsibility in the case of a nuclear accident. This resolution, which will only be legally binding once the corresponding legislation is adopted, should clear the way for Western companies to become more involved in safety improvement work in Ukraine. Mykhailo Pavlovskyi, Chairman of the Rada Standing Commission for Nuclear Policies and Nuclear Security, said that the Verkhovna Rada laid the basis for the ratification of the Vienna Convention when it passed the law "On the Use of Atomic Energy and Radiation Safety." The Supreme Rada intends to pass additional "by-laws" specifying how the law "On the Use of Atomic Energy" will be implemented, especially in terms of state liability. The current Ukrainian law does not channel liability for nuclear damage to the installation operator. It does, however, channel "complete responsibility" to the NPP owner, with no evidence needed except the mere fact of an accident's occurrence.
10/24/94: RADA CONSIDERS DRAFT LAW
The draft law on "Nuclear Energy Utilization and Radiation Safety" was submitted to the Supreme Rada of Ukraine.
5/4/98: CHORNOBYL CHIEF DISMISSED
Serhiy Parashin was fired from his position as plant manager of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant for "crude violation of his duties and executive discipline."[1,3,5,7] The dismissal came partly in response to a letter Parashin sent to President Leonid Kuchma and to the Ministry of Energy in which he expressed his opposition to the operating principles of Enerhoatom, Ukraine's national energy company.[1,2,3,5,6] In Parashin's opinion, Enerhoatom was organized too hastily and violated nuclear legislation by failing to procure a proper license to run nuclear power plants.[2,3,5] In an interview conducted after his dismissal, Parashin stated that under the present system "no one bears juridical responsibility." According to Parashin, Ukraine's nuclear energy industry is ". . . returning to a system under which safety becomes a secondary thing and carrying out supervisors' orders is a primary thing."[6] In addition to these complaints, Parashin did not support plans by Enerhoatom to close Chornobyl by 2000.[6,7] Nur Nigmatullin, president of Enerhoatom, viewed Parashin's direct appeal to Kuchma as a violation of the principle of subordination, and stated that "by speculating on the notion of responsibility for the safety of a nuclear facility, Parashin groundlessly claimed that nuclear legislation had been violated in the process of reorganizing Ukrainian nuclear power plants and suggested suspending the regulating documents of Enerhoatom."[1,2] Parashin was replaced by Vitaliy Tovstonohov, a representative of Enerhoatom and former chief engineer at Chornobyl.[3,4,5]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 4 May 1998; in "Chernobyl Chief Dismissed for 'Crude Violations' of Duties," FBIS-SOV-98-124.
[2] Interfax, 5 May 1998; in "Chornobyl Ex-Director Views Reasons for Dismissal," FBIS-SOV-98-125.
[3] Interfax, 6 May 1998; in "Political Overtones Seen Behind Chornobyl Manager Dismissal," FBIS-SOV-98-135.
[4] Interfax, 5 May 1998, "Novyy i.o. generalnogo direktora chernobylskoy AES uveren v neobkhodimosti sushchestvovaniya kompanii 'Energoatom'."
[5] Vitaliy Portnikov, "Chernobylskoy radiatsii dali novogo direktora," Russkiy telegraf online edition http://www.mosinfo.ru:8080/news/rtf/index.html, 6 May 1998.
[6] Volodymyr Zamanskyy and Iryna Titova, "The Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant Director Has Been Dismissed. What is Next?" Kiyevskiye vedomosti, 11 May 1998, p. 6; in "Former Chornobyl Director on his Dismissal," FBIS-SOV-98-149, 29 May 1998.
[7] Olga Musafirova, "Otstranen direktor Chernobylskoy AES," Komsomolskaya pravda, 6 May 1998, p. 1. {Entered 6/3/98 SP}
3/26/97: CHORNOBYL DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL SAYS RESTART OF UNIT 2 UNLIKELY
On 3/26/97, Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) Deputy Director-General Vasyl Omelchenko stated that bringing Unit 2 back on line was inadvisable. He said that with the proper financing, materials, staff, and equipment, reactor No. 2 could be restarted no sooner than the second quarter of 1998, at a cost of $150 to $200 million (including $50 million for fuel). Omelchenko pointed out that investing the same sum in fuel for coal and thermal power plants could generate 12.5 billion kW/hrs, nearly twice the power output of Unit 2 before it was shut down. Or, as another alternative, the money could be used to complete the Rivne-4 reactor, obviating the need for foreign funding for its construction.
3/25/97: RUSSIA'S TVEL SHIPS NUCLEAR FUEL FOR CHORNOBYL-3
Despite the debt of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) to TVEL, the Russian concern nevertheless shipped enough nuclear fuel on 25 March 1997 to keep Chornobyl-3 operating for two to three months.[1,4] ChNPP reportedly owes $30 million to Russian nuclear fuel suppliers for past shipments; the plant has received no fuel since July 1996. (The Chornobyl RBMK reactor uses fuel assemblies that are produced only in Russia.) However, ChNPP manager Serhiy Parashin noted that the plant recently paid 20 percent of its debt to Russian firms.[2,3] Due to the reduction in power generating capacity, ChNPP produced only 523 million kW/hr in March, 223.7 million kW/hr short of its target production for the month.[5]
3/12/97: UKRAINE REDUCES CHORNOBYL-3 OUTPUT TO HALF CAPACITY
Ukraine reduced Chornobyl-3 to half capacity on 12 March 1997 due to a fuel shortage caused by the failure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) management to pay the Russian joint stock company, TVEL, for nuclear fuel shipments. According to the head of Chornobyl's information department, Valeriy Idelson, the power plant owes TVEL $3.5 million for past deliveries -- a problem in part due to consumer debt to ChNPP, which now stands at $108 million.[1] One alternative for fueling Unit 3, proposed by the ChNPP management, includes extracting the 600 partially spent nuclear fuel assemblies located in Unit 2; this plan could reportedly save $30 million in the long term. ChNPP representatives have drafted a document on using Unit 2 fuel and submitted it to Derzhkomatom (the State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power) and the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety.[2,3] Financial problems notwithstanding, Ukraine expects a fuel shipment within the month. Otherwise, Unit 3 would have to be stopped.[1,4] According to a representative of the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, halting Unit 3 represents an unsafe situation, since a reactor requires a large amount of energy for safety and routine maintenance, even when not in operation. Usually, other units at the site provide the needed energy, but in this case, there are no other operable units.[4]
11/30/96: UKRAINE SHUTS DOWN CHORNOBYL-1, BUT MAY RESTART UNIT 1 OR 2
Ukraine shut down Chornobyl-1 at 10:00 p.m. local time on 30 November 1996. The move fulfilled a vow by Ukrainian President Kuchma, made at the April 1996 Nuclear Safety Summit in Moscow, to take the unit off line by 2000.[1] With Unit 1 shut down, Ukraine loses approximately 4.8 billion kW/hr per year of energy output as well as 1600 jobs in the Slavutych region.[2] Some observers have wondered whether the decision was strictly political, since the safe life of Unit 1 ended in early 1997. At that time, either the management would have taken the reactor off line anyway or replaced and modernized the reactor's channels--an expensive procedure, the funds for which Kiev lacked.[3] In its official application to shut down Unit 1, the ChNPP management cited the need for a comprehensive engineering assessment, especially of the fuel channels, as the reason for the move. According to Chornobyl plant manager Serhiy Parashyn, no document prohibiting the future operation of Chornobyl-1 exists.[2,3] Speculation that the unit may be restarted has arisen due to the plan to keep 1600 fuel assemblies inside Chornobyl-1 for two years. In fact, both Derzhkomatom (the Ukrainian State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy) and Parashyn have reportedly said that Chornobyl-1 will be maintained and, perhaps, restarted if energy is lacking during the winter.[1,4] Nevertheless, Kuchma announced that restarting Unit 1 is not economically viable since it would cost an estimated $225 to $450 million. The high end of this estimate is approximately the same as the estimated cost of completing the Khmelnytskyy-2 or Rivne-4 reactors.[2,5] At an estimated cost of $85 to $280 million, bringing Unit 2 back on line for continued service presents a more likely alternative for immediate power replacement.[2,6,7] Shortly before shutting down Chornobyl-1, Derzhkomatom passed a decree sanctioning such a measure.[2] If allocated by the Ukrainian Government, Unit 2 refurbishment money would probably go towards safety backfits, replacement of isolation valves on the inlets to the fuel channels below the reactor, and borrowing turbines and fuel from Unit 1.[2,8] A recent article, however, expressed some pessimism about restarting Unit 2, placing the earliest possible on-line date in the second quarter of 1998.[7] Thus, only Unit 3 remains in operation at ChNPP.[1]
9/18/96: CHORNOBYL-1 TO BE PERMANENTLY SHUT DOWN ON 11/30/96
According to Deputy Director General of the Chornobyl NPP Vasyl Omelchenko, the Ukrainian government made its final decision to permanently shut down Unit 1 at Chornobyl on 30 November 1996, which is several months before the reactor's service life expires. Omelchenko said that the decision was made not only because of the agreement signed by the G-7 and Ukraine in Ottawa, but also because nuclear fuel deliveries have been interrupted by the Russian nuclear production company TVEL due to Ukraine's $25 million unpaid bill for the supplied fuel. Chornobyl is completely dependent on TVEL's fuel, which is produced specifically for RBMK-type reactors. However, Omelchenko mentioned that the management of the Chornobyl NPP will soon find financial resources to purchase nuclear fuel from Russia.
7/1/96: CHORNOBYL HAS NUCLEAR FUEL FOR ONE MONTH ONLY
Ukrainian customers owe $50 million to Chornobyl NPP for energy. According to the chief engineer of the Chornobyl NPP, Vitaliy Tovstonogov, the plant lacks the financial resources to buy nuclear fuel from Russia, because many of the Chornobyl NPP customers are failing to pay their electricity bills. Tovstonogov said that if Chornobyl NPP had to operate at full capacity and the arrival of nuclear fuel from Russia in late June 1996 never took place, the plant would fully consume available nuclear fuel in one or one and a half months.
6/28/96: UNIT 1 AND 3 OPERATION DEPENDS ON ARRIVAL OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FUEL
Unit 3 at Chornobyl resumed operating at full capacity, after the arrival of nuclear fuel from Russia on 24 June 1996 under the agreement on supplying Ukraine with nuclear fuel in exchange for the nuclear warheads withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. This first consignment of reactor fuel will last until October 1996, taking into account planned stoppages of the Chornobyl reactors for repairs and maintenance. It is expected that Russia will provide two more deliveries of nuclear fuel, each 50 percent larger than the first, by the end of 1996. Before the arrival of Russian fuel, Units 1 and 3 had been operating at reduced capacity; 50 percent and 40 percent respectively. Unit 1 is temporarily shut down for planned maintenance, with its restart planned for 8 July 1996.
6/22/96: TEMPORARY SHUTDOWN OF UNIT 1 AT CHORNOBYL
Chornobyl's Unit 1 was temporarily shut down until 6 July '96 for planned short-term repair and maintenance. According to experts from the Ukrainian State Committee on Use of Nuclear Energy, one of the main reasons for the unit's shutdown was the lack of nuclear fuel expected from Russia. During the maintenance work on Unit 1, the power plant's specialists will check on the condition of the unit's zirconium pipes, and report back to a group of state experts by 30 June '96. Based on the findings of the report, experts from the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety will make a final decision concerning the date of the Unit 1 shutdown.
5/23/96: RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN-U.S. NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AGREEMENT AMENDED
In Kiev, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk amended the Trilateral Statement between the Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. presidents of 14 January '94, which provided for the delivery of Russian nuclear fuel (1,800 fuel rods) to Ukrainian nuclear power plants, particularly to Chornobyl, from 1994 to 1997. According to the amendment, instead of 155 VVER fuel rods scheduled for delivery in 1996, Russia would deliver 1,040 RBMK fuel rods by the end of 1996.
4/3/96: DELIVERY OF RUSSIAN FUEL AVERTS UNIT 3 SHUTDOWN
Russia delivered 160 fresh fuel assemblies to Chornobyl-3, alleviating the fuel shortage and averting a shutdown. Unit 3 was operating at nominal power and was expected to be shutdown by the end of March 1996 due to a lack of $2.5 million worth of fuel assemblies from Russia.
2/12/96: CHORNOBYL NPP OPERATES AT 70% CAPACITY
After Ukraine was cut off from the Russian-Ukrainian power grid, capacity utilization at Chornobyl NPP was increased to 100% at Unit 1 and to 80% at Unit 3. The Chornobyl NPP normally operates at around 70% capacity utilization, which is in-line with government standards.
1/25/96: UKRAINIAN NPPS NEED $100 MILLION WORTH OF FUEL TO STAY ON-LINE
Ukrainian State Committe for the Use of Atomic Energy (Derzhkomatom) warned that the Ukrainian NPPs need $100 million worth of fuel from Russia to stay on-line. However, because the government is only receiving payment for 13% of the energy produced at the NPPs, Derzhkomatom cannot afford to buy fuel from Russia and may have to cancel production in February or March 1996.
1995: REPORTS CONFLICT ON CHORNOBYL'S SHARE OF UKRAINE'S ELECTRIC ENERGY
According to the Verkhovna Rada press service, the Chornobyl NPP supplied 6% of Ukraine's total electric energy at the end of 1995 while the plant's capacity utilization was only 50%. This conflicts with other reports citing Chornobyl NPP as having the highest capacity utilization in Ukraine.[1] According to UNIAN, generating capacity through October '95 was more fully utilized at Chornobyl than any other Ukrainian NPP, 69.2% in comparison with an average of 61.1% for Ukraine's nuclear power industry as a whole.[2] For the first ten months of 1995, Chornobyl reportedly produced 16.1% (9085m kilowatt-hours) of the total output for the nuclear industry.[2]
11/6/95: UNIT 1 BROUGHT BACK ON LINE
Unit 1 was brought back on line. It had been shutdown since 27 October 1995.
10/23/95: RESTART POSTPONED
Ukraine postponed the restart of Unit 1.
10/17/95: UNIT 1 BROUGHT ON LINE AND RECONNECTED TO THE GRID
Unit 1 was brought on line and reconnected to the grid after 39 of the unit's 1692 fuel channels were replaced. Plant management reportedly is considering major fuel channel reconstruction at the three viable Chornobyl units. Fuel channel replacement would allow the units to operate until 2010-2015.
10/11/95: NUCLEAR REACTORS MAY PROVIDE 40% OF UKRAINE'S ENERGY IN 1996
On this date, only Chornobyl-3 is connected to Ukraine's electricity grid. The remaining reactor is undergoing routine maintenance and reportedly should be reconnected to the grid the week of 16 October '95. Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk expressed hope that nuclear reactors would provide 40% of Ukraine's energy in 1996.
10/1/95: CHORNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION IN SEPTEMBER
In 9/95, Chornobyl nuclear power plant produced 708.1 kWt/hrs of electricity, which fulfilled 104.9 percent of its plan. The NPP released 647.4 million kWt/hrs into the power system, 106.7 percent of the monthly plan. Reportedly, only Unit 3 was operating in September. During September '95, radiation emissions from the sarcophagus remained within the established norms.
8/95: ONE MORE STEP TO EXTEND CHORNOBYL'S OPERATION
Planned replacement of 13 of the 1600 zirconium fuel channels began in the beginning of August '95. This may be a step in the movement to extend Chornobyl's operation an additional 10 years if the $4.4 billion is not supplied by the West.
8/28/95: REDUCED CAPACITY AT CHORNOBYL'S UNIT 1
Unit 1 operated at only 70-80% of its capacity for safety reasons.
8/13/95: DERZHKOMATOM IS PLANNING TO EXTEND LIFE OF THREE REACTORS
According to Mykhailo Umanets, Chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, Ukraine will extend the life of the three undamaged reactors if it does not receive billions of dollars in Western aid. A Derzhkomatom plan to extend the life of the three reactors by ten years requires no foreign aid as the station will sell electric power at US$.03 per kWh. To justify the continued operation of the plant, Umanets cited a number of figures: the Chornobyl NPP fulfilled 104% of its planned quota for the first half of 1995, producing KBV79.4 trillion worth of power, but only received 57% of its payments. During this same period, breaks and errors were reduced by 31%. Unit 1 operated without errors.
8/8/95: NUCLEAR ENERGY COMMITTEE SUPPORTS NON-NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
The State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy (Derzhkomatom) reportedly supports the proposal for steam-gas electric plants in Slavutych. The Ministry of Energy supports the modernization of existing coal and gas-oil power plants, which currently make up 67.6 percent of Ukraine's electrical energy capacity.
8/7/95: CHORNOBYL PRODUCES PROFIT
Chornobyl NPP reportedly produced a profit last year. At local festivities, the plant raffled off over half a million kilowatts of electric power to Ukrainian citizens.
6/15/95: NEW GAS-FIRED PLANT AT CHORNOBYL: PROS AND CONS
There were mixed reactions to the announcement that a new gas-fired plant was to be constructed at Chornobyl as a means to replace the electricity generated by the nuclear units that are slated for closure. Proponents of the idea state that it will increase Western investment and pave the way for future Western-Ukrainian partnerships; additionally the gas-fired plants are very efficient. One of the drawbacks is that gas fuel is more expensive and Ukraine is already deeply in debt to Russia for previous gas deliveries. Minenergo is against the proposal because nearly 40% of Ukraine's generating capacity is sitting idle for lack of fuel; Minister of Energy Vilen Semenyuk has stated that there is no reason then to build new generating units. Mykhailo Pavlovskyi, Chairman of the Rada Standing Commission for Nuclear Policies and Nuclear Safety, and Nuclear Development Subcommittee Chairman Mykola Dudchenko have stated that no final decisions will be taken until a complete feasibility study is finished.
6/12/95: THERMAL GAS POWER PLANT : SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS
Supporters of the plan to build a thermal gas power plant to replace Chornobyl's generating capacity include Serhiy Parashin, Chornobyl's plant manager; Mykhailo Umanets, head of Derzhkomatom; and Yuriy Kostenko, Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (MEPNS). The Ministries of the Economy and Energy, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Administration, within MEPNS argue that ensuring gas supplies is both difficult and expensive. Umanets and Kostenko oppose the setting of a definite timetable for Chornobyl's closure. First Deputy Minister Smyshlyayev, who works for Kostenko, and Kostenko have been at odds over this and reportedly took their debate to Prime Minister Marchuk for mediation.
5/27/95: ABB WILL REPLACE CHORNOBYL POWER PLANT WITH ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES
A Western consortium headed by ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. will work to replace the Chornobyl power plant with alternative energy sources and provide employment for the plant workers. Ukraine signed an agreement with ABB for the conversion of the station into a non-nuclear source. President and CEO of ABB, Percy Barnevik, stated that a gas-fired plant, the most fuel efficient and environmentally safe alternative, should be completely operational in three years; the first installation, 100 kilometers from Chornobyl, should be generating electricity within 24 months. Twelve months later, according to ABB representatives, the plant would be at full capacity--3000 megawatts. ABB has converted nuclear power plants into fossil-fuel burning ones in the United States previously. Estimates of the cost of closing Chornobyl and associated costs range from $1.4-$1.7 billion. Building a new power plant will cost $2.3 billion and the entire project will cost an estimated $10 billion. The consortium, in addition to replacing the nuclear power plant's power capacities, hopes to maintain Chornobyl's social infrastructure, maintain the trained personnel and scientific potential of the Ukrainian nuclear industry, and carry out international financing of the project. The international consortium includes: ABB Kraftwerke AG and Mannesmann (Germany), Stromberg (Finland), Skansa and Vattenfall (Sweden), Danish Power Consult (Denmark), Sulzer (Switzerland), SAE Sadelmi (Italy), ABB Combustion Engineering and CMS Energy Corp. (United States), and Kawasaki Heavy Industries and JGT (Japan). The Ukrainian partners of this consortium include: the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (sic), the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the National Academy of Sciences, the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Turboatom, Monolit, Khartron, Dniproenergobudprom, NVP Rotor, AT Budmachin, Energoproyekt Kiev, and Energoproyekt Kharkiv. Siemens AG recently stated that building a gas-fired plant was not the best option for Ukraine given its already substantial debt to Russia for natural gas. The director of Siemens AG predicted that the gas plant would cost $3 billion, plus $300 million per year for fuel imports. Mykhailo Umanets, Chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, meanwhile stated that the Chornobyl problem will not be resolved until 2025, at the earliest.
2/17/95: NEW FOSSIL-FUEL BURNING PLANT WILL BE BUILT IN CHERKASSY OBLAST
The joint-stock company ENERGY that is planning to construct a new fossil-fuel burning plant in the town of Chyhyryn in the Cherkasy Oblast has declared that its main reason for building this new plant is the closure of Chornobyl. ENERGY seeks to create conditions that would facilitate the permanent closure of Chornobyl. This industrial financial conglomerate is the first of its kind to exist in Ukraine; it has 30 member firms and institutions, including "the municipal state energy board, Kyivenergo; Donenergo, a similar board in Donetsk; UkrElectroProject, an educational research institution; and DniproStroyProm, the largest state construction association within the Ministry of Energy." This organization was established by presidential decree on 27 January 95. The president of ENERGY Ravil Abubekerov said that the only realistic method to resolve the Chornobyl closure crisis is to come up with capital to cover the costs of the construction of three 700 MWe fossil fuel plants to replace the electricity generated by Chornobyl. This project will cost an estimated $1.3 billion. ENERGY is seeking Western partners for the project since efficient and environmentally safe technology is not available domestically. One problem with the project may be the choice of location; Chyhyryn is an environmentally protected site and plans to construct a nuclear plant there during Soviet times were halted. The infrastructure of the incomplete nuclear power station at this site is valued at $120 million. Seventy percent of ENERGY's statue fund consists of Ukrainian capital. SIEMENS and IBB have expressed interest in the project.
1994: CHORNOBYL CONTINUES TO HOLD SHARE OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
In 1994, electricity produced at Chornobyl accounted for 7% of the total supply in Ukraine.
12/22/94: WILL UKRAINE WITHDRAW VERKHOVNA RADA MORATORIUM?
Nur Nihmatullin, first Deputy Chairman of Derzhkomatom, reported that Ukraine was offered a $400 million ECU credit to bring on-line (unspecified) units which had had their construction halted due to a Verkhovna Rada moratorium. According to this politician, Spain also planned on contributing $500 million for a 500 MWt reactor for Ukraine.
12/9/94: UNIT 1 RESTARTED
Unit 1 was restarted. Returning the unit to operation was delayed due to some problems that had been identified during the shut-down inspection. Only one of the unit's turbogenerators is operational; the other is still undergoing repairs.
10/10/94: SHORTAGE OF FUNDS MEANS NO FUEL RESERVES AT CHORNOBYL
As a result of Ukraine's shortage of funds with which to buy nuclear fuel from Russia, the two units at Chornobyl were forced to refuel directly from the fuel transport car that delivered the assemblies; there were no reserves of fuel left at the plant. Ten fuel reloads were required for the first six months of 1994, but only two were actually delivered. The Trilateral Statement of 14 January '94 stipulated that Ukraine receive 430 fuel assemblies; thus far, only 180 have been received. The 250 additional assemblies should be delivered by the end of the year, but Ukraine needs 550 fuel assemblies for the VVERs and 800 for the RBMKs.
2/23/94: KUCHMA'S DIRECTIVE ON DEVELOPING OF NUCLEAR POWER
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a directive, "On Urgent Steps to Develop Nuclear Power and Complete the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Ukraine." The directive provides for the introduction of four new nuclear reactors, the restart of Chornobyl's Unit 2, and the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle in Ukraine.
10/21/93: CHORNOBYL TO BE KEPT OPEN; MORATORIUM TO END
The Ukrainian Parliament voted (221-38) to keep the Chornobyl nuclear power plants open past the end of 1993 and to end the moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power stations in the country. This decision was taken in light of the power shortage in Ukraine; nuclear power currently generates nearly one-third of Ukraine's energy. Given the difficulties Ukraine is having in making its payments to Russia for energy supplies, Ukraine's indigenous energy supplies will become increasingly important. Units 1 and 3 will continue operation. Unit 2, closed after a serious fire in October '91, may be restarted. The Parliament's action reversed a 1991 decision to close the entire power station on 3 December '93 Mykhailo Umanets, Chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power, said the decision would secure increased capacity of 18,000 megawatts within the next year. Ukrainian deputies stated that this reversal of policy was possible due to a dramatic change in both society's and government's attitudes. Evidence of society's change came out in a study of media reports that found 49 percent of all statements published in the first half of 1993 about nuclear power "had a positive coloring," in contrast to the five years following the Chornobyl disaster when only 4 percent of the reports were positive Chairman of the UkrSCNRS Nikolai Steinberg expressed the government's current opinion, commenting that "the current level of operational safety at Chornobyl allows me to conclude that operation without major risks is possible."
9/93: KALNYUK REPORTS ON UNIT 2 RESTART
V. Kalnyuk, first deputy to the presidential representative in the Lviv Oblast, reported that Unit 2 would be restarted. This decision was made at the 9 September Cabinet of Ministers meeting. The power supplied by Unit 2 should save an estimated 3.3 million tons of coal in Ukraine.
5/6/93: CHORNOBYL REACTORS WERE USED TO PRODUCE IRRADIATED SILICON
It was recently revealed that the Chornobyl reactors have been used for much of the decade to produce irradiated silicon, which is a material with semiconductor properties. The silicon may have been produced for the Soviet defense sector as well as for export abroad to Eastern Europe in exchange for hard currency.
 |
| |
Updated September 2005 |
|
|
