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Excerpted from the Inventory of International Organizations and Regimes 2001 published by the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project. A complete PDF copy of the 2000 edition of the Inventory is available in the Publications section of the NTI website.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)

Opened for signature: 13 January 1993
Entered into force: 29 April 1997
The Convention is of unlimited duration.
Signatories: 166 states.
Ratifications/Accessions: 143 states.
Depositary: UN Secretary-General

Obligations: not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; not to use chemical weapons; not to engage in military preparations for use of chemical weapons; not to assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention.

Each State Party is required to destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well any chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party not later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention. Each State Party also undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. The Convention defines a chemical weapon as the following, together or separately:

"a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in Subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph."

The Convention identifies and categorizes toxic chemicals and precursors according to their potential for chemical weapons application and extent of industrial applications. Schedule 1 lists chemicals with high potential weapons utility and little or no industrial utility. Schedule 2 singles out chemicals with some degree of commercial application and significant potential for use in weapons. Schedule 3 chemicals are generally produced in large quantities for industrial purposes and have some potential for chemical weapons application. Declarations and verification requirements are the most stringent for Schedule 1 and the least so for Schedule 3.

Verification: is conducted through a combination of reporting and routine on-site inspections of declared sites. To ensure the implementation of the Convention's provisions, including those on verification and compliance, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established upon the entry into force of the Convention (April 29, 1997). In addition to routine verification and recourse to a procedure for consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding, each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in any other State Party for the purpose of clarifying and resolving questions concerning possible non-compliance. The challenge inspection team is designated by the Director General of the OPCW and dispatched as quickly as possible.

Declarations: Reportedly, eleven countries have declared possession of existing or former CW-production facilities, these include, among others: China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States. Four countries have declared CW stocks: India, Republic of Korea, Russia and U.S.A. Eight countries have declared old CW on their territory, including: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and UK. Four countries have declared abandoned CW on their territory, including: China, Italy, and Panama.

Other main provisions: the Convention provides for the rendering to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons and assistance in the event of a chemical attack. States Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. States Parties are obliged to provide data on the import and export of scheduled chemicals, as well as data on facilities and chemical production. Restrictions on transfers of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals to states not party to the Convention entered effect at entry into force and on April 29, 2000, respectively. Those on Schedule 3 transfers will be considered five years from entry into force. Each State Party is required to enact national implementing legislation to, inter alia, prohibit individuals under its jurisdiction or control from engaging in activities prohibited by the Convention. Each State Party is obligated to designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the focal point for liaison with the OPCW and with other States Parties.

At the Helsinki Summit, March 21, 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed a "Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on Chemical Weapons". The statement noted that the two presidents discussed issues relating to the entry into force of the CWC. They stressed the commitment of the U.S. and Russia to full and effective accomplishment of the tasks and objectives of the Convention. The Presidents reaffirmed their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the U.S. be a party when the Convention entered into force in April 1997, and strongly urged prompt Senate action. President Yeltsin noted that the Convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification.

The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the CWC. They agreed to continue cooperation in chemical disarmament.

The United States undertook to seek appropriation of necessary funds to build a facility for the destruction of neuroparalytic toxins in Russia as previously agreed.

The U.S. Senate voted to ratify the CWC on 24 April 1997 by a vote of 74 in favor and 26 against.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): The OPCW came into being at the entry into force of the CWC. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has a staff of approximately 500, some 200 of which are inspectors. The total budget for 1998 was 141 million Dutch guilders ($70 million) with roughly 83 million guilders ($41.5 million) allocated for verification. Total annual budgets for 1999 and 2000 were approximately 138 and 133 million guilders ($72 and $62 million), 77 and 69 million guilders ($40.5 and $32 million) of which were allocated for verification. The total budget for 2001 was set at approximately 60 million Euros ($54 million), with 29.5 million Euros ($26 million) of that earmarked for verification.

Headquarters: The Hague

Principal organs:

Conference of the States Parties - The OPCW's principal organ, composed of representative of all Member States. Regular session of the Conference is to be held annually unless otherwise decided, and special sessions convened when necessary. The Conference can take decisions on any matters brought to its attention by the Executive Council or any of the States Parties. It elects members of the Executive Council and appoints the Director-General. The Conference is responsible for taking measures necessary to ensure compliance, and for redressing situations of non-compliance. It has the power to suspend the rights and privileges of States Parties in non-compliance upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, and may recommend collective measures if a State Party engages in activities prohibited by the Convention. In cases of particular gravity, the Conference is to inform the UNSC and the UNGA.

The first session of the Conference of States Parties was held in The Hague, May 6-23, 1997, with the participation of 80 States Parties, 3 contracting states, and 34 signatory states. Pieter Cornelis Feith (The Netherlands) was the Chairman. The second session was held from December 1-5, 1997. It was attended by 82 States Parties, 2 contracting states, 18 signatory states and 2 observers, and chaired by Ambassador Simbarashe S. Mumbengegwi (Zimbabwe). The third Conference was held from November 16-20, 1998 and attended by 96 States Parties, 16 signatory states and 2 observers. It was chaired by Ambassador Young-shik Song (Republic of Korea). The fourth session was held from June 28-July 2, 1999. It was chaired by Ambassador István Gyarmati of Hungary and attended by 102 States Parties, 14 signatory states, and 1 observer. The fifth session took place May 15-19, 2000 and was attended by 109 States Parties, 2 contracting states, 7 signatory states, and 1 observer.

Executive Council - consists of 41 rotating members, representing five regional groupings: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western European and Others Group. The members for 1999-2003 are as follows:

Africa: 1999-2001: Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Zimbabwe; 2000-2002: Algeria, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa; 2001-2003: Botswana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia

Asia: 1999-2001: Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia; 2000-2002: Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; 2001-2003: China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia.

Eastern Europe: 1999-2001: Romania, Ukraine; 2000-2002: Poland, Russian Federation, Slovenia; 2001-2003: Bulgaria, Croatia.

Latin America and the Caribbean: 1999-2001: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico; 2000-2002: Chile, Cuba, Peru, Panama; 2001-2003: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay.

Western Europe and Other States: 1999-2001: France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States; 2000-2002: Austria, Canada, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden; 2001-2003: France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States.

The Executive Council is the executive organ of the OPCW. Each member has one vote, and the Council decides on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority. The significance of chemical industry and as political and security interests are among the factors that determine the composition of the Executive Council. The Council can request States Parties to take measures to redress situations of non-compliance. If the State Party concerned fails to take the requested action, the Council may inform the other States Parties and make recommendations to the Conference. In cases of particular gravity and urgency, the Council is to bring the matter directly to the attention of the UNGA and UNSC. The Council can decide by three-quarter majority to block challenge inspections.

Technical Secretariat - carries out the practical work of the OPCW, particularly in the area of verification. It comprises the Director-General, who is its head and chief administrative officer; an inspectorate responsible for verification activities; and scientific, technical, administrative, and other support personnel.

Scientific Advisory Board: composed of independent experts and established by the Director General in order to enable him to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention to the Conference, Executive Council, or States Parties.

Confidentiality Commission

Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters

Financing: All States Parties are assessed contributions to the OPCW budget, based on the UN scale of assessment.

OPCW Update:

In December 2000, OPCW held its 22nd Session of Executive Council during which it discussed plans of destroying chemical weapons in various countries and carrying out inspections along with the procedure for the payment by OPCW members of their annual contributions to the budget of this organization and a number of important organizational questions.

On 15 December 2000, the OPCW concluded its first three-month Associate Program, which was designed to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry, particularly amongst those whose economies are either developing or in transition. This first program included participants from 12 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The OPCW Associate Program is an important part of the OPCW's international cooperation efforts.

In October 2000, OPCW signed the relationship agreement with the UN. Both organizations undertook, inter alia, to explore possibilities for cooperation in the provision of assistance if chemical weapons are used in the future. The agreement addresses the fostering of international cooperation in relation to the peaceful use of chemistry, and will thus contribute to economic and technological development. The CWC is among the 25 multilateral treaties identified by the UNSG as core treaties for the new millennium. The signing of this relationship agreement is accordingly expected to initiate a significant enhancement and intensification of the everyday relationship between the two organizations, in the pursuit of their shared goals of enhanced security and peace.

The Fifth Conference of the CWC States Parties held in Hague from 15-19 May 2000 reappointed the Director-General of the OPCW Mr. José Bustani for a second term of four years starting 13 May 2001. The OPCW reported considerable success in efforts to ban the production, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. More than 4,000 tons of chemical agents and over a million chemical bombs, shells and rockets had been destroyed. OPCW staff have made more than 700 inspections in 35 countries, including 460 visits to weapons storage and destruction sites and over 240 inspections of industrial chemical plants. The Conference also recommend extending the deadline for Russia to destroy 1% of its Chemical Weapons. The Conference also approved a number of requests from the Russia and the UK for the conversion of former chemical weapons production facilities to peaceful purposes. Delegates also welcomed two new members to the OPCW, Malaysia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which join the Organization on May 20th.

The OPCW stated on January 25, 2000, that the world's declared stockpiles of 70,000 tonnes of chemical weapons and more than 8 million munitions and bulk containers had been inspected by OPCW inspectors, and were subject to a stringent international verification regime. Three of the four countries that had declared possession of chemical weapons were now actively destroying them under the continuous scrutiny of OPCW monitoring teams. All of the 60 declared chemical weapons production facilities around the world had been inspected and sealed. Of these, 20 had been certified as destroyed, and 5 had been approved for conversion for peaceful purposes. To prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, a stringent industrial verification regime had been put in place, involving inspections of facilities that produce or consume "dual-use" chemicals that could be used for both peaceful purposes and to create chemical weapons. By May 11, 2000, more than 4,000 tons of chemical agents had been destroyed. Over a million chemical bombs, shells and rockets had been destroyed. OPCW staff had made more than 700 inspections in 35 countries, including 460 visits to weapons storage and destruction sites and over 240 inspections of industrial chemical plants since the entry into force of the Convention. The Organization's routine verification activities gave no indication that States Parties were not in full compliance with their fundamental obligations under the CWC, notwithstanding certain implementation-related inconsistencies and technicalities, which continued to occur. However, they were being addressed and corrected. To sum up, there was currently no evidence to suggest that the essence of the Treaty was not being upheld.

OPCW Senior Staff: Director-General José Bustani (Brazil); Deputy Director-General John Gee (Australia); Director, Verification Ron Manley (United Kingdom); Jean-Louis Roland (France); Director, Inspectorate Ichiro Akiyama (Japan); and Director, External Relations Huang Yu (China).
Address:
Johan de Wittlaan 32,
2517 JR, The Hague,
The Netherlands.
Tel: 31-70-416-33-00,
Fax: 31-70-306-35-35.
E-mail: webmaster@opcw.org
Website: http://www.opcw.org

 



This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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