A Primer on WMD
Limiting Use of WMD
 

Option 3: Cut Off Assistance to Russian Organizations

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Proponents Say: Cut Off Assistance Only to Russian Organizations Profiting from Missile- and WMD-related Exports to Iran.

  • Cutting off assistance to targeted organizations is the current U.S. policy. It keeps the pressure on Russia and penalizes only those organizations that are profiting from sensitive transfers to Iran. In addition, the policy does not interfere with other important U.S. initiatives.
  • The United States should offer new incentives to persuade Russia to end sensitive exports to Iran. For example, the United States should support the development of an international spent nuclear fuel storage center in Russia, which could generate billions of dollars. U.S. approval is required because much of the fuel that would be stored in Russia was originally produced in the United States.
  • Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin are building a good partnership. The United States should use this personal relationship to persuade Russia to stop sensitive exports to Iran. Harsher sanctions will only damage U.S.-Russian relations and make cooperation on Iran impossible.

Opponents Say: Stronger Measures Are the Only Way to Convince Russia to Halt Sensitive Exports to Iran.

  • The current approach of stopping U.S. assistance to specific organizations has been tried for years and has done little to stop sensitive Russian exports to Iran.
  • Offering new incentives may make the United States look weak. In any event, Russian environmentalists will oppose U.S. support for a spent fuel storage center and thus development of the center will be impossible.

Further Reading:

John P. Barker and Joseph M. DeThomas, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

WMD 411, Policy Options: The United States and the Middle East

CRS, Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions"


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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