Nuclear Testing and Strategic Arms Control

Arms Control. The 2001 NPR departs from the policies of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review in several ways.  First, it rejects the tenet that binding arms control agreements are an essential component of U.S. nuclear policy. For example, the 2001 NPR rejected the applicability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the new security environment. This security environment is defined in the 2001 NPR by increased cooperation and friendship with Russia, and these treaties are viewed as outdated.

The United States, in the 2001 NPR, states that it seeks to move away from arms control agreements that are based on ensuring the continuity of deterrence based on the "balance of terror" between Russia and the United States. The ABM Treaty in particular was viewed by the Bush administration as a relic of Cold War hostilities, and the United States formally withdrew from the treaty in 2002. The New Triad, introduced in the 2001 NPR, calls for the inclusion of a national ballistic missile defense architecture, which was banned in the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty was designed to limit the number and scope of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) in both the Soviet Union and the United States as a means to enforce the notion of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction (MAD). This relationship was considered stable. Policy-makers  believed that neither side would risk launching a first-strike out of fear of retaliation because neither side would possess the means to shoot down incoming missiles.

With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems (ballistic missiles) to "rogue" states and terrorists, however, the United States is no longer fearful of a first-strike from Russia, which is now considered to be an ally in the war on terror. In the absence of an impending nuclear threat from Russia, the Bush administration argued that the ABM Treaty was no longer relevant because it hampered the ability of the United States to protect itself against a ballistic missile attack from other state and non-state actors.

The Bush administration capitalized on its friendly relationship with Russia and formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The United States views this move not only as a step forward in establishing better relations with Russia, but also as a means of protection against other actors armed with ballistic missiles. (See "BMD and Russia: The Debate over the ABM Treaty.") 

Further Reading:

	Globalsecurity.org, 2001 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]
	White House, "ABM Treaty Fact Sheet"
	U.S. State Department, "The Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat"
	U.S. State Department, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
	Disarmament Diplomacy, (Clinton-era Nuclear Policy), "U.S. Deterrence Posture and Requirements: Congressional Testimony (1998)"
	Arms Control Today, Panel Discussion, "Parsing the Nuclear Posture Review"
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "The Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues"
	Arms Control Association, Strategic Arms Control and Policy
	CACN, "Briefing Book on the Bush-Putin Summit and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review"