Nuclear Terrorism |
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Produced by the Monterey
Institute's James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies
Updated June 2009 Introduction
Nuclear terrorism is one type of WMD terrorism and involves terrorist use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or materials. Strictly speaking, nuclear terrorism refers to the creation and detonation of a device in which a sustained fission reaction takes place. This restricts nuclear terrorism to bombs using highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (Pu). However, some people use the term "nuclear terrorism" to refer to any terrorist weapon using a radioactive substance. This includes the use of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). RDDs use conventional explosives to spread radioactive material over a wide area. Examples of materials that could be used in RDDs are cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60, all of which are commonly used and often weakly protected in civilian research laboratories and medical facilities. Attacks by terrorists on nuclear power plants or research reactors, intended to cause a nuclear accident that would release radiation, can also be considered nuclear terrorism. What is the Potential for Nuclear Terrorism?It is very doubtful that any terrorist group could produce a nuclear weapon on its own without assistance from a state nuclear program. Acquiring and enriching uranium, or creating plutonium in a nuclear reactor, is an extremely expensive and difficult process, requiring sophisticated equipment and techniques. Even if a terrorist group were able to acquire enough weapons-grade HEU or plutonium, it is still a technically demanding and expensive task to put together even a simple nuclear device. Producing a chemical or biological weapon would be far easier for terrorists to accomplish than creating a nuclear weapon. Terrorists could attempt to acquire a complete, working nuclear weapon from a state. In this case terrorists could potentially steal a nuclear device, receive one from a state sponsor, or bribe military or political officials to acquire a device. Concerns about this possibility increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, as doubts were raised about the security of Soviet nuclear weapons. One debate centered on whether the Soviets had safeguarded so-called "suitcase nukes." Even if a nuclear weapon were successfully stolen, terrorists would have to defeat built-in mechanisms that are designed to prevent the unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. The U.S. Department of Defense, through its Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), has been working with the Russian Ministry of Defense to increase the security of Russian nuclear weapons. A nuclear explosion, even though difficult to achieve, would be extremely attractive to terrorists if they wanted to cause mass casualties. This is because of the devastating effects of nuclear explosions (heat, blast effects and radiation contamination) and also the shock value this would have on the target population. While the probability of terrorists acquiring and using a nuclear fission weapon is quite low, there is a much greater likelihood of terrorists using an RDD. Highly radioactive substances are far more readily available than HEU or plutonium. These substances cannot be used to make a nuclear weapon, and the destruction caused by an RDD would be much less than that caused by a nuclear weapon. While much less technically challenging than building a nuclear weapon, building a so-called "dirty bomb" is not easy. Terrorists would have to work with highly radioactive materials while assembling the device. They would require the training and knowledge to design the device in such a way as to maximize its impact. If a conventional bomb were used to disperse the radioactive material, the primary cause of death would be the conventional explosive. It would be very difficult to create an RDD that would cause immediate mass casualties, since it is hard to maintain high concentrations of radioactive materials while dispersing them over a wide area. Illnesses and deaths due to the radioactive component of an RDD probably would not appear for a substantial period of time. An RDD could, however, be an effective terror weapon because fear of radiation might induce panic and overreaction within the population. For example, the nuclear terrorism alerts in late 2001 and the May 2002 arrest of Jose Padilla, an alleged Al-Qaeda affiliate believed to have studied how to make radiological weapons, increased public anxiety and prompted many people to purchase Geiger counters and potassium iodide pills in anticipation of a radiological attack. Decontaminating the affected area may also be a difficult and expensive process, depending on the type of explosive and radioactive material used, topography, and a number of other factors. An attack on a nuclear facility, with the aim of causing a massive release of radioactive material, is also a credible possibility for terrorists who cannot get their hands on sufficient amounts of radioactive material. Most nuclear facilities have security measures to counter a terrorist attack, such as well-trained guards and safety mechanisms to prevent or mitigate release of radioactivity. However, many critics argue that these are insufficient to prevent the entry into critical areas of a nuclear facility by highly trained, well-armed terrorists, sabotage by insiders, or the deliberate crashing of a hijacked airliner into a nuclear facility. There is also some debate as to how likely a large-scale release of radioactivity would be in such a case. The U.S. government is attempting to increase security at nuclear facilities in order to prevent this. In July 2006, Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to improve cooperation on measures to protect nuclear materials, prevent nuclear trafficking, deny safe haven to nuclear terrorists, mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack, and adopt strong national legislation to punish terrorists. This new effort supplements UN measures to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism, including UN Resolution 1540. In 2006, the head of MI5 in the United Kingdom warned of potential WMD threats by Al-Qaeda, indicating there could be as many as 30 active plots at the time. She also disclosed that these threats could be of a chemical or nuclear nature. This announcement heightened awareness in both the United Kingdom and the United States regarding nuclear threats from Al-Qaeda and potentially other terrorist groups. In December of 2008, the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism established by Congress released a report called World at Risk, which revealed that “unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” The report largely tied efforts in nuclear nonproliferation and safeguarding existing materials to the ability of the United States to combat potential nuclear terrorist incidents. In an April 2009 speech, President Barack Obama underscored the danger posed by terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. Obama suggested that Europe faces a greater risk of nuclear attack by terrorists than does the United States. Similarly, at the 2009 European Union-U.S. summit Obama announced the need for greater efforts toward disarmament, especially in light of the danger presented by terrorists' possibly getting access to nuclear weapons and materials. As a result of these announcements, greater attention is being drawn to both nuclear disarmament measures and the increased risk of nuclear terrorism both in the United States and abroad. |
Further Reading:
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This material is
produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
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Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.