CTBT - U.S. Action

The United States was the first country to sign the CTBT, but on October 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted 51 to 48 not to ratify it. (Approval would have required a vote by two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 votes.) The Clinton administration supported the CTBT but failed to organize an effective campaign on behalf of the treaty in the Senate. Conservative Republican Senators opposed to the treaty, in particular Senator Kyl of Arizona, won over moderate, uncommitted Republican Senators. These efforts, and parliamentary maneuvers that brought CTBT ratification to a vote before the Clinton administration had time to build support for the treaty, led to its defeat.

Although animosity toward President Clinton and other domestic political considerations played a role in the Senate vote, substantive issues were more important to the outcome. Some treaty opponents argued that arms control treaties like the CTBT are not in the U.S. national security interest and should be avoided. Most opponents of the treaty, however, voiced three main concerns:

1. Stockpile Stewardship. Deterrence, it was argued, is still central to U.S. security policy, and without further nuclear testing, the United States could not maintain the necessary confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Treaty opponents considered the stockpile stewardship program, designed to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. weapons stockpile, to be uncertain and possibly ineffective.
2. Verification. CTBT critics argued that the treaty verification regime was not sufficient to detect low-yield tests (of less than one kiloton). As a consequence, advanced nuclear weapon states such as Russia and China would be able to conduct militarily significant tests without being detected, enabling them to verify the reliability of their weapons or even to develop new ones. Such cheating could give these countries a military advantage over the United States, which would honor its non-testing obligation.
3. Nonproliferation Impact. Critics argued that the CTBT would not impede further nuclear proliferation as treaty proponents claimed. The rudimentary fission weapons that would probably be attractive to new proliferators would not require testing. Also, more sophisticated states that were not already bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (India, Israel, and Pakistan) might be able to build more nuclear weapons without additional testing.

Arguments for Ratification

Supporters of the CTBT take issue with the arguments above as follows:

1. Stockpile Stewardship. Supporters of the CTBT contend that the stewardship program is sound and will permit the United States to maintain high confidence in the integrity of its nuclear weapons stockpile. In July 2002, a panel of experts reaffirmed the technical capabilities and proficiency of the stockpile stewardship program.  The effectiveness of the program, however, depends on sustained administration support and congressional funding. In any event, should a situation arise in which assurance could not be met through the stewardship program, a number of safeguards included by the Clinton administration would allow the United States to withdraw from the treaty and conduct whatever tests were necessary to ensure confidence in the safety and security of a specific type of nuclear weapon. These safeguards would also allow the United States to take other measures to ensure the reliability of its nuclear deterrent.
2. Verification. CTBT supporters contend that the extensive global verification system utilizing multiple sensor technologies and the International Data Center represent a valuable addition to U.S. national monitoring capabilities. The combination of these verification systems increases the likelihood that militarily significant testing will be detected. In addition, the treaty provides for short-notice on-site inspections to investigate ambiguous events. According to CTBT proponents, this combination of technological and institutional capabilities sharply limits the possibility that explosions of sufficient yield to threaten U.S. national security would go undetected.
3. Nonproliferation Impact. Proponents argue that although the CTBT cannot stop nuclear proliferation by itself, it is a key element of U.S. nonproliferation strategy. They assert that a ban on all nuclear tests would make it more difficult for existing nuclear weapon states to develop new nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear weapons and compact nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles. Likewise, aspiring nuclear weapon states could not conduct nuclear tests without a high risk of detection that would draw the attention of the international community. The CTBT thus raises the political costs of testing, both for the five nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the NPT and for the three non-NPT states that have nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the CTBT is the one specific step toward nuclear disarmament explicitly mentioned in the preamble to the NPT and would be a step toward the nuclear weapon states' NPT Article VI obligation to disarm. This point is especially important for non-nuclear weapons states that contend that the NPT is discriminatory because it allows only a few state to have nuclear weapons. Completing and implementing a universal CTBT is thus highly relevant to nonproliferation.

Further Reading:

	National Institute for Public Policy, Kathleen C. Bailey, "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Update on the Debate"
	NTI, Lawrence Scheinman, "The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty"
	Arms Control Association, Daryl Kimball, "Prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty"
	CRS, Jonathan Medalia, "Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty"
	Arms Control Association, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
	The Acronym Institute, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty