2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

Former President George W. Bush
Source: georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov

Many of the tenets of the 2001 NPR under the Bush administration reflected those of the previous review in 1994. Most importantly, the 2001 NPR underscored the importance of nuclear weapons in war fighting. It also reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Russian relationship and noted that Russia retained the ability to destroy the United States with its immense nuclear arsenal. In addition to Russia, the United States named six countries that could present a threat and therefore might warrant a nuclear strike: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and China. Finally, the 2001 NPR asserted the need for military flexibility through a "capabilities-based" defense system as opposed to a "threat-based" system.

The departures from the 1994 NPR indicated a significant shift in policy from the Clinton administration, and reflected a new stance on arms control. Additionally, the 2001 NPR set forth a new strategic nuclear triad that incorporated conventional weapons as well as a stronger role for missile defense. The 2001 NPR also advocated increasing the development and deployment of so-called bunker busters and low-yield nuclear weapons (or mini-nukes), which would serve the primary role of destroying underground nuclear facilities.

Arms Control. The 2001 NPR rejected the tenet that binding arms control agreements are an essential component of U.S. nuclear policy. For example, the 2001 review rejected the applicability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the new security environment. The 2001 NPR characterized the new security environment as one of increased cooperation and friendship with Russia, rendering such Cold War-era treaties as the ABM and CTBT unnecessary. The ABM Treaty in particular was viewed by the Bush administration as a relic of Cold War hostilities, and the United States formally withdrew from the treaty in 2002. The New Triad, introduced in the 2001 NPR, called for the inclusion of a national ballistic missile defense architecture, which was banned by the ABM Treaty.

The New Triad. The 2001 NPR transformed the traditional nuclear triad of missiles, bombers, and submarines into a New Triad. The first leg of the New Triad includes conventional precision-guided munitions (PGM) to expand the president's options in a crisis. PGMs take "dumb" conventional warheads and couple them with delivery platforms (missiles) equipped with a combination of advanced navigational features that significantly improves the accuracy of the weapon.  A highly capable and robust PGM force could prevent a situation where the United States' non-nuclear weapons options have been exhausted and the use of nuclear weapons is imminent. In theory, the president would be able to employ non-nuclear PGMs to strike the enemy's weapons and forces, a role previously reserved for nuclear weapons.

Both active and passive defense measures form the second leg of the nuclear triad. Active defense refers to systems like ballistic missile defense (BMD), and passive defense refers to civil defense measures. This portion of the triad described in the 2001 review reflected the view that traditional nuclear deterrence would no longer be sufficient to address the threat posed by state and non-state actors armed with WMD and ballistic missiles. The 2001 NPR envisioned BMD as a complement to U.S. deterrence as adversaries armed with ballistic missiles, possibly carrying WMD, would be dissuaded from launching an attack if they knew that there was a possibility their missiles would not reach their targets.

The third leg of the triad indicates U.S. intentions to develop a defense infrastructure better able to meet the needs of a more amorphous security environment and less reliant on "legacy" systems (such as main battle tanks, heavy bombers, and air-to-air combat fighters). As outlined in the NPR, this new leg of the triad would increase the flexibility of and investment in new technologies. It also seeks to streamline the procurement process for weapons as new technologies are introduced. The early deployment of a national BMD system without testing, however, demonstrated one of the tensions inherent in building a new defense infrastructure. It is possible that the rapid deployment of new systems might undermine pre-existing testing requirements.

Further Reading:

	Globalsecurity.org, 2001 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]
	U.S. State Department, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
	NTI, Charles D. Ferguson, "Nuclear Posture Review"
	CRS, Amy F. Woolf, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure"
	Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insights, "A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad"
	Arms Control Today, Hans Kristensen, "The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit"
	U.S. Department of Defense, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" (2005)
	Arms Control Today, Hans Kristensen, "The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge" (2005)