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The 1994 NPR established the practice of storing downloaded warheads
(the term used to describe warheads removed from missiles) instead
of destroying them. The idea was to create and maintain a responsive
"hedge" force, whereby warheads could be brought out of storage and placed back on their respective delivery platforms in
case of an emergency. Of the 6,000 nuclear warhead ceiling mandated
by the still-in-force 1991 START I
Treaty, the 2001 NPR states that
approximately 3,000 of those warheads will be placed in the hedge force.
This rationale, explained in detail below, is one reason the United States sought unilateral cuts in its nuclear arsenal
in parallel with Russia, and why the United States chose to limit
itself to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads as codified in the
2002 SORT Treaty. START I limited Russia and
the United States to a 6,000 total warhead ceiling. To arrive at the
1,700-2,200 limit imposed by the SORT Treaty, the United States is
removing 1,300 warheads from operational service by 2007. In addition to these 1,300 warheads, the 2001 NPR
states that approximately 3,000 warheads will either be transferred
to the hedge force or retired by 2012; the year that the SORT Treaty
expires.
Arguments in Favor of Hedge Force. Proponents of the hedge
force claim that by storing downloaded warheads, the United States
is in a better position to decrease the total number of
operationally deployed warheads. The ability to reconstitute a large
nuclear force by maintaining a hedge force permitted the United
States to declare in 2001 that it was going to pursue unilateral
reductions in its operationally deployed force (warheads that are
loaded onto missiles and are ready for launch). The 2002 SORT Treaty
was the product of this declaration.
The hedge force, proponents claim is on par with the tenets
outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and NPR. By retaining downloaded warheads,
the United States increases its range of options, and thus
increases its flexibility to redeploy these weapons if necessary
for deterrence. Essentially, proponents claim that the hedge force
serves two broad purposes besides facilitating unilateral reductions
in the operational arsenal: it prevents a second Cold War between
Russia and the United States, and it prevents the emergence of a
third nuclear near-peer competitor.
While a near-peer competitor is not likely to
emerge in the next 20 years, nuclear war planners do not
discount the possibility that the political situation in Russia
could change for the worse and reignite a second Cold War. Russia possesses the world's second largest nuclear arsenal
and remains the only state that has the capability to destroy the
United States. Therefore, keeping a large number of warheads in
reserve is viewed as prudent for the United States.
By keeping the option to reconstitute a large nuclear force, the
United States, proponents argue, sends a clear signal to other
states not to build up their nuclear forces with the hope of
achieving nuclear parity. In this context, the hedge force acts as a
deterrent and prevents other states from competing on a strategic
level with the United States.
The final argument in favor of the hedge force is that it permits
the United States to respond adequately and immediately to surprises
in the operationally deployed arsenal. In essence, the reserve force
provides "back-up" if one or more deployed
weapon type were to fail.
Arguments Against the Hedge Force. Opponents of the hedge
force claim that downloaded warheads are only one of several factors
that have led to unilateral U.S. nuclear reductions. While any net
decrease in the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads is
viewed as positive by both sides of the hedge force debate, opponents
argue that using the hedge force as a justification for reductions
is misleading and perhaps even dangerous. By keeping a hedge force,
it is argued, the United States sends a signal to would-be nuclear
proliferators that nuclear weapons are essential components of
guaranteeing security. Thus, it is argued that the hedge force
promotes nuclear proliferation.
Also, opponents point out that technological advances in the guidance
systems of missiles have made nuclear intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) more accurate. The more accurate a weapon system
is, the higher the probability that it will strike its intended
target and fewer numbers of missiles are required to ensure target
destruction. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet Union meant that
military forces, including nuclear weapons, were consolidated on
Russian territory. That translates into fewer number of targets for
U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as a smaller geographical area. The
hedge force has no bearing on these facts.
Finally, opponents of the reserve force contend that unilateral
nuclear reductions, and the SORT Treaty in particular, are harmful to
the process of negotiating binding strategic arms control
agreements. If both parties to arms control accords know that the
other side is maintaining a hedge force, then no real reduction in
the absolute quantity of nuclear forces is possible. Opponents argue
that simply downloading warheads does not go far enough for each
side to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which calls
for a treaty on nuclear disarmament and a "good faith" effort to end
the nuclear arms race as soon as possible.
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Further Reading:
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Arms Control Today,
"Parsing the Nuclear Posture Review" |
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Arms Control Today, Daryl
Kimball,
"New Strategic Experiment" |
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Arms Control Today, Hans
Kristensen,
"The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit" |
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BASIC, Mark Bromley,
"'Planning to Be Surprised': The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and its
Implications for Arms Control" |
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CRS, Amy Woolf,
"U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues" |
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Nautilus Institute, Hans Kristensen,
"The Matrix of Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Command Force Structure
Studies" |
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Arms Control Today, Jean du
Preez,
"Half Full or Half Empty? Realizing the Promise of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty" |
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