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Many of the tools described in "Curbing WMD Proliferation" were used in U.S. efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In the mid-1980s, the United States learned that North
Korea was building facilities to produce materials for nuclear weapons. However,
following diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union, North Korea became a party
to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1985. The treaty prohibits development of nuclear weapons. It also required
North Korea to place all of its nuclear activities under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, including inspections. North Korea did not
sign the IAEA safeguards agreement, however, until 1992. This enabled the United
States to demand that North Korea accept inspections of its nuclear facilities.
In 1992, IAEA inspections revealed that North Korea had almost certainly produced
plutonium secretly. The inspection findings did not match North Korea's declaration
of nuclear materials. The United States encouraged the IAEA to learn more about
North Korea's nuclear program through additional inspections. North Korea,
however, refused
to allow further inspections.
The United States brought the matter to the UN
Security Council. There the IAEA reported North Korea's actions and the
United States persuaded members of the Council that North Korea was violating
the NPT and that the United Nations should consider having all countries cut
off trade with North Korea. This approach is known as threatening to impose
economic sanctions.
North Korea responded by stating that it would consider UN imposition of economic
sanctions to be an act of war. This seemed to mean that it would attack South
Korea, which has a military alliance with the United States. The U.S. responded
by sending additional military forces into the area to support South Korea.
In June 1994, former President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea, as a special
representative of President Clinton. He proposed a diplomatic solution. If North
Korea agreed to freeze the dangerous parts of its nuclear program, the United
States, Japan, and South Korea would give North Korea two nuclear power plants
that were less likely to be used for weapons proliferation. This agreement would
help its desperately poor economy, which has been suffering from a severe energy
shortage. This was an incentive
for North Korea to halt its WMD activity. North Korea agreed to this deal, and
a few months later, North Korea and the United States signed a joint understanding
closing the bargain. The understanding is known as the
"October
1994 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea." Today, the North Korean nuclear weapons
program appears to be frozen and work continues on building the two new nuclear
power plants.
In October 2002, however, North Korea verified a U.S. accusation that it had
been
secretly pursuing a uranium enrichment program, rather than the
plutonium-based nuclear weapons program addressed in the Agreed Framework.
This covert program breached the spirit, and possibly the specific terms of its
obligations under the 1994 agreement, and may also have violated the country's
obligations under the NPT. However, North Korea argued that violations of
the Agreed Framework had
occurred first on the U.S. side, and that the escalation of threats by the
United States to North Korea's national security entitled North Korea to seek
possession of nuclear weapons.
The situation deteriorated further in
December 2002 when North Korea announced it would
reactivate its Yongbyon facility, a site capable of supporting a
plutonium-based nuclear program. Days later, Pyongyang insisted that the
IAEA
remove all monitoring equipment and seals from all nuclear facilities in
North Korea. Subsequently, the DPRK disrupted most of the IAEA safeguards
equipment at the Yongbyon facilities,
expelled IAEA inspectors from the country, and announced its
withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). In the wake of this decision, the
United States and the leaders of four other nations, South Korea, China, Japan
and Russia, persuaded North Korea to sit at the negotiating table in late
August 2003; this ongoing
series of negotiations is known as the Six-Party Talks. In February 2005, the DPRK Foreign
Ministry declared that North
Korea possessed nuclear weapons and the country would increase its
nuclear arsenal to counter the hostile U.S. policy toward it. Nonetheless, the
Six-Party Talks resumed after a year's recess in late July 2005.
On September 15, 2005, the six
parties reached a
tentative agreement, according to which the DPRK commits to
abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to
returning to the NPT and allowing IAEA inspections. The DPRK also states that it
has a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In return, the United States
agrees not to attack the DPRK, and all parties agree to undertake economic and
energy cooperation. In the September statement, the parties agree to hold
another round of talks in November to work out the details and timetable for
implementing the agreement.
This case illustrates how the United States and other countries combined many tools to
try to reduce the
threat of WMD. The tools included intelligence, enforcement of the NPT,
IAEA inspections, the threat of UN economic sanctions, military pressure, and
the offer of a reward, or incentive, to slow the spread of nuclear weapons. However, none of these tools has been
decisive and multi-party talks continue to try to completely halt the DPRK's
nuclear weapons program.
 Map of North Korea
North Korea Country Profile
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