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Updated February 2007
Weapons experts performing verification.
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Export
controls are laws, regulations, or treaties designed to halt
or restrict the transfer of WMD, and the materials and technology
used to make them, between countries. They are vital for nonproliferation
because most countries require some level of foreign assistance
to develop nuclear weapons or
missiles.
Countries seeking to develop chemical or biological
weapons may also use imported technology. Both
multilateral treaties
and national export control systems play an important
role in controlling the spread of WMD. Complementary international
activities, such as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI),
seek to work within the limits of national and international laws to
strengthen existing export control measures and
nonproliferation treaties.
Foreign Government Assistance to WMD Programs
Almost without exception, nations that have developed nuclear
weapons have relied on expertise or equipment imported from
countries that are more advanced in these areas. The same is true
for countries developing missiles. For several countries, such as
Iran,
Iraq, and
Libya, foreign assistance was also important for the development
of chemical and biological weapons. Such assistance can be obtained
through deliberate sharing between countries or through smuggling.
Sometimes, the more advanced country provides the assistance
deliberately to the less advanced country, in order to help a friend
or military ally. For example, Great Britain and the United States
cooperated on the development of nuclear weapons during World War
II. Today, the United States supports Great Britain's nuclear
missile forces. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union assisted China in the
early stages of its nuclear weapons program. In the 1950s and 1960s,
France assisted Israel in the construction of its
Dimona nuclear reactor. Both
China
and
North Korea
helped
Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and missiles during the
1980s and 1990s.
With respect to missiles,
India,
Iran,
Iraq,
Israel,
Pakistan, and
North Korea, among others, have all benefited from foreign
assistance.
In July 2005, President Bush announced the creation of a global
partnership between the United States and India that would include
civil nuclear energy cooperation. This cooperation would violate the
export guidelines of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG)
and require the United States to create exception to its nuclear
export control laws. In December 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the
Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, lifting U.S.
export requirements provided India concludes a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA and the NSG lifts its embargo on nuclear trade to
India, a non-Non-Proliferation Treaty member with nuclear weapons.
Non-State Actor Assistance to WMD Programs
For almost 15 years, Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist,
A.Q. Khan, provided nuclear materials and know-how to several
nations. Sources indicate that Khan shared nuclear technology
with Iran, North Korea and Libya and made unsuccessful attempts to
deal with Iraq. The
Khan network is the only documented case
of a non-state actor contributing significantly to WMD
proliferation. Since the exposure of the Khan network in 2002, the
international community has paid more attention to export controls.
Moreover, Pakistan adopted new export control regulations for
nuclear and biological weapons and delivery systems with tougher
penalties for violations. However, in May 2006, Pakistan closed the
investigation into the Khan network without prosecuting any
individuals involved in the nuclear transfers or allowing Khan to be
questioned by the United States.
Concerns have also been raised about
China’s lax WMD export controls and the ability of the Chinese
government to effectively monitor the practices of private
companies.
In 2002, the United States imposed sanctions on three
Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with chemicals used to
make chemical and biological weapons.
A year later, similar sanctions were implemented against the
China North Industries Group (Norinco)
for supplying dual-use missile technology, again to Iran.
China has acknowledged that it must try to ensure that nuclear and
dual-use technologies supplied to other countries are not used for
weapons proliferation. China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in
May 2004, and it has adopted new legislation to improve its
nonproliferation export control system.
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Further Reading:
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni,
"Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and
Trends" |
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Arms Control Association,
Export Controls |
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni,
"Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status" |
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IAEA, Fritz Schmidt,
"Nuclear Export Control: Closing the Gap" |
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CNS,
International Export Control Observer |
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University of Georgia,
Center for Trade & Security,
Export Control Resources |
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NTI, Dennis Gormley &
Lawrence Scheinman,
"Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation" |
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni,
"Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status" |
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NTI, Shichin Lin,
"The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export
Controls" |
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NTI, Sean Lucas,
"China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group" |
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