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Export controls have become increasingly restrictive over the years. Unfortunately,
they are usually tightened only after a country seeking WMD has figured out a way
to defeat the existing controls. (For example, Pakistan overhauled its export
control laws after the country's chief nuclear scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan,
confessed to his illicit transfer of nuclear weapons-related technology to
Iran, Libya, North Korea and other countries.) As a result, a number of countries have WMD
today because they successfully bypassed earlier export control rules.
Some countries may lack the necessary legislation establishing and enforcing
export controls, and the means for verifying compliance with export control
requirements.
Countries with export control legislation may not interpret their export rules strictly
and thus do not enforce them effectively.
For
example, the United States believes that Russia is allowing Russian
organizations to transfer nuclear and missile technology to
Iran that may be
used to advance Iran's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities.
Russia rejects this view. In some cases, Moscow has denied that certain
exports identified by the United States have been made. In other cases, it
argues that particular exports are not ones that can be used for military
purposes.
In
essence, export controls work only as well as they are implemented and enforced
by national governments. International interdiction
measures, like the Proliferation Security Initiative, seek to further strengthen export controls by
preventing states and non-state actors from completing sensitive WMD-related
technology transfers in violation of existing export control laws. In
addition, the UN Security Council, in response to renewed concern about the spread of WMD, passed
Resolution 1540 (2004);
it calls on
states to refrain from supporting attempts by non-state actors to gain access
to WMD and their associated delivery platforms (i.e., missiles, etc.). UN
Resolution 1540 also calls on states to adopt and enforce domestic legislation
to tighten controls on WMD and related exports.
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Further Reading:
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University of Georgia, Center for International Trade and Security,
Export Control Database |
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Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
International Export Control
Observer |
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NTI, Sean Lucas,
"China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group" |
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RAND, Evan Mederios,
"Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for
WMD-Related Goods and Technologies" |
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NTI, Shi-chin Lin,
"The
AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls" |
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ISIS, Jacob Blackford,
"Multilateral Export Controls After the A.Q. Khan Network" |
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BASIC,
Proliferation Security Initiative, Combating Illicit WMD Trafficking |
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UN,
Security Council Resolution 1540 |
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