START I
12/11/2000: NEW AGREEMENT ON SS-24 ELIMINATION MODIFIES START PROVISIONS
On 11 December 2000 the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement in Geneva to provide for the two-phased elimination of SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine. The agreement addresses the need to clarify wording in START I implying that a missile must be fully eliminated at one time. The new agreement specifies that a party to the treaty may request a phased dismantlement procedure for its missiles. The agreement further describes procedures to dismantle the Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs in two phases. In the first phase, components essential to the missile's operation will be destroyed, rendering it unusable; the remainder of the missile will be eliminated in the second phase.
[Wendy Lubetkin, "Two Sets of Arms Control Agreements Signed in Geneva," USIS Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov/, 13 December 2000.] {Entered 1/3/01 RG}

11/9/95: REVISION OF START-I PERMITS EXPORT OF ICBMs AS SLVs
A revision of the START-I treaty was signed in Geneva which permits the export of converted mobile strategic missiles as space launchers. Under this revision, Ukraine and/or Russia would have to notify Western partners if they transferred converted ICBMs. Analysts fear that the missiles and technology may be transferred to rogue states such as Iran, which is acceptable under the revision. The Missile Technology Control Regime limits where the missiles can be moved but has no enforcement mechanisms. Russia and Ukraine reportedly announced their intentions to sell SS-25 and SS-24 ICBMs as commercial boosters for satellites as early as 9/95.
Source:
[1] Bill Gertz, "White House Denies Any Concessions To Russia In START Revision," Washington Times, 11/10/95, p. A3.
[2] Bill Gertz, "Russia, Ukraine Have Unlimited Mobility With Converted ICBMs," Washington Times, 11/17/95, p. A4.

5/94: JOINT COMMISSION SIGNED REGULATORY AGREEMENT
The Joint Commission On Compliance and Inspection, the body set up to work out the details of implementing the START I Treaty, met in Geneva in 5/94. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the US signed a number of agreements that will regulate the multilateral fulfillment of the Treaty.
[Ostankino Television First Channel, 5/6/94, in "Work Of Arms Control Commission In Geneva Reported," FBIS-SOV-94-088, 5/6/94, p. 8.]

2/3/94: RADA VOTES TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF START I RATIFICATION BUT FAILS TO APPROVE ACCESSION TO NPT
The Verkhovna Rada voted overwhelmingly to exchange the instruments of ratification of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol. The Rada failed by about 24 votes, however, to approve Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Ratification was seen as a victory for the President Leonid Kravchuk who had argued that the conditions placed upon ratification of the START I Treaty by the Rada in 11/93 had been satisfied by the Trilateral Statement. A promise from the US to double financial assistance to Ukraine once it accedes to the NPT and fully ratifies the START I Treaty was made public at the debate. Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko and Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyi both supported the Trilateral Statement. Valentyn Lemysh, Chairman of the Rada Committee on Defense and National Security, called for accession to the NPT and the unconditional ratification of the START I Treaty. Dmytro Pavlychko came out very strongly against the Trilateral Statement.
Sources:
[1] Robert Seely, "A-Arms Pact Is Approved In Ukraine," WASHINGTON POST, 2/4/94, p. A1, A21.
[2] John Lepingwell, "Ukrainian Parliament Ratifies START-I Without Conditions," RFE/RL RESEARCH BRIEF, 2/4/94.

11/26/93: RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT DENOUNCES UKRAINIAN CONDITIONAL RATIFICATION OF START-I
The Russian government formally denounced the Ukrainian conditional ratification of the START I Treaty and stated that it was not valid under international law.
["Russia Cuts Off Maintenance Of Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons," RFE/RL NEWS BRIEFS, 11/29/93, Vol. 2, p. 6.]

11/20/93: KRAVCHUK DISPLEASED WITH RADA’S CONDITIONAL RATIFICATION OF START-I
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk stated that he was not pleased with the Rada's conditional ratification of the START I Treaty and promised to resubmit the START I and NPT Treaties to the new Rada in 3/94.
[John Lepingwell, "Kravchuk: Reratify In March?" RFE/RL NEWS BRIEFS, 11/22/93, Vol. 2, No. 48, p. 1.]

11/18/93: RADA RATIFIES START I WITH CONDITIONS
The Verkhovna Rada voted 254-9 (out of 440 members) to ratify the START I Treaty, but set 13 conditions that must be met prior to the deposition of the instruments of ratification. The Parliament interprets the treaty to include 36 percent of the launchers and 44 percent of the warheads on Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk had urged the Rada to include all 1,240 warheads on the 176 ICBMs Ukraine inherited from the USSR. Instead, the Rada committed to dismantle 63 multiple-warhead missiles and remove 520 warheads from the missiles. The START I Treaty requires that the disarmament process be completed seven years after signing, but Ukraine maintains that the countdown will begin only after the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China sign security guarantees with Ukraine. The speed with which Ukraine pursues its disarmament is also dependent upon the foreign financial aid it receives. The Ukrainian government has stated that it needs $2.8 billion in order to dismantle its entire arsenal; the US has offered $175 million. According to the Rada's interpretation of the Treaty, dismantlement of the SS-19 ICBMs should continue as scheduled but the SS-24s would not be dismantled. The fate of the cruise missile warheads based in Ukraine is still uncertain. The warheads were to be transferred to Russia under the specifications of the Massandra agreement; this agreement, however, is in limbo as a result of several disagreements.
Sources:
[1] Mary Mycio, "Ukraine OKs Nuclear Arms Treaty But Limits Scope," LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/19/93, p. A6.
[2] John Lepingwell, "After START: What Next?", RFE/RL NEWS BRIEFS, 11/15/93, Vol. 2, No. 47, p. 9.

4/27/93: RADA NEEDS CONFIRMATION OF UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATUS
162 members of the Verkhovna Rada signed a statement published in MOLOD UKRAINY declaring that the Rada should delay final consideration of the START I Treaty until Ukraine confirmed its nuclear weapons status. They adopted a declaration proposing to recognize Ukraine as a nuclear power, since its role as an equal partner in nuclear disarmament has been acknowledged in Article 12 of the CIS Treaty and Article 1 of the Lisbon Protocol. The parliamentarians also stated that "the Supreme Rada of Ukraine should confirm its ownership rights to the nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory."
[HOLOS UKRAINY, 4/27/93, p. 1, in UKRAINE TODAY, 4/27/93, pp. 10-11.]

4/23/93: KOSTENKO: UKRAINE IS A NUCLEAR SUCCESSOR OF THE USSR
Yuriy Kostenko, Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety and the chairman of the Rada committee reviewing the START I Treaty, announced that Ukraine is a nuclear state under the NPT, since it took part in nuclear tests under the auspices of the Soviet Union and it is a full legal successor to the USSR. He also emphasized that dismantling just the nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine would require $1-2 billion, while a full-scale dismantling of the silos and the launch pads would cost Ukraine $3 billion.
Sources:
[1] HOLOS UKRAINY, 4/27/93, p. 1, in UKRAINE TODAY, 4/27/93, pp. 10-11.
[2] Lepingwell, "Ukraine, Russia, And Nuclear Weapons Supplementary Chronology," RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, 1/28/94, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 22.

4/93: RADA AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERS START I RATIFICATION
An ad hoc group of the Members of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada, created by its Presidium to consider START I ratification and Ukraine's non-nuclear status, completed its first closed parliamentary hearing.
[HOLOS UKRAINY, 4/27/93, p. 1, in UKRAINE TODAY, 4/27/93, pp. 10-11.]

3/93: RATIFICATION OF START I AFFECTS ONLY PART OF MISSILES STATIONED IN UKRAINE
Dmytro Pavlychko, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, indicated that ratification of the START I Treaty would affect only a portion of the missiles stationed in Ukraine. Under this scenario, Ukraine would be able to retain roughly 40 SS-24 missiles.
[KURANTY, 3/27/93, p. 3, in RUSSIA AND CIS TODAY, 3/28/93, p. 54.]

9/92: GENERAL TOLUBKO ARGUES AGAINST "RASH" RATIFICATION OF START I
Parliamentarian General Volodymyr Tolubko cautioned against pursuing short-term political gains and against a `rash' ratification of the START I Treaty. He argued that this would not conflict with the Ukrainian pledge to become a nuclear-free state, since the pledge was made when Ukraine was still part of the USSR, which provided full-scope security guarantees. On later occasions, General Tolubko advocated Ukraine's development of a significant nuclear deterrent.
[HOLOS UKRAINY, 9/20/92, p. 7; See also NEW YORK TIMES, 3/31/93.]

7/31/91: START I SIGNED BY RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES
US President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). The START I Treaty calls for both superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6,000 "accountable" warheads. Ballistic missiles cannot carry more than 4,900 warheads. The START I Treaty will reduce the Soviet arsenal by 48% and the US arsenal by 38%. START I cuts will occur over seven years in three stages. The Treaty will remain in effect for 15 years, with an option to extend it for five more years.
Sources:
[1] Dunbar Lockwood, "START Treaty Signed; Brings Historic Cuts In Strategic Warheads," ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 9/91, pp. 25, 32-33.
[2] "USA And Soviets Agree START Cuts," JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 7/27/91, p. 131.

LISBON PROTOCOL
11/18/93: RADA SETS NUMBER OF CONDITIONS TO LISBON PROTOCOL
The Lisbon Protocol was ratified, with the reservation that Article 5, which states that Ukraine will join the NPT as a non-nuclear state, does not apply. The conditions that were set by the Rada include compensation for the tactical nuclear warheads that were withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia in 1992, and recognition of Ukraine's "territorial integrity and existing borders." Ukraine maintains its right to administrative control over the nuclear weapons as well as complete ownership of them.
[Lepingwell, "START-I: Ukraine Ratifies With Conditions."RFE/RL NEWS BRIEFS, 11/15/93, Vol. 2, No. 47, p. 8.]

6/25/93: UKRAINE SHOULD RATIFY LISBON PROTOCOL BUT WITHOUT ARTICLE 5
Yuriy Kostenko indicated that Ukraine might ratify the Lisbon Protocol without Article 5, which requires Ukraine to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear state as soon as possible.
[Lepingwell, "Ukraine, Russia, And Nuclear Weapons Supplementary Chronology," RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, 1/28/94, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 23.]

12/17/92: UKRAINE WILL REMOVE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN SEVEN YEARS
Ukrainian participants at a meeting with the National Resources Defense Council and Princeton University Center for Energy and Environmental Studies claimed that the full seven-year time period allowed under the Union protocol for START I implementation would be needed to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory. [NUCLEONIC WEEK, 12/31/92, pp. 14-15.]

5/23/92: UKRAINE SIGNS LISBON PROTOCOL
Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, under which it is obligated to ratify the START I Treaty and adhere to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state "in the shortest possible time." The Verkhovna Rada has not yet ratified the Protocol or approved Ukrainian accession to the NPT. Ukraine has not concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
[ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 6/92, pp. 34-35.]

TRILATERAL STATEMENT
6/9/2000: KUCHMA ANNOUNCES UKRAINE IS OWED $3 BILLION FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS
On 9 June 2000 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma issued instructions to create an investigative commission to determine why Ukraine was not compensated for tactical nuclear warheads transferred from Ukraine to Russia in 1991-1992 by the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. He alleged that Ukraine is owed $3 billion.[1] The Russian Foreign Ministry denied the allegations, stating that Russia owes Ukraine no money for tactical nuclear warheads. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s Press and Information Department expressed surprise at the allegations, stating that the Trilateral Statement signed on 14 January 1994, which provided for the transfer of Ukraine's nuclear warhead to Russia in return for compensation, concerned only strategic nuclear warheads and that Russia had fulfilled its obligations in that regard. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesmen added that the Russian government had agreed to compensate Ukraine for the fissile material extracted from the tactical nuclear warheads as a “good will gesture,” and that the process of accounting for the cost of tactical warheads is continuing. In February 2000, following negotiations between the Finance Ministries of Russia and Ukraine, Russia agreed to cancel over $1 billion of Ukrainian debt to Russia, $199 million of which was canceled as compensation for fissile materials from tactical nuclear warheads.[2]
Sources:
[1] “Trekhmilliardnyy isk Rossii,” Nezavisimaya gazeta on-line edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/NGA/, 10 June 2000.
[2] “V MID RF oprovergayut utverzhdeniya o tom, chto s Ukrainy byli besplatno otpravleny v Rossiyu yadernyye boyegolovki,” Interfax, No.1, 11 June 2000. {Entered 6/26/00 MJ}

10/21/96: UDOVENKO CRITICIZES RUSSIA’S PROCRASTINATION ON COMPENSATION FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Addressing US politicians and political analysts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko stressed that Russia is still reluctant to reach a final agreement and start paying compensation to Ukraine for tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia.
[INFOBANK (Lviv), 10/22/96, in "Udovenko Says Russia Creates Most Problems in Relations," FBIS-SOV-96-206, 10/22/96.]

9/27/96: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON COMPENSATION FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 11/1/96
A scheduled working meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian intergovernmental commission on preparing a Ukrainian-Russian treaty on friendship and cooperation was held in Moscow. During the working meeting between the Ukrainian delegation, headed by Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Vasyl Durdynets, and the Russian delegation, headed by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Serov, both sides agreed to reach an agreement on Russia’s compensation for tactical nuclear weapons to Ukraine by 11/1/96.
[UNIAR (Kiev), 9/27/96, in "Progress of Russian-Ukrainian Military, Economic Talks," FBIS-SOV-96-190, 9/27/96.]

6/21/96: KOSTENKO ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPENSATION
Ukrainian Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety Yuriy Kostenko said that it is unclear when and how Russia would provide $450 million in financial compensation to Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukrainian territory in 1992. Russia agreed to provide such compensation in 5/96.
["Ukraina poluchit ot RF v 1996 godu yadernoye toplivo dlya AES v polnom obyeme--ministr ekologii respubliki," INTERFAX, 6/21/96.]

6/4/96: US, RUSSIA FULFILL COMMITMENTS UNDER TRILATERAL STATEMENT
According to Moscow INTERFAX, Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov reported that Washington and Moscow have fully carried out their commitments under the Trilateral Statement
[INTERFAX, 6/4/96, in "Ukraine: Shmarov: Russia, U.S. Fully Stand By Trilateral Declaration," FBIS-SOV-96-108, 6/4/96]

6/96: KUCHMA ANNOUNCES WARHEAD TRANSFER COMPLETE
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma announced that Ukraine had completed the transfer to Russia of all nuclear warheads left on its territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the 1/14/94 trilateral statement between Ukraine, Russia and the U.S., Ukraine transferred about 1,800 strategic nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. On 05/18/96, Russia agreed to pay Ukraine $450 million compensation for tactical nuclear weapons removed from Ukraine in 1992. This agreement is not officially confirmed and was apparently concluded during the 17 May Summit of Heads of State or Government of the CIS.
["Ukraine Completes Transfer of the Nuclear Weapons," DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, 06/96, pp. 48-49.] {Entered 8/13/96 KD}

5/23/96: KUCHMA AND CHERNOMYRDIN DISCUSS RUSSIAN COMPENSATION FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KIEV
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin paid a one-day visit to Kyiv to discuss issues of bilateral cooperation, including Russian compensation for tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine, with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and other Ukrainian officials. Despite expectations that an agreement on compensation would be signed, and Chernomyrdin's statement that the final agreement was "99.9 percent ready," no document was signed. Chernomyrdin confirmed all the provisions of the agreement reached in Moscow on 17 May 1996, including the amount of the compensation ($450 million) to Ukraine. Although no indication was given as to why a formal agreement was finalized, both Kuchma and Chernomyrdin pronounced the meeting a success
Sources
[1] UNIAN, 5/23/96, in "Chernomyrdin Pleased With Results of Visit to Ukraine," FBIS-SOV-96-102, 5/23/96
[2] Yuliya Mostova, "Viktor Chernomyrdin: ‘Boris Yeltsin’s Readiness to Visit Kiev is Higher than Ever Before’," ZERKALO NEDELI, 5/25/96-5/31/96, p. 2, in "Recent Turns in Relations With Russia Viewed," FBIS-SOV-96-106, 5/31/96.

5/17/96: RUSSIA AGREES TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO UKRAINE FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
During a meeting held in Moscow after the CIS summit, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin agreed that Ukraine should receive $450 million in compensation for tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn to Russia in 1992. The $450 million would be credited towards Ukraine's debt to Russia for imports of natural gas and oil. No document was signed at the meeting. Russian officials denied that the compensation for tactical weapons is linked to success in resolving the Black Sea Fleet dispute. However, according to a NARODNA ARMIYA report, Chernomyrdin did link the issue of compensation to progress in negotiations on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and its basing
Sources
[1] "Premier RF i prezident Ukrainy dogovorilis o kompensatcii za vyvezennoe iz ukrainy takticheskoe yadernoe oruzhiye," INTERFAKS-UKRAINA, 5/17/96
[2] "Ukraine May Get Compensation for Tactical Nuclear Warheads," MONITOR, 5/20/96
[3] INTERFAX, 5/18/96, in "Chernomyrdin, Kuchma Agree on Compensation for Nuclear Arms," in FBIS-SOV-96-098, 5/18/96
[4] Yuliya Mostova, "Viktor Chernomyrdin: ‘Boris Yeltsin’s Readiness to Visit Kiev is Higher than Ever Before’," ZERKALO NEDELI, 5/25/96-5/31/96, p. 2, in "Recent Turns in Relations With Russia Viewed," FBIS-SOV-96-106, 5/31/96
[5] "Russia Agrees to Compensation for Tactical Weapons," NARODNA ARMIYA, 6/19/96, p. 1, in "Russia Agrees to Compensate Ukraine for Tactical Nuclear Weapons," FBIS-UMA-145-S, 7/29/96. {Entered 11/96 GN, JL}

4/26/96: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY VOLODYMYR HORBULIN REPORTED THAT RUSSIA HAS NOT DELIVERED ANY NUCLEAR FUEL RODS TO UKRAINE IN 1996.
[ITAR-TASS, 4/24/96; See also "Hrushevsky Street News," EASTERN ECONOMIST, 4/8/96, P. 26.]

2/25/96: KUCHMA DISAGREES WITH WILLIAM PERRY’S CALCULATION
US Secretary of Defense William Perry reported that the Trilateral Statement is on schedule and he expects Ukraine to be non-nuclear by summer. However, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma reported that Russia has not kept up its end of the bargain in that it has not delivered the seven years worth of nuclear fuel that it had promised.
["Kuchma Completes Whirlwind Working Visit," Khristina Lew, THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY, 2/25/96, pp. 1-16.]

2/13/96: UKRAINE TO SEEK COMPENSATION FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Volodymyr Ohryzko, Senior Advisor to Ukrainian President Kuchma, indicated that Ukraine would seek additional compensation for tactical nuclear weapons that it had shipped to Russia for dismantling. The issue of tactical nuclear weapons, shipped out of Ukraine in 1993, was left unresolved in the 1994 Trilateral Accord ["Ukraine Seeks Compensation For Tactical Nuclear Arms," REUTER, 2/23/96.]

1/10/96: UKRAINE TO EXCHANGE WARHEADS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL
Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov stated that Ukraine will transfer 26 percent of its nuclear warheads in 1996 in exchange for fuel for its nuclear power plants. He also noted that Russia has not paid for the losses incurred by the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine in 1992.
[FBIS-TAC-96-001, "Ukraine To Exchange Warheads For Russian Nuclear Fuel," 1/10/96.]

12/95: UKRAINE TRANSFERS 1,410 WARHEADS
Ukrainian officials reported that 1,410 warheads had been removed from Ukrainian territory to Russia. It was reported that warhead withdrawal would probably be completed by mid-1996.
["Proliferation: Threat And Response," OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 4/96.]

9/14/95: FREE FUEL IN EXCHANGE FOR UKRAINIAN WARHEADS MEETS ONE HALF OF UKRAINE'S POWER INDUSTRY NEEDS
According to Mykhailo Umanets, the pace of the withdrawal of warheads has resulted in "free" fuel for 65% of the needs of Ukrainian NPPs. This covers approximately one half of the needs of Ukraine's power industry.
[Ihor Osypchuk, "'Warhead' Shock," VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, 9/14/95, p. 1.]

7/17/95: UKRAINIAN POWER PLANTS FORCED TO USE EMERGENCY STOCKS
Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko accused Russia of failing to deliver fuel rods to Ukraine in accordance with the Trilateral Statement, which calls for $1 billion worth of nuclear fuel rods to be delivered as compensation for the materials in the nuclear warheads moved from Ukraine to Russia. According to Hryshchenko, Ukrainian NPPs have been forced to use emergency stocks, which will last only 18 months. Defense Minister Shmarov reportedly discussed this problem with a US delegation in a recent visit to the United States
Sources:
[1] "Concern Over Nuclear Fuel Deliveries From Russia," INTERFAX, 7/17/95.,"In Ukraine," POST-SOVIET NUCLEAR AND DEFENSE MONITOR, 8/7/95, p. 15.
[2] Ustina Markus, "Ukraine Accuses Russia over Nuclear Fuel Rods," OMRI DAILY DIGEST, No.138, Part II, 7/17/95.

7/13/95: KOSTENKO ACCUSES RUSSIA OF FAILING TO DELIVER FUEL ROD
Yuriy Kostenko, Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, claimed that no fuel assemblies have been received from Russia for Ukrainian nuclear power plants in the framework of the (Trilateral) Statement This statement contradicts earlier reports that Russia in fact has been delivering fuel assemblies
[INTERFAX-Ukraine," INTERFAX, 7/13/95.]

12/15/94: MIKHAILOV DOUBTS RUSSIAN ABILITY TO FINISH WITHDRAWAL OF WEAPONS FROM UKRAINIAN TERRITORY
Ukraine has received 102 tons of LEU fuel assemblies in exchange for the 300 warheads returned to Russia for dismantlement. Currently, according to Viktor Mikhailov, Russia possesses neither the financial nor the technical capability to complete the procedure of withdrawal, dismantlement, and reprocessing of weapons on Ukrainian soil. Mikhailov has stated that the $60 million advance made by the US to help finance Russia's production of fuel assemblies for Ukrainian nuclear power plants is insufficient and barely accounts for half of Russia's expenses
["A Contrasting View of Russian-US Cooperation--Viktor Mikhailov Speaks Out," POST-SOVIET NUCLEAR & DEFENSE MONITOR, 1/16/95, Vol.2, No. 11, pp. 2-3.]

11/14/94: HORBULYN EVALUATES PARTICIPATION IN TRILATERAL STATEMENT
Volodymyr Horbulin, President Kuchma's National Security Advisor and Secretary of the National Security Council, assessed the implementation of the Trilateral Statement thus far, giving Ukraine "excellent" marks, Russia "good" marks, and the US "fair" marks. The rationale for his grading was that Russia is providing the fuel rods to Ukrainian power plants but the US' deliveries are less than adequate and fail to meet Ukraine's needs. Horbulin noted that there is no precise mechanism for the delivery of Nunn-Lugar aid, nor is there a schedule for the aid.
[UNIAN, 11/14/94, in "Horbulin Assesses Trilateral Agreement," FBIS-SOV-94-220, 11/14/94.]

10/3/94: PRESIDENT'S ADMINISTRATION EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT US AND RUSSIAN FINANCIAL AID
Dmytro Tabachnyk, chairman of the president's administration, expressed concern that the financial and technical disarmament assistance promised by the US has not been forthcoming. He emphasized that Ukraine continues to abide by its commitment in the Trilateral Statement to pursue disarmament, yet its partners--Russia and the US--are not upholding their sides of the bargain.
[KYIV RADIO UKRAINE WORLD SERVICE, 10/3/94, in FBIS-SOV-94-192, 10/3/94.]

8/94: TWO SHIPMENTS OF NUCLEAR REACTOR FUEL DELIVERED TO UKRAINE
Russia has delivered two shipments of nuclear reactor fuel to Ukraine, as stipulated in the Trilateral Statement, signed by Russia, the US, and Ukraine on 1/14/94. The reactor fuel is compensation for the value of the HEU in the warheads that Ukraine has transferred to Russia. The US has provided $60 million to Russia as an advance payment on the US-Russia HEU contract to help pay for the reactor fuel being provided to Ukraine. See entry for 1/14/94 for more on the US-Russia HEU contract.
[Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 8/2/94, 12:45 PM.]

7/16/94: UKRAINE TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS UNDER TRILATERAL STATEMENT
President-elect Leonid Kuchma has stated that Ukraine will fulfill its obligations under the Trilateral Statement. Ukraine will continue to transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia in return for compensation. Kuchma previously suggested that Ukraine should hold on to part of its nuclear arsenal for use a bargaining chip.
["Kuchma Vows To Stick To Warheads Deal," INTEL NEWS, 7/19/94; and David Marples, "Ukraine After The Presidential Election." RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, 8/12/94, p. 7.]

5/19/94: PROTOCOL SIGNED ON TRILATERAL STATEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
Acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Yefim Zvyagilskiy and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a protocol in which Ukraine pledged to meet a new disarmament deadline and Russia promised to supply nuclear fuel to Ukraine's nuclear power plants. Ukraine will transfer its last warhead to Russia by 1997, taking three rather than seven years for the disarmament process. Russia also pledged to compensate Ukraine $500 million for the approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads that were transferred from Ukraine in 1992. The money will go towards Ukraine's $1 billion energy debt to Russia
["Ukraine Pledges To Double Speed Of Disarmament," REUTERS, 5/19/94.]

4/5/94: UKRAINE RECEIVES RUSSIAN FUEL ASSEMBLIES
Ukraine confirmed that it received the first shipment of fuel assemblies from Russia for its nuclear reactors, as was agreed in the Trilateral Statement. The fuel will go to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.
["Moscow Trilateral Statement Implementation Begins," ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 5/94, p. 24; Ukraine Learning Fast How To Hold Out For The Best Deal," RUSSIA AND REPUBLICS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1, 5/25/94, p. 29.]

4/4/94: RUSSIA SENDS UKRAINE 25 MT OF LEU
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov announced that 25 tons of LEU had been sent to Ukraine. The LEU is part of the compensation for the nuclear warheads that are being withdrawn from Ukraine. In all, Russia will supply Ukraine with 100 tons of LEU
[MOSCOW RADIO ROSSII NETWORK, 4/4/94; in "Weapons Grade Uranium Shipped To Ukraine," FBIS-SOV-94-065, 4/5/94, p. 5.]

1/14/94: TRILATERAL STATEMENT CALLS FOR UKRAINE TO JOIN NPT
The US, Russia, and Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement and Ukraine and Kravchuk presented it to the Supreme Rada as the fulfillment of the conditions that the Rada placed on its ratification of the START I Treaty. The Trilateral Statement calls for the complete withdrawal of all nuclear weapons in Ukraine to Russia, which is in direct contradiction to the Rada's interpretation of the START I Treaty. It also stipulates that Ukraine is to be immediately compensated by Russia for those nuclear weapons in the form of fuel assemblies for Ukrainian nuclear power plants. The US will provide Russia with a $60 million advance on the US-Russia HEU contract to help finance the first deliveries of reactor fuel to Ukraine. Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom agreed to provide Ukraine with security guarantees once Ukraine accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
[Roman Woronowycz, "Foreign Ministry: Tripartite `Statement' Requires No Parliamentary Ratification," UKRAINIAN WEEKLY, 1/23/94, p. 1, 8.]

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)
11/16/2000: VERKHOVNA RADA RATIFIES CTBT AND AGREEMENT WITH PREPARATORY COMMISSION
On 16 November 2000 the Verkhovna Rada ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[1] The Rada also ratified an agreement with the CTBT Preparatory Commission concerning certification of international monitoring activities that permits the commission to modernize the seismic monitoring station located in Ukraine.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Prezident Ukrainy podpisal dva zakona, kasayushchikhsya zapreta yadernykh ispytaniy," Interfax, No. 4, 7 December 2000.
[2] "VR ratifitsirovala dogovor o vseobemlyushchem zapreshchenii yadernykh ispytaniy," UNIAN, No. 46, 13-19 November 2000. {Entered 2/15/01 RG}

9/27/2000: UKRAINE TO MODERNIZE NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING SEISMIC STATION
DINAU reported on 27 September 2000 that Ukraine will modernize a seismic monitoring station belonging to an international network of nuclear test monitoring stations intended to verify the CTBT treaty. The station, designated PS-45 and located in the town of Malin, is in poor condition and will be re-equipped using funds allocated by the CTBT Organization. The CTBT Preparatory Commission has already assigned $211,000; the total cost of upgrading the station is expected to reach $2 million. The issue of PS-45 modernization was discussed by the CTBT Preparatory Commission Executive Director, Wolfgang Hoffman, during his meeting in Kiev with National Space Agency of Ukraine General Director Oleksandr Nehoda.
[DINAU, 27 September 2000; in "Ukraina planiruyet modernizirovat seysmostantsiyu, vkhodyashchuyu v mezhdunarodnuyu sistemu monitoringa yadernykh ispytaniy," Nirozpovsyudzheniya ta kontrol ozbroven, September-October 2000, p. 58.] {Entered 5/16/2001 MJ}

9/27/96: UKRAINE SIGNS CTBT
Having received instructions from Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at UN Headquarters.
[UNIAN (Kiev), 9/28/96, in "Foreign Minister Signs Test Ban Treaty at UN," FBIS-SOV-96-190, 9/28/96.] {Entered 9/22/96 GN}

8/8/96: UKRAINE DECLARES SUPPORT FOR CTBT DRAFT TREATY
Ukrainian representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Oleh Shamshur stated that the Ukrainian government supports the draft comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) which was submitted to the Conference on 6/28/96. Shamshur emphasized that although the final draft does not include certain provisions which were proposed or supported by Ukraine, the document should be regarded as a "sound compromise" considering all the disagreements over the final draft originally expressed by many participants. The Ukrainian representative urged the participants not to postpone the conclusion of CTBT talks any further which might jeopardize the adoption of the final draft at the 51st session of the UN General Assembly.
[ITAR-TASS, 8/8/96, in "Kiev Declares Support for Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," FBIS-SOV-96-155, 8/8/96.] {Entered 9/29/96 GN}

11/15/95: UKRAINE ATTENDS FIFTIETH SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON CTBT
Sources:
[1] "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL, No. 49, 12/1/95, pp. 6-7.
[2] Natalya Riznyk, "2000 Yadernykh Vybukhiv. Mozhe, Vystachyt?," HOLOS UKRAINY, 1/26/96, p. 5.

9/94: UDOVENKO: CTBT IS IMPORTANT TO UKRAINE
Hennadiy Udovenko stated that Ukraine devotes great importance to the preparation of the comprehensive test ban treaty, currently being negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament.
["Statement by H. E. Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in the General Debate of the 49th Session of the UN General Assembly," 9/28/94.]


NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
3/24/99: UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT CALLS FOR NON-NUCLEAR STATUS REVISION
Reacting to NATO's air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution, the fourth clause of which states "The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall submit to the Supreme Council a draft law on cancelling the decisions and renouncing Ukraine's obligations concerning its non-nuclear status."[1] Over 66 percent of the deputies approved the resolution.[2] In response, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma stated that Ukraine is not able to independently maintain nuclear weapons. He stressed that this was the key factor influencing the decision to give up its nuclear weapons and that it is impossible to "turn back."[3] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk responded to this development by stating that Ukraine has to observe international agreements on its non-nuclear status.[4] According to Tarasyuk and Kuchma's press secretary, the deputies' decision was emotional.[2,4] Ukraine's non-nuclear status is codified in Ukraine's constitution[5] and is further re-affirmed in the declaration "On the State Sovereignty of Ukraine" adopted in 1990. Since then, Ukraine has re-confirmed its status as a non-nuclear weapon state in numerous documents.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Zayavleniye press-sluzhby Verkhovnoy rady Ukrainy," Estonskoye Agentstvo Novostey ETA, 25 March 1999; in Natsionalnaya sluzhba novostey, http://nel.nns.ru/.
[2] "V Kieve zatoskovali o yadernoy bombe," Vremya MN,  http://www.mosinfo.ru:8080/news/.../0325-2.html, 25 March 1999.
[3] UNIAN, 29 March 1999; in "Ukraine Cannot Maintain Nuclear Weapons "Independently" - Kuchma," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.
[4] UNIAN, 25 March 1999; in "Tarasyuk: Ukraine Must Adhere To Non-Nuclear Status," FBIS Document FTS19990330000936.
[5] "Parlament prinyal resheniye ob otmene bezyadernogo statusa," Ekonomicheskoye obozreniye Logos Press, 29 March 1999; Natsionalnaya sluzhba novostey, http://nel.nns.ru/. {Entered 4/1/99 SK}

12/5/94: UKRAINE ACCEDES TO NPT AS NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE
Ukraine formally acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state party at a ceremony at the CSCE conference in Budapest. The United States, United Kingdom, and Russia, in turn, gave Ukraine a signed document providing security guarantees. France and China issued similar unilateral guarantees.
["Ukraine Renounces Nuclear Arms, START-I Enters Force," REUTER, 12/5/94; in EXECUTIVE NEWS SERVICE, 12/5/94.] 
 
11/16/94: UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT WILL ACCEDE TO NPT BUT NEEDS SECURITY GUARANTEES
The Ukrainian Parliament voted to accede to the NPT with several reservations. The vote was 301 to 8 with 20 abstentions. The reservations include a provision that Ukraine receive signed security guarantees from the nuclear states.
[RADIO UKRAINE WORLD SERVICE (Kiev); in "Text Of Resolution Detailing NPT Reservations," FBIS, 11/16/94.] 
 
5/23/92: UKRAINE SIGNS LISBON PROTOCOL
Ukraine became a signatory to the Lisbon Protocol, under which it was obligated to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state "in the shortest possible time."
[ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 6/92, pp. 34-35.] 

NPT EXTENSION
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Ukraine was a co-sponsor of the draft decision introduced by Canada to indefinitely and unconditionally extend the Treaty.
 
5/12/95: UKRAINE URGES NUCLEAR STATES TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARSENALS
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian delegation, stated that Ukraine's renunciation of its nuclear weapons and decision to join the NPT did not mean that Ukraine gave "its blessing to the eternal continuation of the now existing right of the nuclear weapon states to possess their nuclear arsenals." He urged the five nuclear powers to follow Ukraine's example and work toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons "in the shortest possible time." Any foot-dragging on this issue is perceived by Ukraine as a breach of the "strengthened and reinvigorated" NPT. Hryshchenko also emphasized that he hoped that the continuing process of disarmament would provide new and stronger incentives for the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) with nuclear ambitions to abandon their desires for nuclear capability and accede to the NPT swiftly. He urged the United States and Russia to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as possible. The fact that the NPT was extended indefinitely, Hryshchenko said, was a sign of trust on the part of the NNWS that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) will fulfill their side of the bargain and the NWS should strive to "justify (the trust) in the nearest future."
[STATEMENT by Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, at the Final Plenary Meeting of the NPT Extension and Review Conference, New York, 5/12/95.] 
 
4/27/95: HALAKA: UNCONDITIONAL NPT EXTENSION WILL THREATEN NONPROLIFERATION
Serhiy Halaka, vice-president of the Ukrainian Center of International Political Studies, stated that Ukraine's number one priority for the future should be the preservation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. He concluded that indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT would threaten the goal of nonproliferation. He supported extension of the NPT for 25 year period(s). He urged the signing of the CTBT, early ratification of START II by Russian and US legislative bodies, and further talks on nuclear disarmament.
[STATEMENT by Serhiy Halaka, Vice-President of the Ukrainian Center of International Political Studies, at the NGO meeting during the NPT Review and Extension Conference, 4/27/95.] 
 
4/18/95: UDOVENKO STATES NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES IMPORTANT
Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Head of the Ukrainian delegation, made a statement at the NPT Review and Extension Conference that lauded the NPT's success, but did not specifically endorse indefinite and unconditional extension. In general he was enthusiastic about the future of the NPT, which although not an "absolute or perfect solution," is an important starting point. He also stated that this Review and Extension Conference should concentrate attention on additional measures for preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms, including the improvement of the IAEA safeguards regime. According to Udovenko, "Ukraine proceeds from the premise that the consideration of improvements in the global non-proliferation regime should be inseparably linked to the broadening of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy." The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is important to Ukraine, as is improved communication between suppliers and supplier groups.
[STATEMENT by His Excellency Mr. Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 4/18/95.] 
 
1/25/95: UKRAINE HOPES UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA WILL RATIFY START II BEFORE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko stated during the Preparatory Conference of the NPT Review and Extension Conference that Ukraine hoped the United States and Russia would be able to ratify the START II Treaty before the conference actually began in 4/95. He also urged the United Kingdom, China, and France to take additional specific measures to reduce their nuclear arsenals as soon as possible. According to some analysts, Ukraine's accession to the NPT strengthens the case for an indefinite extension of the treaty. It demonstrates to non-nuclear nations that they can achieve security through other means and it also shows that Russia and the United States do not discriminate in their pressure for countries to remain non-nuclear.
Source:
[1] Kathleen Hart, "Ukrainian Ratification Of NPT Seen Boosting Extension Conference," NUCLEONICS WEEK, 11/24/94, pp. 7-8.
[2] UNIAN (Kiev), 1/25/95, in "Delegation Takes Part in NPT Conference," FBIS-SOV-95-017, 1/25/95.

	Updated April 2005