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Throughout the 1990s, Yugoslavia was widely considered to represent one of the world's most serious chemical warfare (CW) threats. Revelations immediately following the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation fostered the perception that Yugoslavia was a particularly aggressive country which threatened its neighbors and provided technical aid and support to outlaw regimes such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. This perception led to the assumption that Yugoslavia, or more precisely the Serbian-dominated rump state that existed after 1992, probably possessed a large and advanced offensive CW capability that might well be used in hostile actions against other states. From an early 21st century vantage point, it is apparent that this threat was greatly overstated.
The determination to develop an independent defensive capability has been a consistent theme in the history of Yugoslavian CW-related activity. The pursuit of this capability has spanned basic research on CW agents to the development, testing, and production of defensive systems. Initial efforts in the field of defensive CW activity date back to the 1920s, but clear information is only available from the 1930s onwards. There are good reasons to believe that initial work on the development and production of offensive chemical weapons was undertaken at the same time. All of this activity was interrupted by Yugoslavia's defeat and occupation in World War II. To a large degree facilities and capabilities had to be re-established from scratch in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Thereafter Yugoslavia continued to devote considerable efforts to the development and production of defensive capabilities. At some point in the 1960s, a decision appears to have been made to lay the groundwork for an offensive CW capability. It should be noted, however, that the process of turning a defensive CW program into an offensive CW program was rather drawn out. Real progress only appears to have been made in the 1980s, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that developing this capability was a low priority both for the Yugoslavian government and the scientific establishment tasked with the duty. There are strong indications that the Yugoslavian leadership decided by the end of the 1980s to deploy chemical weapons in significant quantities with combat forces. Despite this apparent decision, the fact remains that Yugoslavia's CW program never got beyond research, basic weaponization trials, and small scale trial production runs. Full industrial production of the chosen CW agents was not instituted prior to end of program. The program was increasingly disrupted in 1990 by the impending political collapse of the Yugoslavian state and appears to have been abandoned in 1991. It is noteworthy that an effort was made to actually destroy stockpiles at this time. A residual capacity for offensive CW activities was retained after 1992 in the form of a cadre of trained personnel and key production equipment salvaged from the Potoci facility near the city of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, no serious effort appears to have been made to resume the offensive program in the 1990s, and the production equipment was destroyed in 2003.
Since 1992, the main focus of the CW programs of the Yugoslavian successor states has been research and production related to protective purposes. In this regard, the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro has a protective purposes program recognized by the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that involves the use of strictly limited quantities of CW agents. Croatia, the Bosnia Republika Srpska, and Slovenia all have dedicated military CW defensive capabilities. There is currently no reason to suspect that the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro possesses or seeks offensive CW capabilities.
There appears to have been some use of non-lethal CW agents such as tear gas during the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s, but the transient effects of these agents combined with the lack of independent observation make it difficult to determine the extent of their use. Use of tear gas in combat operations does not appear to have been limited to Serbian forces although there are indications that theirs was the most extensive use. There are also indications that Bosnian Muslim forces made some limited use of stocks of industrial chlorine as part of their defensive efforts. The Bosnian government seems to have made an effort for propaganda purposes to show that Serbia used chemical weapons from 1992 to 1995. It is likely that this propaganda effort, combined with the early 1990s revelations about the Yugoslavian CW programs of the 1970s and 1980s, produced the exaggerated concerns about Serbian CW capabilities and intentions seen in the late 1990s.
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (after 1929, Yugoslavia)
There is relatively little information available regarding CW developments in Yugoslavia prior to the World War II. However the information that does exist strongly suggests that initial interest in chemical weapons dates to the early 1920s, shortly after the kingdom's establishment on 1 December 1918. Such an interest was not unusual for the time, when the general consensus was that chemical weapons were an extremely important part of a modern military establishment and would be extensively used in future wars. As part of its overall campaign of modernization and development, Yugoslavia established the Obilicevo chemical complex in the town of Krusevac. In addition to civilian chemical production, this complex was the site of Yugoslavia's first CW program.
In developing its chemical warfare capabilities, Yugoslavia received assistance from German sources. From 1927 to 1931, Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg, a German chemist associated with the German government's clandestine chemical warfare activities in the early 1920s, was involved in the transfer of technology and equipment related to the production of chemical weapons to the Yugoslavian government.[1] Dr. Stoltzenberg is believed to have been acting independently of his government.
It is unclear whether this assistance was undertaken on a private basis or was conducted with the approval of the German civil and military authorities. Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany was forbidden from undertaking any development or production of chemical weapons. In order to get around these restrictions of a military weapon that had been a very important part of German doctrine and tactics in the latter part of World War I, the Weimar Republic entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union. The agreement allowed Germany to secretly develop chemical weapons and engage in the training of its officer corps in their use. It is possible, although not proven, that less formal, even private arrangements with other states were also encouraged as a means of sustaining and further strengthening the German chemical warfare base.
By the beginning of the World War II, Yugoslavia could produce domestically classic chemical warfare agents, including mustard agent. It was also engaged in the production of protective equipment for its troops. This domestic capability was destroyed in the course of World War II. German troops seized Yugoslavia's stockpiles of CW agents and removed them to Germany.[2] In April 1941, German air-raids destroyed Yugoslavia's CW production facilities at the Obilicevo chemical complex.[3]
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
Following the expulsion of German forces in 1945, a major concern for the new government of Marshal Tito was reconstruction of the devastated social and economic infrastructure. Additional concerns were resisting pressures from the Soviet Union and resolving a border dispute with the United States and the new Italian government in the region surrounding the city of Trieste.
By the mid- to late 1950s, Yugoslavia's relationship with the United States had improved sufficiently to enable Yugoslavia to benefit from exchanges of personnel and sales of U.S.-produced military equipment. From 1956 to 1961, Yugoslavian army personnel were able to attend U.S. Army chemical and biological weapons training courses.[4] It was during this period that new research on the effects of modern CW agents began to appear in open source publications in Yugoslavia, demonstrating the development of new research and defensive interests and capabilities. At some point prior to 1958, the Military Technical Institute facility for research and production of CW agents was constructed in the village of Potoci, 10 kilometers north of Mostar. Initial production of small quantities of CW agents apparently began in 1958. From this time onwards, the Potoci facility was the primary, though not the sole center for CW research in Yugoslavia.
Throughout the 1960s, Yugoslavia undertook a program of research into protective devices and medical treatments relevant to the use of CW in warfare. Some of this research activity involved the production of certain CW agents in greater than laboratory quantities. It is not clear from available information how much agent was produced during this initial period. One source describes the production of 30 kilograms of mustard agent and 143 kilograms of sarin nerve agent at the Prva Iskri factory in the town of Baric up to 1961.[5] However another source describes these same quantities as representing the batch production capability of the facility, which suggests that much more agent could have been produced without actually indicating that it was.[6] Although some of this agent was put into 152- and 155-millimeter (mm) artillery shells, it would be overstating matters to refer to this as weaponization. Instead these materials appear to have been used for dissemination and contamination tests at a number of locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[7] Although this research may have contributed to later efforts to develop an offensive capability, it is not out of character with defensive research.
In addition to this capability for the small-scale production of sarin and mustard agents, a facility for the production of 20 kilograms of phosgene per day was established in 1959 at the Potoci facility. There are no indications as to whether this facility was operated continuously or on an episodic basis, but until 1965 it is reported to have produced 15 metric tons of agent. There is no reference to the weaponization of this agent.
The early 1960s also saw a modernization of Yugoslavian defensive capabilities with the introduction of a new model of gas mask based on the U.S. M-9. This remained the standard defensive mask until a new model was introduced in the 1980s.
In the late 1960s, research into the production of CW agents continued, resulting in an improved capability to produce mustard and sarin agents. Two new facilities had a design output of up to 200 kilograms per day allowing production of several tens of metric tons of agent per annum. A trial run of this equipment in the period 1969 to 1970 is reported to have produced 600 kilograms each of sulfur mustard and sarin agents. An additional facility capable of producing up to 70 or 80 kilograms of agent was used for the production of 350 kilograms of mustard agent over the same period. These facilities do not appear to have been operated extensively thereafter; reportedly Yugoslavia produced slightly more than 5 metric tons of sarin up to 1988.[8]
It is generally believed that Yugoslavian leaders decided on the development of an offensive CW program in the 1970s. This decision represented a major policy shift from the previous emphasis on defensive research. The offensive CW research project, named the Jastrebac program, reportedly was initiated in 1976.[9] The initial stages of this program involved the identification of suitable agents for weaponization followed by the development and testing of production equipment and delivery systems. This preliminary work was largely completed by the end of the 1980. Without additional information it is difficult to differentiate between the work conducted prior to 1976 and that conducted afterwards. There does not appear to have been a sense of urgency associated with the program. Yugoslavia did not exploit its CW production facilities to produce substantial quantities of bulk agent in anticipation of the production of delivery systems. At some point in the mid- to late 1980s, a decision was taken, presumably at the level of the General Staff or State Presidency to deploy an initial offensive capability.[10] This capability would have become available in the early to mid-1990s. The core of this capability was to be sarin and mustard agents loaded into 122mm artillery shells, 128mm artillery rockets, and BAD 100 aircraft delivered bombs.[11] There may have been plans to deploy a variety of spray delivery systems ranging from items sized for use by a single man to those suitable for mounting on aircraft or ground vehicles. By 1990, all preliminary work was completed and plans were in place for large scale weaponization. Orders were placed for the production of 5,800 special 122mm artillery shells from 1991 through 1995 and up to 3,000 artillery rockets annually.[12] These materials were to be delivered to the Potoci facility where a filling plant had been established. This plant had a capacity of 30 artillery shells or rocket warheads per day.[13] These figures are suggestive of an overall lack of urgency in the program.
Yugoslavia also investigated non-lethal agents such as tear gas and BZ. Initial research in the early to mid-1970s[14] led to a 200-kilogram-per-day production capability for CS-1, a variety of tear gas, and a 5-kilogram–per-day capability for BZ. Production of CS from 1978 onwards may have been as high as 100 metric tons, and there are clear indications that the use of CS was incorporated into armed forces tactical doctrines and training. Yugoslavian forces were also equipped and trained for the use of BZ,[15] though at least one report claims the use of this agent was abandoned in the mid 1980s.[16]
The increased Yugoslavian defensive and potentially offensive research activities were contemporaneous with the revival of Western concerns about Soviet chemical warfare capabilities in the mid- to late 1970s.[17] Existing concerns were greatly increased by the capture of Soviet-supplied equipment used by Egyptian and Syrian forces in the October 1973 war with Israel. From examination of the captured equipment, it was discovered that Soviet troops were all equipped with protective equipment including gas masks, Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) protection suits and nerve gas antidote. Furthermore it became clear that modern Soviet systems such as tanks and armored personnel carriers were equipped with filtration systems machines. Examination of available intelligence information on Soviet forces indicated that units were provided with specialized teams equipped for CW detection and decontamination. Given what was discovered about the Soviet CW arsenal, it was widely concluded that Soviet forces, along with their Warsaw Pact allies, possessed a significant military advantage over Western armies, which had devoted relatively little attention to chemical warfare since the early 1960s. One important consequence of this realization was increasing pressure for a revival of the U.S. offensive CW program, which resulted in the development of binary weapons in the 1980s. Other developments were a reinvigoration of defensive CW programs throughout NATO with the intent of properly equipping troops with modern equipment suitable for fighting on a CW-contaminated battlefield. Given the expectation that CW might well be employed in a NATO versus Warsaw Pact conflict and the continuing difficulties in Yugoslavian-Soviet relations, there were clearly strong incentives for Yugoslavia to pursue a defensive and offensive capability of its own. During this time, Yugoslavia gradually developed an offensive CW research program and emphasized defensive measures such as the establishment of training courses for territorial defense forces in how to fight in a chemical warfare environment.[18]
When it became apparent that Yugoslavia was on the road to dissolution, the Yugoslavian military leadership, which was dominated by Serbian elements, removed Yugoslavia's CW capability from the potential arsenals of the successor states. Although there was an effort to retain the capabilities developed up to 1990, the offensive CW program was largely abandoned. A determining factor in this development may have been the threat posed to key facilities such as the Military Technical Institute in Potoci by Bosnia's potential secession from the Federation combined with the proximity of the facility to the Croatian border. The breakup of the multinational research team was a further consideration. By 1992 General Zlatko Binenfeld, a key figure, had left the CW program, taking a position with the Croatian army.
As the Yugoslav Army prepared to close down the Potoci facility one of the initial actions was the destruction of some of the existing stocks of weaponized CW agents in 1991. This included 220 artillery rockets, 15 filled artillery projectiles, and an unspecified quantity of unfilled munitions.[19] Given the scale of the program up to this point, this may in fact have represented the entire stock of weaponized agent existing at that time. In mid-1991 as fighting between Serbian and Croatian forces intensified, the records of the Potoci CW facility were removed to Belgrade. Then in early 1992, the entire facility was dismantled and key production reportedly transferred to the Miloje Blagojevic Factory for Nitrocellulose Gunpowder on the outskirts of the town of Lucani.
Federation of Serbia and Montenegro (formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the bulk of Yugoslavia's capacity for the development, production, and employment of CW remained in the hands of the Milosevic regime in Serbia and Montenegro. However, contrary to some assessments, it is clear that this remnant capacity was substantially degraded.[20] Existing stockpiles of agent and delivery systems had been destroyed while the CW production facilities were being devoted to serving the pressing need for more conventional artillery. Furthermore, the Yugoslavian defense industry experienced severe disruption as a result of the breakup; weapons manufacturers were cut off from suppliers. Many key personnel had deserted the CW program to return to their native Croatia. The primary facility had been dismantled and transported to Lucani in Serbia. It has been alleged that this equipment was initially relocated to the Miloje Blagojevic explosive plant where it was secretly installed in a specially constructed building and then used for the production of CW in the 1990s.[21] Reportedly, significant difficulties, caused in part by the lack of suitably qualified senior personnel, were experienced when workers attempted to reinstall the equipment.[22] Although this may have happened, there is little concrete information to substantiate the claim. Yugoslavia only declared a single CW production facility to the OPCW in its 2000 initial declaration. The declared facility was the Potoci research and production facility. This declaration also covered the process equipment which had been removed to Serbia in 1992. It is possible that secret sections of this declaration mentioned other facilities that had been destroyed prior to the Chemical Weapon Convention's (CWC) entering into force for Yugoslavia and that these included the alleged CW production facility at Lucani. Unless additional information becomes available, it is impossible to confirm that CW production took place in the mid-1990s at the Miloje Blagojevic facility. If attempts were in fact made to restore production of CW agents, the war with NATO in 1994 is likely to have further complicated these efforts.
During the fighting in Bosnia and Croatia, Serbian forces appear to have employed CS gas on many occasions. At the same time, it appears that many allegations of CW use were either false or greatly exaggerated to advance the propaganda goals of the forces involved. In one instance in April 1994, Serbian and Bosnian Muslim forces both accused each other of mounting an attack using tear gas in the vicinity of Goradze. However, observers from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) denied that any such attack had taken place or that there had been CW casualties.[23] High profile allegations of Serbian use of BZ were leveled in 1995 following the destruction of a number of UN-protected enclaves in Bosnia Herzegovina, notably the town of Srebenica, resulting in investigations by both the United Nations and international human rights organizations.[24] Yugoslavian army tactics and doctrine incorporated incapacitants such as BZ and tear gas; thus it would not be surprising if these agents were used on occasion, especially given the brutal and confused nature of the conflicts.
Allegations of the use of CW were reported in 1998 and 1999 in the course of fighting in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Once again it is possible that tear gas agents were used, especially since Serbian para-military police forces were often employed in the early stages of suppressing the rebellion rather than regular army troops. However, claims that Serbian forces used nerve agents or BZ against Kosovan rebels have not been supported by independent evidence and should probably be regarded as spurious.[25]
One area of concern during the 1990s was the possibility that Yugoslavia was cooperating with other states, primarily Iraq, to assist them in the development of a CW capability. These suspicions built upon known cooperation with Iraq in the development of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and allegations that Iraqi scientists and technicians had received training at Yugoslavia's Potoci facility in the 1980s.[26] A major problem with allegations of this type is that no evidence of an active Iraqi CW program in the 1990s has been found since the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003.
The Current Situation
As is typical of many modern military forces, the army of Serbia and Montenegro (VSCG—Vojske Srbije i Crne Gore) has a unit (ABHO—Atomsko-Biolosko-Hemijske Odbrane) responsible for detecting and responding to the consequences of chemical attacks.[27] This is in addition to the unit's responsibilities in regards to biological and nuclear attack. The advanced training of ABHO personnel takes place at the NBC educational center in the town of Krusevac.[28] As of 2003, Serbia and Montenegro was working to modernize the capabilities of this unit to bring it into line with NATO standards.[29]
The army of Serbia and Montenegro is provided with a full range of individual and collective protective equipment intended to enable it to continue operations in the event of a CW attack. A CW protective capability was typically included as part of the standard equipment fit-out of Yugoslavian designed armored vehicles and this continues to be the case for similar vehicles manufactured since the Yugoslavian breakup. The Trayal Corporation, based in Krusevac, continues to produce a range of NBC protective equipment for individuals, including masks, filter cartridges, gloves and protective suits, for the domestic and export markets. It also produces filter equipment for military vehicles.[30] Other companies are engaged in the production of CW detectors, decontamination materials, and medical response items such as antidotes.
During the Kosovo war of 1999, the NATO leadership was concerned that Yugoslavia might still possess, and be willing to use, a significant offensive chemical warfare capability. As a consequence, NATO officials issued a series of public statements warning the Yugoslavian leadership of severe consequences if there were any use of CW against NATO forces. Additionally, NATO launched a series of air strikes against the Yugoslavian chemical industry and facilities believed to be associated with Yugoslavia's CW program. As a consequence, Yugoslavia's civilian chemical industry suffered substantial damage. Reconstruction has since restored the infrastructure associated with the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro's defensive CW capability.
The Federation of Serbia and Montenegro continues to possess a significant defensive CW capability. As noted above the Trayal Corporation, formerly the Miloje Zakic industrial facility, continues to produce NBC protection equipment. The Military Medical Academy continues research into CW effects and the means of countering them, notably through the staff and activities of the National Poison Control Center.[31] This research appears to involve the continued production and use of laboratory quantities of CW agents or alternatively their import.
Yugoslavia continues to manufacture CS weapons, grenades, rifle grenades, and smoke pots for domestic use and export. These are the same weapons previously deployed with the Yugoslav armed forces, many of which were also filled with BZ when this was part of the Yugoslavian arsenal.
Yugoslavia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 2000. In its initial declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Yugoslavia declared a single small scale facility (SSSF) engaged in CW production on its territory and took partial responsibility for one other facility in Bosnia Herzegovina, the former Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci and its associated production equipment stored in Krusevac. All additional information regarding Yugoslavia's initial declaration remains confidential. In 2001, the OPCW conducted one inspection of a Schedule 1 facility, most likely the previously declared SSSF.[32]
In December 2001, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared the existence of a National Protective Program under Article 10 of the CWC.[33] All declarations of such protective programs are confidential, and no information regarding this program is available from the OPCW. In September 2002, the OPCW Executive Council approved a facility agreement between OPCW and Yugoslavia. This agreement, which established guidelines for verification of the facility's CW-related activities, applies to a SSSF. This facility is part of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro's National Protective Program and is probably closely associated with the work of the Military Medical Academy.[34]
Destruction of all remaining CW production equipment stored at the Trayal Corporation's Jasikovac plant in Krusevac was undertaken from 15 to 30 September 2003 under the supervision of OPCW inspectors.[35] This production equipment was previously installed at the Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci and was initially removed for storage at the M. Blagojevic plant in Lucani before being relocated again at some point between 1992 and 2003.
An indication of the international community's acceptance of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was its election to the Executive Council of the OPCW, which took effect on 12 May 2004. The Federation of Serbia and Montenegro jointly with the OPCW hosted a basic course on assistance and protection against CW in the town of Krusevac.[36] This course, which appears to have been conducted at the ABHO school based in Krusevac, focused on training participants in how to plan for the protection of civilian populations against CW attack. This course was the first of what is planned to be a regular series that will allow the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro to use its existing capabilities to contribute to the mission of the OPCW.
Croatia
Since establishing its independence in 1991, Croatia has maintained an active CW protection program. A number of key figures in the Yugoslavian CW program were of Croatian origin and relocated to Croatia at the time of the Yugoslav breakup. The most prominent example was General Zlatko Binenfeld whose role in Yugoslavian CW activities dated back to the early 1950s.[37] These personnel formed the core of a Croatian CW defense program. As a consequence of the presence of these informed personnel, and the ongoing conflict between Croatia as a secessionist state and what remained of Yugoslavia, Croatia became a source for information on the history and capabilities of the Yugoslavian CW program as it existed until 1991. The value of this information in support of Croatian propaganda goals during its wars with Yugoslavia should not be overlooked when examining the existing open-source information on Yugoslavia's CW programs. By releasing information on the Yugoslavian CW programs, Croatia was able to contribute to the picture of Yugoslavia as a rogue state threatening its neighbors with weapons that were generally abhorred.
There is no evidence to suggest that Croatia attempted to develop an offensive CW program following independence. Croatia did take advantage of available personnel and pre-existing facilities to establish a defensive CW program.
Croatia has three agencies involved in research relevant to its CW protection program, all of which are based in Zagreb. The first is the NBC laboratory contained within the Military Academy. The second is the Institute for Medical Research and Occupational Health, and the third is the Institute Ruder Boskovic. Since the early 1990s, staff members of both of these organizations have regularly published their research into the effects of, and means of protecting against, CW agents, particularly nerve and blister agents.[38] The quantity of outputs is beginning to decline, however, no doubt reflecting the retirement, or redirection of those previously involved in CW research activities, whether offensive or defensive.
The Croatian Army has maintained an NBC defense capability since the republic's initial establishment in 1992. Information regarding the size and capabilities of this unit is very limited in nature. However, it appears that Colonel Zvonko Orehovec[39] served as Chief of the NBC Defense Department for the Joint Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces through the later 1990s and into the 2000s. There is at a minimum an NBC defense platoon deployed by the Croatian Army, and it is possible that this unit is part of a larger stand-alone force. No further information is currently available.
Croatia ratified the CWC on 23 May 1995 and has been an active member of the OPCW since the OPCW's creation in 1997. From May 2001 through May 2003, Croatia served a two-year term on the Executive Council of the OPCW.
Croatia has sought to play an active role in international efforts to protect against the use of CW by state or non-state actors. In support of this goal, the Croatian government has, in cooperation with a private organization Applied Science and Analysis Inc. hosted several of a series of Chemical and Biological Medical Treatments Symposia (CBMTS), in October 1998, April 2001, and September 2003. From 10 to 14 September 2002, Croatia hosted the first OPCW exercise on the delivery of assistance in the town of Zadar. This exercise involved more than 900 participants from 12 states and was aimed at testing the capacity of the international community to respond to the terrorist use of chemical weapons. As of early 2004, Croatia was negotiating a formal agreement with the OPCW whereby it will undertake to provide an NBC decontamination unit in the event that a CWC member state should request assistance in the face of a CW attack.[40]
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (including Republika Srpska)
From January to March 1992, the Yugoslavian Army began work on dismantling the CW research facility in Mostar, about 40 km southwest of Sarajevo. The key production equipment from the facility was relocated to the town of Lucani in Serbia. All documentation associated with the facility was removed to Belgrade, Serbia for safe keeping in July 1991. A chemical weapons storage facility was constructed on the site of the Overhaul and Technical Institute in the town of Hadzici near Sarajevo. Apparently, this facility was intended to be the primary storage depot once CW weaponization got underway.[41] It was never used for this purpose due to the collapse of the program in the period 1990 to 1991. It is reported that the Hadzici CWSF was used as a temporary depot during the shipment of CW agents from Mostar to Lucani.[42] In any event, there are no reports of either of these facilities being used for CW-related purposes following the Yugoslavian Army's transfer of all CW-related equipment to Serbia in late 1991 and early 1992. The PRETIS munitions plant, in the Bosnian town of Vogosca near Sarajevo, was tasked with producing the special artillery rounds required for the planned Yugoslavian CW weaponization program of the 1990s.[43] However, with the collapse of the program in 1990-1991, the pressing need for conventional artillery rounds and the prospect of fighting in the area of the PRETIS plant, the planned production of up to 5,800 CW shells never took place. At the most, a few hundred shells were produced and delivered to the Potoci facility in 1990, and these may to have been destroyed along with other equipment in mid-1991.[44]
In October 1992, as his country found itself under extreme pressure from Serbian forces, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned that his troops had access to a CW capability that they were willing to use against Serbian troops.[45] In August 1993, Bosnian Serb forces in the vicinity of Boskovici, near Zvornik, reported that they had been attacked on three occasions by Bosnian Muslim forces using chlorine filled 120mm mortar rounds.[46] In October 1993, Croatian forces operating in central Bosnia claimed that they too had been attacked by Bosnian Muslim forces using chlorine gas.[47] Bosnian Muslim forces obtained chlorine for chemical weapons from a factory in the city of Tuzla.[48]
The vast majority of claims that CW were used in the Yugoslav wars are concentrated in Bosnia Herzegovina and feature accusations of use and production, either of chlorine by Bosnian Muslim forces or of incapacitants by Bosnian Serb forces. Bosnian Serb forces may have made frequent use of tear gases, CN or CS, in the course of their operations. Unfortunately, a major problem is separating genuine cases from cases of mis-identification or propaganda.[49] Recognizing the international community's general abhorrence of CW, all parties in the Bosnian conflict made efforts to obtain support by leveling charges that their enemies were using CW against their armies or civilian populations.
Bosnia Herzegovina ratified the CWC on 25 February 1997.[50] In its initial declaration to the OPCW, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the existence of a single CW production facility on its territory. Responsibility for this facility was shared with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[51] The CW production facility in question is almost certainly the former Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci that was used for research on, and production of, CW agents from 1958 to 1991. The reason for the joint declaration of this facility with Yugoslavia was the removal of the key production equipment and documentation associated with CW production from the facility in early 1992. The former buildings of the Military Technical Institute in Potoci appear to have been left in place and remained intact in the hands of the Bosnian government. Reports from the mid-1990s indicate that significant evidence of the Institute's use as a CW research facility remained.[52] In its initial declaration to the OPCW, the Bosnian government declared the facility as a former CW production facility. Under the terms of the CWC, such a facility must be destroyed or clearly converted to uses that are not prohibited under the terms of CWC. In March 2004 the Director-General of the OPCW announced that a destruction certificate had been issued to Bosnia and Herzegovina for a CW production facility. Thus, the history of the Potoci facility has come to an end.
The Army of the Republika Srpska has maintained an NBC defense capability since the republic's initial establishment in 1992. Information regarding the size and capabilities of this unit is very limited in nature; however, in 1995, it appears that each of the Republika Srpska's six Corps had an NBC defense department directly associated with the Corps Headquarters with a smaller version operating at the Brigade level.[53] The next clear reference to the existence of a defensive capability dates to July 2002 when one Boro Šarčević was identified as the Assistant of the Chief of Staff for NBC Defense of the Army of the Republika Srpska. No further information is currently available.
Slovenia
Following its break from the Yugoslavian federation in 1991, Slovenia does not appear to have retained any residual offensive CW capabilities. Some Slovenian personnel at the University of Ljubljana's Institute of Pathophysiology appear to have been involved in Yugoslavia's defensive CW research and development programs from the mid-1980s onwards. Their focus was research into the effects of soman and the development of antidotes and treatments.[54]
In so far as it was able to retain access to Yugoslav military equipment on its territory at the time of secession Slovenia possessed a defensive CW capability. As previously noted Yugoslavian military personnel were issued NBC protective gear and armored vehicles were fitted out with NBC protection systems. There are no indications that Slovenia has developed the ability to manufacture its own protective equipment, and in the spring of 2001, Slovenia purchased a batch of protective masks sufficient to equip 30,000 soldiers.[55] As of late 2003, the Slovenian Army appears to have included at least one unit dedicated to NBC activities, the 18th NBC protection battalion.[56] This unit may have been re-equipped with more modern detection, decontamination, and protection equipment since 1992, but there are no specific indications that this is the case.
Slovenia ratified the CWC on 11 June 1997[57] and made its initial declaration to the OPCW on 6 November 1997.[58] Slovenia declared the existence of a quantity of old chemical weapons on Slovenian territory.[59] These weapons, predating 1925, were probably items leftover from battles conducted on Slovenian territory during World War I. These items were destroyed without OPCW verification.[60] In April 2001, Slovenia declared the existence of a National Protective Program under Article 10 of the CWC.[61] All declarations of such protective programs are confidential, and no information regarding this program is available from the OPCW.
The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
There have been no indications of offensive or defensive CW-related activity in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia since its break from Yugoslavia in 1992. The Mount Krivolak base and training facility was used for open-air testing of CW agents by the Yugoslavian military in the 1980s, but this was never the facility's main purpose. Since the break with Yugoslavia, Macedonia has made limited use of the facility for its own military while attempting to interest NATO in adopting its as a major facility. The Macedonian armed forces are poorly equipped, lacking significant quantities of modern heavy weapons although this has been changing since 2000. The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia ratified the CWC on 20 June 1997. In May 1997, Macedonia hosted a NATO exercise simulating rescue operations following a chemical accident or environmental catastrophe. Participating units included NATO CBW defense troops.[62]
Conclusion
Significant gaps remain in our understanding of the Yugoslavian CW program. The role of the Federal government or the military leadership in pressing for the development of an offensive capability remains unclear. Did the scientists and technicians involved in the CW program force or hinder the progress of the effort? Did those involved simply see an offensive program as the logical outgrowth of their defensive work, or was it instead a diversion from their preferred activity? Was the CW arsenal intended for active use in the event of conflict, or was it being developed as a deterrent to the CW arsenals of NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Yugoslavia probably could have made much faster progress on its CW program if it had chosen to. The development of delivery systems was extremely slow. The first tests of CW artillery shells were conducted in 1961. Yet, despite these tests, production of shells was only begun in 1990. Similarly, by the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia had the capability to produce as much as 73 metric tons each of sarin and mustard per year. Yet this production capacity was effectively mothballed for much of the period up to 1986 when a short production run of 4.5 metric tons took place. The failure to resume the program after its dispersion in 1991 is also puzzling. Although some key personnel were lost and access to certain facilities was no longer available, these factors should not have prevented a resumption of the program at a new facility. Instead the process equipment and precursors were placed in storage, the personnel turned their hands to other tasks, and the offensive CW program was abandoned. Even as this was happening, the defensive CW program was sustained suggesting that there is more to the story than a lack of technical personnel. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Eastern Europe followed shortly after by its dissolution transformed Yugoslavia's security environment. One question that is perhaps unanswerable is whether or not the program would have continued in the event that Yugoslavia had not disintegrated in 1991. Further questions revolve around the attitude of Serbia towards the CWC and OPCW. Serbia resolutely refused to adhere to the CWC up to 2000. Then suddenly it ratified the CWC and declared its facilities. The change in position predates the fall of Milosevic, but significantly postdates the defeat in the Kosovo war. What were the drivers behind these positions?
What is clear from the history of Yugoslavia's involvement with CW is that it reflects a determinedly independent strain in the national character. There is a constant preference for finding domestic solutions rather than relying on imported equipment or technology. This is just as true now under a democratic government as it was under the monarchy or the Communist Party. It is all too clear now that the WMD programs of Iraq and Yugoslavia have a great deal in common. But this commonality was not the product of an unholy alliance of rogue states. Rather, it was the result of a willingness to treat knowledge of past misdeeds as evidence of present sins. In the absence of new information, old intelligence was recycled and mixed with contemporary distaste for the regime involved. In retrospect, the failure to correctly identify the state of the Yugoslavian CW program in the 1990s, a fact that became apparent after 2000, should have served as a warning to those too determined to see WMD programs in every shadow.
Key Sources:
[1] Edward. M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation (New York, St. Martins Press 1994), p. 8.
[2] Edward. M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation (New York, St. Martins Press 1994),Edward. M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation (New York, St Martins Press 1994) p. 7 and p. 7 note 17.
[3] TRAYAL corporation official timeline, .
[4] The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume II. CB Weapons Today (Stockholm, SIPRI, 1973), p. 249.
[5] Igor Alborghetti, "Yugoslav Army has 40 Metric Tons of the Poisonous Gases Sarin and Mustard Gas in the Underground Storage Facility of the Chemical Plant in Lucani," Zagreb Globus, 16 April 1999, pp. 18-19.
[6] General Zlatko Binenfeld, Production of Chemical Weapons at the Military Technical Institute – Mostar Plant by the Former Yugoslav National Army (JNA), Statement at seminar on "National Authority and National Implementation Measures for the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Warsaw, Poland, 7-8 December 1993, p. 2.
[7] General Zlatko Binenfeld, Production of Chemical Weapons at the Military Technical Institute – Mostar Plant by the Former Yugoslav National Army (JNA), Statement at seminar on "National Authority and National Implementation Measures for the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Warsaw, Poland, 7-8 December, 1993, p. 3.
[8] General Zlatko Binenfeld, Production of Chemical Weapons at the Military Technical Institute – Mostar Plant by the Former Yugoslav National Army (JNA), Statement at seminar on "National Authority and National Implementation Measures for the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Warsaw, Poland, 7-8 December, 1993, pp. 2 & 3. Binenfeld notes three production runs. A batch process capable of 120 kg per run prior to 1961, a new facility producing of 600kg of sarin from 1969 to 1970 followed a further 4.5 mt produced from 1976 to 1988. This results in a figure of 5.22 mt. There is a possibility of substantially more production using the early facilities however extant sources, including Binenfeld himself do not suggest that this was the case.
[9] General Zlatko Binenfeld, Production of Chemical Weapons at the Military Technical Institute – Mostar Plant by the Former Yugoslav National Army (JNA), Statement at seminar on "National Authority and National Implementation Measures for the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Warsaw, Poland, 7-8 December, 1993.
[10] There is no specific information on the decision making bodies involved or the exact timing of decisions taken. The existence of such a decision is presumed on the basis of actions taken. It is further presumed that a decision to create a stockpile of weaponized CW agent would be taken at a high level
[11] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, .
[12] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, .
[13] General Zlatko Binenfeld, Production of Chemical Weapons at the Military Technical Institute—Mostar Plant by the Former Yugoslav National Army (JNA), Statement at seminar on "National Authority and National Implementation Measures for the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Warsaw, Poland, 7-8 December, 1993, p. 3.
[14] R. Kusic, N. Rosic, B. Boskovic and V. Vojvodic, "Clinical picture and management of acute poisoning by current chemical-warfare irritation poisons (type CS, CR)," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (5) (September/October 1974), pp. 348-349; N. Rosic, R. Kusic, B. Boskovic and V. Vojvodic, "Pharmacological and toxicological properties of modern chemical warfare poisons causing irritation (type CS, CR)," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (5) (September/October 1974), pp. 345-347. N. Rosic, R. Kusic, V. Vojvodic and B. Boskovic, "Psychochemical warfare gases type BZ," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 31 (6) (November-December 1974), pp. 393-396. (in Serbian).
[15] Zvonko Orehovac, Incapacitant and Irritant Chemical Weapons of the Armed Forces of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, National ground Intelligence Center, US Department of the Army, 15 June 1995, p. 5. (original in Serbo-Croatian, Hrvatski vojnik 74 (4), 7 October 1994, pp. 49-52) and Yugoslav People's Army, "Specijalne Rucne Bombe M79 (Translated by Human Rights Watch) in Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch 10 (9) (November 1998), bosniacw/Bosni98o-02.htm>.
[16] Milos Vasic, "Report About Superficiaity," Belgrade Vreme, 1 December 2002 pp. 28-30. Original in Serbian, translated by FBIS under title Belgrade Article Refutes ICG FRY-Iraq Arms Trade Report; Says Authors 'Confused'.
[17] Jeremy Paxman and Robert Harris, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 225-233.
[18] "Work of Civil and Territorial Defense Center in Belgrade," Yugoslav News Agency, 29 January 1985, .
[19] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, .
[20] Examples of reports about the imminent threat posed by Yugoslavian CW capabilities include Greg Seigle, "Experts Highlight CBW Stockpiles in Yugoslavia," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 April 1999, p. 63, ; "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, ; Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, Federation of American Scientists website, .
[21] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, and .
[22] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter,
[23] The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 30 (December 1995), p. 23.
[24] Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors, Human Rights Watch 10 (9) (November 1998), .
[25] Arming Saddam?: The Yugoslav Connection, Balkans Report No. 136 (Belgrade/Brussels: The International Crisis Group, 3 December 2002), p. 5.
[26] Arming Saddam?: The Yugoslav Connection, Balkans Report No. 136, (Belgrade/Brussels: The International Crisis Group, 3 December 2002), p. 5 - 6.
[27] Webpage of the Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Defense Branch of the Army of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro, /Vidovi/kov/abho.htm>.
[28] Webpage of the Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Defense Branch of the Army of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro, /Vidovi/kov/abho.htm>
[29] Timothy Edmunds, Adelphi Paper 360, Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).
[30] TRAYAL Corporation website, .
[31] Milos P. Stojiljkovic, Danica R. Pantelic, Matej Maksimovic (National Poison Control Centre, Belgrade, Serbia), Tabun, Sarin, Soman and VX Poisoning in Rats: Kinetics of Inhibition of Central and Peripheral Acetylcholinesterase, Ageing, Spontaneous and Oxime-Facilitated Reactivation, Paper presented to the Seventh CBW Protection Symposium, 16 June 2001, Gothenberg, Sweden, Medical_Aspects_on_CWAs/stojiljkovic.pdf>, Milos P. Stojiljkovic (National Poison Control Centre, Belgrade, Serbia),The Effects of Tabun Low-level Exposure in Rats, Paper presented to the Chemical and Biological Medical Treatment Symposia (CBMTS) IV, 2 May 2002, Spiez Laboratory, Switzerland.
[32] Report Of The OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in the Year 2001 C-7/3, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 10 October 2002, p. 54.
[33] OPCW Annual Report on Activities in 2002, C-8/5, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 22 October 2003, p. 82, .
[34] Thirtieth Session of the Executive Council Concludes, Press release #58, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 18 September 2002, press_releases/2k2/PR58_2002.html>.
[35] "Serbia-Montenegro completes destruction of dual-use chemical industry equipment," BBC Monitoring Service, 17 October 2003, .
[36] Invitation to Participate in the First International Basic Course on Assistance and Protection, Krusevac, Serbia and Montenegro, 5—9 July 2004 S/420/2004, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 4 May 2004, .
[37] M. Drakulic, Z. Binenfeld, "Neurotoxic war gases," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 11(9-10) (September/October 1954), pp. 378-84; K. Baryla, Z. Binenfeld, "Clinical aspects and therapy of nerve gas poisoning," Vojnosanitetski Pregled 13 (1-2) (January/February 1956), pp. 34-39; Z. Binenfeld, "Nervi bojni otrovi u napadu na naseljena mesta," Civilna Zastita, Vol 8 (2) (1956), pp. 1-4, noted in The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume II. CB Weapons Today (Stockholm, SIPRI, 1973), ref 991 p. 377.
[38] Examples of this work include E. Reiner, V. Simeon, S. Simaga, S. Cizl, D. Jelicic, V. Sumanovic, and D. Batinic, "A field-test for detecting organophosphorus compounds in water," Arhiv za higijenu rada i toksikologiju 44 (2) (June 1993), pp. 159-62. V. Simeon-Rudolf, M. Skrinjaric-Spoljar, E. Reiner, Z. Orehovec, I. Jukic, S. Bokan, and B. Smoljan, "Identification of the contents and the shelf-life of indicator tubes from field kits for detection of organophosphorus compounds in the air," Arhiv za higijenu rada i toksikologiju 48 (2) (June 1997), pp. 219-224.
[39] Note Colonel Orehovec's involvement in defensive CW research earlier in the 1990s through the Croatian IMI.
[40] Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control Policies in the Republic of Croatia, Website of the Croatian Foreign Ministry, .
[41] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, .
[42] Milos Vasic, "Report About Superficiality," Belgrade Vreme, 1 December 2002, pp. 28-30, from FBIS (original in Serbian).
[43] Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch 9 (5) (March 1997), p. 10, /YUGOSLAV/YUGO973.PDF>.
[44] "Yugoslav Chemical Warfare Capability. Mostar's History of Chemical Weapon Research, Development, Production: What, When, Where, How Much?" The ASA Newsletter, .
[45] "Bosnia Threatens Poison Gas Against Serb Forces," The New York Times, 31 October 1992, p. 3.
[46] "Chemical Weapons claims Probed," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 August 1993, p. 5, .
[47] The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 22, December 1993, p. 19.
[48] "Moslems threaten to gas Serbs, though ceasefire largely holds," Agence France Presse, 19 June 1993.
[49] Cases of misidentification can include but are not limited to deaths from asphyxiation in the course of artillery bombardments, which can result from the toxic byproducts of high explosives concentrating in confined or low lying spaces such as bunkers or dugouts; the use of military smokes and obscurants such as white phosphorus or titanium tetrachloride, both of which are toxic when inhaled in significant quantities.
[50] Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements .
[51] Daniel Feakes, "Global Civil Society and Biological and Chemical Weapons," in Fiona Holland (ed.), Global Civil Society 2003, (London, London School of Economics, 2003), p. 89.
[52] Reginald Bartholomew (nom de plume), "The Balkans and Chemical Warfare: A Possibility?" ASA Newsletter (50), October 1995, pp. 1 & 7.
[53] Amended Indictment against Radislav Krstic, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 October 1999, paragraphs 14.9 and 14.12, english/krs-1ai991027e.htm>.
[54] An example of this work is Z. Grubic, D. Sket and M. Brzin, "Iso-OPMA- induced potentiation of soman toxicity in rat correlates with the inhibition of plasma carboxylesterases," Archives of toxicology 62 (5) (1988), pp. 398-399.
[55] Igor Mekina, "Slovenia and its Army: Expansion as Business," AIM Press, 25 August 2001.
[56] The 18th Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Protection Battalion, Angelsko/vojska_strok.htm>.
[57] Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements .
[58] Note by the Director-General: Status of Initial Declarations and Notifications, C-3/DG-11, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 13 November 1998, p. 5 .
[59] Technical Secretariat Background Paper, Consolidated Unclassified Verification Implementation Report (April 1997—31 December 2002), RC-1/S/6, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25 April 2003, p. 38, .
[60] Technical Secretariat Background Paper, Consolidated Unclassified Verification Implementation Report (April 1997—31 December 2002), RC-1/S/6, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 25 April 2003, p. 41,
[61] OPCW Annual Report on Activities in 2002, C-8/5, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 22 October 2003, p. 82, .
[62] The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 37, September 1997, p. 17.
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