Back to Country Index COUNTRY PROFILE
Nuclear Biological Chemical Missile
Access Newswire
Country Information
 
Nuclear Facilities

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)

Location: Natanz Enrichment Plant
Subordinate to: Uranium enrichment
Size: Commercial scale enrichment facility
Primary Function: Uranium enrichment

Description:

The Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, is Iran's planned main enrichment facility. Natanz is also the site of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), a test facility before industrial scale enrichment takes place at the FEP. During his February 2003 visit, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General learned that the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, when completed would house 50,000 centrifuges at full operational capacity. While the FEP was scheduled to be completed in 2005, as per the last design information verification carried out by the IAEA in June 2006, construction work still continues at the FEP facility. The IAEA received updated design information from Iran for the FEP on 8 February 2006. Also, as per latest IAEA reports, equipment such as process tanks and an autoclave are being currently moved into the FEP and it is estimated that the installation of the first 3000 P-1 centrifuge machines at the FEP is planned for the fourth quarter of 2006. However, at the present time the number of complete centrifuges in Iran's possession is yet uncertain.

It is estimated that once completed, the FEP operating at full capacity (50,000 centrifuges) will have the potential to produce at a minimum, 500kg of weapons-grade uranium per year.

Key Sources:
[1] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 6 June 2003, p. 6.
[2] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Iran, Player or Rogue," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003, p. 57.
[3] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 26 August 2003, p. 7.
[4] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2 September 2005. p. 12, 13.
[5] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 27 February 2006. p. 8, 9.
[6] "Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 8 June 2006. p. 2, 3.



 

Updated November 2006



Overview
Conversion
Enrichment
Fuel Fabrication
Heavy Water Production
Milling
Mining
Nuclear Power Reactors
Reprocessing
Research and Development
Research Reactors, Critical and Sub-Critical Assemblies
Waste Management
Weaponization


Maps
U.S. and Hostile Powers: Iran
IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failue to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference
WMD in the Middle East
Treaties and Organizations
Iranian Regime Defiant in Face of Aug. 31 Nuclear Deadline (2006)
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (2006)
In Focus: IAEA and Iran (2005)
Iran's Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold (2005)
FAS: Iran Special Weapons Guide (2005)
For Tehran, Nuclear Program Is a Matter of National Pride (2005)
Curbing the Iranian Nuclear Threat: The Military Option (2004)
Iran: Countdown to Showdown (2004)
Shahab-3 (2004)
A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (2004)
The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations (2004)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
Iran, Player or Rogue? (2003)
Iranian Missiles: The Nature of the Threat (2003)
Iran and Nuclear Weapons (2000)
Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile (1998)
Iran and CBW (1998)



GO
Match:
 


Country Information
Argentina
Belarus
Brazil
China
Cuba
Egypt
France
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Japan
Kazakhstan
Libya
North Korea
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
South Korea
Syria
Taiwan
United Kingdom
United States
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Other


Research Library
Country Information Glossary
Issues & Analysis Source Documents
Databases Warheads & Materials
 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

HOME   | CONTACT US   | GET INVOLVED   | SITE MAP