Spying, Smuggling, and Diversion

Updated February 2007

In many cases, less advanced states obtain what they need for their illicit WMD programs through spying or smuggling goods   from more advanced countries. Often times, the less advanced state secretly misuses items that it received openly and that it probably pledged in good faith to use for non-military purposes. For example, the Soviet Union spied extensively on the U.S. nuclear program during World War II. Its first nuclear weapon was basically a duplicate of the one that the United States dropped on Nagasaki. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet Union did have its own design and eventually would have  succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon on its own. Soviet espionage of the U.S. program only served to speed things up. Non-state suppliers such Pakistan's Dr. A.Q. Khan have used a variety of unorthodox channels, effectively bypassing national export controls.

Cases Involving Nuclear Weapons

India's first nuclear device in 1974 contained plutonium produced in a Canadian-supplied reactor, which had a key component supplied by the United States. India had assured the two supplier countries that their exports would be used only for peaceful purposes, but India made a nuclear explosive instead. India called the test a peaceful nuclear explosion, but the world recognized that it had become a nuclear power. In the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan smuggled plans and equipment for nuclear weapon facilities out of the Netherlands, West Germany, and other Western European countries. North Korea also appears to have advanced its nuclear weapons program by misusing (or diverting) a reactor supplied by Russia for peaceful purposes. In December 2003, Libya admitted to pursuing nuclear weapons by importing enrichment equipment from the Khan network. In exchange for the lifting of some international sanctions, Libya agreed to halt and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs.

Cases Involving Chemical and Biological Weapons

The best-known cases of countries relying on foreign suppliers for help developing chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) are Egypt and Syria.  Both countries benefited from assistance from the Soviet Union and other countries. In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s, Iraq, Iran, and, Libya imported extensive CW equipment and CW-related chemicals (precursor chemicals) from Western Europe.

Further Reading:

	ISIS, David Albright, "Preventing Illegal Exports: Learning from Case Studies, Part I"
	ISIS, David Albright, "Preventing Illegal Exports: Learning from Case Studies, Part II"
	Arms Control Today, Leonard Weiss, "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lesson for U.S. Policy"
	Arms Control Association, Nuclear Black Markets/Khan Network: News and Analysis
	NTI, Sammy Salama & Lydia Hansell, "Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components"
	The Nonproliferation Review, Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt"
	The Middle East Quarterly, Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons"