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Sometimes one WMD can be employed to deter the use of another. During the
1991 Gulf War, for example, the United States and Israel hinted that they
would use nuclear weapons against Iraq if that country employed chemical or
biological weapons (CBW) against U.S.-led forces or civilians in the region.
Iraq never used these weapons in that war, suggesting that deterrence worked.
In keeping with this view, in the
"National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," released in
December 2002, the Bush administration stated that the United States reserves
the right to retaliate with overwhelming force, including nuclear weapons,
against the use of CBW by other states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated
this position in the 2005 draft
"Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations," which includes the
option to use nuclear weapons to destroy identified enemy stockpiles of
chemical or biological weapons.
This echoed the Bush administration's
2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which identified chemical and biological weapons as
an element of the threat to the United States that nuclear arms must address.
This document implies that the future configuration of U.S. nuclear forces will be
influenced by the need to use these forces to deter large-scale chemical and
biological weapons attacks by hostile states.
At the same time, however, the Nuclear Posture Review also declared that
U.S. conventional military forces, which are now the most powerful in the
world, were a major component of the U.S. deterrent. This suggests that
the United States might choose to respond to the use of chemical or biological
weapons by means of an overwhelming attack with conventional weapons.
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Further Reading:
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni,
"Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and
Trends" |
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Arms Control Today,
"National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
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Arms Control Today,
Hans Kristensen,
"The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons" |
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U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
"Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" |
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International Security, Scott D. Sagan,
"The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not
Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks"
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