Removal versus Dismantlement

While SORT requires that the United States and Russia reduce the numbers of their strategic offensive operationally deployed nuclear warheads, the treaty does not specify what is to be done after the warheads are removed from their missile delivery systems. The United States has plans to voluntarily dismantle some of its removed warheads, but has also announced that many of the warheads will be placed in storage. Russia has not publicly stated that it will dismantle its removed warheads, but is considered to lack the funds necessary to keep all of its warheads in storage.

Proponents Say Removal is Sufficient. Neither START I nor the unimplemented START II required the dismantlement of removed warheads. SORT should be no different, as all of these treaties are aimed at reducing deployed nuclear forces. While Russia has reduced its warhead production capabilities, it continues to maintain its nuclear arsenals by replacing aged and potentially unstable warheads with newly produced ones. The United States temporarily ceased production of its nuclear warhead "pits" in 1989; the Department of Energy restarted  small-scale warhead pit production at Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico and produced it first pit in 2003. In the case that reliability or safety issue is discovered in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, or if there is a drastic, unforeseen change in the global security environment, warheads once removed may again be necessary for redeployment. Therefore, it made sense for the United States to sign and ratify SORT because of the lack of a provision calling for warhead dismantlement. Likewise, Russia signed on to SORT because it was in the process of reducing its nuclear forces anyways; SORT permitted at least some codified assurance that the United States would take reciprocal measures.

The actual dismantlement process for nuclear warheads requires extensive personnel training, warhead evaluation, and facility preparation. Specifying warhead dismantlement in the treaty could place an undue burden on the NNSA, the U.S. agency responsible for the evaluation, upkeep, and dismantlement of warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Because these responsibilities directly affect national security, the decision of storage versus dismantlement should be left to the discretion of the president.

Opponents Say Warheads Must Be Dismantled. Although neither START I nor the unimplemented START II required the dismantlement of warheads, they did require the destruction of launchers and delivery platforms. This requirement ensured that even if removed warheads were simply placed in storage, they could not easily be redeployed on a delivery vehicle. Because SORT includes no such provision, dismantlement of the actual warhead should be required.  

Furthermore, simply storing the removed warheads underscores the value that the United States and Russia place on nuclear weapons and may encourage other countries to acquire nuclear arms and to build nuclear arsenals. Codifying the dismantlement of even a minimal number of warheads could help to demonstrate U.S. and Russian compliance with Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (which requires all states to negotiate in good faith a treaty toward nuclear disarmament).

With the exception of its December 31, 2012 expiration date, the treaty does not specify any period during or after its 10-year term in which the number of each country's strategic offensive deployed warheads cannot exceed the 2,200 limit. This allows each country the right to redeploy any and all removed warheads the day after the treaty expires. Requiring at least some of the warheads to be dismantled could help to prevent such a situation.

Russia's weapons storage facilities are often poorly protected and already in great disrepair. Increasing the number of stored warheads in these facilities will only increase the chances of warhead theft by terrorists. The United States, on the other hand, already has large quantities of nuclear weapons in reserve that can be used to replace warheads deemed unsafe or unreliable. If the goal of SORT is truly to reduce the amount of excess warheads, those that are not considered necessary for stockpile replacement should be dismantled.

Further Reading:

	U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee"
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty"
	Arms Control Association, Background Information on New Strategic Nuclear Reductions Treaty
	Center for Defense Information, "Likely Nuclear Arsenals Under SORT"
	SIPRI, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2006"
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues"