Newswire rollover

A Primer on WMD

Definitions
Effects
Production
Proliferation & Use
Missiles
Terrorism
Historical Context and Scope of Threat
What Can Be Done?
Nuclear Terrorism
Bioterrorism
Curbing WMD Proliferation

header graphic

 

Nuclear Terrorism

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated November 2006

Introduction

Nuclear terrorism is one type of WMD terrorism and involves terrorist use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or materials. Strictly speaking, nuclear terrorism refers to the creation and detonation of a device in which a sustained fission reaction takes place. This restricts nuclear terrorism to bombs using highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Pu). However, some people use the term "nuclear terrorism" to refer to any terrorist weapon using a radioactive substance. This includes the use of radiation dispersal devices (RDDs). RDDs use conventional explosives to spread radioactive material over a wide area. Examples of materials that could be used in RDDs are cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60, all of which are commonly used and often weakly protected in civilian research laboratories and medical facilities. Attacks by terrorists on nuclear power plants or research reactors, intended to cause a nuclear accident that would release radiation, can also be considered nuclear terrorism.

What is the Potential for Nuclear Terrorism?

It is very doubtful that any terrorist group could produce a nuclear weapon on its own without assistance from a state nuclear program. Acquiring and enriching uranium, or creating plutonium in a nuclear reactor, is an extremely expensive and difficult process, requiring expensive equipment and sophisticated techniques. Even if a terrorist group were able to acquire enough weapons-grade HEU or plutonium, it is still a technically demanding and expensive task to put together even a simple nuclear device. Producing a chemical or biological weapon would be far easier for terrorists to accomplish than creating a nuclear weapon.

Terrorists could attempt to acquire a complete, working nuclear weapon from a state. In this case terrorists would either steal a nuclear device, receive one from a state sponsor, or bribe military or political officials to acquire a device. Concerns about this possibility increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, as doubts were raised about the security of Soviet nuclear weapons, one example being the debate over so-called "suitcase nukes." Even if a nuclear weapon were successfully stolen, terrorists would have to defeat built-in mechanisms that are designed to prevent the unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. The U.S. Department of Defense, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), has been working with the Russian Ministry of Defense to increase the security of Russian nuclear weapons.

A nuclear explosion, even though difficult to achieve, would be extremely attractive to terrorists if they wanted to cause mass casualties. This is because of the devastating effects of nuclear explosions (heat, blast effects and radiation contamination) and also the shock value this would have on the target population.

While the probability of terrorists acquiring and using a nuclear fission weapon is quite low, there is a much greater likelihood of terrorists using a radiological dispersal device (RDD). Highly radioactive substances are far more readily available than HEU or plutonium. These substances cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon, and the destruction caused by an RDD would be much less than that caused by a nuclear weapon. While much less technically challenging than building a nuclear weapon, building a so-called "dirty bomb" is not easy. Terrorists would have to work with highly radioactive materials while assembling the device. They would have to have training and knowledge to design the device in such a way as to maximize its impact. If a conventional bomb were used to disperse the radioactive material, the primary cause of death would be the conventional explosive. It would be very difficult to create an RDD that would cause immediate mass casualties, since it is hard to maintain high concentrations of radioactive materials while dispersing them over a wide area. Illnesses and deaths due to the radioactive component of an RDD probably would not appear for a substantial period of time. An RDD could, however, be an effective terror weapon because fear of radiation might induce panic and overreaction within the population. For example, the nuclear terrorism alerts in late 2001 and the May 2002 arrest of Jose Padilla, an alleged Al-Qaeda affiliate believed to have studied how to make radiological weapons, increased public anxiety and prompted many people to purchase Geiger counters and potassium iodide pills in anticipation of a radiological attack.  Decontaminating the affected area may also be a difficult and expensive process, depending on the type of explosive and radioactive material used, topography, and a number of other factors.

An attack on a nuclear facility, with the aim of causing a massive release of radioactive material, is also a credible possibility for terrorists who cannot get their hands on sufficient amounts of radioactive material. Most nuclear facilities have security measures to counter a terrorist attack, such as well-trained guards and safety mechanisms to prevent or mitigate release of radioactivity. However, many critics argue that these are insufficient to prevent the entry into critical areas of a nuclear facility by highly trained, well-armed terrorists, sabotage by insiders, or the deliberate crashing of a hijacked airliner into a nuclear facility. There is also some debate as to how likely a large-scale release of radioactivity would be in such a case. The U.S. government is attempting to increase security at nuclear facilities in order to prevent this.

In July 2006, Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to improve cooperation on measures to protect nuclear materials, prevent nuclear trafficking, deny safe haven to nuclear terrorists, mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack, and adopt strong national legislation to punish terrorists. This new effort supplements UN measures to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism, including UN Resolution 1540.

Further Reading:

NTI, CNS, Nuclear Terrorism Tutorial
Nuclear Control Institute, Nuclear Terrorism
CNS Book, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
NTI, Matthew Bunn & Anthony Wier, "Securing the Bomb 2006"
PBS Frontline, "Russian Roulette"
CRS, Jonathan Medalia, "Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief Review of Threats and Responses"
House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Hearing: "Averting Nuclear Terrorism"
BCSIA, Managing the Atom: Nuclear Terrorism
NTI, CNS, Radiological Terrorism Tutorial
Council on Foreign Relations, Factsheet: Dirty Bombs
Council on Foreign Relations, Charles Ferguson, "Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism"
CNS, Nikolai Sokov, "'Suitcase Nukes': Permanently Lost Luggage"


back to top previous next

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.