Addressing the Threat |
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Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Updated July 2008
Traditionally, the United States has differentiated between "national" and "theater" missile defense to counter the threat from ICBMs and SRBMs, respectively, but the Bush administration has eliminated these terms from the U.S. vernacular. The proposed U.S. BMD architecture will employ systems capable of defeating both long- and short-range ballistic missiles. Background on the Threat. In July 1998, the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, also known as the "Rumsfeld Commission Report," emphasized that missile threats against the United States are growing and stressed that the threat could worsen suddenly and unexpectedly. The report gained added influence on August 31, 1998, when North Korea surprised the world with a test flight of its first three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), the Taepodong-1. Although the third stage failed, the Taepodong-1 is the first North Korean missile that might be able to reach U.S. territory (conceivably the western islands of the Aleutian chain in Alaska). In 1999, the National Intelligence Council produced a report titled "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015." According to that report, updated again in 2001, in addition to the long-standing nuclear missile threats from Russia and China, the United States by 2015 may also be threatened by:
As one element of its efforts to meet this challenge, the United States is developing missile defense systems aimed at destroying incoming missiles before they reach their targets. The United States believes that traditional deterrence is sufficient to meet the Russian and Chinese missile challenges; however, it is not clear how effective these approaches will be against small, isolated, and confrontational states whose leaders have engaged in terrorism or aggression against the United States and its allies and friends. |
Further Reading:
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Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.