Existential Deterrence

In some cases, states have developed a strategy of posing a nuclear threat without demonstrating to the world that they possess nuclear weapons by, for example, conducting a nuclear test. What they have done is to acquire nuclear weapons material or the ability to enrich uranium, and then to let it be known that they possess such a capability. In other words, these states declare that they have mastered the most difficult part of building nuclear arms without actually demonstrating it. The nuclear weapons material could be converted rapidly into weapons, perhaps in a matter of weeks, if all other components are also easily obtainable.

Israel began a secret nuclear weapons program in the 1950s that yielded a bomb by 1967. Although Israel is now believed to possess between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons, it has never publicly acknowledged its nuclear status nor joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India appeared to adopt a similar strategyafter its supposedly peaceful nuclear test in 1974. It apparently did not build nuclear weapons, but China and others knew that it could. Pakistan adopted this strategy in the 1980s. Sometime during the mid-1980s, Pakistan produced highly enriched uranium. U.S. intelligence learned about this effort and word leaked out. Pakistan, however, apparently did not actually build nuclear weapons until 1989. Nonetheless, Pakistani President Zia declared in 1988 that a form of nuclear deterrence existed in South Asia. India knew that if war broke out between these two countries, Pakistan could build nuclear weapons rapidly. Both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapon tests in the spring of 1998; neither country has joined the NPT.

Iran might also be engaging in existential deterrence. While it claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian energy purposes, it has taken steps that lead many Western countries to believe it is building a nuclear weapons program. Although Iranian leaders have threatened Israel repeatedly, they have not made specific threats about a possible nuclear attack, or nuclear weapons capabilities.

Nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, North Korea
Source: newsline.llnl.gov

A key example of existential deterrence can be seen in the North Korean case. In the early 1990s, it acquired enough plutonium, outside of international monitoring, for a small nuclear weapons program.  By the mid-1990s, the United States feared that this material might have been used to make one or two nuclear weapons.  North Korea's threat in December 2002 to restart its Yongbyon nuclear plant, its removal of monitoring equipment and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals on nuclear materials, its expulsion of IAEA inspectors, and the announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT revived fears that Pyongyang would resume the pursuit of a plutonium-based weapons program. In September 2005, North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear weapons program in exchange for security guarantees, energy assistance, and financial incentives. However, the parties disagreed on the terms of this agreement, and on October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had tested a small nuclear device with a yield of less than one kiloton. North Korea claims that it developed a nuclear deterrent because it feels threatened by the United States.

Four months after testing a nuclear device, on February 13, 2007, North Korea consented to abide by its 2005 agreement and began closing its nuclear facilities and allowing international inspectors into the country in exchange for approximately $400 million in fuel, food and other aid from the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia. (Japan did not agree to the aid package as it still had outstanding bilateral issues with the DPRK.) In addition, the United States and Japan agreed to begin discussing normalizing relations with North Korea and lifting trade and financial sanctions. North Korea took substantial steps to disclose the extent of its nuclear program and to denuclearize in 2008; however, in April 2009, the government launched the Unha-2 rocket, causing widespread condemnation and leading to North Korea's withdrawal from ongoing Six-Party Talks. The country then conducted another nuclear test in May 2009, further damaging hopes for denuclearization. As of November 2009, U.S. President Obama and the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak indicated their willingness to offer a "grand bargain" (including both economic and political benefits) to North Korea in exchange for its agreement to denuclearize. In the meantime, North Korea is moving from existenial to actual nuclear deterrence.

Additional countries may have the capability to build a nuclear weapon, having already obtained most of the necessary technology and know-how. These countries include Japan, South Korea, and Brazil. While they might have the capability to build a nuclear weapon, these countries have denied that they plan to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

Further Reading:

	Arms Control Today, Chuck Freilich, "The United States, Israel, and Iran: Defusing an 'Existential Threat'"
	The Nonproliferation Review, Guarav Kampani, "From Existential to Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India's Decision to Test"
	CFR, Lionel Beehner, "Israel's Nuclear Program and Middle East Peace"
	Arms Control Today, Lawrence Freedman, "Does Deterrence Have a Future?"
	Strategic Studies Institute, Andrew Scobell & John Sandford, "North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles"
	NTI, "North Korea in Focus"
	Strategic Analysis, Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces: The Conceptual Components"
	NTI, Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, "Issue Brief: Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Developments"
	Multimedia:
	World News , "North Korea Makes Nuke Claims" (Video, 2009)
	Google Video, "Pakistan and India: Under the Nuclear Shadow"