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In trying to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
sanctions can be a middle ground between diplomacy and military force. Sanctions
can be imposed by a single country or a multinational group; they often involve
trade and financial restrictions. One
study
lists the four objectives of sanctions as (1) action, to show that
something is being done in response to unacceptable proliferation behavior; (2)
deterrence, to discourage the country, organization or individual being
sanctioned and others from repeating such behavior; (3) constraint, to
impose economic of technological barriers to a continuation of the
proliferation; and (4) coercion, to encourage better behavior in the
future. While sanctions can be an effective nonproliferation tool, they can also
impede diplomatic cooperation and cause political, humanitarian, and financial
harm to both the sanctioning and sanctioned country. For example, the United
States, as required by its federal laws, imposed sanctions on
India and
Pakistan in 1998 after those countries conducted nuclear weapons tests. The
U.S. sanctions banned loans, military assistance, investment, and technology
transfers. The U.S. government soon lifted these restrictions as they interfered
with the United States growing commercial trade with India and its strategic
partnership with Pakistan.
If WMD activity in a state
violates an international treaty, any state party to the treaty in question can
try to have the treaty enforced. For example, if a state
that is a party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
appears to be secretly producing chemical weapons (CW), another state party can
demand a challenge inspection. This inspection would be conducted by a multinational
team under the auspices of the
Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The inspection might
reveal that the state was indeed violating the treaty. If the violator did not
stop, it would cease to enjoy the benefits of the CWC, such as access to trade
in certain treaty-controlled chemicals. In addition, CWC member-states could agree to
refer the issue to the
UN Security Council, whose mission is to ensure international security. The
UN Security Council could vote to punish the treaty violator by halting trade or
ending economic assistance programs. Measures that impose penalties on countries
pursuing activities that other states oppose are known as economic and military sanctions.
According to some
analysts and a
U.S.
government report, the UN economic sanctions and weapons inspections
imposed on
Iraq beginning in August 1990 successfully prevented that country from
rebuilding its WMD programs. However, U.S. and UN sanctions on
North
Korea did not dissuade that country from testing ballistic missiles in
July or detonating a nuclear device in October 2006.
Cost of Sanctions.
States imposing sanctions on others may also suffer
unintended consequences. For example, if the United States cuts off trade with a country
to punish it for developing WMD or for helping others to do so, the sanctions
can also hurt the United States. The profits of many companies, for example,
come from selling products that are manufactured cheaply in China. If the United
States were to cut off trade with China to punish it for selling missiles to
Iran, U.S. businesses would also suffer. Moreover, economic sanctions aimed at
restricting a government's unacceptable WMD proliferation, may hurt the
sanctioned country's civilian population. According to some
analysts,
while UN sanctions successfully restrained Iraq from rebuilding its WMD
programs, they also imposed needless and widespread suffering on Iraqi
civilians. The restrictions on the export of dual-use goods to Iraq prevented
Iraqi citizens from receiving necessary medical and water treatment equipment,
and as a result child mortality rates increased dramatically.
Also, many times sanctions do not
work because the target country continues its WMD activities despite the
sanctions. Another problem is
that other countries may not follow the United States in imposing sanctions. This creates an opportunity for companies of other countries to
take advantage of the sanctions imposed by the United States and to make profits that might
otherwise have gone to U.S. firms. For these reasons, imposing sanctions requires careful review of many
issues.
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Further Reading:
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Arms Control Today, David Cortright and George Lopez,
"Bombs, Carrots, and Sticks: The Use of Incentives and Sanctions"
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CGP-SSRC, Scott Snyder,
"Economic Instruments to Achieve Security Objectives" |
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RAND, Richard Speier, Brian Chow, S.
Rae Starr,
Nonproliferation Sanctions |
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CRS, Dianne Rennack,
"Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions:
Selected Current Law" |
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Arms Control Today,
George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero,
"Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran's Nuclear Program"
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The Nonproliferation Review,
Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere,
"The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan" |
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The Nonproliferation Review,
Randy Rydell,
"Giving Nonproliferation Norms Teeth: Sanctions and the NPPA" |
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Special Advisor to the
DCI,
Comprehensive Report on Iraq's WMD (Sept. 2004) |
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Harper's, Joy Gordon,
"Cool
War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass Destruction" |
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CRS. Dianne Rennack,
"North Korea: Economic Sanctions" |
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