The Hedge Force

The 1994 NPR established the practice of storing downloaded warheads (the term used to describe warheads removed from missiles) instead of destroying them. The idea was to create and maintain a responsive "hedge" force, whereby warheads could be brought out of storage and placed back on their respective delivery platforms in case of an emergency. Of the 6,000 nuclear warhead ceiling mandated by the still-in-force 1991 START I Treaty, the 2001 NPR states that approximately 3,000 of those warheads will be placed in the hedge force.

This rationale, explained in detail below, is one reason the United States sought unilateral cuts in its nuclear arsenal in parallel with Russia, and why the United States chose to limit itself to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads as codified in the 2002 SORT Treaty. START I limited Russia and the United States to a 6,000 total warhead ceiling. To arrive at the 1,700-2,200 limit imposed by the SORT Treaty, the United States is removing 1,300 warheads from operational service by 2007. In addition to these 1,300 warheads, the 2001 NPR states that approximately 3,000 warheads will either be transferred to the hedge force or retired by 2012; the year that the SORT Treaty expires. 

Arguments in Favor of Hedge Force. Proponents of the hedge force claim that by storing downloaded warheads, the United States is in a better position to decrease the total number of operationally deployed warheads. The ability to reconstitute a large nuclear force by maintaining a hedge force permitted the United States to declare in 2001 that it was going to pursue unilateral reductions in its operationally deployed force (warheads that are loaded onto missiles and are ready for launch). The 2002 SORT Treaty was the product of this declaration.

The hedge force, proponents claim is on par with the tenets outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and NPR. By retaining downloaded warheads, the United States increases its range of options, and thus increases its flexibility to redeploy these weapons if necessary for deterrence. Essentially, proponents claim that the hedge force serves two broad purposes besides facilitating unilateral reductions in the operational arsenal: it prevents a second Cold War between Russia and the United States, and it prevents the emergence of a third nuclear near-peer competitor.

While a near-peer competitor is not likely to emerge in the next 20 years, nuclear war planners do not discount the possibility that the political situation in Russia could change for the worse and reignite a second Cold War.  Russia possesses the world's second largest nuclear arsenal and remains the only state that has the capability to destroy the United States. Therefore, keeping a large number of warheads in reserve is viewed as prudent for the United States.

By keeping the option to reconstitute a large nuclear force, the United States, proponents argue, sends a clear signal to other states not to build up their nuclear forces with the hope of achieving nuclear parity. In this context, the hedge force acts as a deterrent and prevents other states from competing on a strategic level with the United States.

The final argument in favor of the hedge force is that it permits the United States to respond adequately and immediately to surprises in the operationally deployed arsenal. In essence, the reserve force provides "back-up" if one or more deployed weapon type were to fail.

Arguments Against the Hedge Force. Opponents of the hedge force claim that downloaded warheads are only one of several factors that have led to unilateral U.S. nuclear reductions. While any net decrease in the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads is viewed as positive by both sides of the hedge force debate, opponents argue that using the hedge force as a justification for reductions is misleading and perhaps even dangerous. By keeping a hedge force, it is argued, the United States sends a signal to would-be nuclear proliferators that nuclear weapons are essential components of guaranteeing security. Thus, it is argued that the hedge force promotes nuclear proliferation.

Also, opponents point out that technological advances in the guidance systems of missiles have made nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) more accurate. The more accurate a weapon system is, the higher the probability that it will strike its intended target and fewer numbers of missiles are required to ensure target destruction. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet Union meant that military forces, including nuclear weapons, were consolidated on Russian territory. That translates into fewer number of targets for U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as a smaller geographical area. The hedge force has no bearing on these facts.

Finally, opponents of the reserve force contend that unilateral nuclear reductions, and the SORT Treaty in particular, are harmful to the process of negotiating binding strategic arms control agreements. If both parties to arms control accords know that the other side is maintaining a hedge force, then no real reduction in the absolute quantity of nuclear forces is possible. Opponents argue that simply downloading warheads does not go far enough for each side to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which calls for a treaty on nuclear disarmament and a "good faith" effort to end the nuclear arms race as soon as possible.

Further Reading:

	Arms Control Today,  "Parsing the Nuclear Posture Review"
	Arms Control Today, Daryl Kimball, "New Strategic Experiment"
	Arms Control Today, Hans Kristensen,  "The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit"
	BASIC, Mark Bromley, "'Planning to Be Surprised': The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and its Implications for Arms Control"
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues"
	Nautilus Institute, Hans Kristensen, "The Matrix of Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Command Force Structure Studies"
	Arms Control Today, Jean du Preez, "Half Full or Half Empty? Realizing the Promise of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty"