Criticisms of BMD

Critics of missile defenses to protect the United States question whether missile defense technology will actually work. They believe that simple countermeasures, such as the use of radar-reflecting metal chaff (small bits of metal), balloon decoys, or dummy warheads, incorporated into missile warheads could defeat defenses aimed against long-range missiles during their midcourse or terminal phases (the times after the launch of a missile when it is flying through space or when the warhead has separated from the missile body and is reentering the atmosphere). The critics also argue that defenses will not work in the boost phase, while a missile is still burning its propellant to generate thrust, because defensive systems may not be able to get close enough or fire quickly enough to hit the target missile during its first few minutes of flight.

Critics also point to the high costs of missile defenses. Since the 1950s, the United States has spent approximately $148 billion on just the research and development of various missile defense systems. According to some estimates, a layered BMD system capable of protecting all 50 states with both ground- and space-based interceptors could cost between $100 billion and $1 trillion by the year 2030.

Critics of BMD argue further that missile defenses would not help defend against a rogue country WMD attack that did not use ballistic missiles. They argue that a rogue state could, for example, bring a nuclear weapon into a U.S. port on board a ship and then detonate it, or smuggle biological warfare (BW) agents into the United States and disperse them secretly. Such covert means of delivery would be preferable to using missiles because a ballistic missile has a "return address," that is, the United States could determine the country that had launched it and then retaliate. If the country secretly brought WMD into the United States and used them, however, it might be able to disguise its involvement and avoid retribution.

Moreover, critics of missile defenses argue that no BMD system, no matter how comprehensive, can guarantee total security against a ballistic missile attack. Since no defensive system could provide total protection, and even a single nuclear strike on a U.S. city would constitute "unacceptable damage," the United States would be deterred by nuclear rogue states even if it did possess a national missile defense system.

Potential Effects on the Global Strategic Balance. The development of defenses against longer-range missiles is highly controversial. The main reason is that if the Unites States develops defenses of this kind, it could upset the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, and between the United States and China. Today, each of these countries is confident that it could survive a U.S. nuclear first strike and still be able to retaliate against the United States with its own nuclear-armed missiles, and that the United States could do the same. The existence of this "second-strike capability" provides security to all three countries. It allows each to feel confident that it will not be attacked because it has the ability to retaliate and cause unacceptable damage to the attacker. If one country had missile defenses, however, it might be able to strike first and then block a retaliatory strike. This capability, even if it was never used, could allow the possessor to intimidate other major nuclear countries. Russia may also be concerned that a U.S. BMD system may prompt China to expand its own strategic nuclear force, making China more of a threat to Russia.

Further Reading:

	Nautilus Insitute, Lt. General Robert Gard & John Isaacs, "The Illusion of Operational Readiness of National Missile Defense"
	Technology Review, Theodore Postol, "Why Missile Defense Won't Work"
	Arms Control Association, "U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance"
	Union of Concerned Scientists, "Missile Defense"
	Union of Concerned Scientists, "Technical Realities: An Analysis of the 2004 Deployment of a U.S. National Missile Defense System"
	Arms Control Association, Missile Defense Resources
	Arms Control Today, Philip Coyle, "Is Missile Defense on Target?"
	Government Accountability Office, "Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but Program is Short of Metting Goals" (March 2008)
	NTI, Nathan Voegelli, "A Look at Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System"