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As part of their effort to be as militarily self-reliant Yugoslavia was quite active in the CW field from the 1950s onwards. In addition to the development and production of protective equipment, Yugoslavian researchers appear to have engaged in a particularly thorough exploration of chemical agents that might be used either by or against their armed forces. The need for this activity was made particularly urgent by an awareness of an ongoing offensive CW program in the Soviet Union and the subsequent revival of the United States' CW program in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
After an initial focus on protective work beginning in 1958, Yugoslavia began a program that expanded its defensive research and developed an offensive CW capability. Although reference is made to the establishment of the Jastrebac project in 1976 it seems appropriate to regard this activity as a continuation of work done in the 1960s and early 1970s rather than as a sudden shift in policy. Production facilities for Phosgene, sulfur Mustard and Sarin were all established prior to the Jastrebac projects' inception. In the first period of the Jastrebac project, research seems to have concentrated on irritants and incapacitants (i.e., Adamsite, BZ, CR, CS, and Chloropicrin) with a lesser focus on more lethal agents, such as Cyanogen Chloride, Diphenylcyanosarin, and Diphosgene. After 1980 research emphasised nerve agents such as Armin, Soman, Tabun and VX. In the late 1980s a decision appears to have been made to focus efforts on the weaponization of Sarin and sulfur Mustard. These would have been added to BZ and CS which had been weaponized and deployed with the armed forces since the late 1970s. It appears that a Yugoslavian program for large scale weaponization of chemical weapons was interrupted by the country's breakup beginning in late 1990.
It is possible, though not demonstrated, that Yugoslavia produced large stockpiles of CW agent prior to making any decisions on weaponization or producing delivery systems. Claims for the production of Sarin range from a low of one or two metric tons to a high of over 50 tons.[3] There is an isolated claim that up to 30 metric tons of Lewisite and nitrogen Mustard, up to 50 metric tons of Soman, Tabun and VX and up to 50 metric tons of Sarin were produced by Yugoslavia, but without additional information this report should probably be regarded as unreliable.[4] The same source also claims that Yugoslavia possessed a stockpile of over 400 metric tons of sulfur Mustard which is suspiciously close to Yugoslavia's maximum production potential since the completion of its production facilities.[5] All of of these figures contradict the bulk of reports that provide sufficent detail to support the position that Yugoslavia did not produce as much CW agent as it could have. Most agents, including Soman, Tabun and VX are described as having been produced in laboratory quantities only. Beyond that there are no clear figures on total production. It is clear that several tons of Sarin, Mustard and BZ were produced and stored; beyond that it is difficult, if not impossible, without access to Yugoslavian records to make a definitive stament as to Yugoslavian output.
Adamsite
Research into the offensive possibilities of Adamsite was reportedly undertaken at the Potoci facility between 1976 and 1980 as part of the Jastrebac program.[6] There are no indications that this agent was pursued beyond the laboratory stage.
Chloropicrin
Investigation into the offensive possibilities of Chloropicrin was reportedly undertaken at the Potoci facility over the period 1976 to 1984 as part of the Jastrebac program.[7] A limited production capability of 10 kg per day was operated during the period 1980 to 1984. The production of this agent would appear to be in character with a generalized Yugoslavian interest in incapacitants - the agent being of limited value as a lethal agent in modern warfare.[8] There are no details as to how much Chloropicrin was ultimately produced, whether it was weaponized and deployed in any form and what became of the agent subsequent to the end of the Jastrebac project.
CR
Dibenz-(b,f)-1,4-oxazepine (CR) is a more recent tear gas than CN or CS. It was first synthesized in the United Kingdom in 1962. It reportedly is more potent, less toxic and more persistent than CS but still is not used widely. Yugoslavian researchers appear to have investigated this agent in the early 1970s.[9] There are no indications that this agent was adopted for use by Yugoslavian military or police forces.
CS
Although not generally regarded as a chemical weapon, CS has been extensively used in military conflicts as a force multiplier. While CS is not usually lethal, it has many of the tactical benefits generally associated with riot control agents, specifically the capacity to produce panic or disruption in a defending force. They are especially useful against untrained or unprotected opponents who have little choice other than fleeing the site of exposure or being rendered incapable of defending their positions. For this reason CS and other non-lethal chemical agents are treated as chemical weapons by the Chemical Weapons Convention if they are used for the purposes of warfare.
The earliest published reference to research on CS by Yugoslavian researchers is a pair of 1974 articles examining the pharmacology, toxicology and treatment of the riot control agents CS and CR.[10] Investigations into the production of CS reportedly took place at the Potoci facility during the period 1975 to 1977.[11] This was followed by the establishment of a CS production facility with a design capability of 200 kilograms per day, probably within the Miloje Blagojevic factory for nitrocellulose gunpowder.[12]
Both of these agents were thoroughly incorporated into Yugoslavian tactical doctrine and appear to have been regularly used during the wars of the 1990s.
Up to 1989 Yugoslavia may have produced as much as 100 metric tons or more of CS. The production facilities were capable of producing up to 200 kilograms per day. It is unclear whether production was initially undertaken at the Potoci facility and then reestablished in Lucani or operated in Lucani from the start. Production is alleged to have continued until 1993.[13]
The following weapons systems were employed for delivery of CS. The BRS M79 AF-1 special hand grenade which contained 112 grams of CS; the BRS M79 AG-1 special hand grenade which contained 103 grams of CS; the MTHS-D M83 40mm rifle grenade which contained 120 grams of CS; the MTHS-E M83 60mm rifle grenade which contained 160 grams of CS; the KODPS M1 (RL-M1) shoulder mounted sprayer which held up to 10 kilograms of solid CS or 10 liters of CS liquid; the KODS M2, KODS M3E and M3F toxic smoke containers which contained 160 grams of CS; the KODS M4E and M4F toxic smoke container which contained 1320 grams of CS, and unspecified mortar rounds.[14]
CS weapons are indicated by red markings, often including the phrase CS, and a red stripe or overall red coloring. The Yugoimport Company of Serbia and Montenegro continues to produce CS-filled munitions for internal and export markets.
[15]
BZ
The Yugoslavian military incorporated this agent into its tactical arsenal and doctrines.
BZ was reportedly explored by Yugoslavian researchers as part of the Jastrebac program during the period prior to the initiation of production in 1976 to 1977.[16] However, the earliest published reference to research on BZ by Yugoslavian researchers is a 1974 article entitled "psychochemical warfare gases type BZ" which points to earlier investigations.[17] In 1977 a decision was taken to develop a production capability of 5 kilograms per day, and production may have begun at this rate in 1980.[18] The initial production activity between 1980 and 1984 is described as a research program leaving open the possibility that production capability was expanded thereafter.[19] One report dates the beginning of systematic production of BZ to February 1984 without specifying a production figure.[20] It is unclear if this date represents the beginning of regular production, with the production that began in 1980 being nothing more than test runs or pilot production; or, if instead, it represents the introduction of a larger capability than the reported 5 kg per day. Alternatively, the report may be in error.
The BZ production line was in Lucani, probably at the Miloje Blagojevic factory for nitrocellulose gunpowder. [21] The filling of munitions with chemical agents is reported to have taken place at a facility located in Krusevac, possibly the Industry Miloje Zakic, although this is not confirmed.[22] There are no reliable figures detailing how much BZ was ultimately produced or when production ceased. There is one report to the effect that Yugoslavia possessed a stockpile of 300 tonnes of BZ in 1999.[23] In the absence of an additional unidentified production, capability an order of magnitude larger than that which has been described in open sources should be regarded as spurious.[24] It is possible that production of BZ continued into the 1990s as the facility was located in Serbia and was physically undisturbed by the Yugoslavian breakup.
There have been allegations that Yugoslavian/Bosnian Serb forces made use of BZ in the course of their operations to destroy a number of Bosnian Muslim enclaves in 1995.[25] Due to the lack of independent witnesses and the difficulties associated with obtaining environmental samples, not least due to the lengthy period that passed between the events and their being reported or investigated, it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to arrive at firm conclusions regarding the use or non-use of BZ in this instance.
BZ was only weaponized for tactical uses. The chosen means for delivery was the BRS M79 AF-2 special hand grenade which contained 50 grams of BZ, the BRS M79 AG-2 special hand grenade which contained 103 grams of BZ,[26] and the KODPS M1 (RL-M1) shoulder mounted sprayer.[27] In addition there was a capability to fill the M83 40mm and 60mm rifle grenades with BZ.[28] It is further reported that 82mm and 120mm mortar bombs were filled with BZ.[29] The Yugoimport company of Serbia and Montenegro continues to produce non-BZ-filled versions of these munitions for internal and export markets.
In 1981 the Yugoslavian army produced and distributed a manual on the use of the M79 hand grenade and the M1 shoulder mounted sprayer filled with BZ, suggesting that deployment was either anticipated or actually taking place.[30] This manual suggested the use of BZ in the following situations:
When a group is blocked (Section 35): BZ should be used against a "blocked" group, i.e., a group that is pinned down and cannot maneuver, "[w]hen it is desired to exhaust the blocked group and bring them to a condition of mental confusion. Mental confusion should appear one hour after application of the bombs and should last several hours to several days. Then, appropriate action can be taken to capture, disarm or destroy the blocked group."
- In an ambush (Section 41): "[BZ] is very effective for the ambush of a certain person or group, but not when there is an immediate need to capture or destroy the group, but rather to disable them for a later operation."
- In surrounding and destroying a group (Section 45): BZ can be used to "destroy" a surrounded group "when it is unimportant that the task is accomplished immediately. Under these conditions the destruction, or capture, of the group which is surrounded should be attempted one or more hours after application of the [chemical agent], and after clear and positive signs of the effect of the chemical are registered (some of them may be shouting, coming out of the shelter, uncoordinated fire, etc.)."
The manual also warns that if BZ is used, "enemy individuals or groups should not be captured or destroyed immediately, because it can be expected that such individuals or groups will subsequently, under the effects of [this chemical agent], inflict great damage and losses on their own forces."[31]
LSD-25
It is claimed that Yugoslavian researchers at the Potoci facility explored the military potential of LSD-25 as an incapacitant at some point prior to the facility's closure in 1991.[32] The earliest Yugoslavian published research on LSD-25 dates to 1960 and involved unspecified tests on animals and considerations on its use in psychiatric practice which is not in itself unusual.[33] Further consideration of this agent in the 1970s may be indicated by the 1971 publication "Psychotropic drugs and their military importance."[34] This was one of a number of articles on "psychochemical warfare agents" which generally refer to BZ but which may also include others such as LSD-25.[35] There are no indications that this agent was weaponized.
Chlorine
This World War I agent was employed as an improvised weapon by the Bosnian-Muslim defenders of the city of Tuzla. Bosnian-Muslim forces used Chlorine taken from a Chlorine factory in the town to fill 120mm mortar bombs which they alledgedly used against Serbian forces in August 1993.[36] The defenders also appear to have set up cylinders of Chlorine for possible release in a cloud attack, and they frequently warned that they could release the large quantities of Chlorine stored in tanks at the factory if their defenses were breached.[37] These weapons were not part of a wider program and appear to have been of limited military utility.
Cyanogen Chloride
Research into the offensive possibilities of Cyanogen Chloride was reportedly undertaken as part of the Jastrebac program during the period 1980 to 1984.[38] There are no indications that this agent was chosen for further research and development or produced in significant quantities.
Phosgene / Diphosgene
Production of Phosgene was initially undertaken at the Military Technical Institute's Potoci facility following the 1959 installation of a production line which produced fifteen metric tons of Phosgene up to 1965.[39] In 1965 the production line was relocated to the Industry Miloje Zakic chemical complex in Krusevac.[40] It is not known how much Phosgene was produced for military purposes after 1965. There are no indications that Phosgene was weaponized and stockpiled for use by Yugoslavian forces. It is likely that a significant part of Yugoslavian Phosgene production at the Potoci facility was used to provide a quantity suitable for the testing of defensive measures. Phosgene is a World War I weapon with limited value against an enemy equipped with modern defensive measures.
In addition to its use as a chemical weapon, large quantities of Phosgene are used in a number of industrial applications. If the Yugoslavian intention was the creation of a militarily useful stockpile of weaponized Phosgene, the most effective manner would have been to tap the production of industrial facilities or, in their absence, to develop these. Such a program could easily have been concealed within a wider program of industrial development. Using a dedicated military production line that is only capable of a low rate of production, in the order of three metric tons per year, would be extremely inefficient and furthermore would not yield militarily useful quantities of agent.[41] If evidence were to become available suggesting that this production line was capable of much higher levels of production this assessment would necessarily change.
In addition some part of the Phosgene stock, or new production, may have been utilized in the production of an unspecified quantity of Diphosgene. As part of the Jastrebac project Yugoslavian researchers are reported to have explored Diphosgene at some point between 1976 and 1979.[42] There are no suggestions that this agent was weaponized or produced in quantity.
Lewisite
Research into the offensive possibilities of Lewisite was reportedly undertaken over the period 1980 to 1984 as part of the Jastrebac program.[43] There are no indications that this agent was chosen for further research and development or produced in significant quantities.
Nitrogen Mustard
Research into the offensive possibilities of Nitrogen Mustard was reportedly undertaken over the period 1980 to 1984 as part of the Jastrebac program.[44] There are no clear indications that this agent was chosen for further research and development or produced in significant quantities.
Sulfur Mustard
Yugoslavia experimented with several varieties of blister agents over the course of its chemical warfare programs. Ultimately systematic production appears to have been limited to sulfur mustard.
The first instance of mustard production appears to have begun in the late 1920s or early 1930s and was associated with the development of a chemical industry in the town of Krusevac. By 1938 Yugoslavia was believed to possess stocks of agent and a capacity for additional production.[45] All such activities came to an end as a consequence of the conquest of the country by Nazi Germany in early 1941.
The creation of a more active program for the development of CW protection in 1958 seems to have resulted in the production of an initial batch of 30 kilograms of Mustard agent at some point between 1958 and 1961 as part of a project designated HM-501. Production of the agent took place at the Prva Iskra plant in the town of Baric. This material was used to fill a small number of 152mm and 155mm artillery projectiles. These rounds were used in open-air tests in the Velez and Cvrsnica regions of Bosnia between 1961 and 1969.[46] A further round of live agent testing with 152 and 155mm artillery shells filled with 3.5 liters of Mustard agent is reported to have been conducted in 1988.[47]
In 1965 Yugoslavia started developing a Mustard agent production capability. This involved the design and the subsequent purchase or construction of equipment for a Mustard production line. In 1970 equipment for the production of sulfur Mustard was installed at the Potoci facility. For reasons which remain unclear this equipment was not used for production until 1976. The design production capacity of this facility was 30 metric tons per annum.[48] Assuming continuous operation from 1976 to 1989 this facility could not have produced more than 420 metric tons which would represent a significant quantity of agent. There is no evidence, however, to support a position that the Mustard production line was operated in this manner.
A decision to engage in larger scale production and weaponization of Mustard agent appears to have been made in the late 1980s. In 1989 or early 1990, an order was placed for the production of 5,800 122mm artillery shells suitable for filling with CW agents, 1,000 of which were to be filled with Mustard, to be delivered over the period 1991 to 1995.[49] In addition there was allegedly a plan to annually produce and fill 100 155mm artillery shells with Mustard.[50] Although this production plan points to an intention for weaponization and deployment, the plan would only have used a very small part of Yugoslavia's claimed annual Mustard production capability.[51]
All plans for significant production and weaponization of Mustard were interrupted by the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Before production of Mustard could begin the Potoci facility was shut down, its records and equipment relocated, the facility itself abandoned and the staffdisbanded. At the time of the program's breakup, no more than a few hundred of the 5,800 122mm artillery shells had been produced; the remainder of the order seems to have been abandoned or cancelled.[52] At least a portion of the small existing stocks of weaponized agent contained in artillery shells and artillery rockets was destroyed during 1991.[53] It is unclear how many, if any, of these weapons contained Mustard or what proportion of the total holding of weapons those destroyed represented. Allowing for the use of some weapons in testing during the mid to late 1980s, the destruction figures offered of 15 shells, 220 rockets and a quantity of unfilled munitions may in fact have represented the bulk of Yugoslavia's holdings of CW agents, with the notable exception of BZ and CS which were available in much larger quantities.[54]
Some sources claim that Yugoslavia possessed a stockpile of over 400 metric tons of sulfur Mustard which is suspiciously close to Yugoslavia's maximum production potential.[55] Yugoslavia does not appear to have possessed a stockpile of Mustard at the time of its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Yugoslavia has not entered into agreements with the OPCW for the monitoring of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) which would be obligated to do if Yugoslavia had possessed a stockpile of CW agents at the CWC's Entry Into Force (EIF). If large amounts of Mustard agent were produced in the 1970s and 1980s, these presumably must have been destroyed at some point during the 1990s.
Armin
Armin (O-ethyl-O-4-nitrophenylethylphosphonate) is a nerve agent grouped for lethality with Tabun (ethyl-N,N'-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate) and Gd-7 (O-ethyl-S-2-ethylthioethylmethylphosphonothiolate). Armin is not known to have been incorporated into the CW arsenals of any states.[56] The earliest published reference to research on Armin by Yugoslavian researchers is a 1960 article that was followed by several more over the period 1961 to 1964. All appear to focus on the physiological effects of Armin and the utility of various antidotes.[57] Yugoslavian researchers are reported to have explored the utility of Armin as a CW agent as part of the Jastrebac program during the period 1980 to 1984.[58] This research does not appear to have led to production or adoption for use by the Yugoslavian armed forces.
Diphenylcyanosarin
Yugoslavian researchers may have explored this agent's properties, either for defensive or offensive purposes, between 1976 and 1980. There is no other information however and no indications that it was ever weaponized or produced in significant quantities.[59]
Sarin
Initial Yugoslavian activity related to Sarin can be characterized as legitimate defensive research of a type conducted in many countries. It is possible that published research on the effects of nerve agent poisoning from the mid-1950s onwards may have included investigations of Sarin although this agent is not specifically mentioned.[60] Laboratory scale production of CW agents reportedly began at the Potoci facility in 1958, and this activity may have included the production of Sarin.[61] Up to 1961, 143 kg of Sarin was allegedly produced at the Prva Iskri factory. This report, however, may confuse production of agent with the manufacture and filling of projectiles.[62] The greater part of the Sarin produced was used to fill a number of 152mm and 155mm artillery projectiles for initial testing of designs and weapons effects.[63] These shells were used in a series of open-air field tests in the Velez and Cvrsnica regions of Bosnia between 1961 and 1969.[64] The purpose of these tests appears to have been gaining information on ground contamination from shell bursts and the performance of shells filled with CW agent.[65] This activity does not automatically imply the existence of an offensive CW program. Nonetheless if the original intent was purely defensive research, the information gathered may well have been of value in the event of an offensive program being pursued. The development of protective equipment would require experiments to determine agent dissemination patterns following shell bursts and the testing of prototype equipment against live agent under field conditions.
In the mid 1960s, a decision appears to have been taken to increase Yugoslavia's ability to produce nerve agents. To this end investigation of the industrial production of Sarin and its precursors began. Starting in 1965 initial development work on a facility for the production of methylphosphonyldichloride, a nerve agent precursor, was undertaken by Yugoslavian scientists at the Prva Iskri complex in the town of Baric.[66] In 1968 this effort resulted in the installation of a methylphosphonyldichloride (DC) production line with a design capacity of 180 kg per day at the Miloje Blagojevic Powder Mill in the town of Lucani.[67] It is not clear how much methylphosphonyldichloride production initially took place.
It is claimed that a Sarin production line capable of producing no more than 40 metric tons of Sarin per year was installed at the Potoci facility in 1970.[68] At some point thereafter special filling and checking equipment is also alleged to have been installed.[69] Interestingly the same reports claim that this production line did not begin operations until 1976 at which point "laboratory quantities" began to be produced.[70] The failure to engage in regular production of Sarin prior to 1976 may reflect difficulties in mastering the techniques of Sarin production, problems in obtaining adequate quantities of precursors, or simply a decision not to engage in production prior to this time. This production line is reported to have produced 4.8 metric tons of agent as part of the Jastrebac project between 1976 and 1988, which is substantially less than the claimed capability.[71] Sarin was tested in an assortment of delivery systems including 122mm artillery shells filled with 1.8 liters of agent, 155mm artillery shells filled with 3.5 liters of agent, 128mm artillery rockets filled with 2 liters of agent, aerial bombs of various sizes filled with up to 20 liters of agent and land mines with 0.3 to 0.6 liters of agent.[72]
A trial production run at the Potoci facility in 1986 to 1987 produced 250 Sarin filled 122mm artillery rounds, which would have represented approximately 500 kg of agent. If automated filling equipment was used, this event probably represents testing of the munitions filling facility. In addition this effort provided a number of artillery shells for use in tests. A fresh round of live agent testing is reported to have been conducted in 1988.[73]
A decision to engage in larger scale production and weaponization of Sarin appears to have been made in the late 1980s. From 1988 to 1989 the Miloje Blagojevic Powder Mill in the town of Lucani produced 40 metric tons of methylphosphonyldichloride (DC) intended for use in the production of Sarin. In 1989 or early 1990, an order was placed for the production of 5,800 122mm artillery shells suitable for filling with CW agents, 4,800 filled with Sarin, to be delivered over the period 1991 to 1995.[74] In addition there was allegedly a plan to annually fill 3,000 128mm artillery rockets for use in multiple rocket launchers.[75] Although this production plan points to an intention for weaponization and deployment, the plan would only have used approximately one fifth of Yugoslavia's claimed annual Sarin production capability.[77]
All plans for significant production and weaponization of Sarin were interrupted by the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Before production of Sarin could begin, the Potoci facility was shut down, its records and equipment relocated, the facility itself abandoned and the staffdisbanded. At the time of the program's breakup, no more than a few hundred of the 5,800 122mm artillery shells had been produced; the remainder of the order seems to have been abandoned or cancelled.[78] At least a portion of the small existing stocks of weaponized agent contained in artillery shells and artillery rockets was destroyed during 1991.[79] It is unclear how many of these weapons contained Sarin or what proportion of the total holding of weapons those destroyed represented. Allowing for the use of some weapons in testing during the mid to late 1980s, the destruction figures offered of 15 shells, 220 rockets and a quantity of unfilled munitions may in fact have represented the bulk of Yugoslavia's holdings of CW agents, with the notable exception of BZ and CS which were available in much larger quantities.[80]
Soman
Some sources claim that Soman (GD) was explored by Yugoslavian researchers as part of the Jastrebac program during the period 1980 to 1984.[81] It is clear from published research that Yugoslavian researchers were investigating the toxicity of Soman and the utility of possible antidotes and treatments as early as 1968.[82] This first period of research appears to have ended around 1973. A new period of intense Soman research began in 1980 and continued to produce results until 1986, at which point this research appears to have been de-emphasized with only a handful of papers being subsequently produced. The focus of the publications remained antidotes and treatments. The only military force to deploy significant quantities of Soman throughout this period was the Soviet Union, which posed a military threat to Yugoslavia. In this context the investigation of Soman would have represented an appropriate focus for a Yugoslavian defensive CW program. There are no indications that Yugoslavia produced significant quantities of Soman or that it ever intended to weaponized this agent.
Tabun
The first clear reference to defensive research on Tabun by Yugoslavian researchers is a 1967 article entitled "protective action of toxogonin and TMB-4 in experimental Tabun poisoning."[83] It is possible that earlier published research on the effects of nerve agent poisoning from the mid-1950s onwards may have included investigations of Tabun.[84] Research into the offensive possibilities of Tabun was reportedly undertaken over the period 1980 to 1984 as part of the Jastrebac program.[85] There are no reports that this agent was produced in significant quantities or stockpiled for service. It appears that Yugoslavia decided to pursue the more lethal agent Sarin. In this context, it would appear that research into Tabun may be categorized as largely defensive in purpose.
VX or analogues
Yugoslavian researchers are believed to have conducted basic research on this agent since the 1960s.[86] Small quantities of VX were probably produced in laboratories for experiments conducted in the mid 1980s.[87] It is possible that additional research was undertaken which was not published in open-sources. Yugoslavian researchers are reported to have explored the value of VX as a CW agent as part of the Jastrebac program during the period 1980 to 1984.[88] There are no claims that Yugoslavia pursued the weaponization of this agent or engaged in any significant production of V-agents. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia established a CW defense program that engaged in some research on the effects and protection against V-agents.[89] It is possible, though not demonstrated, that the parallel Croatian CW defense program has also undertaken defensive work on VX, building on research conducted during the 1980s.
[1] Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention States Parties are permitted to produce and stockpile quantities of irritants or Riot Control Agents (RCA). They are obligated to declare the types and quantities possessed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and are prohibited from using these agents as weapons of war. Use in police activities is permitted.
[2] As set out below: 5 kg BZ per day X 365 = 1,865 kg X 19 years (1980 to 1998) = 34,675 kg. This involves extremely optimistic assumptions regarding output and reliability of equipment.
[3] Federation of the Atomic Scientists (FAS), Serbian CW weapons overview, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html>.
[4] Federation of the Atomic Scientists (FAS), Serbian CW weapons overview, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html>.
[5] Federation of the Atomic Scientists (FAS), Serbian CW weapons overview, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html>.
[6] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[7] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[8] Chloropicrin acts as an irritant in low concentrations (50 mg-min/m3) but is deadly at higher concentrations. The lethal exposure is slightly higher than that for Chlorine (20,000 mg-min/m3 for PS versus 19,000 mg-min/m3 for Cl). Julian P. Robinson, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume I. The Rise of CB Weapons, (Stockholm, SIPRI, 1971), p. 47.
[9] R. Kusic, N. Rosic, B. Boskovic and V. Vojvodic, "Clinical picture and management of acute poisoning by current chemical-warfare irritation poisons (type CS, CR)," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (5), September/October 1974, pp. 348-349; N. Rosic, R. Kusic, B. Boskovic and V. Vojvodic, "Pharmacological and toxicological properties of modern chemical warfare poisons causing irritation (type CS, CR)," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (5), September/October 1974, pp. 345-347.
[10] R. Kusic, N. Rosic, B. Boskovic and V. Vojvodic, "Clinical picture and management of acute poisoning by current chemical-warfare irritation poisons (type CS, CR)," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (5), September/October 1974, pp. 348-349; N. Rosic, R. Kusic, B. Boskovic and V. Vojvodic, "Pharmacological and toxicological properties of modern chemical warfare poisons causing irritation (type CS, CR)," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (5), September/October 1974, pp. 345-347.
[11] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[12] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[13] Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch 9 (5), March 1997, p. 13, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/Y/YUGOSLAV/YUGO973.PDF>.
[14] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 5. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52.)
[15] Yugoimport, list of products, website accessed 15 March 2004, <http://www.yugoimport.com/products/ammunition09.htm>.
[16] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[17] N. Rosic, R. Kusic, V. Vojvodic and B. Boskovic, "Psychochemical warfare gases type BZ," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (6), November-December 1974, pp. 393-396. (in Serbian).
[18] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[19] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[20] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[21] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 6. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52.)
[22] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 6. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52.)
[23] Kevin Kavanaugh, "Federation Confirms Serb Forces Use of Chemical Agent BZ Against KLA," FAS Public Issue Report 52 (3), May/June 1999, <http://www.fas.org/faspir/v52n3.htm>.
[24] Yugoslavia is described as possessing a capacity for producing 5 kg of BZ per day. If we optimistically assume that 365 days of maximum production could be achieved every year this would result in an annual output of 1,865 kg. If this production rate was maintained from the beginning of 1980 up to the end of 1998 the most that could have been produced was 34.7 metric tons.
[25] Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch 10 (9), November 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/bosniacw/Bosni98o-04.htm>.
[26] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 5. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52.)
[27] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 5. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52.)
[28] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 5. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52.)
[29] Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch 10 (9), November 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/bosniacw/Bosni98o-02.htm>.
[30] Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch 10 (9), November 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/bosniacw/Bosni98o-02.htm>.
[31] Yugoslav People's Army, "Specijalne Rucne Bombe M79, (Translated by Human Rights Watch) in Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch 10 (9), November 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/bosniacw/Bosni98o-02.htm>.
[32] Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch 9 (5), March 1997, p. 6, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/Y/YUGOSLAV/YUGO973.PDF>.
[33] D. Jovanovic, B. Kandic and T. Kronja, "On certain aspects of the application of LSD-25 in our clinical psychiatric practice," ," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 17.
[34] N. Rosic, "Psychotropic drugs and their military importance," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 28 (12), December 1971, pp. 640-643. (in Serbian).
[35] T. Belamaric, "Psychochemical war poisons," Lijecnicki Vjesnik 94 (6), June 1972, pp. 298-299.
[36] "Chemical Weapons claims Probed," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 August 1993, p. 5, <http://www.janes.com>.
[37] "Moslems threaten to gas Serbs, though ceasefire largely holds," Agence France Presse, 19 June 1993.
[38] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[39] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[40] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[41] Phosgene requires from 10 to 100 tons to contaminate 1 km2 as seen in WWI usage.
[42] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[43] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[44] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[45] Nineteenth Report of the Chemical Defence Research Department, 1938, Public Record Office, WO 33/1634, quoted in Edward. M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation (New York, St Martins Press 1994), pp. 7 & 9.
[46] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19
[47] Greg Seigle, "Experts Highlight CBW Stockpiles in Yugoslavia," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 April 1999, p. 63, <http://www.janes.com>. "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[48] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[49] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>. Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[50] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[51] 30 metric tons per year would be sufficent to fill over 8,000 155mm shells or more than 16,000 122mm shells. The claimed program would have utilized approximately 700 kg per year.
[52] Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch 9 (5), March 1997, p. 6, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/Y/YUGOSLAV/YUGO973.PDF>.
[53] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[54] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[55] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/serbia/cw/index.html
[56] William S. Augerson, A Review of the Scientific Literature as it Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses Volume 5: Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, (Santa Monica, RAND, 2000) p. 55.
[57] V. Vojvodic, B. Grbesa, M. Stevanovic, Z. Binenfeld, N. Gazivoda, K. Baryla, and V. Bozic, "Preliminary results with armin (ethyl-ethoxy phosphoryl p-nitrophenolate) in myasthenia gravis," Voprosy Kliniki I Lecheniia Zlokachestvennykh Novoobrazovanii (Riga), November 1960, pp. 1167-1170.
[58] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[59] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[60] examples include: M. Drakulic, Z. Binenfeld, "Neurotoxic war gases," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 11(9-10), September/October 1954, pp. 378-84. K. Baryla, Z. Binenfeld, "Clinical aspects and therapy of nerve gas poisoning," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 13 (1-2), January/February 1956, pp. 34-39.
[61] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[62] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[63] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[64] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[65] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[66] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[67]
[68] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[69] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[70] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[71] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[72] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[73] Greg Seigle, "Experts Highlight CBW Stockpiles in Yugoslavia," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 April 1999, p. 63, <http://www.janes.com>.
[74] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>. Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani", Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[75] 76 "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[77] 3,000 rockets X five years (1991 to 1995) @ 2L per MLRS rocket = 30,000L of CW agent at density of 1.102 per cc = 33,060 kg of agent / 5 years = 6,612 kg GB per year.
4,800 122mm shells / five years (1991 to 1995) = 960 shells per year @ 1.8L per shell) = 1,728L of liquid GB at density of 1.102 per cc = 1,904 kg of GB per year.
6,612 kg + 1,904 kg = 8,516 kg / theoretical capacity of 40,000 kg per year = 21.29% of annual capacity.
[78] Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch 9 (5), March 1997, p. 6, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/Y/YUGOSLAV/YUGO973.PDF>.
[79] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[80] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[81] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[82] B. Boskovic, M. Maksimovic, D. Minic, "Ageing and reactivation of acetylcholinesterase inhibited with Soman and its thiocholine-like analogue," Biochemical Pharmacology, 17 (8), August 1968, pp. 1738-41.
[83] B. Boskovic, M. Maksimovic and D. Vukovic, "Protective action of toxogonin and TMB-4 in experimental tabun poisoning," Vojnosanitetski pregled 24 (1), January 1967, pp.13-16. (in Serbian)
[84] Examples include: M. Drakulic, Z. Binenfeld, "Neurotoxic war gases," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 11(9-10), September/October 1954, pp. 378-84. K. Baryla, Z. Binenfeld, "Clinical aspects and therapy of nerve gas poisoning," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 13 (1-2), January/February 1956, pp. 34-9.
[85] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[86] The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume II. CB Weapons Today (Stockholm, SIPRI, 1973), p. 248-49.
[87] D. Tanasijevic, "The effect of atropine, Hi-6 and diazepam on the levels and metabolism of monoamines in the brain of rats poisoned with VX," God Vojnomed Akad. 1986;28:50-5. Croatian.I. Macic, M. Maksimovic, D. Erdeljan and L. Stojadinovic, "Antagonism of miosis induced by sarin and VX in rabbits," Vojnosanitetski Pregled. 43 (2), March/April 1986, pp. 103-8. in Serbian. I. Macic, V. Vojvodic, D. Knezevic, and M. Maksimovic, "The effect of the oxime HI-6 on miosis induced by topical administration of sarin and VX in the rabbit eye," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 47 (6), November/December 1990, pp. 399-401. in Serbian. D. L. Knezevic and V. Tadic, "Decontamination with clay or alcoholate of pigs percutaneously poisoned with VX and soman," Vojnosanitetski pregled 51 (6), November/December 1994, pp. 488-91. R. C. Jovic, "Changes in the brain acetylcholinesterase activity in mice treated with o-ethyl-s-(2-diisopropyl-aminothyl)methyl thiophosphonate vx and exposed to high oxygen concentrations in the air," Arhiv Za Higijenu Rada I Toksikologiju 27 (1), 1976 pp. 15-22. in Croatian.
[88] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, <http://www.asanltr.com/ASANews-99/992a.htm>.
[89] D. L. Knezevic and V. Tadic, "Decontamination with clay or alcoholate of pigs percutaneously poisoned with VX and soman," Vojnosanitetski pregled 51 (6), November/December 1994, pp. 488-91.
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