U.S.-Russian Treaties & Agreements

Updated January 2007

The United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) entered into several bilateral treaties and agreements limiting the size and configuration of their nuclear forces, as well as banning certain nuclear tests and weapons systems. They have also implemented a number of confidence-building measures to reduce the threat of nuclear confrontation between them.

U.S. - Russian Bilateral Treaties and Agreements

1969-1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I): The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) resulted in the signing in 1972 of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty): The ABM Treaty, from which the United States withdrew on June 13, 2002, limited the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The treaty allowed deployments of up to two limited-area defensive systems with up to 100 interceptor launchers each. One of these systems could defend the national capital, the other an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment site. ABM systems that could defend the entire territory of either country (nationwide defense) were prohibited. In 1974 a protocol to the ABM Treaty was signed limiting each side to only one limited-area defensive system with up to 100 interceptors. The treaty restricted testing of anti-missile systems and deployment of early-warning radars. It also banned mobile and space-based ABM systems. In 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed recognizing Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the successor states to the Soviet Union and parties to the ABM Treaty. On June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in order to pursue the development of missile defenses that would have been banned by the agreement.  See WMD 411, Case Study: Ballistic Missile Defense; the ABM-TMD Demarcation Agreements; and the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1997 Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD Demarcation: On September 26, 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed recognizing Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the successor states to the Soviet Union and parties to the ABM Treaty. In addition, two Agreed Statements were signed outlining limits on the testing of theater missile defense (TMD) systems. The Agreed Statements, often referred to as the TMD Demarcation Agreement, outlined criteria that distinguished TMD systems from strategic BMD systems. Under the agreement, the deployment of "lower-velocity" TMD systems (those with interceptor velocities of three kilometers per second or lower) were allowed, provided that they were not tested against ballistic missile targets having velocities above five kilometers per second or ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers. The agreement prohibited the five parties from testing "higher-velocity" TMD systems (those with interceptor velocities above three kilometers per second) against ballistic missile targets with velocities above five kilometers per second or ranges that exceeded 3,500 kilometers. At the same time, the parties made commitments regarding information exchanges and confidence-building measures. The Bush Administration's announcement of the United States' official withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, however, has made this agreement unnecessary, and its ratification is no longer being pursued.  See the Arms Control Association Fact Sheet; the U.S. State Department Fact Sheet; and CNS, Carnegie, Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union, Chap. 2.

1972 SALT I Interim Agreement: The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the numbers of ICBM launchers at 1972 levels: 1,054 for the United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. The agreement also set ceilings on the number of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and ballistic missile submarines. The United States was permitted to reach a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on 44 ballistic missile submarines from a base level of 656 SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union was permitted to reach a ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers on 62 ballistic missile submarines from a base level of 740 SLBM launchers. These additional launchers were permitted only as replacement for older ICBM or SLBM launchers, which were required to be dismantled or destroyed. The duration of the Interim Agreement was five years. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty: This treaty prohibits underground nuclear weapons tests with yields above 150 kilotons. Although submitted to the U.S. Senate in 1976, this treaty did not enter into force until 1990, after additional verification procedures had been agreed. See U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: The PNE Treaty governs underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The treaty did not enter into force until 1990. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II): The Salt II Treaty was signed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. The terms of the treaty called for limiting the number of delivery vehicles (launchers and bombers) to 2,400 on each side, to be reduced to 2,250 by the end of 1981. The treaty also set limits on the numbers of MIRVed launchers. In early 1980, President Carter asked the Senate to delay consideration of the treaty because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter, and subsequently President Ronald Reagan, made statements committing the United States to abide by the terms of the treaty even though it had not been ratified. In 1986, President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the SALT II limits because of Soviet violations of its arms control commitments. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF): The INF Treaty required the United States and Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles. The treaty covered all ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It also banned testing and production of these missiles. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Chemical Weapons: The U.S.-Soviet Wyoming MOU on Chemical Weapons provided for a bilateral verification experiment and an exchange of data on chemical weapons and production facilities. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA): The U.S.-Soviet BDA called for the destruction of 35,000 metric tons of chemical weapons on both sides. See the Federation of American Scientists Fact Sheet.

1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I): START I, signed by the United States and Soviet Union, set a ceiling of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 accountable warheads for each country. Through the Lisbon Protocol signed in 1992, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia became parties to START I as successor states to the Soviet Union. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II): START II was a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation that was abandoned by both sides before coming into force. The treaty called for reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (long-range ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) and the number of warheads deployed on them. By the end of 2001, each party was to have reduced the total number of deployed strategic warheads to 3,500. No more than 1,750 warheads were to be deployed on SLBMs. MIRVed ICBMs were prohibited, but MIRVed SLBMs were allowed. The United States and Russia ratified START II in 1996 and 2000, respectively, although Russia added conditions as described below. In September 1997, the United States and Russia signed a protocol to START II that extended the deadline for completing the START II reductions from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007, and called for early deactivation of systems scheduled for destruction under the treaty. The START II Treaty did not enter into force because the Russian ratification act made entry into force conditional on U.S. Senate consent to ratification of the September 1997 protocol and approval of the Agreed Statements on ABM-TMD Demarcation.  Neither of these occurred because of opposition to the latter in the U.S. Senate, where a strong faction objected to any action that might be seen as supporting the ABM Treaty.  On June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it would no longer consider itself to be bound by START II provisions.  See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet and CNS, Carnegie, Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union, Chapter 2.

2000 Agreement Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (Plutonium Disposition Agreement): On September 1, 2000, U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement. Under the agreement, each country must dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium that have been withdrawn from a nuclear weapons program and designated as no longer required for defense purposes. The agreement also obligates the countries to declare the quantities, forms, and other information about the disposition plutonium, and to cooperate in the management of their disposition programs. Both countries must begin either immobilizing or burning as mixed-oxide fuel the weapons-grade plutonium by 2007.  See the agreement text, and NTI's "Russia: Plutonium Disposition Overview."

2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT): Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush signed this treaty, also referred to as the Treaty of Moscow, on May 24, 2002. The approximately 475-word treaty states that both the United States and Russia will reduce their numbers of operationally deployed nuclear warheads to between 1,700-2,200 within the next 10 years. It establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, scheduled to meet at least twice a year, to discuss and review the treaty's implementation. The treaty will remain in force until December 31, 2012, at which time the parties have the option of extending or terminating the agreement. Either party can withdraw from the treaty upon giving three months written notice to the other. The document does not require the destruction of strategic delivery systems, specify what is to be done with the warheads once they have been removed from launchers, or constrain the development of ballistic missile defenses.  A Joint Statement, also issued on May 24, 2002, establishes a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to discuss confidence-building measures and transparency issues, as well as other strategic issues of mutual interest.  See the treaty text, the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, and the Joint Statement.

U.S. - Russian Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures

(Dates indicate date of signature.)

1963 Hot Line Agreement: The Hot Line Agreement established a direct communications link between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the chances of a nuclear exchange stemming from an accident or miscalculation. The agreement was adopted following the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and has been modified to take note of advances in telecommunications technology. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet. See also U.S. Department of State Fact Sheets on the Expansion Agreement and Modernization Agreement.

1971 Accidents Measures Agreement: The Accidents Measures Agreement requires each party to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement: The Incidents at Sea Agreement provides for advance notice of actions on the high seas that represent a hazard to navigation or aircraft in flight. Planned ballistic missile launches that will take place in international waters represent such a hazard, and, under the Incidents at Sea Agreement, notification must be provided. Notices to pilots and mariners consist of warnings that announce "closure areas" at sea or in the air; these notices need not identify the nature of the hazard. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1973 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement: Under the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and the non-use of nuclear weapons an "objective of their policies," to practice restraint in their relations toward each other and toward all countries, and to pursue a policy dedicated toward stability and peace. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) Agreement: The NRRC Agreement called for each party to establish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital and to establish a special facsimile communications link between these Centers. These NRRC became operational on April 1, 1988. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification: The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement provides for notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any test launch of an ICBM or SLBM. The agreement also provides that these notifications be provided through the NRRC. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Reduction Initiatives: On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush announced a series of unilateral measures that reduced the alert level of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and started the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. ground forces and from all naval vessels except strategic missile submarines (SSBNs). Nine days later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced a similar set of unilateral measures that were subsequently confirmed and expanded by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in January 1992. Combined, the Soviet/Russian measures would eliminate warheads for tactical land-based missiles, artillery shells, and mines; eliminate one-half of the warheads for anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles; remove all substrategic nuclear weapons from naval vessels; partially eliminate warheads from naval aircraft; and cut the number of warheads for tactical aircraft in half. However, the United States is concerned that Russia has not fully implemented these understandings. See Acronym Institute, U.S. Deterrence Posture and Requirements: Congressional Testimony and CNS, Carnegie, Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union.

1994 Mutual Detargeting: Under this arrangement, the United States and Russia agreed to no longer target their ICBMs and SLBMs at each other. However, the missiles can be retargeted on short notice, in seconds or minutes. See the Federation of American Scientists Fact Sheet.

1998 Joint Data Exchange Center Memorandum of Understanding (JDEC MOU): The JDEC MOU calls for the creation in Moscow of a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems and notifications of missile launches. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

2000 Notification of Missile Launches Memorandum of Understanding (PLNS MOU): This MOU calls for a Pre- and Post-Launch Notification System (PLNS) for launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The MOU provides for the voluntary notification of satellites forced from orbit and certain space experiments that could adversely affect the operation of early warning radars. See the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet.

Further Reading:

	U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Agreements
	U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments"
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S. Russian Agenda"
	WMD 411, START & SORT Case Study
	Arms Control Today, Nikolai Sokov, "The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT"
	Federation of American Scientists, Arms Control Agreements
	Arms Control Association, Treaties
	CNS and Carnegie Endowment, Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union

	CNS, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty"