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Deterring CBW Threats with Nuclear Weapons

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated March 2007

Source: CNS/UNSCOM Sometimes one WMD can be employed to deter the use of another. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, the United States and Israel hinted that they would use nuclear weapons against Iraq if that country employed chemical or biological weapons (CBW) against U.S.-led forces or civilians in the region. Iraq never used these weapons in that war, suggesting that deterrence worked.

In keeping with this view, in the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," released in December 2002, the Bush administration stated that the United States reserves the right to retaliate with overwhelming force, including nuclear weapons, against the use of CBW by other states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated this position in the 2005 draft "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations," which includes the option to use nuclear weapons to destroy identified enemy stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.

This echoed the Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which identified chemical and biological weapons as an element of the threat to the United States that nuclear arms must address.  This document implies that the future configuration of U.S. nuclear forces will be influenced by the need to use these forces to deter large-scale chemical and biological weapons attacks by hostile states.

At the same time, however, the Nuclear Posture Review also declared that U.S. conventional military forces, which are now the most powerful in the world, were a major component of the U.S. deterrent.  This suggests that the United States might choose to respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons by means of an overwhelming attack with conventional weapons.

Further Reading:

CRS, Sharon Squassoni, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends"
Arms Control Today, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
Arms Control Today, Hans Kristensen, "The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons"
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations"
International Security, Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks"

     

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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.