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ABSTRACT 

The U.S. Department of Energy and technical specialists from Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories, are working jointly with representatives of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology to upgrade and modernize the physical protection and material control and accounting systems at the Institute. Recently, Japan and Sweden have also agreed to participate in the cooperative effort. 

The perimeter of the facility is being upgraded with new fences, intrusion detection sensors, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, and improved lighting. A great deal of work has been completed within the perimeter as well. The building that houses the nuclear materials has been hardened. Walls, windows, and doors have been strengthened and public utilities have been removed. Additional layers of access control and intrusion detection have been added. New systems have been installed in the Central Alarm Station for computerized alarm monitoring, CCTV camera switching, and radio communication. A modular vault has been installed to provide immediate protection to the nuclear materials. 

Material control and accountability upgrades include several computers, a computerized database for tracking nuclear materials movements, bar-code equipment, new radiometric instruments for nondestructive analysis, a supply of reusable containers, and equipment and supplies to be used during nuclear materials repackaging. 

INTRODUCTION 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and technical specialists from Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), are working jointly with representatives of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) to upgrade and modernize the physical protection (PP) and material control and accounting (MC&A) systems at the Institute. Recently, Japan and Sweden have also agreed to participate in the cooperative effort. 

KIPT was one of the premier research and development institutions within the former Soviet Union (FSU), Much of the effort at KIPT was focused on nuclear technologies. Although this work has been greatly reduced since the breakup of the FSU, significant quantities of nuclear material remain in storage at the Institute. 

In June 1995, a group of DOE specialists visited the Institute to perform a survey of existing PP and MC&A systems. After the survey was completed, reports were issued which evaluated the existing systems and recommended several upgrades. These reports were accepted and agreed upon by DOE and KIPT. The recommendations in these reports form the basis for the upgrade work in progress at the Institute. 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION UPGRADES 

The existing physical protection (PP) systems were designed and installed in the 1970s. Although there was an attempt to upgrade these systems in the mid-1980s, the project failed because of budget reductions. Consequently, many of the systems have become obsolete and should be completely replaced (Figure 1). 

The current PP modernization was started in early 1996 and is well underway. First, areas requiring restricted access were defined. Then, the modernization began from the center outwards. Effort first concentrated on the building that houses the nuclear material. A portal equipped with walk-through metal detector and radiation sensors is being installed. All persons entering or leaving the building will be required to pass through this portal. Metal doors with electromagnetic locks are being installed in all laboratories designed for nuclear materials work. Card readers and motion sensors are also being installed in these laboratories. Intrusion detection sensors are being installed where appropriate. 

Much work has also been done in the inner area of the building. Walls and windows have been strengthened, public utilities have been removed and new doors have been installed (Figures 2, 3). A rapid deployment access delay system (RAPADS) vault, designed and fabricated by SNL, was installed and is currently being used for materials (Figure 4). Several layers of intrusion detection, including CCTV cameras, are being installed. Card readers, keypads, and mechanical locks have been installed for entry control. A two-person rule is strictly enforced. 

Figure 2. Basement detail showing reinforced window grates and elevator hatch	Figure 3. Basement entrance showing new doors and reinforced concrete roof

The Institute's perimeter has been evaluated and several new devices have been selected to enhance physical security. New fences will be installed. Two independent intrusion detection systems are being implemented, along with a CCTV network and improved lighting. An auxiliary power generator is being provided to keep the new equipment operational during power failures. Japan is funding the perimeter work. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate representatives are performing the design and installation work. 

A new Central Alarm Station is under construction. Additional AC power lines and a new heating/air conditioning system are being installed. A computerized control console has been provided which includes an alarm monitoring system, CCTV switching and monitoring, and entry control. A three-channel MPT-1327 trunking system has been installed with portable, vehicle, and base station Motorola radios. 

When the PP upgrades are completed, KIPT will have an integrated physical protection system that is comparable to those used by west European and U.S. facilities for protection of nuclear materials. 

MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY UPGRADES 

At the time of the 1995 site survey, material control and accountability (MC&A) practices at KIPT followed the Soviet model. Materials had been received from other facilities accompanied by a "passport" or source document, and entered into KIPT's database using the declared values for enrichment, mass, and concentration. No re-measurement was performed to confirm the values from the source documents. The database was kept in a bound ledger, and any materials movements were also recorded in the ledger. The source document information for material received directly from its point of origin is most reliable, however information on material that has been handled by secondary sources may not accurately reflect the true composition. 

The immediate goal of the MC&A upgrades at KIPT is to establish a reliable inventory of their nuclear materials. To accomplish this, KIPT must first repackage its nuclear materials. During repackaging, the materials will be weighed and analyzed to determine U-235 enrichment and concentration. Samples will be taken from several material types and analyzed in the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) laboratory at Seibersdorf to confirm the radiometric instruments' calibration. Once the inventory is complete, an initial declaration is to be made to the IAEA, and the materials are to be placed under international safeguards following standard IAEA guidelines. A computerized database (supplied by the U.S. through ANL) will be used to track post-inventory materials movements. Japan and the U.S. have provided equipment and supplies to assist in the repackaging effort. The U.S. has also provided funding for this project under three separate subcontracts between KIPT and ORNL. 

Several computers have been supplied to KIPT for managing the nuclear materials database. The AIMAS software package (Automated Inventory/Material Accounting System), created at ANL, has been designed to meet the needs of several nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The latest version of AIMAS was recently installed at KIPT and technical personnel there were trained in its use. 

The U.S. has provided bar-code equipment to the Institute to facilitate materials inventory and minimize transcription errors. The bar-code equipment includes one stationary reader and two handheld readers, one specialized printer, software and supplies. The equipment is to be installed and integrated with the AIMAS database in late summer. 

Before repackaging of the nuclear materials could begin, an ample supply of suitable containers was required. The ideal container would be sturdy, reusable, and have dimensions appropriate for nuclear criticality safety. Such containers are not readily available commercially, so 300 reusable stainless steel containers in three different sizes were designed and built by KIPT under a subcontract with ORNL (Figure 5). 

Figure 5. Nuclear material containers.
These stainless steel containers were
built in three sizes - 90 mm, 120 mm,
and 150 mm - and are reusable.

To minimize the hazards associated with handling nuclear materials, glove bags, anaerobic glove boxes, and special ventilators were supplied to the Institute. The glove bags are intended for use when long fuel rods are handled, and will minimize spread of contamination caused by oxide flakes from bare uranium rods. The anaerobic glove boxes (Figure 6) can be operated with either argon or nitrogen, and will minimize risks from airborne particles and from pyrophoricity. Polyethylene tents will be built around the entry ports of the glove boxes, and airflow will be created using ventilators equipped with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Japan has supplied protective clothing and dosimeters to be worn by personnel who will handle the nuclear materials. Japan is also supplying hand-and-foot counters for monitoring personnel as they exit their work areas. 

Scales and checkweights have also been provided to KIPT from the U.S. Six scales of three different types have been provided, including two scales with mass range up to 150 kg, two high-precision scales with mass range up to 5 kg, and two battery-powered scales with mass range up to 8 kg for use in inert-atmosphere glove boxes. Checkweights have been provided so that each scale can be tested over its full range. 

Radiometric instruments are being used to determine the uranium concentration and enrichment (weight percent U-235) of each item. A high-resolution gamma ray detector has been installed to measure uranium enrichment (Figure 7), and an active well neutron coincidence counter (AWCC, Figure 8) has been installed to determine the fissile content of each item. KIPT technical personnel have received extensive technical training with these instruments and have written detailed procedures to describe their uses. The instruments have been field-calibrated and tested. Analysis of the repackaged material has begun, but no results are available to date. 

 

Figure 7. Workers using high-resolution gamma spectrometer (Note protective clothing supplied by Japan)	Figure 8. Workers calibrating the active well neutron coincidence counter

 

Under subcontract with ORNL, KIPT personnel have designed and constructed shelving units for the RAPADS vault and for the general storage area. These shelves are designed so that nuclear criticality safety is assured even when the shelves are fully loaded. The same subcontract provides funding for labor to move, repackage, and measure the nuclear materials. 

A third subcontract between KIPT and ORNL provides additional funding for certain facility upgrades, radioactive waste disposal, and purchase of materials and supplies such as detergents and liquid nitrogen. 

CONCLUSIONS  

Over the past two years, a multinational team has been working to upgrade physical protection (PP) measures and materials control and accountability (MC&A) practices at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology. The initial part of the work is nearing completion. By the end of the calendar year, significant improvements will be evident in both PP and MC&A. Possibilities for future joint projects are under discussion including remote monitoring of nuclear materials, and upgrade of KIPT's chemical analysis capability. 

AUTHORS 

Valerij A. Mikhailov Kharkov  Institute of Physics and Technology	Lars-Gunnar Flyghed ANS Inc.,  Sweden
Robert N. Ceo, E. Ray Hinton Jr.,  and Kenneth A. Thompson  Lockheed Martin Energy Systems	Thomas E. Zinneman  Argonne National Laboratory

 
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	Updated April 2006