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In 1987, the United States and six other advanced Western democracies (the
"Group of Seven" or "G-7") established the
Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR attempts to slow the spread of
missiles able to carry WMD. It is not a formal treaty nor binding agreement.
Members of the regime agree to adopt the same
export
control rules. These rules limit the transfer of missiles able to carry
500 kilograms (1,100 pounds) a distance of 300 kilometers (190 miles) or more.
The regime also restricts exports of technology and equipment for the production
of such missiles. The regime covers both ballistic
missiles and cruise
missiles. Today, the MTCR has 34 members, as well as a number of countries
(notably
China)
that agree to follow its guidelines, even though they are not formally members
of the regime.
Although the MTCR has had important successes, it has not halted missile proliferation.
Missile capabilities are growing for a number of reasons.
North
Korea, which is not a member of the MTCR, has exported missiles and missile
technology to
Iran,
Pakistan,
Syria,
and
Libya.
In addition,
China made a number of significant missile and missile technology exports during the
1990s, especially to
Pakistan. However, in
September 2003, China formally expressed an interest in becoming a member of the MTCR,
and the second round of a series of negotiations to join concluded positively in June 2004.
The United States believes that
Russia
continues to provide assistance to Iran's missile program. Russia is a member
of the MTCR but denies making the exports. Finally, as scientific and technical
knowledge spreads around the globe and countries have gained their own experience
in developing missiles, the need for outside help tends to become less important.
India,
a country with a robust missile program, is a specific example of this general
trend.
Limits of the MTCR. One shortcoming of the MTCR
is that its export control policies are meant only as a means of restricting the
supply of missile technology, not as a step towards the abolition of the
missiles in national military forces. In fact, several MTCR members themselves possess
large arsenals of sophisticated missiles. For this reason, critics of the MTCR
contend that the group is discriminatory, separating the missile "haves" from
the "have-nots." Indeed, the MTCR does not place any controls on countries seeking to acquire missile capabilities,
unless they are new states seeking to become members of the MTCR. These
countries must accept restrictions on their missile programs and missile-related
exports. Finally,
because the MTCR
offers no financial incentives for accepting its guidelines, membership may be financially
detrimental to countries that have invested in expensive missile
development programs only to find themselves limited in their ability to export missile-related
equipment and technology.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
Missile proliferation and the limited scope of the MTCR's aims, incentives, and
membership caused the creation of the
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in
2002 (now known as the "Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation.")
It is open for signature by all countries, whether MTCR members or not.
One hundred and twenty-five countries have
signed the Code by October 2006. The Code
recognizes the threat presented by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and
tries to reduce the demand for missiles worldwide. It encourages
signatories to provide greater openness and restraint in their missile programs. Specifically, the Code calls upon signatories to exercise maximum restraint in
the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles; to make annual
declarations regarding ballistic missile programs; and to provide pre-launch
notification before ballistic missile or space vehicle launches.
However, the code is only politically—but not legally—binding. Several
observers have
noted weaknesses in the Code's current provisions and continued lack of real
incentives to join. The weaknesses are a result of several factors. First, the provisions had to be agreeable to the MTCR members. Many of the
original MTCR members (a group that includes France, Russia, the United States,
and the United Kingdom) would not
sign a document that called for the reduction or elimination of their missile
stockpiles. Second, the Code only requires states to exercise restraint
regarding ballistic missile programs, and not space launch vehicles. It does not
account for the interchangeable nature of most of the technology for ballistic
missiles and peaceful space launch vehicles. Finally, several key states, such
as North Korea, India, Pakistan, and China, have refused to sign the Code. Nonetheless, the Code has been hailed by some as a useful tool in the global
nonproliferation regime, serving as an expression of the international norm
against ballistic missile proliferation. (However, unlike the MTCR, which limits
transfers of technology for both ballistic and cruise missiles, the Code
does not cover cruise missiles or related technology.)
Missile Defenses: A New Priority. The Bush administration is actively
pursuing research on ballistic
missile defense. It hopes to deploy missiles able to shoot down in-coming
enemy missiles launched by one of the hostile, emerging WMD states, i.e., Iran or North Korea. Although critics continue to question whether
ballistic missile defenses
will be effective against
intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), a broad consensus has emerged in the United States
supporting at least the limited deployment of ballistic missile defenses. The Bush
administration announced plans to put a limited missile defense
system in place by the end of September 2004, with interceptors deployed at bases in
Alaska and California. In August 2005, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency
announced a new series of tests for the U.S. ballistic missile defense
systems. But in March 2006, the
Government
Accounting Office reported that the Missile Defense Agency had made only
modest progress and systems intended to intercept missiles from North Korea and
the Middle East failed to meet quality and performance standards. In September
2006, the U.S. Congress restricted funding for the space-based interceptor
program and called for a comprehensive assessment of the foreign policy and
national security implications of the program. Still, the Congress authorized
2007 funding for other missile defense programs.
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Further Reading:
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Missile
Technology Control Regime website |
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Arms Control Association,
Ballistic
Missile Proliferation |
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The Nonproliferation Review, Wyn Q. Bowen,
"U.S.
Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997)" |
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Disarmament Diplomacy, Thomas
Graham & Dinshaw Mistry,
"Two Treaties to Contain Missile Proliferation" |
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Arms Control Association,
U.S. Missile Sanctions |
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U.S. Department of
State,
Missile Defense and Deterrence |
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Arms Control Today, Aaron Karp,
"Going Ballistic? Reversing Missile Proliferation" |
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Disarmament Diplomacy, Viacheslav Abrosimov,
"Preventing
Missile Proliferation: Incentives and Security Guarantees" |
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CNS,
Missile Technology Control Regime |
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CNS,
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation |
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Arms Control Today, Mark Smith,
"On Thin Ice: the First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct" |
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CRS, Steven A. Hildreth,
"Missile Defense: The Current Debate" |
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NTI,
WMD411,
Ballistic Missile Defense
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U.S. Missile Defense Agency website |
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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Nicole Evans,
"Missile Defense: Winning Minds, Not Hearts" |

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