A Primer on WMD
Curbing WMD Proliferation
 

Issues Raised by Resolution 1540

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Updated July 2008

The adoption of Resolution 1540 raises several issues and poses ongoing challenges for the international community. The first and foremost question involves the Security Council's authority. The Council, in unanimously adopting the resolution has imposed obligations on states that neither negotiated nor ratified the process and now have no choice but to comply. There is also the question of whether a UN resolution should address an issue that has traditionally been covered by the three main treaties of the nonproliferation regime. However, these treaties do not directly regulate non-state actor behavior and the requirements outlined in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) leave substantial gaps, especially given the less than universal adherence to these WMD-related treaties. There are signs that the resolution will complement rather than conflict with the existing treaties. For example, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, provided a briefing to the 1540 Committee in which he emphasized that improvements in measures to implement the CWC are occurring in parallel with the complementary requirements laid down in Resolution 1540, which are binding on all UN member states, including states that are not members of the OPCW.

Another issue that has been raised is whether the Security Council will back up the resolution with enforcement measures to hold states accountable for their compliance, and whether states fully appreciate the implications of the obligations that have been placed upon them. Furthermore, states must meet the resolution's legally binding requirement to institute "appropriate" and "effective" measures to deny non-state actors WMD. However, the resolution does not define what is "appropriate" or "effective," leaving this task to the Committee to interpret these standards. Another issue that has come to light is that many states, for example Burkina Faso, Peru, the Republic of Namibia, Oman and others contend that the resolution does not apply to them because they lack the weapons or materials targeted by the resolution. Additionally, others maintain that they do not have the capacity or the resources to execute the mandate of the resolution. The burden of responsibility then falls on the richer nations of the OECD and the Australia Group to develop and implement the necessary legal structures and enforcement measures. This brings to light concerns about lack of enforcement and what becomes of non-compliant states when "non-compliance" has not been clearly defined. A final issue is the effective implementation of Resolution 1540 and the responsibility of international organizations and states with the capacity to satisfy the terms of the resolution to help those 150 nations without the adequate legal infrastructure to successfully do the same.

While Resolution 1540 shows the resolve of some states to stop the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors, its provisions will require much cooperation by states in order to be effective.

 

Further Reading:

"Letter dated 25 April 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) Addressed to the President of the Security Council"

The Nonproliferation Review, Peter Crail, "Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540"

Carnegie Endowment, Monika Heupel, " Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy"

Disarmament Diplomacy, Merav Datan, "Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD and Non-State Trafficking"
Cassady Craft, "Challenges of UNSCR 1540: Questions about International Export Controls"
Arms Control Today, "Keeping WMD From Terrorists: An Interview with 1540 Committee Chairman Ambassador Peter Burian"


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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