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Institute of Nuclear Physics
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Site Description || MPC&A Objectives & Strategies || Physical Protection Upgrades
Central Alarm Station Upgrades || Material Control & Accounting Upgrades
MPC&A Training || Accomplishments to Date || Author
The Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) is located in a remote, wooded area approximately 30 kilometers from the capitol city of Tashkent. Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Science, the INP has a staff of 220 people that monitor the operations of a 10 megawatt research reactor. Often described as the largest facility of its kind in Central Asia, the INP has an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear research and isotope production facility for the region. Today, the facility maintains fresh and irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to support continued reactor operations. Under International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines, facilities that store or process significant amounts of direct-use nuclear materials must protect against both and external threat, such as a terrorist group, or an internal threat, such as a site employee. Protecting fresh and spent fuel stored at the INP was identified as a primary nonproliferation concern. The main objective of physical protection upgrades at INP is to protect the reactor complex which consists of three contiguous buildings; the Administration Building which contains the reactor control room, the Reactor Building which houses the research reactor and the spent fuel storage pool, and two-story addition.
Start Date/Initial Site Survey: June 1995
Site Completion Date: August 1996
Additional Support Being Considered: To be completed by February 1998
MPC&A OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES
Site Objectives and Priorities
In June 1995, the IAEA convened MPC&A specialists from Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States to review MPC&A needs at the INP. Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance in the areas of material control and accounting (MC&A), while the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to provide physical protection upgrades. After the Department of Energy obtained budget authorization in September 1995, contracts with INP personnel were initiated for the design of a physical protection system and the purchase and installation of equipment. Working in collaboration with donor states, facility upgrades were completed in August 1996.
The MPC&A improvements at the INP represent a significant accomplishment in US/Uzbekistan cooperative efforts to reduce the risk of unauthorized use, theft or diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials. The improved security of nuclear materials at the INP also represents a success in efforts to reduce the global threat of nuclear proliferation.
Physical Protection system provide the capability to detect, delay, and respond to adversarial acts, including attempts at theft and sabotage. Physical protection enhancement at INP included four main components: delay barriers, entry control system, and alarm assessment system and an enhance communications system.
Before these systems could be installed, site preparation activities had to be completed in order to maximize the effectiveness of barriers and detection sensors and the cameras that view portions of the exterior of the facility. For instance, a 10 meter wide clear zone was established around the perimeter of the reactor complex by removing vegetation and discarding or relocating objects. In addition, windows at the ground level that were readily accessible from the exterior of the building were permanently covered with security grills.
Physical protection also involves restricting and delaying movements around and within critical areas and designating doors as primary access points. In the main building lobby entrance, a grilled door was installed to control entry. In addition, the main doors to the lobby entrance, reactor control room and the reactor building were equipped with card readers and keypads, magnetic door locks, balanced magnetic switches (which detect the opening of a door), and request to exit-switches (which allow authorized exit without activating alarm). If and intruder or unauthorized personnel attempts to enter restricted areas through these entry points, the alarm system will be triggered and a signal transmitted to the central alarm station for assessment and response.
In addition, the fresh fuel storage vault was reconfigured as a room within a room, requiring two authorized personnel to be present with lock codes before the magnetically locked door can be opened. Other doors utilize entry control systems that use secure card system, personal identification numbers (PINS), and administrative controls.
Intrusion detection sensors were installed at all critical area within the facility. Video surveillance cameras were installed in the Reactor Building to monitor movement and operations. Finally, handheld and walk-through SNM and metal detectors were installed in the main building entrance enable security personnel to detect the unauthorized movement of radioactive materials.
CENTRAL ALARM STATION UPGRADES
In addition to sensor systems, general area surveillance was achieved with the installation of video cameras and a video display system. In order to have this capability, the INP was provided with a new Central Alarm Station (CAS). The CAS, located adjacent to the main building foyer, houses the alarm annunciation system, access control system and alarm monitoring system. DOE technical experts initiated several security modification designed to harden the CAS against attempts at forced entry. These modifications included replacing the main entrance door and hardening the windows. The door is now controlled by means of a card reader and keypad. Only authorized personnel with an access control card and code can enter into the CAS. In addition, a bullet-proof observation window was constructed to provide the guard force with a clear view of the entrance hall.
The CAS, manned 24 hours a day, monitors numerous security sensors and fire and safety sensors. These detectors have been installed at various locations to alert security personnel in the CAS should a secured door, window or other area be compromised. Sensors - both interior and exterior - are electronically connected to the CAS. Displays indicate to the guard force the status of intrusion detection sensors. Monitors provide capability to view selected areas within the facility. From the CAS, security personnel have the capability to assess an alarm and direct a response force to an area of concern. Handheld radios were provided to the INP guard force to improve their performance during normal and emergency response procedures.
MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING UPGRADES
The fundamental objective of MC&A is to provide current information as to the nature, status, and location of all nuclear materials within a facility. MC&A tools include computerized accounting systems, measurement systems, reporting systems, and containment and surveillance systems.
Prior to cooperation in this area, the INP recorded nuclear material locations, movements, and transfers by hand in a bound, laboratory notebook. The Institute had no capability to measure the fuel items on-site and used the producer "passport" for all accounting information. As part of the Uzbekistan-USDOE cooperation, a fresh fuel measurements system was provided to enhance the INP’s capability to measure the isotopic composition of the fresh fuel items in the inventory. In addition, Australia provided the INP with a personal computer-based material accounting system and accounting software which enables personnel to accurately track the movement of nuclear materials, prepare general ledgers and inventory change reports.
To enhance the effectiveness of safeguards measures, tamper indication devices (TID) were provided to prevent unauthorized access to storage containers. E-Type seals replaced the wax seals the facility formerly used.
The Department of Energy provided several MPC&A training courses for INP officials. These courses proved hands-on training in US approaches and methodologies to physical protection system design and analysis, and equipment maintenance and use. In addition, the INP Guard Force personnel received equipment and training. These MPC&A training activities markedly enhance the overall security posture of the facility by providing an interface between the protective force, physical security systems, and material control and accounting systems.
Uzbekistan and the United States have made impressive progress in collaborative MPC&A efforts over the past two years. Installation of improved physical protection systems such as hardened doors and windows, nuclear material detectors and personnel access controls has markedly enhanced the security of nuclear materials at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Great progress has also been made in building relationships among key official and facility managers in the two countries.
MPC&A improvements at the INP are another successful demonstration of the strategy of the Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force.
L. E. Romesburg
Sandia National Laboratories
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Updated April 2006 |
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