Introduction

Yugoslavia's leader Josip Broz Tito embarked upon a nuclear program in the late 1940s, most likely viewing the development of nuclear power as a key to overall economic development. Yugoslavia's early research program benefited tremendously from collaboration with Norway, particularly on reprocessing, and, to a lesser degree, with the Soviet Union. Concurrent with the civilian research program, Tito initiated a nuclear weapons program. Security concerns and the desire for an international status may have played a role in his decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. It is not entirely clear why in the early 1960s Tito terminated the weapons drive, but the decision was short-lived. In 1974, after India, with which Yugoslavia competed for the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement, tested a nuclear weapon, the weapons program was once again revived under the name Program A.[1] Lack of enthusiasm among nuclear scientists and insufficient financial resources are often cited as the reason why Yugoslavia's drive toward nuclear weapons was ultimately unsuccessful and was finally abandoned in 1987.

In the 1970s the focus of Yugoslavia's civilian program shifted from research to nuclear power. In 1981, its first and only nuclear power plant, Nuklearna Elektrana Krsko (NEK), became operational. However, the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 led to a moratorium adopted first by Slovenian Parliament and then by the Federal Council, which essentially ended all nuclear power-related research in Yugoslavia. By all accounts, Yugoslavia's nuclear weapons program did not progress beyond the research stage. During the mid to late 1990s, scientists from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, one of Yugoslavia's main nuclear research facilities, began expressing concern about the safety of over 40kg of fresh nuclear fuel, containing highly enriched uranium, stored at Vinca. In August 2002 a multinational team of public, private and international entities organized a successful operation to transport 48 kg of 80%-enriched uranium from Vinca to the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad, Russia.

History

In 1947 Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, made a decision to establish the country's first nuclear research center at Vinca, thus embarking on the path of nuclear energy. In the midst of post-war reconstruction and forecasting high electricity demand, Yugoslavia may have speculated that nuclear energy development would be the key to its overall economic growth.[2] The Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences was founded in 1948, followed by two other nuclear research centers, the Jozef Stefan Institute in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and the Rudjer Boskovic Institute, near Zagreb, Croatia, founded in 1949 and 1950, respectively.

From the start, the political and security consequences of Yugoslavia's geographic location and war experience played a role in its decision to pursue nuclear development. Unlike some states in Eastern and Central Europe, who relied heavily on the Soviet Union in their liberation from the Germans, Yugoslavia emerged after the war with a strong and independent Communist Party. In the years immediately after the war, tensions began to form between the Soviet and Yugoslav governments. Stalin wanted cohesion and subordination within the Communist Bloc, and Tito sought to rebuild Yugoslavia largely independent of Stalin's supervision. In June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and essentially from the Soviet Bloc.[3] Yugoslavia found itself at the core of geographical and ideological divisions in Europe. As the editors of Nuclear Engineering International stated in 1971, "In such a situation [desire for economic and political independence and unfavorable geographic position] the utilization of nuclear energy is almost inevitable providing you do have the resources and industrial know-how to furnish your own fuel."[4]

At the time when neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were willing to share their nuclear know-how or technology, Yugoslavia was forced to devote a substantial amount of its own material and human resources to the nuclear program.[5] As the three nuclear research centers mentioned above, were being built, Yugoslavia commissioned or constructed basic equipment that would enable it to conduct advanced nuclear research: a 1.5 MeV Cockcroft-Walton particle accelerator for Vinca, a 30 MeV betatron and a 2.5 MeV Van de Graaff electrostatic generator for Jozef Stefan, and a 16 MeV cyclotron for Rudjer Boskovic. In the early 1950s Norway became Yugoslavia's most important and closest collaborator in the field on nuclear science.[6] Beginning in 1952 Yugoslav scientists trained and worked at Norway's Institute for Nuclear Energy Research in Kjeller, particularly in the field of chemical extraction of plutonium; researchers from both countries conducted joint work on plutonium reprocessing; and, Norway aided Yugoslavia in the construction of a laboratory-scale reprocessing facility, equipped with hot cells and employing the Purex reprocessing method.

The research carried out by Yugoslav scientists with their Norwegian counterparts appears to be consistent with a nuclear weapons program. In addition to plutonium reprocessing, investigations were carried out into uranium enrichment, using the electromagnetic isotope separation techniques, employing Vinca's calutron and Rudjer Boskovic's cyclotron, as well as other enrichment methods at Vinca.[7] According to a Norwegian correspondent, in 1953, Yugoslav scientists working at Kjeller may have also smuggled a quantity of highly enriched uranium back to Vinca.[8] Tito's decision in the late 1940s to develop a nuclear weapon, evident in the founding of the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, appears to coincide with Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union. In September 1949, Stevan Dedijer, a former director of the Vinca Institute, was recruited to the weapons program and was told by one of Tito's closest collaborators, Edvard Kardelj: "We must have the atomic bomb."[9] In 1955 the Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy (FCNE) was established to supervise the development of the nuclear program. Aleksandr Rankovic, head of secret police, became the head of the Commission.[10]

Security considerations were probably a factor in Tito's initial decision to pursue the nuclear weapons capability. Having learned of the Soviet atomic bomb and fearing Stalin's retribution following the split between the two countries, Tito might have thought that a nuclear deterrent would fare well against a threat of a Soviet invasion. Security, however, was not the sole reason, and, as some analysts argue, not the most important one.[11] Considering Yugoslavia's position at the time, the desire for international status, which having such a powerful weapon would assure, might have been the decisive factor. Yugoslavia collaborated with Norway in the field of plutonium reprocessing, established a spent fuel reprocessing department at Vinca, signed a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1956 for the 6.5MW heavy water moderated and cooled research reactor, RA, and constructed the RB a zero power heavy water – natural uranium critical assembly. The RA reactor, described by Vinca officials as "essentially a plutonium production reactor," was fundamental in Tito's weapons research.[12]

In the early 1960s, as the nuclear research program was gaining momentum, Tito reportedly de-emphasized the weapons aspect of the program. In 1958 a criticality excursion at Vinca's heavy water RB reactor killed one person and left five more with radiation poisoning. However, Tito's decision may have been based on the thaw felt in Soviet-Yugoslav relations following Stalin's death. Other factors may have included the apparent lack of results of the program and the financial strains it was putting on the country's economy. Additionally, Yugoslavia's international position was to advocate nuclear disarmament and press the nuclear weapons states to dispense with their nuclear arms.[13] Yugoslavia signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and ratified it in 1970. There were also signs that the focus of Yugoslavia's nuclear program was shifting from a research to nuclear power program. After years of feasibility studies, the U.S. firm Westinghouse was selected to build the country's first power plant, a 664MW[14] pressurized light water reactor at Krsko.[15]

Yugoslavia's decision to abandon nuclear weapons development was short-lived however, when in May 18, 1974 when India, Yugoslavia's long-time rival for the NAM leadership, carried out its first nuclear test. According to first-hand accounts, immediately after the Indian test, Tito called two meetings with the heads of the country's primary nuclear research facilities, representatives of armed services, and military intelligence officials. At the meeting military representatives instructed those present to develop ways to utilize the civilian power program as a cover for a parallel weapons program.[16]

During the 1970s, Yugoslavia became increasingly frustrated with the apparent monopoly by the major nuclear powers on nuclear technology. It began to demand easier access to nuclear technology and chastising what it termed the "gigantic world cartel of nuclear powers" for restricting other nuclear countries from sharing the nuclear know how with the developing world.[17] Yugoslavia began implicitly tying the slow pace of nuclear transfers to its security concerns, stating: "It depends the least upon us whether Yugoslavia will be obliged to consider her A-bomb or even to begin her production."[18] Perhaps feeling as if the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons was lifted by a lack of action on the part of nuclear powers toward nuclear disarmament, the government announced, through newspaper Borba, the possibility of building a nuclear weapon: "...[S]hould the use of mass terror be contemplated, or should nuclear or other weapons for mass destruction be used, our country may, in the framework of the general defence concept, reconsider its attitude towards the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."[19]

After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia continued its nuclear weapons development, led by the new secretary of defense, Admiral Branko Mamula, who was an active supporter of the weapons program. Under Admiral Mamula, scientists worked on two parallel programs that were linked in infrastructure and funding. Program A was designed to develop a nuclear weapon, while Program B focused on Yugoslavia's nuclear power program, and was used to conceal Program A.[20] The Military Technical Institute (MTI) oversaw operations for both programs. Most of Yugoslavia's nuclear research facilities were involved one way or another with either Program A or Program B, however the majority of the weapons research was undertaken by scientists at Vinca, the University of Belgrade's Institute of Physics, and at MTI facilities.[21]

On 7 July 1987, during a meeting at MTI, it was announced that the President had decided to end Program A.[22] Several reasons influenced the Yugoslavia's decision yet again to abandon the weapons drive. The decreasing relevance of factors that originally contributed to the decision to weaponize – the importance of nuclear power to Yugoslavia's economic growth, its desire for international prestige, combined with the heavy financial burden that the program placed on the resources, all must have contributed to the apparent lack of urgency perpetuated by the leadership and lack of enthusiasm for the program displayed by the scientists.[23]

Soon after the death of Program A, Program B followed that same fate. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in April 1986 had an immediate effect of casting doubt on the safety of nuclear programs in countries around Europe and beyond, and strengthened national anti-nuclear lobbies. The Yugoslav power program was not immune. As a result of the accident, the Croatian Parliament removed what was to become Yugoslavia's next nuclear power plant, Prevlaka nuclear plant, from the 1986-1990 provincial plan. After much deliberation, the upper house of the Yugoslav Parliament adopted a self-imposed moratorium that prohibited construction of nuclear facilities indefinitely, imposed criminal penalties for planning such facilities, including preparation of investment decisions and technical documentation, and forbade federal funding of nuclear energy safety-related and other research activities. This decision largely brought all nuclear-related activities in Yugoslavia to an indefinite halt.

Status

Although Yugoslavia's nuclear program came to an end safely and responsibly, the legacy of the program continues. As the country was thrown into the abyss of ethnic violence, secessionism and overall political unrest during most of the 1990s, scientists at Vinca began to raise concerns in the mid-1990s regarding the security of the facilities storing weapons-grade, 80%-enriched fresh uranium fuel, as well as an inventory of spent fuel from the RA reactor, for fear it might be at risk for criminal, terrorist or state-sponsored theft, diversion or seizure.[24] Beginning in 1995, the IAEA conducted several visits to Vinca to inspect the safety and security of the fresh and irradiated uranium fuel and made some security improvements.[25]

Even though the IAEA decided that the safeguards agreement for the RA reactor would continue to be in force after the break-up of Yugoslavia, because the United Nations refused to recognize Slobodan Milosevic's regime as a successor to Yugoslavia, the IAEA inspections to Vinca were limited in time and scope. Additionally Milosevic had reportedly systematically intimidated Vinca's scientists who had voiced concerns about the safety of nuclear material at Vinca.[26] The IAEA was unwilling to take up the case of actively securing the inventory of fissile material at Vinca until Yugoslavia's diplomatic status was resolved. However, when in April 2001, having conceded the loss in presidential elections the previous October, Milosevic was taken into custody by Yugoslav police and turned over to the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal, officials at the U.S. State Department saw an opportunity to negotiate the removal of fissile material from Vinca as part of a diplomatic package to engage the new leadership of Yugoslavia.[27] In August 2002 in a culmination of a 15-month long negotiations process, a multinational team of public, private and international entities organized a successful operation to transport 48 kg of 80%-enriched uranium from Vinca to the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad.[28] In 2003, after the return of Vinca's HEU fuel to Russia, the Yugoslav authority imposed an embargo on the development of nuclear technology.[29]

The removal of the highly enriched uranium from Vinca was widely regarded as a major nonproliferation success. Although the most dangerous nuclear material has been removed, it is too soon to declare Vinca a proliferation-resistant facility, a large inventory of spent fuel still remains.[30] In October 2006, the IAEA announced that it had finalized a multi-million dollar contract to package and ship over two metric tonnes of spent nuclear fuel to Russia. The IAEA concluded a $4.3 million contract with a Russian consortium and Serbia to prepare 8,000 old fuel elements for shipping.[32] Repackaging and shipment costs totaling $9.75 million are being covered by the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. According to NuclearFuel, the fuel cannot be shipped until a reprocessing agreement is put in place, which could bring total costs for the spent fuel removal project to as high as $30 million.[33]

Key Sources
[1] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[2] James P. Nichol and Gordon L. McDaniel, "Yugoslavia," in Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah (eds.), (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982), p. 346.
[3] "Cominform Communiqué: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 28, 1948," The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), as cited in The Internet Modern History Sourcebook, November 1998, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1948cominform-yugo1.html>.
[4] "Energy and Research Trends in Yugoslavia," Nuclear Engineering International, September 1971, p. 772.
[5] James P. Nichol and Gordon L. McDaniel, "Yugoslavia," in Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah (eds.), (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982), p. 346.
[6] For an in-depth discussion of Norwegian assistance to Yugoslavia's nuclear program, refer to William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[7] Andrew Koch, "Yugoslavia's Nuclear Legacy: Should We Worry?" The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol04/43/koch43.pdf>.
[8] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[9] Stevan Dedijer, Tito's Bomb, draft manuscript, Institute of Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Palo Alto, California, 1969, as quoted in William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[10] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[11] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[12] As cited in Mark Hibbs, "Vinca Wants Fresh HEU Removed in View of Growing Serbian Unrest," NuclearFuel, Vol. 22, No. 3, February 10, 1997, via Lexis-Nexis.
[13] Although undoubtedly fueled by some altruistic reasons for pressing for disarmament among the nuclear weapons states, Yugoslavia was more vocal about the slow pace of technological assistance in the nuclear field afforded to developing countries by the nuclear powers. While criticizing the nuclear weapons states at the NPT review conference for not "fulfilling their basic obligations assumed under the Treaty," Yugoslavia did not shy away from highlighting as an important evidence of such violations the fact that "the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries still falls far short of expectations and promises and of the obligations assumed by nuclear Powers under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." "2403rd Meeting," United Nations General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records of the 2383rd to 2413th Meetings, 12 November 1975.
[14] The plant's power has been listed elsewhere at 632MW. "Krsko Nuclear Plant to Begin Test Production," Borba, August 18, 1981, in FBIS, Doc. No. FBIS-EEU-81-159.
[15] "Energy and Research Trends in Yugoslavia," Nuclear Engineering International, September 1971, p. 772; Nada Stanic, "Yugoslavia Aiming to Define Next 20 Years of Nuclear Growth by Year End," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 22, No. 9, March 5, 1981, via Lexis-Nexis; James P. Nichol and Gordon L. McDaniel, "Yugoslavia," in Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah (eds.), (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982), p. 350.
[16] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[17] Dr. J. Brezaric, "Nuclear Problems," Review of International Affairs, Vol. 649, April 20, 1977; Edvard Kljun, "The Nonaligned Countries and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Power," Review of International Affairs, No. 684, October 5, 1978.
[18] "Interview with Col.-Gen Kukoc," Nin, 13 March 1977, reprinted in Survival, Vol. 20, May/June 1977, p. 128.
[19] Dimitrije Seserinac Gedza, Borba, 7 December 1975, reprinted in "Yugoslavia and Nuclear Weapons," Survival, Vol. 18, May/June 1976, p.117.
[20] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[21] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[22] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[23] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html>.
[24] Mark Hibbs, "Vinca Wants Fresh HEU Removed in View of Growing Serbian Unrest," NuclearFuel, Vol. 22, No. 3, February 10, 1997, via Lexis-Nexis; David Albright, "What About Yugoslavia's Nuclear Explosive Materal?" Policy Paper, Institute for Science and International Security, April 21, 1999, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/yugoslavia/yugoslavia499.html>.
[25] "Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety," The Nuclear Safety Review 1997, International Atomic Energy Agency, General Conference, GC(41)/INF/5, 23 July 1997, <http://www.iaea.org>; Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Sends Mission to Belgrade: Fuel Removal Is 'Hazardous, Costly'," NuclearFuel, Vol. 22, No. 4, February 24, 1997, via Lexis-Nexis.
[26] Mark Hibbs, "Belgrade Intimidated Officials Who Sought Foreign Help for Vinca," NuclearFuel, Vol. 25, No. 21, October 16, 2000, via Lexis-Nexis.
[27] Philipp C. Bleek, "Project Vinca: Lessons for Securing Civil Nuclear Material Stockpiles," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall-Winter 2003, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol10/103/103bleek.pdf>.
[28] "NTI Commits $5 Million To Help Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Weapons Material," Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 23, 2002, <http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_082302.pdf>
[29] Branka Jaksic, "Nuclear Power Station in Serbia," Ekspres (Belgrade), 6 November 2003, in "Report Links French Nuclear Firm's Visit to Construction of Facility in Serbia," FBIS, EUP20031108000209.
[30] Daniel Horner, "HEU Secured From Yugoslav Reactor, But Remaining Spent Fuel Poses Problem," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 18, September 2, 2002, via Lexis-Nexis.
[31] William C. Potter, Miljanic, Djuro and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00potter.html.
[32] "Vinca's Long & Winding Road Nears Milestone: Countries Step Up to Help Serbia Improve Nuclear Safety, Security," IAEA Staff Report, 6 October 2006.
[33] Ann MacLachlan, "Fresh HEU from Russian reactors moves, but spent fuel pace slower," NuclearFuel, 19 November 2007.

	Updated November 2007