One of the most notable features of the Syrian CW program has been the manner in which it has escaped the kind of public criticism and detailed examination given to CW programs of states such as Libya, North Korea, and Iran. Despite the lack of information about Syrian CW-related activities, it is possible to draw a general picture of its CW program.

Since the early 1980s, Syria has made determined efforts to acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemical weapons. The country has purchased large amounts of precursor chemicals for mustard agent and sarin gas production from Iran since 2004, including sodium sulphide, hydrochloric acid, and ethylene glycol-MEG.[1] For its part, Iran has provided assistance to Syria to construct and operate chemical facilities that will enable Syria to produce these precursors on its own. Some analysts believe that the objective of these activities is to provide Syria with a capability to wage CW that would deter Israel from taking advantage of its superior conventional warfare capabilities. Although the Syrian perception of an immediate Israeli threat has most likely served as its motivation to pursue a CW program, Iraq's development and use of chemical weapons in the early to mid-1980s may have also played a role. In other words, having observed Iraq's successes against Iran, which depended to some extent on its use of chemical weapons, Syria determined that it should also acquire weapons for purposes of deterrence and, in case of Iraqi aggression, tactical uses in the field. Syria has consistently pursued its CW program despite the damage this has done to its international reputation and the negative impact it has had on the Syrian economy, which suffers from the Australia Group countries' imposition of stringent export controls aimed at preventing CW proliferation. Despite having made substantial investments in the construction and equipping of chemical facilities, Syria appears to remain heavily dependent on imports of materials and expertise for maintaining CW agents production and delivery means. Since the early 1990s, Syria has shifted its focus from the basic development of CW agents to the improvement of delivery systems, such as Scud missiles.

History

Syria first obtained chemical weapons from Egypt in 1972 or 1973 as part of the two countries preparing for a joint attack on Israel in October 1973.[2] Reports that Israeli troops captured stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that these weapons were in the possession of Syrian combat units during the Yom Kippur War.[3] It is notable that despite Syria's defeat, they made no use of their CW capability. In the absence of information about Syrian strategic thinking or intentions, explanations as to why chemical weapons were not used by the Syrians in 1973 remain speculative.

The next major development in Syrian efforts to acquire chemical weapons took place following the defeat of Syrian air and land forces deployed to Lebanon during Israel's 1982 invasion. However, a direct causal relationship between this event and Syria's decision to acquire chemical weapons cannot be made, for it seems that Syria decided to acquire chemical weapons in part to counterbalance Israel's nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the decision took place prior to 1982. Nevertheless, the exposure of Syrian vulnerability to Israeli conventional forces may have given new urgency to Syria's ambition to acquire a chemical weapons arsenal. It is worth noting that there are no reports of large-scale acquisition of materials and construction of facilities by Syria prior to 1982.

The Syrian CW program was established under the aegis of the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS), an ostensibly civilian research institute that appears to be responsible for all Syrian research, development, and production activities and facilities. Once the decision to proceed with a CW program had been made, it appears that the initial focus was to establish a facility for research and development, and possibly pilot production, in the Damascus area. This facility continues to be used for CW-related research. Simultaneously, the construction of larger CW production facilities in Al-Safira, Hama, and Homs commenced, with all three coming on line in the mid- to late 1980s. The Syrian CW program's first priority was to produce sarin and initial, small-scale production appears to have started in 1984. As originally conceived, Syrian Air Force bombers were to carry bombs filled with sarin, but once Israel's air superiority was recognized, this method was deemed unreliable. Intense efforts were then undertaken to develop a more dependable delivery system. By 1987, Syria was able to fit sarin-filled warheads on some of its Scud missiles, thus creating a limited, medium-range (up to 600 km) CW strike capability. Since that time, the focus of Syrian efforts has been on increasing the range and effectiveness of their chemical strike capability by improving warheads and obtaining longer-range missiles from foreign suppliers such as North Korea. The fitting of bomblet-filled, cluster warheads to Scud-C missiles after 1997 was a significant development that greatly increased the potential effectiveness of Syria's chemical capability. Additionally, Syria has sought to increase the lethality of its force by developing V-agents—an effort that began in the late 1980s. Reports throughout the 1990s indicated that Syria continued to work on V-agents with little success.

Following the successful weaponization of sarin in the mid-1980s, Syria started to develop mustard gas, which is a type of vesicant. Syria appears to have built up a substantial stockpile of mustard and sarin in the 1990s. At about the same time, the Syrian CW program seems to have reached a plateau in terms of capability and production; i.e., its CW capability appears to have reached its apex. There is no current dependable information on whether Syria is engaged in ongoing large-scale production and stockpiling of CW agents.

The driving motivation behind Syria's CW program has been the need to find a way to counterbalance Israel's superior conventional warfare capabilities. During the 1980s and 1990s, the differences in the relative capabilities of the two countries rapidly increased in Israel's favor, leaving Syria in a position of heightened vulnerability. The distancing of Syria from its Soviet patron in the mid-1980s—combined with the obvious inadequacies of Soviet-supplied equipment—required Syria to seek an equalizer. In this sense, the objective of the Syrian CW program has been to provide Syria with the option to expand a conventional conflict so it would come to include direct chemical attacks against Israel's civilian population and/or inflict unbearably heavy losses on Israeli forces. The key dilemma facing Syria in all its efforts has been the need to develop and maintain a credible threat while not being so threatening as to trigger a preventive Israeli attack, which might destroy Syria's chemical capability and, simultaneously, expose Syria's weak defenses. In this regard, Syria has found it advantageous to adopt an opaque policy, not unlike that of Israel, in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of chemical weapons, even as it continues to deploy them and, as possible, improve on them.

From its earliest beginnings, Syria's CW program has been heavily dependent on outside support. As a consequence of its low levels of industrial and technological development, Syria has been a voracious importer of materials, technologies, and expertise. Although indigenous development efforts have been made, they have been constrained by Syria's relative isolation from the international community, its relative poverty, the diversion of a substantial proportion of its national resources to military activities, and pervasive corruption. Consequently, it is not clear whether Syria has made significant achievements in terms of its ability to pursue indigenous development of chemical weapons agents and their delivery systems. Open sources continue to refer to extensive efforts to secure materials and expertise from foreign suppliers, indicating that indigenous capabilities have substantial limitations.

The Syrian CW development program appears to have undertaken surprisingly few field tests, whether of agents or delivery systems. It is possible that foreign intelligence agencies have simply failed to detect additional tests or that they have not been reported in open sources. It is also possible, though less likely, that the extensive outside support Syria has received has enabled it to have a high degree of confidence in its chemical weapons systems despite the absence of field testing. A botched attempt to arm a Scud-C missile with a chemical warhead in July of 2006 led to the alleged discontinuation of a Syrian-Iranian program to use short-range missiles as a delivery vehicle. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, an explosion caused by the ignition of fuel in a missile production laboratory, dispersing chemical agents including VX and sarin, resulted in the death of 15 Syrian soldiers and several Iranian engineers. Damascus explained that the explosion occurred as a result of the effects of abnormally high temperatures on an ammunition dump. [4]

Syria has not publicly announced doctrines related to the use of chemical weapons; indeed, it has continually denied possessing such weapons. All conclusions regarding doctrines or policies are based on the limited information about Syrian force structures and production history available in open sources. It has always been presumed that the primary focus of Syrian chemical weapons was an attack on the Israeli civilian population rather than tactical battlefield use. However, given source limitations, this strategy is impossible to confirm.

Very little reliable information exists regarding Syrian CW defensive efforts, in part because open source information has focused on Syrian offensive rather than defensive capabilities. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of military vehicles purchased from the Soviet Union and equipped with NBC protection systems. Further, it is probable that the Soviet Union supplied the country with a full range of decontamination equipment in the 1970s and 1980s.[5] It is assumed, though not demonstrated, that personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers during the same period. There is one known instance in which Syria purchased more than 11,000 Chinese MF-11 protective masks; however, it is not clear whether this was a single purchase or part of a broader effort to replace all existing masks.[6]

For several decades, Damascus has expressed general opposition to WMD. At the same time, Syria has supported the right of any state to adopt those measures that it feels are appropriate to secure itself against outside threats. On numerous occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has indicated that it will not renounce the right to possess chemical weapons, nor destroy any arsenal if it possessed one, until Israel first abandons its nuclear weapons program. It is unclear whether this position represents a willingness to bargain away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclear weapons program or whether it is simply a useful argument to justify the possession of chemical weapons. In practice, Syria remains adamantly opposed to membership in the CWC, aligns itself politically with Egypt in opposition to membership, and has attempted to discourage other Arab nations from joining it.

Status

Syria is currently believed to deploy between 100 and 200 Scud missiles fitted with sarin warheads. Some of these missiles may allegedly be fitted with V-agent warheads, although this information is unreliable. In addition, Syria is believed to have stockpiled several hundred tons of sarin and mustard agents that can be used to fill artillery shells and air-dropped munitions for tactical uses. Syria retains its production infrastructure of at least three, and possibly as many as five, chemical production facilities. Syria conducted one missile test in July 2001, which probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead.[7] Since that time, only the July 2007 missile test has been reported.

In general, previously noted trends established in the early 1990s continue. Despite regular Israeli announcements of Syrian successes, Syria is apparently still working to perfect its V-agent capability and to enhance the range and effectiveness of its missile delivery systems.

In 2003, the United States became concerned once again about Syrian WMD capabilities, making numerous accusations that Syria had received and hidden Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. Although assertions that Syria had received Iraqi WMD prior to the spring 2003 U.S.-led invasion proved untrue, they were nevertheless important at the time since they represented the U.S. determination to pursue WMD issues and a refusal to maintain relations with Syria on a "business as usual" basis. This new approach resulted in a number of policy shifts, the most significant of which was U.S. support for ultimately successful efforts to expel Syria from Lebanon. Additional pressure on Syria came as a consequence of the public repudiation of all WMD efforts by Libya in late 2003, and the subsequent dismantling and conversion of all Libyan WMD related equipment and facilities in 2004 and 2005.

In 2004, Syrian officials met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and Syrian representatives also began to attend regional seminars organized by the OPCW. In November 2005, a Syrian delegation attended the Annual Conference of the CWC States Party in The Hague. These actions were interpreted as the first signs of possible change in Syrian policy on chemical weapons arms control or, more likely, an attempt to relieve international pressure on Syria by suggesting that such a change is being considered by its government.

Recently, published satellite images taken of the Al Safir facility in northwest Syria between 2005 and 2008 suggested an increase in activity at what is purported to be Syria's most important chemical weapons storage and production site. While this information does not provide proof that the Al Safir and other facilities are currently being used to produce CW agents, the Al Safir site's high-security protection indicates that it is a military facility. This information will undoubtedly be viewed with concern by Israel.[8]

Sources:
[1] "Syria blast 'linked to chemical weapons': report," AFP, 19 September 2007, afp.google.com/ article/ ALeqM5i JugIQv DKwkxupz 9eULk1ml6OZ4Q.
[2] W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988.
[3] Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, 17 May 1984, p. H4088.
[4] "Syrian blast was chemical warhead glitch-magazine," Reuters, 19 September 2007, www.alertnet.org/ thenews/ newsdesk/ L19908453.htm.
[5] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[6] Ibid.
[7] David C. Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead", Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 September 2001, www.janes.com.
[8] "Syria Appears to be Developing its Chemical Weapons Capability," HIS Jane's, 19 February 2009, www.janes.com/ media/ releases/ pc090219_1.shtml.

	Updated March 2009