Supplier Countries Band Together |
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Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Updated December 2006 To help slow the spread of WMD equipment, material, and technology, nations concerned about proliferation have banded together on several occasions to control exports of these items. In the nuclear field, the supplier countries that are members of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) established the NPT Exporters Committee, also known as the Zangger Committee. The Committee ensures that any nuclear exports from member countries are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in the country that receives them. The IAEA monitors the exported equipment or material to ensure that is not used for a nuclear weapon program. After India's 1974 nuclear test, nuclear-supplier countries established a second organization, which included countries, such as France, which were not parties to the NPT. It is called the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). National export controls on materials and equipment for producing biological weapons (BW) and chemical weapons (CW) are harmonized by the Australia Group. Since 1997, many CW-related chemicals are also controlled through the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Missiles are controlled through an organization known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as well as through the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The Code commits member states to curb the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles, and to exercise restraint when developing, testing, and deploying such missiles. How the Export Control Systems OperateAll of the supplier groups develop lists of the items they want to control. Each member country then passes laws regulating the export of the items on the list. Companies that want to export a controlled item must obtain a license from the government of the exporting country. For some items, such as facilities that can manufacture missiles, licenses are never granted. For other items, such as some chemicals that could be used for beneficial insecticides but also for CW, licensing officials allow the export only if they are convinced that it will not be misused for weapons purposes. The Costs of Export ControlsExport controls are controversial because they restrict trade. Often licenses are denied for items that the receiving country says it plans to use for non-military purposes, but that export-licensing officials believe will actually be used for weapons. In cases like these involving dual-use items, such as high-speed computers, many exporting companies believe that the profits they lose when export licenses are denied outweigh the benefits of blocking transfers to countries of proliferation concern. |
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