Proliferation Security Initiative

Updated November 2006

Interdiction. One way to limit the use of WMD is to attempt to disrupt a state's WMD programs before the state can implement them. This can be done by using naval, ground, or sea forces to interdict, or stop and seize ships, planes, or trucks suspected of carrying WMD or related technology in or out of a target country. A country following a strategy of interdiction would stop any shipment traveling to a country of proliferation risk if it determined that a shipment was carrying WMD or related technology. Also, the interdicting country could stop any shipments believed to be containing WMD from a target country for sale abroad. An interdicting country could also stop shipments of internationally banned substances, such as narcotics or counterfeit money, which the target country could use to fund its WMD programs. For interdiction to be possible, accurate intelligence on shipments of WMD and related technologies is required.

The Proliferation Security Initiative. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a voluntary partnership of states working together to develop a broad range of  diplomatic, military, intelligence and other measures to stop shipments of WMD, missiles, and related technologies via air, land, and sea. First announced by U.S. President George W. Bush in May 2003, the PSI now consists of 15 core member states*, and more than 60 states have shown some support for it. The PSI is an informal grouping of states without an organizational framework, treaty, or permanent staff. The core states hold meetings, conduct joint interdiction training exercises, and have issued a Statement of Interdiction Principles. The activities of the PSI are limited by existing legal authorities for boarding ships, planes, and inspecting cargo.

Initially, critics charged that the voluntary PSI lacks a legal framework and might violate existing laws on international transportation. Subsequently, in April 2004, the United Nations provided some legal support for the PSI by adopting Resolution 1540, which obligates all member states to work to bar non-state actors from transferring WMD-related materials. Also, the International Maritime Organization added the 2005 Protocol to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, outlawing the transportation of WMD materials. Moreover, six countries, including Panama, Liberia, Cyprus, and Croatia have signed boarding agreements with the United States, which could make it easier for the United States to inspect naval vessels flying under these countries' flags that are suspected of transporting WMD or related items. These agreements are important as Panama and Liberia are the leading “flag of convenience” states (i.e., states that have simple and cheap registration for ships listed under their flags).

As of June 2006, PSI participants had held 23 joint interdiction exercises around the world. The United States claims that between April 2005-2006, the PSI led to approximately 24 interdictions, including operations that prevented the export to Iran of nuclear- and missile-related materials. It is unknown how many interdictions of WMD materials were made before the PSI. Some Bush administration officials claimed that the PSI resulted in the October 2003 seizure of centrifuge components intended to be used for enriching uranium bound for Libya, and that this interception forced Libya to disclose and agree to dismantle all of it WMD programs. (See Libya Nuclear Overview.) However, other U.S. and foreign government officials have publicly stated that the operation stemmed from effort to track the A.Q. Khan network, and not from the PSI.

In June 2006, PSI participants held a High Level Political Meeting in Warsaw, Poland, to assess the PSI's first three years. They agreed to strengthen their efforts to block the financial transactions of WMD proliferators, and to focus on destroying the black market networks, illegitimate businesses, and front companies engaged in WMD proliferation. The participants also acknowledged some of the PSI's shortcomings, specifically its lack of global coverage, unresolved jurisdictional questions related to boarding vessels in international waters, and the absence of an organizational structure and source of funding. The participants recognized that the PSI needs to expand the number of participating states, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. Following North Korea's test of a nuclear device in October 2006, the United States has urged South Korea to join the PSI and do more to stop North Korean shipments through its territory that may contain WMD-related materials. In response, South Korea state that while its supports the PSI, it will not confront North Korea.

*These core states are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Further Reading:

	CRS, Sharon Squassoni, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)"
	Strategic Studies Institute, Mark Shulman, "The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security"
	BASIC, Proliferation Security Initiative, Combating Illicit WMD Trafficking
	The Washington Quarterly, Andrew Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction"
	CNS, Inventory, "Proliferation Security Initiative"
	Jofi Joseph, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?"
	Center for International Trade and Security, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Promise and Performance"
	BASIC, "Sailing into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea"
	Nautilus Institute, Ron Huisken, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Coming in from the Cold"