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Unlike other U.S.-Russia treaties
negotiated since the end of the Cold War, SORT does not include a
concrete series of dates and milestones by which compliance with the
treaty can be measured. In fact, the only date specified in the
treaty is the expiration date—December 31, 2012—by which time both
countries are required to reduce the numbers of their operationally
deployed strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 1,700-2,200.
Also, unlike earlier treaties, SORT does not require Russia and the
United States to maintain the smaller arsenals once reductions are
complete. They are legally permitted to build up their arsenals
after the treaty's expiration date in 2012.
Proponents Say SORT Timetable
Is Sufficient. Since both
sides have independently decided to reduce their operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads, a detailed timetable is not
necessary to ensure that the reductions take place. Arguably, both sides entered into the treaty because it was in their
respective national interest; to violate the terms of the treaty by
failing to comply with its provisions does not make sense.
Since each side will be able to
monitor the progress that the other is making in removing warheads,
each country can adjust its own rate of warhead removal to ensure that the
operationally deployed strategic arsenals of the two countries are
reduced at roughly the same rates.
The lack of a detailed official
reduction schedule also allows for flexibility in adjusting to the
emergence of unexpected threats in the global security environment.
The simplified schedule also allows
each country flexibility in addressing the budgetary and logistical
considerations dictated by their own circumstances and interests.
For the United States, such considerations might include determining
where to store the removed warheads, or, in the case of
dismantlement, whether or not to enlarge the dismantlement
facilities and workforce. For Russia, the biggest consideration for
determining the rate of dismantlement may be economic cost. Russia
must balance between expenditures associated with the deployment of
its latest ICBM, the SS-27 Topol-M, and providing adequate funds to
keep the pace of dismantlement moving forward.
Opponents Say the Treaty Should Specify a Reduction Schedule.
Keeping nuclear weapons on
high-alert status creates crisis instability, especially in view of
Russia's already eroded early-warning system capabilities and
silo-based MIRVed missiles vulnerable to first-strike attacks. An
agreed upon timetable requiring early deactivation and removal of
warheads from their launchers would help to decrease the potential
for inadvertent or unauthorized use.
Creating benchmarks by which
warhead reduction progress can be marked would help to ensure that
the implementation is completed by the treaty's expiration date in
2012 by alerting the parties to unexpected delays on either side.
Otherwise, delays might be improperly perceived as attempts to
withdraw from the treaty, which could lead to unnecessary
tensions and misunderstandings.
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Further Reading:
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National Academy Press,
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy |
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CRS, Amy Woolf,
"Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" |
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U.S.
Department of State,
"Annual Report on the Implementation of the Moscow Treaty, 2005" |
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Arms Control Today, Wade Boese, "U.S.
Reports on Nuclear Treaty Implementation" |
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Disarmament Diplomacy, Morton H. Halperin,
"Defining 'Eliminating' Nuclear Weapons" |
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Arms Control Today, Robert Kerrey and William D. Hartung,
"Toward
a New Nuclear Posture: Challenges for the Bush Administration" |
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Arms Control Today,
Anatoli Diakov & Eugene Miasnikov,
"ReSTART: The Need for a New U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement" |
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BASIC,
"Fact Sheet: Comparison of
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaties" |
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