Existential Deterrence

In some cases, states have developed a strategy of posing a nuclear threat without demonstrating to the world that they possess nuclear weapons, for example, by conducting a nuclear test. What they have done is to acquire nuclear weapons material and to let it be known that they possess it; in other words, that they have mastered the most difficult part of building nuclear arms. The nuclear weapons material could be converted rapidly into weapons, perhaps in a matter of weeks, if all other parts of the weapons were prepared in advance.

Israel began a secret nuclear weapons program in the 1950s that yielded a bomb by 1967. Although Israel is now believed to possess between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons, it has never publicly acknowledged its nuclear status nor joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India appeared to adopt a strategy somewhat like this after its supposedly peaceful nuclear test in 1974. It apparently did not build nuclear weapons, but China and others knew that it could. Pakistan adopted this strategy in the 1980s. Sometime during the mid-1980s, Pakistan produced highly enriched uranium. U.S. intelligence learned about this effort and word leaked out. Pakistan, however, apparently did not actually build nuclear weapons until 1989. Nonetheless, Pakistani President Zia declared in 1988 that a form of nuclear deterrence existed in South Asia. India knew that if war broke out between these two countries, Pakistan could build nuclear weapons rapidly. Both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapon tests in the spring of 1998; neither country has joined the NPT.

North Korea has also engaged in a similar approach to developing a nuclear weapons potential.  In the early 1990s, it acquired enough plutonium, outside of international monitoring, for a small nuclear weapons program.  By the mid-1990s, the United States feared that this material might have been used to make one or two nuclear weapons.  North Korea's October 2002 confirmation of its covert uranium enrichment program has also led to the speculation over whether it has achieved the capability to produce HEU, but U.S. government analysts believe it has not reached this milestone. North Korea's threat in December 2002 to restart its Yongbyon nuclear plant, its removal of monitoring equipment and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals on nuclear materials, its expulsion of IAEA inspectors, and the announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT revived fears that Pyongyang would resume the pursuit of a plutonium-based weapons program. In September 2005, North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear weapons program in exchange for security guarantees, energy assistance, and financial incentives. However, the parties disagreed on the terms of this agreement, and on October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had tested a small nuclear device with a yield of less than one kiloton. North Korea claims that it developed a nuclear deterrent because it feels threatened by the United States.

Four month after testing a nuclear device, on February 13, 2007, North Korea consented to abide by its 2005 agreement and to begin closing it nuclear facilities and allowing international inspectors into the country in exchange for approximately $400 million in fuel, food and other aid from the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia. (Japan did not agree to the aid package as it still had outstanding bilateral issues with the DPRK.) In addition, the United States and Japan agreed to begin discussing normalizing relations with North Korea and lifting trade and financial sanctions. North Korea has taken substantial steps to disclose the extent of its nuclear program and to denuclearize, but the parties are still divided on the issues of verification and whether the agreed upon economic and energy assistance has been provided.

Further Reading:

	Arms Control Today, Chuck Freilich, "The United States, Israel, and Iran: Defusing an 'Existential Threat'"
	The Nonproliferation Review, Guarav Kampani, "From Existential to Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India's Decision to Test"
	CFR, Lionel Beehner, "Israel's Nuclear Program and Middle East Peace"
	NIPP, Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence: A New Paradigm"
	Arms Control Today, Lawrence Freedman, "Does Deterrence Have a Future?"
	Strategic Studies Institute, Andrew Scobell & John Sandford, "North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles"
	NTI, "North Korea in Focus"