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Active defenses
attempt to blunt a WMD attack as it is taking place. Missile
defenses are the most visible and most controversial example today.
Historically, the deployment of missile defenses has been limited because of
political and technological constraints. In the 1970s, the United States and
Russia each deployed missile defenses at a single location in each country.
These missiles were tipped with nuclear warheads. The ABM
Treaty limited the size and location of deployments. The United States closed
down its ABM system in 1976, however, because of serious concerns over its cost
and effectiveness. The system was fully operational for less than four months.
Since that time, research and development has continued on missile defenses.
All of these systems currently under development use non-nuclear mechanisms
to destroy incoming missiles. In the United States, President Ronald Reagan
launched a major program to develop defensive systems that would be based in
space, including high-energy lasers. The press nicknamed the program, "Star
Wars." This program was scaled down under Presidents Bush and Clinton,
who focused on land- and sea-based alternatives.
Currently, the United States, Russia, and Israel
have developed land-based systems that can provide a measure of defense against
short-range missiles. Short-range missiles have, in the past, also been referred to
as theater
missiles, because their range indicates they would be used within a regional
area or "theater" of war. (In contrast, intercontinental
missiles (ICBMs) have the range to reach from one continent to another,
for example, from Asia to North America.) Missile defenses against short-range
missiles would help protect
the forces of the United States and its allies in the field, including airfields and military
bases, in wartime. To some degree, they could also protect the cities of U.S.
allies in the Middle East and Asia. The United States is developing a number
of additional missile defense systems that can protect somewhat larger areas.
President George W. Bush has expanded work to develop a variety of missile
defenses. He is accelerating work on defenses against short-range missiles.
In addition, he is concentrating on defenses designed to protect the United
States from ICBMs, which North Korea and Iran may be developing. Bush wants
to integrate all the systems to create a
layered BMD defensive system.
For many years, the work on defenses against long-range missiles was highly controversial. The
main reason was the concern that if the United States developed defenses of this kind, it
could upset the nuclear balance with Russia and China. Today, both of these
countries know that they could strike the United States with nuclear-armed missiles,
just as the United States could strike them. This "balance of terror" was thought by many to provide security in the form of deterrence to all three
countries. According to this view,
this allowed each to feel confident that it would not be attacked because
it had the ability to retaliate and cause unacceptable damage to the attacker.
If the attacker had missile defenses, however, it was argued, the attacker might be able to strike first
and then block a retaliatory strike. Merely having this defensive capability,
it was argued, would allow the attacker to intimidate other nuclear countries.
For these reasons, Russia traditionally sought to retain the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limited
each side to defending one site with only 100 interceptor missiles. It also
prohibited the development of systems that could defend all of Russia or the
United States. Russia's worry was that even though U.S. missile defenses might begin
on a very small scale, they might grow over time. Such an eventuality would
require Russia to build more offensive missiles to overcome the U.S. defenses,
launching a nuclear arms race.
President George W. Bush, however, believed
that the ABM Treaty should be changed to allow the United States to develop
defenses that could protect all of the United States from a handful of missiles
launched from countries like North Korea or Iran. Some analysts perceive such
long-range missiles as a serious emerging threat
to the United States and its allies. Bush argued that the ABM Treaty was a "relic"
of the past and was no longer needed, because the United States and Russia are
no longer enemies.
China, for its part, has only a very small number of missiles that can reach
the United States today. For China, even a small U.S. missile defense system
could blunt its ability to retaliate effectively if it were ever attacked by
the United States. As a result, it would have to build up its offensive nuclear
forces quickly to overcome the new U.S. defenses, possibly triggering an arms
race in Asia. India considers China a potential enemy. If China enlarged its
nuclear arsenal, India might respond by enlarging its own nuclear forces. Pakistan
considers India to be an adversary. If India's nuclear forces were enlarged,
Pakistan would feel compelled to build up its own forces.
In December 2001, the Bush Administration announced its intention to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months (as permitted under
Article XV of the Treaty) in order to pursue the development of missile defenses
that would have been banned by the agreement.
Russia, whose nuclear arsenal would be sufficiently large to
overwhelm the modest missile defenses currently contemplated by the Bush
Administration, reacted cautiously to this announcement, but it appeared that
this step by the United States would not seriously injure U.S.-Russian relations
or the prospects for significant nuclear weapon reductions by the two countries.
China also appeared to accept the U.S. decision calmly. The subsequent
June 13, 2002 official U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty occurred with
little of the
international condemnation predicted by many analysts.
Arguments in Favor of Missile Defense
People favoring defenses that can protect the United States argue such defenses
are essential for U.S. national security. They believe that if there were a
conflict with Iran or North Korea, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation
might not deter the dictatorial leaders in those countries from attacking the
United States with missiles carrying WMD. If the United States feared such an
attack, this fear could deter U.S. leaders from using military force against
one of these countries to defend U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East
and/or East Asia. With missile defenses, however, the United States could protect
itself from such WMD missile attacks, giving it the freedom to defend its allies.
Those in favor of defenses also argue that if a country knew that it would confront
an effective U.S. missile shield, it might be discouraged from developing long-range
missiles in the first place.
Experts on this side of the debate also argue that the small size of U.S. missile
defenses would not affect Russia's much larger nuclear forces. They acknowledge
that U.S. missile defenses might be able to defeat China's much smaller current
nuclear force. They point out, however, that China is already in the process
of modernizing and enlarging its nuclear arsenal, which will enable Beijing
to overcome U.S. defenses and maintain a credible nuclear threat against the
United States.
Arguments Opposing Missile Defense
The critics of national missile defense question whether such a system would
actually work. Tests of components of the system have failed. Moreover, missile
defense systems can be defeated by simple technologies, such as decoys, and
are not foolproof. They also point out that such defenses are not needed because
deterrence has always worked in the past. It worked against
the Soviet Union when it was led by one of the world's most vicious leaders,
Josef Stalin. And, they argue, it worked against Saddam Hussein in the 1991
Gulf War. In that conflict it is possible that fear of U.S. nuclear retaliation
kept Saddam Hussein from using his biological and chemical weapons.
Critics further point out that missile defenses would not help defend against
a WMD attack that did not use missiles. An enemy could, for example, bring a
nuclear weapon into a U.S. port concealed in a ship, or smuggle biological warfare
agents into the United States and disperse them secretly. Opponents also argue
that Russia has said many times that deploying missile defenses could undermine
existing U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, under
which both sides have restricted the size of their offensive missile forces.
Finally, critics also fear that U.S. deployment of missile defenses could lead
China to expand its long-range nuclear-armed missile force beyond its current
plans, leading to a nuclear arms race in Asia.
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Further Reading:
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WMD 411, Policy Options: Ballistic Missile Defense |
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WMD 411 Bibliography, Missile
Defense |
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U.S. Department of State, Missile
Defense & ABM Treaty Archives |
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Federation of American Scientists, "National
Missile Defense" |
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American Foreign Policy Council, Missile
Defense Briefing Report |
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CDI, Colonel Daniel Smith, "A
Brief History of 'Missiles' and Ballistic Missile Defense" |
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The Heritage Foundation, ABM/Missile
Defense |
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National Institute for Public Policy, Keith B. Payne, "The
Case for a National Missile Defense" |
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National Institute for Public Policy, "Rationale
and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" |
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Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization |
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Theodore A. Postol, "The
Target is Russia: The Clinton Administration Has Put Us on the Path to a New
Arms Race" |
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CDI, Christopher Hellman, "The
Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense" |
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Senator Carl Levin, "Remarks
on National Missile Defense" |
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