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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

 
 

Excerpted from the Inventory of International Organizations and Regimes 2001 published by the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project. A complete PDF copy of the 2000 edition of the Inventory is available in the Publications section of the NTI website.

Date of adoption: 3 March 1980.
Entered into force: 8 February 1987.
The Convention does not set any limits on its duration.
Number of Signatories: 45.
Number of Parties: 68 states and EURATOM.
Depositary: IAEA Director-General.

Provisions: Provisions of the Convention oblige parties to ensure that during international transport across their territory or on ships or aircraft under their jurisdiction, nuclear materials for peaceful purposes (plutonium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and irradiated fuel) are protected at the agreed levels, as categorized in Annexes I and II and specified in IAEA INFCIRC/225. Under certain conditions, the Convention shall also apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage, and transport.

Parties undertake not to export or import nuclear materials or to allow their transit through their territory unless they have received assurances that these materials will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention. Parties agree to share information on missing nuclear materials to facilitate recovery operations.

Robbery, embezzlement, or extortion in relation to nuclear materials, and acts without lawful authority involving nuclear materials, which cause or are likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property, are to be treated by states parties as punishable offenses. These offenses shall be deemed to be extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between states parties. States parties undertake to include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

Scope of application: The Convention establishes levels of physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport and also provides for measures against unlawful acts with respect to such material while in international transport as well as in domestic use, storage and transport.[1]

Reservations: Several States Parties, including Argentina, Belarus, China, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey declared that they were not bound by the provision of Article 17, paragraph 2, which provided for the submission of disputes to arbitration or their referral to the International Court of Justice in the case of inability to resolve the dispute on the basis of negotiations between the States Parties.

Review Conferences: Article 16 obligated the States Parties to convene in five years after the entry into force of the Convention to review its implementation and its adequacy to the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation.

2001. In February 2001 the Fourth Working Group meeting of the Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Convention was held. It adopted a Final Report, in which the working group recommended to strengthen the existing Convention by a well-defined amendment, which would cover, among others, domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material with the exclusion of nuclear material and nuclear facilities for military use, mandatory international oversight, periodic national reporting, peer reviews and mandatory use of INFCIRC/225. It also recommended drafting a resolution for the IAEA General Conference with the aim of strengthening the physical protection regime.

The June 2001 Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting adopted this Final Report. The meeting concluded that an amendment to strengthen the Convention should be drafted and then be reviewed by the States Parties with the view to determine if it should be submitted to an amendment conference. It also recommended to the Director-General of the IAEA to convene a group of legal and technical experts to draft such an amendment.

2000. On 22-24 February 2000, the First Working Group meeting to discuss whether to revise the Convention took place in Vienna. The meeting participants decided to establish five working sub-groups on different related matters, including illicit trafficking and physical protection assistance. The Second Working Group meeting, convened on 26-30 June 2000, discussed five working papers related to the competency of the five working sub-groups established at the First meeting.

In May 2000, the Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty, in its Final Document, noted the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material, the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection, and called on all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials. The Conference urged all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)[2] and in other relevant guidelines. It welcomed the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention.

On 20-24 November 2000, the Third Working Group meeting of the Informal Open-Ended Expert Meeting to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Convention was held in Vienna. The meeting was convened to discuss and review several papers presented by the IAEA and member states. The Working Group recommended that a draft resolution on wider adherence to the Convention should be presented to the IAEA General Conference in 2001. It also recommended that the IAEA create Standing Advisory Group on security.

1998-1999. In response to the request of some States party to the Convention to hold a meeting to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention, the Director General of the IAEA decided to convene an Informal Open- Ended Expert Meeting at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna from 15-19 November 1999. The Meeting considered proposal by UK, France Germany, Belgium and Sweden to look more broadly at the question. The Meeting concluded that the next meeting should be held in May 2001, and before that, a working group should be established to make recommendations to the Expert Meeting.

1997. In September 1997, members of the IAEA Board of Governors voiced support to move towards a possible review of the Convention. It was suggested that the Agency should consider the possibility of convening a meeting of interested states to address the issues involved in such a review. It was agreed that in case of a sufficient support for such a meeting, it would be convened in 1998.

1996. The participants of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in April 1996 recognized the importance of effective nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection and fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear material in their possession and the necessity for effective national systems for nuclear accounting, control, and physical protection. They urged all States that had not yet done so to ratify the Convention on the earliest possible date.

1992-1993. The first Review Conference, attended by 35 states parties, was held from September 29 to October 1, 1992, in Vienna. The Review Conference unanimously expressed its full support for the Convention and urged all States to take action to become party to the Convention. The conference reaffirmed that the Convention provides a sound basis for the physical protection of the transport of nuclear material, the recovery and return of any stolen material, and the application of sanctions against any person who may commit criminal acts involving nuclear material; and concluded that no changes were needed in the Convention. The Conference also called upon the IAEA to organize a meeting to examine the IAEA physical protection recommendations in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev. 2, and to consider the incorporation of further guidance on such issues as irradiated fuel, nuclear material contained in waste, and other matters. As a result of a Technical Committee meeting in June 1993, revised recommendations were issued in September 1993 (as INFCIRC/225/ Rev.3) that reflect the Committee's views in these respects.

[1] The Convention's physical protection measures are applied primarily for nuclear material in international transport. At the time of the negotiation of the Convention, states believed that physical protection in the domestic sphere should be subject to national standards.

[2] The series of the IAEA documents INFCIRC/225Rev.1, Rev.2, Rev.3, and Rev.4 represents the existing international consensus guidelines and recommendations intended to apply to the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transport, whether domestic or international and whether peaceful or military.

 



This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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