Prepared by Martin Kelly
Edited by Tamara Robinson
August 1997
Introduction
On 26 April 1986, Chornobyl-4 melted down in the worst accident in the history of nuclear power. Experts have attributed the accident to design problems inherent in the Soviet RBMK reactor and to mismanagement at the plant itself. Nearly five years later, in September 1991, a serious fire in the turbine hall of Chornobyl-2 prompted the Ukrainian government to pass legislation on decommissioning the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP).[1] On 29 October 1991, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) passed Resolution No. 1726-XII, "On Urgent Measures in Connection with the Decommissioning of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant," which called for operations at the plant to cease by 1993. Shortly thereafter, Ukrainian State Resolution No. 152 of 25 March 1992 outlined procedures for closing the plant. However, Ukraine failed to implement these measures due to serious energy shortages and, in fact, considered restarting Unit 2 in 1994 for the same reason.[2]
Closing the Chornobyl nuclear power plant became a matter of focused international concern in July 1994, when the Group of Seven (G-7) met in Naples and placed the issue of Chornobyl shutdown high on its agenda at the insistence of France and Germany. The G-7 sought the closure of Chornobyl-1 and Chornobyl-3, as well as Ukraine's agreement not to restart Unit 2. In return, the G-7 proposed funding the completion of certain reactors, thereby guaranteeing Ukraine no net loss in nuclear power generating capacity. One initial proposal recommended building two new reactors in Slavutych, a town near Chornobyl, which would enable the employment of former Chornobyl workers without relocation and infrastructure costs. A second, more viable proposal to complete three unfinished reactors -- Khmelnytskyy-2, Rivne-4, and Zaporizhzhya-6 -- soon replaced this proposal. A 1991 Ukrainian moratorium on the development of its nuclear industrial sector had previously halted construction of the three reactors. In 1994, the G-7 granted $200 million for the plan that included the completion of the reactors. Together with $600 million in loans and grants from the European Union (EU), Ukraine had $800 million available to finance shutdown.[3] Yet, as of mid-1997, despite Ukrainian pledges to close ChNPP, the lack of a consistent consensus among Western funders and Ukrainian negotiators regarding power replacement options and closure details has prevented the plant's complete shutdown.
Discrepancies over Price Tag for Chornobyl Shutdown
The G-7 proposal sparked a robust response from Ukraine, especially regarding finances. Ukraine pointed out that the G-7 plan did not account for the costs of replacing the Unit 4 sarcophagus, compensation for Chornobyl employees, and/or foregone revenue from Units 1-3, which were potentially operable until 2011. Comprehensive estimates of Chornobyl shutdown, a key aspect to these negotiations, have therefore varied widely depending on the scope of activities included. Between July 1994 and December 1995, the date when Ukraine and the G-7 signed a tentative Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Chornobyl shutdown and its financing, various sources recommended at least a dozen plans for decommissioning the plant. Costs ranged between $1.4 billion and hundreds of billions of dollars, with a median of approximately $4 billion. (See table below.)
From October 1995 to December 1995, the period leading up to the signing of the MoU, Ukraine sharpened its position on shutdown. Mikhailo Umanets, Chairman of Derzhkomatom (Ukraine's State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy), reportedly said in October 1995 that whether or not Chornobyl closed in 2000 depended entirely on Western financing.[4] The leadership in Kiev, including President Leonid Kuchma, Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, and Chairman of the Rada Standing Commission for Nuclear Policy and Safety Mikhailo Pavlovsky echoed this position and predicated Chornobyl shutdown upon increased Western backing.[5, 6, 7] Ukraine tried strengthening its position by reiterating that the plant had 16 years of operating life left and would generate between $2.72 and $4.4 billion during that period.[4, 8, 9] Chornobyl Plant Manager Serhiy Parashin even announced in November 1995 his intention to continue modernizing the plant until the moment it would close.[10]
Meanwhile, Western and G-7 negotiators made few statements regarding shutdown throughout 1995. By June 1995, a consensus in the G-7 had developed, estimating the comprehensive cost of closing Chornobyl at $3.8 billion.[11] At their 15-17 June 1995 meeting in Halifax, Canada, however, G-7 leaders voted not to provide any money for the project additional to the $200 million granted earlier. Instead, they called on the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to help finance the closure.[12, 13, 14] Through 1995, the Western position was often uncoordinated [10, 15], given the difficulty of balancing varying viewpoints and the array of influential actors that had become involved in addressing Chornobyl shutdown -- including the G-7, the EU, the European Commission (EC), the EBRD, the World Bank, the United States, and the Russian Federation, with the latter exhibiting a keen interest in Ukraine's energy market.
December 1995: G-7, Ukraine Sign MOU to Close Chornobyl
Ukraine and the G-7 at last signed an MoU regarding Chornobyl shutdown in December 1995. The MoU was not legally binding, and it neither fixed a concrete deadline for closure nor dealt effectively with rebuilding the Unit-4 sarcophagus. Instead, it served as a substantive basis for the ongoing negotiations. Both sides agreed to set the target date for closure at 2000. After that time, the removal and storage of spent nuclear fuel would require 10 years, and the upgrade of the sarcophagus would take nine years.[16, 17, 18, 19] The Ukrainian Government reportedly cited economic pressure as its reason for signing the agreement. Soon after signing, Ukrainian Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety Yuriy Kostenko said that the aid package probably will not cover all the costs of closing Chornobyl, such as radioactive waste management, environmental cleanup, or sarcophagus reconstruction. Nevertheless, he immediately suggested holding special bilateral talks with G-7 countries to implement the MoU.[20, 21]
According to the MoU, the G-7 earmarked $498 million in grants and $1.8 billion in low interest loans, bringing the total amount of funds allocated for decommissioning Chornobyl to $3.1 billion. Of the $498 million grant, $349 million was slated for improving short-term safety at Unit 3 and subsequent decommissioning, $43 million is allocated to power sector restructuring, $102 million will go towards an energy investment program, and $4 million is delineated for the social safety net. The $1.809 billion in loans includes $480 million from Euratom and is designated for completing the Rivne-4 and Khmelnystkyy-2 reactors, rehabilitating thermal and hydroelectric plants, building storage facilities, and increasing energy efficiency.[16, 18, 19] By this time, Ukraine had completed Zaporizhzhya-6 with funds from the state budget and, therefore, dropped the matter from the negotiations.
1996: Both Sides Haggle over Chornobyl, Progress Limited
Some progress in the negotiations occurred at the April 1996 Nuclear Safety Summit in Moscow. At the gathering, Kuchma announced Ukraine's intention to shut down Unit 1 by November 1996. For its part, the G-7 reiterated support for the MoU and agreed to conduct a feasibility study on how to replace the sarcophagus at Unit 4.[22, 23] The G-7 also clearly outlined its objectives with respect to Chornobyl:
1. reform the Ukrainian energy sector to create a national electricity market;
2. develop a least-cost investment plan to meet Ukraine's energy needs;
3. remove nuclear waste from Chornobyl and make short-term safety upgrades at Unit 3; and
4. ameliorate the social consequences of Chornobyl shutdown.[24, 25]
Limited progress notwithstanding, disagreement between the two sides over funding continued throughout 1996. Ukraine sought to obtain money quickly to begin decommissioning work at Chornobyl and to complete Rivne-4 and Khmelnytskyy-2.[26] During negotiations on 6 June 1996, Ukraine claimed it needed $840 million immediately to finish construction of the two reactors.[27] Without receiving G-7 funding soon, Yuriy Kostenko warned at the time, Ukraine would have to revise the schedule for Chornobyl shutdown and possibly restart Unit 2.[28] Later, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko stated his country's frustration more pointedly, saying "there has not been a penny given to us for assistance" despite the December 1995 MoU.[29]
The G-7 opted to consider the project from all angles and did not release any funds for the Chornobyl project in 1996. In particular, completion of Khmelnystkyy-2 and Rivne-4 became a sticking point. The G-7 pressed the EBRD to take the lead in financing the completion of the reactors, but in order to meet the "least-cost" criteria for meeting Ukraine's power requirements, the EBRD needed to conduct an independent study of Ukraine's energy sector. Kiev strongly criticized this move, which ultimately delayed decommissioning. In September 1996, the EBRD initiated its study, which it hoped to finish in early 1997.[30, 31, 32]
Meanwhile, at the 11-14 October 1996 G-7 meeting in Paris, both sides signed a draft agreement stipulating that the EBRD grant Ukraine $147 million (ECU 118 million) to finance preparatory work for Chornobyl shutdown, specifically to build spent fuel and solid waste storage facilities at the site.[33] The money is in addition to the $3.1 billion aid package designated in the December 1995 MoU. The funds will come from the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), administered by the EBRD on behalf of 14 Western donor countries and the EU. At the Paris meeting, both delegations also drew up the schedule for completing Rivne-4 and Khmelnytskyy-2 and discussed reconstruction of the damaged sarcophagus.[33, 34, 35] The EBRD and representatives of Ukraine approved the $147 million grant on 12 November 1996 at EBRD headquarters in London, allowing disbursement of the funds to begin by January 1997, provided that the Verkhovna Rada ratifies the agreement.[36]
In accordance with his good will vow at the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, President Kuchma shut down Unit 1 on 30 November 1996 [37] and made no plans to restart the reactor due to financial constraints.[38] Hedging their bets for future nuclear power, however, Ukrainian authorities issued a regulation, prior to Unit 1 closure, sanctioning the restart of Chornobyl-2 at an estimated cost of between $85 and $280 million.[39, 40, 41] At this time, Kuchma also issued a decree to create Ukrenergoatom, a company established to act as the identified borrower of Western funds, distinct from the state nuclear ministry, Derzhkomatom. The latter move had been a lending requirement on the part of Western financial institutions.[42]
According to a respected analyst, the December 1996 talks between Ukraine and the G-7 "ended on a note of mutual confidence, with Ukraine finally believing Western promises to finance energy infrastructure projects and the West believing Ukrainian pledges" to shut down the ill-fated Chornobyl NPP by 2000.[43] During the meeting, Yuriy Kostenko continued touting a hard-line position, asserting that closure by 2000 depended on the receipt of monies for Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4 by June 1997.[44] Nevertheless, the discussions were focused. Both sides agreed to set up an expert team of 14 international engineering groups to study solutions for the damaged sarcophagus at Chornobyl-4. The U.S. government and TACIS (the EU's Technical Assistance to the CIS Programme) will finance the work of the expert team. Ukraine and the G-7 also discussed the reactors at Khmelnytskyy and Rivne but made little progress pending the EBRD independent report on the subject.[43]
EBRD Study on Financing New Reactors in Ukraine
On 19 February 1997, the EBRD released the results of its independent study regarding completion of Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4. The main report concluded that financing the completion of the two reactors did not meet the EBRD's "least-cost" criteria.[45, 46, 47] The main report also asserted that Ukraine's energy problems were not related to the quantity of energy resources but were the result of not using given resources in an efficient and economic manner. According to Sussex University Professor John Surrey, who headed the commission, "In order to produce 1,000 Pounds Sterling (approximately $1,600 at the report's date of publication, 19 February 1997) worth of GDP, Ukraine uses more energy than any other EBRD country."[47] The EBRD independent commission proposed directing funds toward long-term energy conservation programs, improving safety conditions at Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and investment in the Ukrainian energy sector.[47, 48] Of the six member commission, five endorsed the findings of the main report, while Swedish Professor Lennart Hjalmarsson strongly dissented, saying, "I regard [financing Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4] as the only well-identified alternative to Chernobyl."[49]
Both sides have criticized the EBRD's independent study. The G-7's nuclear safety working group unanimously rejected the proposal and called for a rewrite [50, 51], while a G-7 spokesman said the EBRD's report had caused a "crisis of confidence" between Kiev and the West.[51] Yuriy Kostenko said that Ukraine will complete the reactors "under any circumstances."[52] Kostenko labeled the conclusions of the commission "wrong and too superficial" [53] and reiterated that the G-7 has an obligation "to fulfill its political commitments," referring to the December 1995 MoU.[48] He has also said that the EBRD expert study fails to take into account the true state of Ukraine's energy sector.[54] In a surprise statement following publication of the EBRD report, Chairman of Ukraine's Derzhkomatom Viktor Chebrov stated that Ukraine could commission the two reactors at a safety level higher than European standards without Western funding [55]; Chebrov's statement, however, contradicts previous official statements regarding financing for the two reactors. In general, criticism of the report remained mild since the study is a recommendation to higher EBRD officials, who will make the final decision in regard to financing the two reactors in question. According to one source, though, the EBRD's delay in accepting the commission's report is attributable to the G-7's unanimous criticism.[51]
Despite difficulty in reaching a plan to fund Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4, Chornobyl shutdown negotiations have recently registered some successes. On 18 March 1997, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the NSA grant agreement for safety and waste management at Chornobyl, thereby allowing for the disbursement of funds and for work to begin on the project.[56] Then, at their April 1997 meeting, the G-7 and Ukraine solidified a growing consensus that the Unit 4 sarcophagus needs stabilization, which involves the removal of nuclear fuel.[57] In other words, the two sides have abandoned plans suggested over the past few years by many different sources for sinking Unit 4 deep in the ground, for encasing the structure in concrete, or for constructing a second sarcophagus over the first. At the talks, the G-7 also agreed to begin extending $900 million (from the December 1995 MoU package) in loans and grants to Ukraine as early as May 1997. G-7 experts estimate that Chornobyl will be completely shut down by 2005.[58]
Recent optimism regarding the closure date notwithstanding, shutting down the Chornobyl NPP remains tricky. The crux of the matter relates to alternative sources of energy for Ukraine. The G-7, the EU, and the EBRD must approve and advance funds more quickly for closure work to proceed. Aside from decommissioning the plant, however, Western funders have not come to a consensus on the costs and types of energy sources needed to replace Chornobyl's power generating capacity. Without a firm Western commitment to fund Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4, Ukraine has said it is unwilling to close Chornobyl. However, the credibility of Ukraine's statements in this regard does not appear very strong, given that Ukraine can barely afford to fuel Chornobyl-3 as it stands. The Chornobyl NPP is currently $30 million in debt to Russian nuclear fuel suppliers [59, 60], while consumer debt to the plant measures $108 million.[61] These figures, indicative of hard times in Ukraine's energy sector, seem to weaken Ukraine's position in negotiating with the West. As negotiations on shutdown are prolonged, Ukraine may be forced into a position to accept less favorable terms from the West, such as fewer dollars for replacement energy, since the plant's value decreases as its foreign debt grows. In the near term, both sides still await the EBRD's decision on whether or not to fund Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4, and final Chornobyl shutdown terms remain ambiguous.
Plans for Chornobyl Shutdown, 6/94-11/95
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| Mikhailo Umanets, Derzhkomatom, 29 November 1995 | $1.4 billion to close Units 1-3; $1.6 billion to replace sarcophagus; $400 million, Kiev power station | $3 billion + [62] | |
| Ukrainian Minister of Nuclear Safety,Yuriy Kostenko, 20 June 1995 | N/A | Hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars [63] | |
| G-7, 1 June 1995 | $1.1 billion for decommissioning Chornobyl; $2.7 billion for replacement energy expenses | $3.8 billion [64] | |
| Ukrainian experts, 27 April 1995 | N/A | $6-7 billion [65] | |
| Ukrainian officials, including Leonid Kuchma, 14 April 1995 | Finance gas-fired combined cycle power plant; new sarcophagus; social programs for 5,000 unemployed Chornobyl workers | $4.4 billion [66] | |
| Chornobyl Plant Manager Serhiy Parashin, 13 April 1995 | $2 billion for constructing steam gas power plant; $2.4 billion to stockpile natural gas | $4.4 billion [67] | |
| Ukrainian government, 10 April 1995 | Stabilize Ukraine's power supply; create spent fuel, rad-waste storage facilities; reconstruct Unit 4 sarcophagus; provide work for Chornobyl employees | $4 billion + revenue from plant operation until closure [68] | |
| Electricite de France, 9 March 1995 | $3 billion for new sarcophagus and clean-up at No. 4; Unit 1 closed by 1995; Unit 3 closed by 1997 | $3 billion + cost of Units 1 and 3 to go off-line [69] | |
| Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, 13 February 1995 | Finance new, modern reactors to enable Chornobyl shutdown | $7 billion [70] | |
| Ukrainian Economics Minister Roman Schpek, 24 December 1994 | Chornobyl shutdown | $1.4 billion [71] | |
| Ukrainian Nuclear Industry, 24 November 1994 | Complete Chornobyl shutdown | $10 billion [72] | |
| Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, 18 November 1994 | Complete Chornobyl shutdown | $10-12 billion [63] | |
| Study by U.S. DOE and Ukraine, October 1994 | $1.396 billion to close Units 1-3; $410 million for preparatory work; $376 million for ten year maintenance; $610 million for retraining, social services | $1.792 billion [73] | |
| Serhiy Parashin, 15 September 1994 | $1.3 billion for plant closing; $700 million for workers compensation; $1.2-1.4 billion for new sarcophagus; $1.4 billion to complete Rivne-4, Khmelnytskyy-2, Zaporizhzhya-6 | $4.6-4.8 billion [74] | |
| Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee On Nuclear Policy and Safety, Mikhail Pavlovsky, June 1994 | Chornobyl shutdown; $2 billion to build two new reactors in Slavutych and provide jobs for displaced workers | $2 billion + [75] | |
Sources:
[1] Judith Perera, The Nuclear Industry in the Former Soviet Union: Transition from Crisis to Opportunity, Vol. 1 (London: Financial Times Energy Publihing, 1997), pp. 70-74.
[2] "Parliament Chairman Denies Decision To Stop Chornobyl NPP," UPRESA Daily Report, 30 November 1995.
[3] Chernobyl And Its Aftermath: A Chronology Of Events, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Energy and National Security Program, 1994.
[4] "Chornobyl Closure Still Uncertain," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1995, p. 12.
[5] Aleksandr Bangerskiy, "Ukraina Uzhe V Evrope," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 November 1995, p. 1.
[6] Interfax, 16 November 1995; in "Chornobyl Plant Likely to Remain In Operation," FBIS-SOV-95-222, 16 November 1995.
[7] Interfax, 25 November 1995; in "Kuchma Says Chornobyl Closure Depends on G-7 Funds," FBIS-SOV-95-227, 25 November 1995.
[8] Yanina Sokolovskaya, "'Chernobylskaya Ruletka' Obeshchaet Mnogoletniye Syurprizy," Izvestiya, 5 November 1995, p. 2.
[9] Yevhen Perehuda, "Chornobyl," Uryadovyy Kuryer, 18 November 1995, p. 5.
[10] Marta Kolomayets, "Money, Once Again, Is Subject Of Controversy Over Chornobyl," Ukrainian Weekly, 12 November 1995, pp. 17-18.
[11] Alex Brall, "Ukraine Proposes Schedule For Shutting Chornobyl Units," Nucleonics Week, 1 June 1995, pp. 7-8.
[12] "Raspri Nad 'Sarkofagom'," Pravda, 24 June 1995, p. 4.
[13] "No New Money For Chornobyl Closure," Nuclear News, July 1995.
[14] "G-7 Makes No Move On Chornobyl," Nuclear Engineering International, August 1995.
[15] Peter Coryn, "Ukraine In No Hurry To Pledge Chornobyl Closure By 2000," Nucleonics Week, 16 November 1995.
[16] "OON proholosila 26 Kvitnya 1996 roku mizhnarodnym dnem pamyati Chornobylya," Holos Ukrainy, 23 January 1996, p. 2.
[17] "Bilateral Agreement On Chernobyl Closure," Council of Advisers' Update of Ukraine, December 1995.
[18] Ray Silver, "West Ups Commitment To Aid Ukraine And Help To Shut Chornobyl In 2000," Nucleonics Week, 11 January 1996, p. 9.
[19] "Ukraina i strany G-7 podpisali memorandum o zakrytie ChAES," Segodnya, 22 December 1995, p. 1.
[20] Alain Guillemoles, "Yuriy Kostenko: Strong Pressure," Le Soir, 20 December 1995, p. 17; in "Minister Interviewed in Chornobyl Closure Conditions," FBIS-SOV-95-245, 20 December 1995.
[21] "Chornobyl Closure Agreed-But Left Open-Ended," Nuclear Engineering International, February 1996, p. 2.
[22] Ustina Markus, "Ukraine To Begin Closing Chornobyl," OMRI Daily Digest, 22 April 1996.
[23] "Chornobyl Reactor No. 1 To Close This Year," Reuter, 22 April 1996.
[24] "Tri milyardy dlya ChAES," Holos Ukrainy, 23 April 1996.
[25] "No New Action On Chernobyl," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, April 1996, pp. 3-4.
[26] Andrew Nagorski and Marta Kolomayets, "Interview: Yevhen Marchuk On Integration, Chornobyl," Ukrainian Weekly, 14 April 1996, pp. 1, 8.
[27] Interfax, 6 June 1996; in "Ukraine: G-7, Ukrainian Experts Disagree Over Chernobyl Shutdown," FBIS-SOV-96-111, 6 June 1996.
[28] "Financial Problems With Chornobyl Closure," OMRI Daily Digest, 7 June 1996.
[29] Ariane Sains, "No Money, No Chernobyl Closure, Ukrainian Minister Says," Nucleonics Week, 12 September 1996, pp. 14-15.
[30] NucNet, 17 September 1996; in UI News Briefing 96.37.
[31] Financial Times, 5 September 1996, p. 2; in UI News Briefing 96.36.
[32] NucNet, 7 October 1996; in UI News Briefing 96.40.
[33] Kevin Done, "Ukraine To Get $150 Million To Help Shut Chernobyl Financial Times, 21 November 1996, p. 3.
[34] "Ukraine: Progress Reported In Chernobyl Shutdown Project," BBC Monitoring Service, 18 October 1996.
[35] Interfax, 14 October 1996; in "G-7 Countries Reach Compromise On Chernobyl Finance Accord," FBIS-SOV-96-200, 14 October 1996."
[36] Pearl Marshall, "Chernobyl Safety, Radwaste Grant, NSA's Biggest Yet, Is Signed," Nucleonics Week, 14 November 1996, p. 14.
[37] Ann MacLachlan, "Ukraine Shuts Chernobyl-1, Fulfilling Promise To West," Nucleonics Week, 5 December 1996, p. 14.
[38] UNIAN, 29 November 1996; in "Kuchma: No Plans To Restart Chernobyl's Generating Set," FBIS-SOV-96-232, 29 November 1996.
[39] Ann MacLachlan, "Chernobyl Managers Want To Reopen Unit 2 To Offset Unit 1 Shutdown," Nucleonics Week, 21 November 1996, p. 16.
[40] "Restart Of Chernobyl Unit 2 Sought By Plant Authorities," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 25 November 1996, p. 12.
[41] Peter Coryn, "Chernobyl-1 Is Shut But Ukraine Keeps Units 1,2 Restart Option," Nucleonics Week, 2 January 1997, p. 14.
[42] Ann MacLachlan, "Ukraine Hints Delay In Closing Chernobyl If Money Doesn't Come," Nucleonics Week, 31 November 1996, p. 17.
[43] Ann MacLacnlan, "G-7 Ukraine Cooperation Now Said To Be Progressing Extremely Well," Nucleonics Week, 2 January 1997, p. 13.
[44] UNIAN, 18 December 1996; in "Ukraine: Officials Say Lack Of Funding To Delay Chernobyl's Closure," FBIS-SOV-96-245, 18 December 1996.
[45] Vladimir Skocyrev, "Zapad he znayet, chto delat' c Chernobylem," Izvestiya, 12 February 1996, p. 3.
[46] "EBRD Told Ukraine Nuclear Plans Too Costly," World News, March 1997, p. 3.
[47] S. Rudenko and O. Burda, "More Than Enough Reactors?," Eastern Economist, 24 February 1997, pp. 1, 4.
[48] Leyla Boulton and Matthew Kaminski, "Ukraine Threatens To Keep Chernobyl Open After 2000," Financial Times, 20 February 1997, p. 12.
[49] "Completing Khmel'nitskiy-2 and Rovno-4 (K2/R4)," Nuclear News, March 1997, p. 71.
[50] UNIAN, 28 February 1997; in "Ukraine: G-7 Claims EBRD Experts Work On Chernobyl 'Unsatisfactory'," FBIS-SOV-97-041, 28 February 1997.
[51] Ann MacLachlan, "G-7 Prodding EBRD To Move On Ukrainian Reactor Project," Nucleonics Week, 13 March 1997, p. 5.
[52] Interfax, 20 March 1997; in "Ukraine: Minister Reports on Construction of Nuclear Power Plants," FBIS-SOV-97-035, 20 March 1997.
[53] "Negotiations: The 'Sarcophagus' Will in Fact Be Purged, But no Agreement Has Been Reached on Finishing Construction of the Two Atomic Generating Units," Vseukrayinskiye Vedomosti, 19 February 1997, p. 3; in "Ukraine: Lazarenko blasts EBRD Decision on AES Aid," FBIS-SOV-97-050, 19 February 1997.
[54] UNIAN, 22 April 1997; in "Ukraine: All Requirements Met EBRD Loan For Power Plants," FBIS-SOV-97-112, 22 April 1997.
[55] Interfax, 20 March 1997; in "Ukraine: Kiev To Complete Nuclear Projects Even Without EBRD Loan," FBIS-SOV-97-035, 20 March 1997.
[56] Pearl Marshall, "Leadership Change Will Refocus NSA On Ex-USSR Reactor Shutdown," Nucleonics Week, 27 March 1997, pp. 1, 12-13.
[57] "Ukrainian, Western Experts Agree On Chornobyl Measures," RFE/RL Newsline, 23 April 1997.
[58] UNIAN, 25 April 1997; in "Ukraine: G-7 Grants $900 Million Loan To Assist in Chernobyl Shutdown," FBIS-SOV-97-115, 25 April 1997.
[59] Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS, 25 March 1997; in "Russia: Firm Ships Fuel to Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Despite Debt," FBIS-SOV-97-084, 25 March 1997.
[60] Oleg Varfolomeyev, "Ukraine Gets Nuclear Fuel, Stops Oil Terminal Construction," OMRI Daily Digest, Vol. 3, No. 60, 26 March 1997.
[61] Interfax, 13 March 1997; in "Fuel Shortage To Cause Shut Down of Chernobyl Power Unit," FBIS-SOV-97-072, 13 March 1997.
[62] "Chornobyl Manager Questions G-7 Plan," IDPR, 29 November 1995, p. 13.
[63] Dmytro Lykhoviy, "Yuriy Kostenko: If The West Squeezes Us, And We Close Chornobyl NPP, Assistance To Chornobyl Will Become An Illusion," Ukraina Moloda, 20 June 1995, pp. 3-4.
[64] Alex Brall, "Ukraine Proposes Schedule For Shutting Chornobyl Units," Nucleonics Week, 1 June 1995, pp. 7-8.
[65] Alex Brall, "Kuchma Announces Decision To Stop Chornobyl Units By 2000," Nucleonics Week, 20 April 1995.
[66] UNIAN, 13 April 1995; in "Director: Plant Closure To Cost $4.4 Billion," FBIS-SOV-95-072, 13 April 1995.
[67] UNIAN, 10 April 1995; in "Government To Postpone Chornobyl AES Closure," FBIS-SOV-95-069, 10 April 1995.
[68] AFP, 13 February 1995; in "Western Aid Demanded To Build New Nuclear Plants," FBIS-SOV-95-030, 13 February 1995.
[69] Interfax, 24 December 1994; in "United States Provides $72 Million Grant," FBIS-SOV-94-248, 24 December 1994.
[70] Ann MacLachlan, Peter Coryn and Alex Brall, "G-7 Resumes Talks To Shut Chornobyl Over Ukrainian Protests," Nucleonics Week, 9 March 1995, p. 12.
[71] Peter Coryn, "Ukrainians Resume Criticism Of G-7 Chornobyl Closure Deal," Nucleonics Week, 24 November 1994, pp. 8-9.
[72] Roma Ihnatowycz, "Ukraine Wants Payback For Passing Non-Nuke Treaty," UPI, 18 November 1994.
[73] "Options For Replacing Chornobyl," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1994, p. 20.
[74] Kyyivska Pravda, 6 September 1994, pp. 1-2; in "Chernobyl Station Chief On Safety, Shutdown," FBIS-SOV-94-179, 15 September 1994.
[75] Alex Brall, Ann MacLachlan, "Ukrainians Say Proposed EU Aid Is 'Obviously Insufficient'," Nucleonics Week, 7 July 1994, p. 6.
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Updated June 2005 |
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