Limiting Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles

In 1987, the United States and six other advanced Western democracies (the "Group of Seven" or "G-7") established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR attempts to slow the spread of missiles able to carry weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is not a formal treaty nor a binding agreement. Members of the regime agree to adopt the same export control rules. These rules limit the transfer of missiles able to carry 500 kilograms (1,100 pounds) a distance of 300 kilometers (190 miles) or more. The regime also restricts exports of technology and equipment for the production of such missiles. The regime covers both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Today, the MTCR has 34 members, as well as a number of countries (notably China) that agree to follow its guidelines, even though they are not formally members of the regime. In April 2009, Kazakhstan announced its intentions of joining the MTCR, although as of early 2010 the country remains outside the regime.

Although the MTCR has had important successes, it has not halted missile proliferation. Missile capabilities are growing for a number of reasons. North Korea, which is not a member of the MTCR, has exported missiles and missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, Syria, and Libya. In addition, China made a number of significant missile and missile technology exports during the 1990s, especially to Pakistan. However, in September 2003, China formally expressed an interest in becoming a member of the MTCR, and the second round of a series of negotiations to join concluded positively in June 2004. However, at least one Chinese firm was accused of exporting banned items to Iran between 2006 and 2008. In September 2009, U.S. President Obama decided to authorize the Commerce Department to oversee missile sales to China (as opposed to the White House), which will likely result in looser controls. The move is perhaps targeted towards increasing collaboration between the two countries' space programs. Although it adheres to the original guidelines of the MTCR, as of May 2010 China has not yet become a member of the regime.

The United States believes that Russia continues to provide assistance to Iran's missile program. Russia is a member of the MTCR but denies making the exports. In October 2009, it appears that Russia signaled its intent to continue arms exports to Iran, specifically S-300PMU surface-to-air missiles. While not ballistic missiles, the potential transfer raised alarm in Washington. However, the decision by the Obama administration to shelve the Bush administration's strategic missile defense plans in Eastern Europe and the continued cooperation between Russia and the United States on nuclear issues (including the signing of the New START Treaty) may encourage Russia to reconsider its future sensitive exports to Iran. The transfer of the S-300PMU missiles is still delayed as of May 2010 (despite reports in April that the deal would go forward), likely due to political considerations.

Finally, as scientific and technical knowledge spreads around the globe and countries have gained their own experience in developing missiles, the need for outside help tends to become less important. India, a country with a robust missile program, is a specific example of this general trend, although it has been pursuing a joint venture with Russia to produce and market the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. India conducted a successful test-launch of the BrahMos in March 2010.

Limits of the MTCR. One shortcoming of the MTCR is that its export control policies are meant only as a means of restricting the supply of missile technology, not as a step towards the abolition of missiles in national military forces. In fact, several MTCR members themselves possess large arsenals of sophisticated missiles. For this reason, critics of the MTCR contend that the group is discriminatory, separating the missile "haves" from the "have-nots." Indeed, the MTCR does not place any controls on countries seeking to acquire missile capabilities, unless they are new states seeking to become members of the MTCR. These countries must accept restrictions on their missile programs and missile-related exports. Finally, because the MTCR offers no financial incentives for accepting its guidelines, membership may be financially detrimental to countries that have invested in expensive missile development programs only to find themselves limited in their ability to export missile-related equipment and technology. 

International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Missile proliferation and the limited scope of the MTCR's aims, incentives, and membership led to the creation of the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in 2002 (now known as the "Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.") It is open for signature by all countries, whether MTCR members or not. As of May 2010, 130 countries have signed the Code. The Code recognizes the threat presented by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and strives to reduce the demand for missiles worldwide. It encourages signatories to provide greater openness and restraint in their missile programs. Specifically, the Code calls upon signatories to exercise maximum restraint in the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles; to make annual declarations regarding ballistic missile programs; and to provide pre-launch notification before ballistic missile or space vehicle launches.

However, the code is only politically—but not legally—binding. Several observers have noted weaknesses in the Code's current provisions and continued lack of real incentives to join.  The weaknesses are a result of several factors. First, the provisions had to be agreeable to MTCR members. Many of the original MTCR members (a group that includes France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) would not sign a document that called for the reduction or elimination of their missile stockpiles. Second, the Code only requires states to exercise restraint regarding ballistic missile programs, and not space launch vehicles. It does not account for the interchangeable nature of most of the technology for ballistic missiles and peaceful space launch vehicles. Third, several key states, such as North Korea, India, Pakistan, and China, have refused to sign the Code. Finally, unlike the MTCR, which limits transfers of technology for both ballistic and cruise missiles, the Code does not cover cruise missiles or related technology. Analysts particularly criticize this omission, as cruise missile proliferation has become an increasing threat. Nonetheless, the Code has been hailed by some as a useful tool in the global nonproliferation regime, serving as an expression of the international norm against ballistic missile proliferation. The UN passed a recent resolution noting the success of the Code and calling on states who have not yet done so to become signatories.
 

Further Reading:

	CNS, Missile Technology Control Regime
	Arms Control Association, "The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance"
	CNS, Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
	U.S. Department of State, Missile Technology Control Regime Fact Sheet
	Arms Control Association, Missile Proliferation
	The Nonproliferation Review, Wyn Q. Bowen, "U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR's First Decade (1987-1997)"
	Disarmament Diplomacy, Thomas Graham & Dinshaw Mistry, "Two Treaties to Contain Missile Proliferation"
	NTI, Dennis M. Gormley, "Making the Hague Code of Conduct Relevant"
	Institute for Strategic Assessment, Sergey Oznobishev, "Missile Proliferation and Missile Technologies"
	NTI, "China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Iran"
	Multimedia:
	Missile Defense Agency, Media Library
	CNS Panel Discussion, The Legal and Policy Implications of Ambiguous Rocket Launches: Learning from the North Korean Case (Video)
	CNS Lecture, Dennis Gormley, Cruise Missile Proliferation (Video)