The New Triad

The 2001 NPR has transformed the traditional nuclear triad of missiles, bombers, and submarines into a New Triad.  The New Triad consists of three "legs," where nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines now constitute just one component of the first leg. Advanced conventional munitions form the second component. The following section describes in more depth each of the legs of the New Triad.

The First Leg: Non-Nuclear Weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review theoretically enables the United States to depend less on its nuclear forces by introducing an assortment of diverse conventional capabilities to augment U.S. deterrence. The 2001 NPR aims to reduces the role of nuclear weapons in conflicts; but it also increases the role of new conventional weapons. For example, the New Triad includes conventional precision-guided munitions (PGM) to expand the president's options in a crisis. PGMs take "dumb" conventional warheads and couple them with delivery platforms (missiles) equipped with a combination of advanced navigational features that significantly improves the accuracy of the weapon.  A highly capable and robust PGM force could prevent a situation where the United States' non-nuclear weapons options have been exhausted and the use of nuclear weapons is imminent. In theory, the president would  be able to employ non-nuclear PGMs to strike the enemy's weapons and forces, a role previously reserved for nuclear weapons.

The Second Leg: Active and Passive Defense Mechanisms. The 2001 NPR incorporates both active and passive defense measures. Active defense refers to systems like ballistic missile defense (BMD), and passive defense refers to civil defense measures. Essentially, the United States, in the post-September 11 security environment, believes that traditional nuclear deterrence is no longer sufficient to address the threat posed by state and non-state actors armed with WMD and ballistic missiles.

The fears of increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by various state and non-state actors are the primary drivers for deploying a national BMD system. This system is envisioned as a complement to U.S. deterrence because it is hoped that adversaries armed with ballistic missiles, possibly carrying WMD, would be dissuaded from launching an attack if they knew that there was a possibility their missiles would not reach their targets.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) governs active defenses. Once under the supervision of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency (BMDO), the MDA is now a full-fledged agency, signifying the importance of BMD as a national security measure.

The Third Leg: Responsive Defense Infrastructure. From the Cold War years, the United States inherited a large and cumbersome military complex designed to meet the threat posed by a peer competitor; the Soviet Union. The 2001 NPR recognizes the limitations of operating within the confines of a defense system inhibited by slow procurement mechanisms and an over-reliance on out-dated "legacy" systems (such as main battle tanks, heavy bombers, and air-to-air combat fighters). Thus, the United States has sought to develop a defense infrastructure better able to meet the needs of a more amorphous security environment.

This architecture, as outlined in the NPR, needs to incorporate flexibility and a robust investment in new technologies. It also seeks to streamline the procurement process for weapons as new technologies are introduced. The early deployment of a national BMD system without testing, however, reflects one of the tensions inherent in building a new defense infrastructure. It is possible that the rapid deployment of new systems may undermine pre-existing testing requirements. The premature use of the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is another example of how military commanders have exhibited a willingness to test new weapons-systems on the battlefield through trial-and-error instead of relying on conventional testing protocols. 

Further Reading:

	Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insights, "A Quiet Revolution: The New Nuclear Triad"
	BASIC, Mark Bromley,  "'Planning to Be Surprised': The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and its Implications for Arms Control"
	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Kurt Guthe, "The Nuclear Posture Review: How is the 'New Triad' New?"
	DOD, J.D. Crouch, "Challenges of a New Capabilities-Based Defense Strategy: 'Transforming U.S. Strategic Forces"
	Disarmament Diplomacy, Jack Mendelsohn, "The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review"
	CRS, Amy Woolf, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure"
	Arms Control Today, Hans Kristensen, "The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge"
	CDI, Nuclear Weapon Database: United States Arsenal
	U.S. Department of Defense, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" (2005)