Proliferation and Use of Biological Weapons (BW)

Updated November 2009

Technician Working on Vaccine in a Former Russian BW Facility
www.dtra.mil/newsservices/photo_library/oe/ctr/russia/R-1.cfm

Biological weapons (BW) are living microorganisms that cause fatal or incapacitating diseases. This category of weapons also includes toxins, which are defined as non-living poisonous chemicals derived from bacteria, plants, or animals. It is difficult to determine the number of countries with BW programs, as nations rarely acknowledge the possession of these types of weapons. Moreover, it is relatively easy to keep such programs secret due to the dual-use nature of biotechnology.

BW by Country

Japan had the largest BW program of all nations that took part in World War II. This country began its program in 1932 and terminated it after surrendering in 1945. Great Britain began an offensive BW program in the early 1940s. It began phasing out the program in the early 1950s, when it developed nuclear weapons. By 1960, the BW program was entirely terminated. In approximately 1943, the United States also began an offensive BW program. President Richard Nixon announced that the United States was unilaterally renouncing offensive BW in November 1969, and that ban was extended to toxins in February 1970. The United States has, however, continued to research defenses against BW. France had an active BW research and development program in the late 1930s. That program was halted before the Germans captured France in 1940, and it did not restart its offensive program after World War II. Germany had a small BW research effort in the 1930s and early 1940s, although it was mainly defensive in nature. Hitler actually forbade the German military from developing offensive BW.

During the George W. Bush administration, concerns arose that Cuba intended to develop an offensive BW program, but this theory was later discounted. Cuba ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1976, and no substantial evidence has surfaced indicating it intended to pursue BW.

The Soviet Union/Russia Had BW and Cheated on an International Arms Control Agreement. The Soviet Union started a BW program in 1928. Its program was of moderate size during World War II and through the 1960s.

The Soviet Union continued an extensive BW program after it signed the BWC in 1972. The accidental release of anthrax from a biological weapons production facility in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in 1979 triggered a serious epidemic in the local population. The Soviet BW program had its greatest growth about 1988, during the years Gorbachev was in power. Despite his dedication toward disarmament in other areas, BW efforts during the Gorbachev years flourished. In 1992, Yeltsin acknowledged that the Soviet Union had violated the BWC and gave orders to dismantle the program. However, it is not known whether that order was carried out completely because the Russian Ministry of Defense forbids foreigners from visiting three military biological research institutes that are known to have played important roles in the Soviet BW program. Additionally, during the time Yeltsin attempted to entirely shut down the program, several generals resisted and sabotaged his efforts. Through its Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States has undertaken efforts to prevent proliferation of BW agents and expertise from the former Soviet anti-plague institutes in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.

Iraq Had a Secret BW Program. After Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, UN inspectors discovered that Iraq had developed and stockpiled several types of BW. These included bombs and missiles armed with warheads containing pathogenic bacteria and powerful toxins. From 1991-1998, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspected and destroyed Iraq's BW development and production facilities, achieving its most important results after the defection of a high-level Iraqi official in 1995. In November 1998, however, Iraq expelled the UN inspectors. UN Inspectors returned in November 2002, but were withdrawn in March 2003 before a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. Released in September 2004, a comprehensive report of the findings of the Iraq Survey Group concludes that Iraq had no plans for a new BW program. The report states that there was no evidence that Iraq had conducted any BW work for military purposes since 1996 or that it had any interest in pursuing a BW program.

Other Programs. Allegations have been made that the following countries have BW-relevant programs: China, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Israel. It is uncertain whether North Korea is currently pursuing a BW program; however, a 2009 report indicates a high probability that the DPRK is pursuing a BW program. However, most other analysts concur that North Korea has no capabilities or interest in BW.

Before December 2003, numerous sources alleged that Libya, which had signed the BWC in 1982, was pursuing an offensive BW capability. Libya did conduct BW research and development, but because of its poor technological base was never able to weaponize BW. In December 2003, Libya renounced all of its weapons of mass destruction programs in exchange for the lifting of international economic sanctions. Subsequently, U.S. and British inspectors found no evidence of an advanced BW program in Libya. In 2004, the United States confirmed that Libya's WMD programs had been shutdown; it has helped to redirect Libya's WMD scientists to civilian projects through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. On May 15, 2006, the United States restored full diplomatic relations with Libya and lifted its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Defensive Research a Good Disguise

Some countries may be pursuing BW programs under the guise of defensive research and development activities. The BWC allows work conducted for defensive purposes; however, some defensive activities can be transformed quickly into offensive programs to develop and produce BW. It is also possible that terrorists could seek to acquire BW. Terrorist groups might do this on their own, or through assistance from nations that have BW programs.

For these reasons, the United States and other countries pursue substantial biodefense programs involving both military and civilian research facilities to counter threats posed by foreign military BW programs and biological terrorism. Allegations have been made that the United States is pursuing offensive BW research under the guise of biodefense, but the U.S. government has denied these allegations and claims that its BW research complies with all BWC provisions.

Biological Weapons Rarely Used

During the 20th century, there was only one major case of widespread use of BW. This was carried out by Japan after it invaded China in the late 1930s. The Japanese additionally carried out biological attacks against Chinese civilian populations during World War II. The biological attacks caused thousands of deaths and illnesses. Japanese military scientists also carried out tests of biological agents on Chinese, Russian, and, perhaps, English and American prisoners. On a smaller scale, in 1979, Bulgarian secret service agents attempted to assassinate two opponents of the Bulgarian government using a toxin called ricin. One target was killed and the other was hospitalized but survived. (The toxin was probably supplied by the Soviet Union.) In the 1980s, agents from white-ruled South Africa are believed to have used BW to assassinate political opponents. It is also alleged that South African operatives started an epidemic of anthrax in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), during the Rhodesian civil war in the 1970s. Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission exposed many details of South Africa's past BW program.

Further Reading:

	NTI, NGO Documents: Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism
	CNS, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present
	NTI, CNS, Inventory, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
	CNS, "Report: The Soviet Anti-Plague System, 1992 and Onwards"
	The Nonproliferation Review, "Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek"
	PBS Frontline, Plague War, Interviews with Key Scientists and Government Officials on the Soviet's BW Program
	Strategic Studies Institute, Milton Leitenberg, "Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat"
	Special Advisor to the DCI, Comprehensive Report on Iraq's WMD (Sept. 2004)
	The Nonproliferation Review, Chandre Gould & Peter Folb,  "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview"
	NTI, Tamara Chapman & Raymond Zilinskas, "Lessons from Select Public Health Events Having Relevance to Bioterrorism Preparedness"
	Multimedia:
	NTI, Biological Warfare Terrorism Tutorial
	PBS Video, "The Living Weapon: The Story of the International Race to Develop Biological Weapons"