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E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics
 
Image Source: BBC
Reactor Building at Mtskheta
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Location: Tbilisi

Website: http://www.acnet.ge/physics.htm 

Subordination: Georgian Academy of Sciences
["Institutes of Georgian Academy of Sciences," Georgian Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/physics.htm.]
 
Activities: Founded in 1950, the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics conducts research on physics of condensed matter, high-energy physics, plasma physics, biophysics, and applied physics.
["E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics," Georgian Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/physics.htm.]

Reactors: One (shutdown)
Reactor Location: Mtskheta, approximately 20 km from Tbilisi.
[NISNP Discussion with Georgian government official, 15 October 1997.]

Name: IRT-M
Type: pool
[Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia:  March 1997).]

Power: 8MW
[ Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia:  March 1997).]

Fuel: From criticality in October 1958 to September 1969, the reactor ran on IRT-1000 fuel assemblies consisting of EK-10 fuel elements with 10% enriched uranium.  From October 1969 to January 1988, the reactor ran on IRT-2M fuel assemblies consisting of fuel elements with 90% HEU.[1]  In 1986 the Institute of Physics received 17 IRT-3M assemblies, which were later shipped to the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in August 1995.[1]  The exact details of this transaction are unclear:  a source from the Georgian Academy of Sciences indicates that Georgia sold Uzbekistan 5kg of fuel rods for $20,000[2], while a New York Times article indicates that Georgia sent 11 pounds of HEU to Uzbekistan at a cost of $6,000.[3]  In April 1998 under Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus, all HEU- and LEU-based spent and fresh fuel was removed to Dounreay, Scotland.  US government documents indicate that approximately 4.3kg of fresh fuel (largely HEU, with some LEU) and approximately 800g of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel were removed.[4]  Documents from the United Kingdom House of Commons indicate that an additional 5.8kg of LEU-based fresh fuel and 3.7kg of LEU-based spent fuel were also removed.[5]
Sources:
[1] Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia:  March 1997), p. 4.
[
2] Interfax, 12 January 1997; in "Foreign Ministry Makes A Statement On Nuclear Reactor," FBIS-SOV-97-008.
[3] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1, A4.
[4] Alexander W. Riedy, et al., Multilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation:  U.S.-Led Effort to Remove HEU/LEU Fresh and Spent Fuel from Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland (Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus) (Paper for the 40th Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 25-29 July 1999).
[5] Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence, "Examination of Witness, Mr. D. Henderson (Questions 243 - 259)," 1 July 1998, United Kingdom Parliament Web Site, http://www.parliament.../.../80701p03.htm.

Status: Shut down in January 1998.
[Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia:  March 1997).]

MPC&A: Prior to Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus, the United States assisted Georgia in improving MPC&A for the fresh fuel at Mtskheta by installing a security system and a brick barrier in and around the single alarmed building that housed the fuel.[1,2] Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs police guarded the building.[2] According to Institute of Physics Director Giorgi Kharadze, there were never any problems with the security alarm, TV cameras, and barriers that comprised the reactor's 24-hour security system.[3] In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency gave Georgia $2.5 million for its nuclear radiation and safety program in 1996, a part of which went toward improving MPC&A at Mtskheta.[4]
Sources:
[1] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1, A4.
[2] Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia:  March 1997), p. 4.
[3] "Interest in the Uranium from Mtskheta Remains High" Shvidi Dge, 1-3 August 1997. pg.1 
[4] Moscow-Interfax, 12 January 1997; in "Foreign Ministry Makes A Statement On Nuclear Reactor," FBIS-SOV-97-008.{Updated 11/14/97 SS}

Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste: During its lifetime, the IRT-1M reactor used 201 fuel assemblies, of which 196 were transported to reprocessing enterprises in Russia at various times during the Soviet era.  The last shipment of 44 fuel assemblies took place in March 1991.[1]  Five assemblies (containing 800g of HEU and LEU)[2] could not be accommodated on the train at the time and were left in the spent fuel cooling pond in Mtskheta.[3] These five assemblies were removed to Dounreay, Scotland in May 1998 under Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus.  There are several facilities at the IRT reactor for storage of liquid and solid wastes, including underground repositories on the reactor site and dry shafts in the reactor building. According to unconfirmed information, there are several radioactive waste disposal sites. Concrete is used at these underground facilities to neutralize or decrease the radiation level.[4]
Sources:
[1] Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk, Russia:  March 1997), p. 5.
[2]
Carol Giacomo, "Moscow Said To Thwart Nuclear Safety Deal," Reuters, 6 January 1997, in Executive News Service, 6 January 1997.
[3]
Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1, A4.{Updated 3/2/01 KB}
[4] NISNP discussions with Ukrainian nuclear engineer, June 1995.

Subcritical Assemblies: One

Name: Breeder-1

Status: A subcritical assembly, fueled by an unspecified amount of HEU, began operation at the Institute of Physics in 1984.  Since all remaining HEU fuel was removed from the site during Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus, it is presumed that the subcritical assembly is no longer in operation. 

Archived Developments
 
4/23/98:  HEU/LEU FUEL REMOVED FROM MTSKHETA REACTOR
On 23 April 1998, after more than two years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Georgia successfully carried out Operation Auburn Endeavor, in which HEU- and LEU-based fresh and spent fuel was transferred from the shutdown IRT-M research reactor in Mtskheta, on the outskirts of Tbilisi, Georgia, to the Dounreay Nuclear Complex in Scotland.  US government documents indicate that the material consisted of approximately 4.3kg of fresh fuel (largely HEU, with some LEU, as well) and approximately 800g of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel.[1]  Documents from the UK House of Commons indicate that an additional 5.8kg of LEU-based fresh fuel and 3.7kg of LEU-based spent fuel were also removed.[2]  For more information, see the Operation Auburn Endeavor section at the end of this page.
Sources:
[1] Alexander W. Riedy, et al., Multilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation:  U.S.-Led Effort to Remove HEU/LEU Fresh and Spent Fuel from Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland:  Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus (Paper for the 40th Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 25-29 July 1999).
[2] Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence, "Examination of Witness, Mr. D. Henderson (Questions 243 - 259)," 1 July 1998, United Kingdom Parliament Web Site, http://www.parliament.../.../80701p03.htm.{Entered 4/23/2001 KB}
 
 
4/22/98: CHECHEN OFFICIAL DENIES SEEKING NUCLEAR MATERIALS
Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Kazbek Makhashev has denied that Chechnya has any interest in acquiring and using nuclear materials as weapons.  The statement was prompted by Western media reports that nuclear material to be transferred from Georgia to the United Kingdom could fall into Chechen hands.  The radioactive material consists of about 4kg of HEU and about 800g of spent nuclear fuel.
[Interfax, 22 April 1998; in "Russia: Chechen Official Denies Seeking Nuclear Substances," FBIS-SOV-98-112]{Entered 4/13/01 GG} 
 
11/3/97: UNRESOLVED FATE OF HEU PROMPTS GEORGIAN THREAT, FRENCH INTEREST
On a number of occasions, Georgian officials have noted their willingness to sell the 4.5kg  of HEU from Mtskheta. The director of the Political-Military Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, David Dondua, appreciated the US government's concern over security of the facility in Mtskheta, but he was rather disappointed by the US government's delay in action.[1] The Political Counselor of the Embassy of Georgia in the United States has made comments along the same lines. He has mentioned that unless the US government decides to purchase the uranium, and if Russia continues to insist on conditions unacceptable to Georgia, Georgia might have no other option but to sell the uranium to countries which constitute a proliferation threat.[2] Meanwhile, some private companies have expressed interest in purchasing the uranium from Mtskheta, including the French company Cogema. Mr. Jack Rame, director of the general mission of Cogema to Georgia, visited Georgia and met with the President Eduard Shevardnadze on 31 July 1997, to discuss prospects for future cooperation.[3,4]
Sources:
[1] NISNP discussion with Georgian government official, 22 September 1997
[2] NISNP discussion with Georgian government official, 3 November 1997.
[3] "The Interest in the Georhgain Uranium Remains High" Shvidi dge, 1-3 August 1997, p. 1.
[4] "Gold Searching Cogema Interested in the Georgian Uranium" Shvidi dge, 1-3 August 1997, p. 5. {Entered 11/14/97 SS} 
 
7/15/97: IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL MEETS CHAIRMAN OF THE GEORGIAN PARLIAMENT
IAEA Director General Hans Blix met with the Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Zurab Zhvania and discussed the MPC&A system for the 5 kg of HEU (as reported)  at the Mtskheta nuclear reactor. Zhvania expressed to Blix his concern over the "out-of-date" technologies used at the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant in neighboring Armenia.
[Guram Dumbadze, Resonansi, No. 192, 16 July 1997, p. 3; in "Georgia Sitting On The Armenian Nuclear Barrel," Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy, and Development, 15 July 1997.] {entered 8/8/97 djw}

1/97: GOVERNMENT DEVELOPS PROGRAM TO ENSURE RADIATION SAFETY
The Scientific Research Institute of Radiology and Radioecology and the Institute of Physics of Georgia are responsible for the implementation of a government program to protect the Georgian population from radiation exposure in the case of an accident at a nuclear plant in a neighboring country. The program also creates a consolidated state environmental monitoring system, equips monitoring centers and regional laboratories, and introduces fundamental legislation and regulations for these activities. According to the Georgian Ministry of the Economy, execution of this program will take place over the course of three years and will require the investment of approximately 580,000 Lari (GEL) ($400,000).
[ITAR-TASS, 17 January 1997; in "Pravitelstvom strany utverzhdena gosudarstvennaya programma obespecheniya radiatsionnoy bezopasnosti naseleniya Gruzii," Yadernyy Kontrol, No. 27, March 1997, p. 16.]


Operation Auburn Endeavor

On 23 April 1998, after more than two years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Georgia successfully carried out Operation Auburn Endeavor, in which HEU- and LEU-based fresh and spent fuel was transferred from the shutdown IRT-M research reactor in Mtskheta, on the outskirts of Tbilisi, Georgia, to the Dounreay Nuclear Complex in Scotland.  US government documents indicate that the material consisted of approximately 4.3kg of fresh fuel (largely HEU, with some LEU, as well) and approximately 800g of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel.[1] Documents from the UK House of Commons indicate that an additional 5.8kg of LEU-based fresh fuel and 3.7kg of LEU-based spent fuel were also removed.[2] 


The project went by different names:  the US Department of Energy called it "Project Partnership," US military personnel called it "Auburn Endeavor," Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel called it "Project Olympus," and the Georgians called it "Program Export."[3]

In January 1996, prompted by concerns over inadequate material protection, control, and accounting standards, the United States began negotiating with Georgia and Russia to transfer 4.3kg of fresh fuel and 800g of spent fuel at Mtskheta to Russian territory.  Russia had delayed plans to transfer the materials to its territory with claims of improper shipment containers, insufficient funds, and environmental hazards.[4]  Negotiations became more difficult after an 11 January 1997 statement by Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy spokesman Georgiy Kaurov in which Russia indicated its willingness to accept the HEU fuel if Georgia were to sign an agreement conditioning the transfer on Georgia's ultimate responsibility for the waste left after reprocessing.[5]  According to Institute of Nuclear Physics Director Giorgi Kharadze, Georgia did not have a place to safely store nuclear waste.[4] 

Similar to Project Sapphire, in which the United States purchased approximately 600kg of weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan and shipped it to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, Auburn Endeavor allowed the West to help eliminate a potential nuclear proliferation risk. However, US State Department concerns over upsetting Moscow and Clinton Administration worries over protests and legal challenges from US environmental groups prevented the United States from accepting the material.  Following the February 1997 assassination attempt on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, US concerns over the material intensified.  The United States asked France to accept the material, but the French refused.  Finally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed to take the uranium and spent fuel.  Though the operation violated British regulations against receiving nuclear material, London indicated that the safety and security of the material was important enough to make an exception.[6]  Environmentalists and Scottish nationalists criticized the operation as "ill-conceived and dangerous,"[7,8] all the more so when it was learned that an additional 9.5kg of LEU material accompanied the agreed-upon 4.7kg.[2]  The British foreign ministry noted in a public statement that most of the material would be used to produce medical isotopes for the treatment of cancer.[7]

The operation was directed by the US National Security Council. The US Departments of State, Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) executed the mission. The Department of State negotiated agreements with and managed policy issues in Georgia and the United Kingdom.  DOD, through US European Command military personnel, was responsible for transportation, logistics, and coordination of security with Georgia.  DOE was responsible for repackaging the fuel and interacting with the Georgian Institute of Physics and UK nuclear authorities.  The fresh fuel was repackaged in US-supplied containers and transported by US Air Force C-5B cargo aircraft from Tbilisi to Kinloss Royal Air Force Base outside Inverness, Scotland.  In Scotland the fresh and spent fuel was transported to the Dounreay Nuclear Complex for interim storage and final disposition.[1]  The United States reportedly paid Georgia $125,000 for the material.[9]
Sources:
[1] Alexander W. Riedy, et al., "Multilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation:  U.S.-Led Effort to Remove HEU/LEU Fresh and Spent Fuel from Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland (Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus)," 40th Annual Meeting:  Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (Documation, 1999).
[2] Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence, "Examination of Witness, Mr. D. Henderson (Questions 243 - 259)," 1 July 1998, United Kingdom Parliament Web Site, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/. 
[3] Robert N. Ceo, Kenneth A. Thompson, Wesley J. Bicha, "Gamma Ray Measurements of Reactor Fuel Elements in the Republic of Georgia," 40th Annual Meeting:  Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (Documation, 1999).
[4] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1, A4.
[5] Scott Parrish and Emil Danileyan, "Russia Ready To Accept Uranium From Georgia," OMRI Daily Digest, 13 January 1997.
[6] Michael Gordon, "U.S., Britain Relocate Nuclear Material From Volatile Georgia," New York Times, online edition http://www.nytimes.com/, 21 April 1998.
[7]"Protests Fly As U.K. Takes Georgia Nuclear Material," Reuters, 21 April 1998.
[8] Ben Partridge, "Georgia: Uranium Flies to Britain For Reprocessing Amid Criticsm of Secret Deal," RFE/RL Russian Dailies, 23 April 1998, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Web Site, http://www.rferl.org. {Updated 5/12/98 TR}
[9] Ben Partridge, "Georgia:  Nuclear Waste Arrives at Scottish Plant," RFE/RL Russian Dailies, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Web Site, http://www.rferl.org, 24 April 1998.{Updated 1/12/2001 NA}



 

Updated December 2007



Facilities Overview
E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics
High Energy Physics Institute (HEPI)
Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT)


Georgia Maps
International Assistance for Anti-Plague Facilities in the Former Soviet Union
Export Control Developments in Georgia
Radioactive Waste Developments in Georgia
Instability in Georgia: A New Proliferation Threat?
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS
Full-Text Documents
NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database
Review of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Georgia, July 2004
Andronikashvili Institute of Physics website
High Energy Physics Institute (HEPI) website
Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology
CIA World Factbook, Georgia



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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