Key Challenges and the Road Ahead

Implementation. Despite the successes that the CWC witnessed in its first decade, several substantial problems remain to be solved. First and foremost are the difficulties in eliminating declared CW stockpiles and CW production facilities in a timely fashion. Of the six states with declared CW stockpiles, only Albania eliminated its stockpile by the original 2007 deadline. The original CWC deadline of 2007 for disposal has proven optimistic, as technical difficulties and high costs, as well as public concerns over environmental and health consequences, have significantly slowed the destruction process. Most notably, the United States and Russia are far behind schedule and likely will not meet their 2012 extended deadlines. As a result, two-thirds of the world's declared CW stockpiles and munitions have not yet been destroyed.

Even within member states with no declared CW stockpiles or production facilities, less than half have passed domestic laws codifying their CWC obligations or developed chemical agent control lists. According to Article VII of the CWC, all member states must take steps to align their domestic law and policy with those of the CWC. Although there has been increased compliance with Article VII following the creation of a two-year Action Plan by the First Review Conference in 2003, many states still fall short of their Article VII obligations.

A U.S. chemical weapons destruction plant.
Source: www.opcw.org

The OPCW tends to encourage states to meet their obligations rather than penalize those that do not. In fact, the OPCW is reluctant to even publicly name countries that are not meeting their obligations.  The OPCW could take steps to penalize noncompliant members such as limiting their voting rights in the OPCW or a denying employment for their nationals in the organization. However, the likelihood of penalties in the short-term is remote given the relatively large number of non-compliant states and the short history of the convention.

Verification. There has also been growing concern regarding the CWC verification apparatus. Although the CWC has verified and inventoried all declared chemical weapons and inspected many CW-related sites, it has paid relatively little attention to potential "dual-use" facilities-chemical production facilities that ostensibly produce commercial agents but could also be used to produce prohibited agents. The dangers posed by ostensibly commercial facilities will continue to grow as new technologies allow manufacturers to change rapidly the chemical agents they produce. The OPCW may need to redirect more of its inspection efforts from Schedule 1 declared chemical weapons facilities to dual-use and other chemical facilities. However, many OPCW members resist a change in inspection priorities, and the OPCW's current budget is strained by even its basic inspection program.

Additionally, the verification regime has attempted to provide equal treatment for members, and thus states have received roughly the same number of inspections regardless of the size of their chemical industry or declared CW stockpiles. As a result, a disproportionately low percentage of chemical sites in larger countries have been subject to inspection.

OPCW inspectors have focused overwhelmingly on declared CW-related facilities. Source: www.opcw.org

Though the CWC verification apparatus includes the possibility of challenge inspections, no challenge inspection has yet occurred. Some experts worry that without the deterrent of challenge inspections, states will no longer fear the verification regime and may choose to develop CW covertly.

Because challenge inspections in the current verification mechanism lack precedent and therefore credibility, there has been a push to reinvent the current verification procedure. One solution would be to loosen the criteria for challenge inspections, thus allowing the OPCW to realistically conduct such inspections at least on occasion. Another solution would be to create a new method of verification altogether, one which would more rigorous than routine inspections but less intrusive than challenge inspections. Either solution would enhance the current verification mechanism, thereby reassuring compliant member states and serving as a deterrent for cheating.

Non-member States. A final challenge for the CWC is the presence of states outside the treaty. Although there are only a handful of states not party to the CWC, several of these states (including Syria, North Korea, and Israel) are suspected of possessing chemical weapons. As long as states exist outside the treaty, it is unlikely the CWC will be able to achieve its goal of complete and verifiable CW disarmament.

Improved Integration with Other Treaties and Agreements. Several agreements exist that overlap with the mandate of the CWC. The Australia Group (AG), for example, coordinates CW-related export controls and encourages related intelligence sharing among its 32 member countries. The Proliferation Security Initiative strives to prevent the transfer of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical weapons. More broadly, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all states to take all possible measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD. In some cases, such as with the Australia Group, countries perceive a conflict between mandates. For example, some states complain that the AG restricts the free trade in chemicals and chemical process equipment to CWC members in good standing with the OPCW and the CWC. By improving the integration of these agreements, the inducements for treaty compliance as well as the punishments for non-compliance can be reinforced, and with them the mandate of the CWC as a whole.

The Second Review Conference. In April 2008, 114 member states met in the Hague for the Second Review Conference to evaluate past activities and set a new agenda. In all, 50 delegations made plenary statements, mainly on national implementation activities, and 20 national working papers analyzing technical issues and particular challenges were submitted. Despite some procedural difficulties, the member states agreed on a final document that covered topics such as developments in science and technology, progress toward universality, verification of CW destruction, and the OPCW's role in nonproliferation.

Further Reading:

	Nonproliferation Review, Sergey Batsanov "Approaching the 10th Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Plan for Future Progress"
	WMD Insights, Daniel Feakes, The Second CWC Review Conference: Success at a Price"
	OPCW, "Second Review Conference of the CWC"
	Arms Control Today, Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has It Enhanced U.S. Security"
	Arms Control Today, Oliver Meier, "CWC Review Conference Avoids Difficult Issues"
	"Report of the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Second Review Conference)" (April 2008)
	American Society of International Law, David P. Fidler, "The Chemical Weapons Convention After Ten Years: Successes and Future Challenges"
	German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Oliver Thränert and John Tucker, "Freeing the World of Chemical Weapons: The Chemical Weapons Convention at the Ten-Year Mark"