| |
In some cases, states have developed a strategy of posing a nuclear threat without demonstrating to the world that they possess nuclear weapons, for example, by conducting a nuclear test. What they have done is to acquire nuclear weapons material and to let it be known that they possess it; in other words, that they have mastered the most difficult part of building nuclear arms. The nuclear weapons material could be converted rapidly into weapons, perhaps in a matter of weeks, if all other parts of the weapons were prepared in advance.
Israel began a secret nuclear weapons program in the 1950s that yielded a
bomb by 1967. Although Israel is now believed to possess between 100 and 200
nuclear weapons, it has never publicly acknowledged its nuclear status nor
joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
India appeared to adopt a strategy somewhat like this after its supposedly peaceful nuclear test in 1974. It apparently did not build nuclear weapons, but China and others knew that it could.
Pakistan adopted this strategy in the 1980s. Sometime during the mid-1980s, Pakistan produced highly enriched uranium. U.S. intelligence learned about this effort and word leaked out. Pakistan, however, apparently did not actually build nuclear weapons until 1989. Nonetheless, Pakistani President Zia declared in 1988 that a form of nuclear deterrence existed in South Asia. India knew that if war broke out between these two countries, Pakistan could build nuclear weapons rapidly.
Both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapon tests in the spring of 1998;
neither country has joined the NPT.
North Korea
has also engaged in a similar approach to developing a nuclear
weapons potential. In the early 1990s, it acquired enough plutonium,
outside of international monitoring, for a small nuclear weapons program. By
the mid-1990s, the United States feared that this material might have been used
to make one or two nuclear weapons.
North Korea's October 2002
confirmation of its covert uranium enrichment program has also led to the
speculation over whether it has achieved the capability to produce HEU, but
U.S. government analysts believe it has not reached this milestone. North
Korea's threat in December 2002 to
restart its Yongbyon nuclear plant, its removal of monitoring equipment and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals on nuclear materials, its
expulsion of IAEA inspectors, and the
announcement of its
withdrawal from the NPT revived fears that Pyongyang would resume the pursuit of
a plutonium-based weapons program. In September 2005, North Korea agreed to halt
its nuclear weapons program in exchange for security guarantees, energy
assistance, and financial incentives. However, the parties disagreed on the
terms of this agreement, and on October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it
had tested a small nuclear device with a yield of less than one kiloton. North
Korea claims that it developed a nuclear deterrent because it feels threatened
by the United States.
Four month after testing a nuclear device, on
February 13, 2007, North Korea
consented to abide by its 2005 agreement and to begin
closing it nuclear facilities and allowing international inspectors
into the country in exchange for approximately $400 million in fuel,
food and other aid from the United States, China, South Korea, and
Russia. (Japan did not agree to the aid package as it still had
outstanding bilateral issues with the DPRK.) In addition, the United
States and Japan agreed to begin discussing normalizing relations
with North Korea and lifting trade and financial sanctions. The
agreement gave North Korea 60 days to take the first steps toward
halting its nuclear program but it left to a later negotiation the
question of whether and how Pyongang will dispose of its nuclear
weapons and the fissile material used to produce them. The April 14
deadline passed without North Korea shutting down its reactor or
inviting in international inspectors.
|
 |
Further Reading:
 |
The Globalist, Joseph Cirincione, "Iran
and Israel's Nuclear Weapons" |
|
The Nonproliferation
Review, Guarav Kampani,
"From Existential to Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India's Decision to
Test" |
|
U.S. DOD, Edward Warner III,
"Nuclear Deterrence Force Still Essential" |
|
NIPP, Keith B. Payne,
"Deterrence: A New Paradigm" |
|
Arms Control Today, Lawrence Freedman,
"Does
Deterrence Have a Future?" |
|
CNS,
North Korea Special Collection |
|
NTI,
"North
Korea in Focus" |
|
